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Abstract 
The research in this thesis focuses on investigating the possible influence of 
design of artefacts and systems on human error, and developing means by which 
the factors contributing to human error related to design can be better 
understood. The thesis suggests that integration of current theories related to 
human error and design issues can help designers to pick up design issues from 
human error cases. The motivation of the research was initiated by the non-
existence of a unique human error theory relating design issues and human error. 
These theories have never been systematically reviewed for their characteristics 
and relationships. The diversity of theories makes it difficult to identify design 
issues from human error cases. The premise that a collective model can be 
constructed with a paradigm is the basis of the research. The expression 
“design-induced error” in this thesis is used to refer to human error influenced 
by design. 
 
This thesis proposes a meta-theory of design-induced error to provide 
an integrated and collective view of related theories by comparing their key 
characteristics and adopting a paradigm. The thesis then develops an ontology 
of design-induced error based on the meta-theory. The developed ontology is a 
reasoning support tool in knowledge-based systems aiming to capture and to 
recognise design issues in human error cases. The models developed were 
examined through the analysis of accident reports. The Australian aviation 
accident report system (AAARS) is the main source for the experiment. 
 
The ontology developed of design-induced error describes concepts and 
relations that relate to capturing design issues from human error cases. The 
ontology examines terms in accident documents such as terms indicating human 
error and the role of design. The software for developing a knowledge model 
(e.g. PCPACK) enables us to break down documents into concepts and relations 
in order to pick up relevant terms effectively from documents. 
 
The models developed in this research provide analytical means for designers as 
well as accident analysts to identify relevant design issues from accident cases 
or documents. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to examine the influence of design on human error (how 
design affects the performance and cognition of human operators), and to find effective 
methods to share knowledge taken from human error theories that describe human–
system interaction failures (i.e. human error) in terms of the role of design (how to 
develop analytical tools that help to capture such issues). This thesis proposes a meta-
theory of design-induced error in order to provide an integrated and collective view of 
related theories. The thesis then develops an ontology of design-induced error based on 
the meta-theory. The developed ontology is a reasoning support tool in knowledge-
based systems in order to capture and to recognise design issues in human error cases. 
The models developed were examined through the analysis of accident reports. 
It is said that design is one of the most influential factors in our society. Human error 
still accounts for a large proportion of all incidents and accidents. The human being is a 
social creature affected by its environment. Design and humans have relations in using 
and operating a system. The questions are: How to investigate these relations? What are 
the adverse effects of design on human operators? These are research questions that are 
addressed in this thesis. 
There are two premises in the research. The first premise investigated in this thesis is 
that human error can be studied from a perspective that there are different rationalities 
on design between designers and operators and these differences may lead to human 
errors, a phenomenon called design-induced error in this thesis. The second premise is 
that an extended concept of design may be useful to find hidden influences of design on 
the incidence of human errors. 
This thesis addresses these issues with two approaches: a theoretical approach and a 
knowledge management approach. The first approach focuses on finding an underlying 
structure in current relevant theories. The latter adopts a technology of knowledge-
based systems to pick up relevant issues from accident reports. 
In Section 1.1 the significance of the role of design in human–system interaction is 
presented, and Section 1.2 discusses design and safety. Section 1.3 reviews briefly 
current human error research issues and then relevant research issues are discussed in 
Section 1.4. Section 1.5 addresses the research aims and objectives of this research. In 
Section 1.6 research methodology adopted in the research is presented and Section 1.7 
sets out the limitations of the research. Finally Section 1.8 outlines the remaining 
chapters. 
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1.1 Significance of the role of design in 
human- system interaction failures 
Engineering design has changed the world. It influences all parts of our lives including 
social systems (e.g. social cultures in our society) and technical systems (e.g. 
machinery in chemical plants). The areas and perspectives of engineering design 
research, as a result, should no longer remain limited in meaning to physical design, 
such as equipment design. It needs to address the contextual aspect between systems 
(design) and users (operators). 
With the evolutionary growth of modern technologies, the design of artefacts or 
systems needs to tackle issues related to more delicate and subtle human–system 
interaction than before. A number of failures have been reported from safety-critical 
areas (e.g. aviation, manufacturing, or medical service) in our life including fatal 
accidents (e.g. the Chernobyl nuclear accident). As a result, appropriate models to 
represent the role of design in human–system interaction failures have been inevitable, 
particularly for the implicit and indirect effects of design on human cognition and 
performance that have been more and more prevalent and important in current complex 
systems.  
We have to design equipment to take full advantage of the capabilities of our 
personnel and we have to design equipment that will not overload, confuse or 
degrade personnel performance in achieving mission objectives ... We have to 
reduce design-induced human error which is so costly a component of accidents 
and operational failures. We have to plan for the wise and judicious use of the 
limited personnel and skill levels available to us by optimizing manpower 
requirements, and through more effective use of automation and expert systems. 
We have to design with greater efficiency and productivity in order to reduce 
costs to our services and to our nations. 
 [Rear-Admiral R. Horne, USN, 1990] 
It is said that one of the foundations for change in our society comes from design. As a 
result of the development of modern design technologies, the world that we inhabit is 
increasingly a designed world, from highly sophisticated nuclear power plants to 
everyday life. Therefore, the role of design in safety of our life has been increased more 
and more. Human users in a system need to adapt to the system. However, there are 
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inherent discrepancies between humans and systems [Norman, 1998]. Designers have 
to understand the characteristics of systems as well as that of humans in the system. 
The importance of the role of design in human–system interaction failures was depicted 
in the following accident cases.  
On 4 September 2000, a AA aircraft, VH-SKC, departed Perth, Western Australia, at 
1009 UTC on a charter flight to Leonora [833 km NE of Perth] with one pilot and 
seven passengers on board. … However, shortly after the aircraft had climbed through 
its assigned altitude, the pilot‟s speech became significantly impaired and he appeared 
unable to respond to ATS instructions. … No human response of any kind was detected 
for the remainder of the flight. Five hours after taking off from Perth, the aircraft 
impacted the ground near Burketown, Queensland, and was destroyed. There were no 
survivors. … The investigation found that the pilot was correctly licensed, had received 
the required training, and that there was no evidence to suggest that he was other than 
medically fit for the flight. The weather presented no hazard to the operation of the 
aircraft on its planned route. The aircraft‟s flightpath was consistent with the aircraft 
being controlled by the autopilot with no human intervention after the aircraft passed 
position DEBRA. After the aircraft climbed above the assigned altitude of FL250, the 
speech and breathing patterns of the pilot displayed changes that were consistent with 
hypoxia, but a rapid or explosive aircraft cabin depressurisation was unlikely to have 
occurred. … The investigation concluded that while there are several possible reasons 
for the pilot and passengers being incapacitated, the incapacitation was probably a 
result of hypobaric hypoxia due to the aircraft being fully or partially unpressurised and 
their not receiving supplemental oxygen. However, the investigation concluded that an 
aural warning for high cabin altitude, and setting visual and aural alerts to operate when 
the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 10,000 ft, may have prevented the accident. [ATSB, 
ASIR 200003771
1
] 
 
However this was not the first case of this type of error. There was a precursor before 
the accident. Similar accidents had happened before the tragedy. 
 
                                                     
1
 ATSB refers to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and ASIR is acronym of 
Aviation Safety Investigation Report. ATSB investigates aviation accidents or incidents 
and publishes ASIR. The number is an occurrence number of an accident investigated 
by ATSB. 
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On 21 June 1999, the BB registered AA aircraft, a flight from Edinburgh, [South 
Australia], to Oakey, Qld, was conducted as a single-pilot operation. … After take-off, 
as the aircraft climbed through 10,400 ft, the pilot began the „climb checklist‟ actions. 
While performing these checks he received a tracking change instruction from Air 
Traffic Control (ATC). The passenger in the co-pilot seat noticed that this appeared to 
temporarily distract the pilot from the checklist as he attempted to reprogram the global 
positioning system (GPS). The pilot then completed the checklist. During this, the 
passenger in the co-pilot‟s seat saw the pilot reposition the engine bleed air switches 
from the top to the centre positions. As the aircraft reached the cruise level of FL250, 
the controller contacted the pilot, indicating that the aircraft was not maintaining the 
assigned track. The pilot acknowledged this transmission. A short time later the 
passenger in the co-pilot seat noticed that the pilot was again attempting to program the 
GPS, and was repeatedly performing the same task. The controller advised the pilot 
again that the aircraft was still off track, however the pilot did not reply to this 
transmission. Shortly after this, the pilot lost consciousness. The passenger in the co-
pilot seat took control of the aircraft and commenced an emergency descent. … 
Significant factors of the accident are pointed out in this case. Both bleed air switches 
were inadvertently selected to ENVIR OFF at about 10,000 ft in the climb. The cockpit 
warning system did not adequately alert the pilot to the cabin depressurisation. It is 
likely that the provision of an audible warning device as strongly recommended in 
CAO 108.26 would have alerted the pilot to the developing pressurisation problem. 
[ATSB, ASIR 199902928; and see Section 8.2.1, Case 1] 
The above accident cases show an example of the importance of the cooperation of 
human-system interaction in a system, and the significance of the role of design in 
human-system interaction. These cases also imply that we have to know why operators 
suffer from following the specifications of a system as designed; and how failure 
occurs in systems.  
During the period this research was conducted there was a tragic aviation accident in 
Greece, on 14 August 2005 [Aviation Safety Network, 2005]. A Boeing 737 of Helios 
flight 522 departed Larnaca in Cyprus on a scheduled flight of 1 hour and 23 minutes to 
Athens. After an intermediate stop there, it was to have continued on to Prague, Czech 
Republic. The flight having cleared for an en route altitude of FL 340, reportedly 
notified the Cypriot controllers that they had some problems with the air conditioning 
system. The 737 entered Greek air space about 10:30, but efforts by air traffic 
controllers to contact the pilots were futile. Around 11:00, two Greek F-16 fighter 
planes were scrambled from the Nea Anghialos air base. About half an hour later the F-
16‟s intercepted the airliner. The F-16 pilots reported that they were not able to observe 
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the captain, while the first officer seemed to be unconscious. The aircraft descended 
and crashed in mountainous terrain north of Athens resulting in 121 fatalities. The 
sequence of events in this accident case may be similar to that described in above cases 
of loss of cabin pressure.  
There are different ways of understanding how the human-system interaction failures 
occur; operator error only or design involvement. If a human-system interaction failure 
is recognised as one of the design issues, the error can be considered as an engineering 
failure, i.e. design specification relating to the failures may possibly be developed into 
preventive measures to contain such failures (a vertical process in Figure 1.1). However, 
if a human-system interaction failure is not accepted as a design issue but as operator 
error only, the human-system interaction failure may be developed into an 
organisational approach (i.e. training problems or procedure issue) (a horizontal 
process in Figure 1.1). The selection of methods of development depends on the way 
people understand the role of design in human-system interaction. The concept of 
design-induced error adopted the in this research is an active interpretation of human-–
system interaction failure in order for designers to design a credible system. 
 
human-system 
interaction 
failures
recognise 
design issue
recognise operator 
issue
organisational  
approach
 engineering 
approach
developing 
safety design 
specification 
(e.g. a safety 
device)
enforcing strict 
procedure (or 
training rules)
 
Figure 1.1  Different approaches of human–system interaction failures 
Human error is a failure committed by a human operator of a system. A systematic 
approach to the investigation of accidents emphasises the root causes of the accident, 
such as a managerial or regulatory body which was responsible for constructing more 
credible systems (Johnson, 2003; Levenson, 2004). The failures described above may 
be regarded as human errors and corrective actions will be made at a personal or 
organisational level e.g. improving training programmes for the operators. As a result, 
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these approaches may result in a failure to encourage design improvements, and the 
opportunity to improve systems may be missed.  
For example, a forklift is a piece of equipment that is commonly used in many places, 
such as factories, construction sites, warehouses and even in the services sector, for 
transporting heavy or bulky goods. Each year about ten thousand workers are injured 
and hundreds die due to forklift accidents in the USA alone (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
US Department of Labor). The major dangers of the equipment are rollover on an 
uneven road or curve, and impact with people who are behind the vehicle. To solve the 
problem, health and safety executives have introduced strict regulations since the 1970s. 
The regulation focuses on the procedures of operation and training of the people who 
use the equipment. Sets of safety rules restricting human behaviour demand human 
caution and perception of the dangers involved. The problems of overturning and 
unintentional backward impacts have not yet been overcome, however. Designers have 
not yet developed fundamental solutions (i.e. design improvement in the structure and 
safety measures) for the issue. Safety issues concerning use of the equipment, therefore, 
are still the same as 30 years ago because human cognition cannot be changed by 
regulations. 
Reason [1997] argued that one of the important root causes or latent conditions is the 
design of systems. However in most accident reports involving cases of human error, it 
is not easy to find design issues being addressed. Rather it is easy to emphasise training 
issues (or procedure issues) of the operator. In order to address the design issue in 
human–system interaction failures, therefore, the concept of design-induced error is 
introduced 
. The concept of design-induced error originated from a review of the literature on 
design and human error. The purpose of this research is to disseminate the concept in 
the form of a meta-theory and ontology of design-induced error. 
The first and most fundamental reason to deliver the concept of design-induced error is 
the fact that humans cannot be treated merely as mechanically logical creatures when 
designing the interaction between human operators and a system. If the designer wants 
to design a system avoiding design-induced error, she or he must understand human 
perception and behaviour in relation to the designed system.  
Human behaviour is associated with physiological and psychological interaction. 
Psychological elements consist of cognitive mode and emotional mode [Norman, 2004]. 
Emotional mode means the fundamental cognitive condition while the cognitive mode 
refers to logical activity. The emotional mode refers to the underlying reasoning of 
human performance and behaviour (e.g. selecting what to do), on the contrary, the 
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cognitive mode is rather logical and conscious. They are related with each other 
psychologically in the human mind and cannot be separated.  
Human decision-making processes are a main factor that rule human performance 
[Rasmussen, 1986]. They are affected by fundamental cognitive activity (i.e. emotional 
mode) as well as the logical cognition of humans (i.e. cognitive mode).  Designers, 
however, tend to depend on their logic on a system and ignore the relationship between 
logical cognition and emotional cognition of human operators when designing a system. 
 
1.2 Design and Safety 
Samuel and Weir [2000] described failures as an intrinsic aspect of engineering design.  
“Engineers are inherently concerned with failure and our vision of success is to develop 
modelling tools to avoid it. Moreover, by studying failures we develop clear ideas 
about causal relationships in complex real-life engineering situations, often too difficult 
to model completely realistically for structural analysis.” [p.5].  
Petroski [1985] also argued that the history of design is a history of accidents and errors 
of design and their recovery. Human error has been one of the major concerns of 
research into system design. Researchers have noted that human error was a causal 
factor in a large proportion of system failures and accidents [Reason, 1997]. For 
instance, research on Canadian aviation accidents between 1996 and 2003 showed that 
nearly 75% of the accidents were attributed to human error as a primary cause [Johnson 
and Holloway, 2004]. 
Design contributes to errors and accidents directly and indirectly. Some wrong designs 
can lead to electrical, mechanical or structural failure of an artefact or system. For 
example, the specification of a boiler may not describe an appropriate thickness of 
boiler wall to contain the expected operating pressures. In this case, it may be relatively 
easy to find the cause of the failures and to remedy the problem, simply through 
recalculation. However it is not as easy to detect and solve design problems that arise 
from the specification of designs that lead users to act in a manner that can lead to 
potentially catastrophic errors in the control of a system.  As said in this thesis, the term 
“design-induced error” will be used for representing design-related human error 
theories that describe design issues which negatively affect operators‟ use of the system 
and which promote errors in operators‟ performance. 
Communication between designers and users is essential in order to avoid the design-
induced errors that arise undetected from the design process. Through discourse with 
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users, designers can gain knowledge of how to reduce or prevent unnecessary errors 
that arise from the inappropriate design of artefacts and systems. Norman [1993] 
argued that designers should try to understand users‟ mental process if they wanted to 
design more user-friendly artefacts.  
However, there are two main problems that make it difficult to engage users in the 
design process. Firstly, limited finance, space and time can restrict the degree to which 
users can participate in the design process. Secondly, it is difficult to capture all the 
relevant problems that arise during typical operations even when there is an opportunity 
to interact with users. Users possess only limited experience which may not capture all 
relevant potential failure conditions of the artefact. To compensate for these limitations, 
researchers have adopted a number of methods for testing artefacts and systems, 
including usability testing [e.g. Stanton, 2002], and ex-post-facto examination of 
accidents. 
Usability tests have been widely used in the domain of computer software design, and 
can help to remedy potential problems with the software before it is released onto the 
market [Wichansky, 2000]. However, due to its time consuming process and its limited 
applications to static human-machine interface, current usability testing needs further 
development of theoretical models for understanding interaction and practical tools for 
engineers and designers [Koubek et al., 2003]. 
The design process combines philosophies, theories, technologies, methods, and 
knowledge [Horvath, 2001]. Thinking about safety is one of the important elements in 
the design process [Cully, 2004].  Human factors, which are a major concern for safety, 
appear throughout   many design areas such as;  
 Design Philosophy: What makes the product user-friendly? 
 Design Ethnography: Who will use the artefact? 
 Design Cognition: How can ambiguity in system displays be removed? 
 Design Ergonomics: What makes the system comfortable for the user to 
use? 
 Design Standard: What needs to be done to ensure the artefact or system 
complies with safety regulations?  
It is inevitable that humans will occasionally act erroneously. In response, designers 
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have tried to mitigate the causes of accidents and their consequences. Sanders and 
McCormick [1993] describe some well-known principles of safer design, which 
include:  
 Exclusion designs: designs that prevent the operator making a specific 
error. 
 Prevention designs: designs that make it difficult, but not impossible, for 
an operator to make a particular error. 
 Fail-safe designs: designs that mitigate against the consequences of an 
operator error without necessarily reducing the likelihood of this error. 
However, in the evolutionary development of technologies, such as the explosion in the 
use of computers to manage aspects of complex systems, designers now confront a 
problem that is distinct from traditional hazards that resulted from moving components, 
corrosion and structural failure – the problem of error in an operator‟s cognition about 
the system. These problems are difficult to catch and deal with because they stem from 
the minds of the operators and the designers. 
Therefore, preventing human error cannot be achieved by simply attempting to produce 
systems that prescribe rules that the operator should follow, but by design research and 
development that pays attention to both a psychological and a technical approach in 
every setting [e.g. Senders, 1993].  
It is critical to understand human performance using psychological tools and to create a 
useful artefact matching with human cognition and performance using technical tools 
in order to achieve safer design. The increasing use of automation, and computers in 
particular, which has led to the development of increasingly complex systems such as 
those used in nuclear power generation, chemical production, or the flight of an aircraft, 
has been a new challenge for designers because the increase in complexity has provided 
new ways for the operators to make errors. Experience has shown that these errors can 
give rise to major accidents [Kletz, 1994; Perrow, 1984]. Perrow [1984] described such 
an error, and its consequence as a “normal accident” because the error and accident 
originated from the normal activities of tightly coupled technological systems.  
The main problem posed by the introduction of automation is that the greater the 
operator‟s exclusion from the control loop of a system, the more the system may need 
human intervention in critical situations. Bainbridge [1983] referred to this problem as 
the “Ironies of Automation”. In the design of complex systems, we need to take account 
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a new concepts relating to the interaction between human and artefact, rather than 
traditional approaches to defending systems, such as defence-in-depth philosophy, 
which would stipulate the need for ever greater numbers of automatic safety devices.  
The study of organisations that successfully manage potentially hazardous technical 
operations suggests that the success of these organisations did not depend on them 
merely avoiding risks or errors, but rather on them anticipating and planning for 
unexpected events and future surprises [Rochlin, 1999]. Designers and researchers 
support these efforts by generating knowledge about the uses of artefacts and systems, 
and not just through the use of increasing numbers of safety devices.   
Safety in design is not a commodity, but should be a necessary area of study supported 
by continuous investigation of the interaction between humans and systems.  Effective 
interaction depends on the open flow of information between operators and systems 
[Vicente and Rasmussen, 1992]. 
 
1.3 Human Error Research: need for 
designers to understand human–system 
interaction failures 
Woods [2000] pointed out that in order to understand and predict human performance 
with any system in a complex setting, we need to make use of the different languages, 
i.e. psychological concepts to describe human performance. Woods addressed the 
reason why designers have to understand human error. The reliability of man–machine 
interaction is an important issue because the dependence on man–machine interaction 
has increased in every domain.  
The understanding of human error as a behavioural phenomenon, therefore, has become 
an inherent part of design, especially in safety critical domains such as nuclear power 
generation, aviation, and off-shore petrochemical production.  Rasmussen [1985] 
argued for the study of human reliability as a primary research area for design, stating 
that:  
It also seems to be important to realize that the scientific basis for human 
reliability considerations will not be the study of human error as a separate topic, 
but the study of normal human behaviour in real work situations and the 
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mechanisms involved in adaptation and learning. The findings may very well 
lead to design of more reliable systems, without improving the basis of 
quantitative prediction of reliability in the higher-level mental tasks required in 
new systems.  
[Rasmussen, 1985: p.1124]. 
Hollnagel [1992] clearly defined the purposes of research on human performance as 
follows: 
 To enable specific system changes to be made in response to specific unwanted 
occurrences, i.e. modifications after the fact (a pragmatic purpose). 
 To be able to make better predictions of what will happen under given 
conditions, in an effort to improve the system design (an engineering purpose, 
and also an extension of the first purpose). 
 To increase knowledge in general about man–machine systems, how they work, 
and to provide better theories of how they work (a scientific purpose, again 
extending the previous purpose). 
There are different perspectives within the field of human error research. For designers, 
their primary need is to understand man–machine interaction, a component of human 
performance control [Neisser, 1976]. To design a credible artefact or system it is 
necessary to understand the interaction between humans and systems, in which the 
factors that degrade human performance and the inaccurate execution of plans can be 
examined and corrected.  
 
1.4 Research issues in design and human–
system interaction failures 
There are many issues concerning design and human error [Alkov, 1997]. Some 
fundamental questions posed in this research area are: 
 What are the theories concerning relationships between design and human 
error? 
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 Why was operator performance incongruent with the designers‟ 
expectations about that behaviour at the time of accidents? 
 Why designs have failed occasionally and not prevented major accidents 
even if they were equipped with a number of modern technological 
systems? 
 How can we extract knowledge relevant to designing more credible 
artefacts and systems from examples of failure and experience of 
operation?  
 How can knowledge-based systems (KBSs) help designers to recognise 
and reason about design issues in human–system interaction failures? 
Additionally, there is ambiguity in the taxonomy used to describe knowledge in the 
study of human error.  For example, the term “human error” itself is ambiguous as the 
term has three different meanings: the cause of an event or action (e.g. the oil spill was 
caused by human error); the event or action (e.g. I forgot to check the water level); the 
consequence of an event or action (e.g. I made the error of putting salt in the coffee) 
[Hollnagel, 1998]. Therefore, it is important to provide designers with explicit, and 
usable terminology of design-induced error. Extracting semantic meanings in terms of 
design-induced error would be helpful for designers in constructing a knowledge base 
for the design of safer systems. 
Although we have to depend on psychological theories to understand human–system 
interaction failures, many theories appear for the explanation and they exist 
respectively. In order to recognise design issues in human–system interaction failures 
more effectively than before, it will be useful if we provide some effective methods to 
examine and to reason on design issues in human–system interaction failures by 
combining psychological theories and knowledge engineering techniques. 
 
1.5 Research aims and objectives 
The purpose of this thesis presented here is to examine the influence of design on 
human error, and to find effective methods to share knowledge taken from human error 
theories that describe human–system interaction failures (i.e. human error) in terms of 
the role of design. For this purpose the aims of the thesis is to propose a meta-theory of 
design-induced error, an integrated and collective view on these theories, in order to 
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present better understanding of how design induces human errors. This thesis then 
develops an ontology of design-induced error based on the meta-theory in order to 
make it possible to capture the issues from accident reports. These are the main 
objectives of the research. 
From the aims of this research, the following five objectives are broken down: 
1) To identify issues involved in a design’s influences on human error. (Chapter 2) 
2) To develop an integrated framework taken from related theories that describes 
relations between design and human error. (Chapter 4) 
3) To analyse accident cases with the framework developed. (Chapter 5) 
4) To develop a knowledge model for capturing useful texts in the description of 
accident documents. (Chapter 7) 
5) To demonstrate how the developed knowledge model can help to analyse 
accident cases that include design issues in human errors. (Chapter 8) 
 
1.6 The research methodology 
The research was a combination of human error research and knowledge-based system 
research. This research generally adopted the methodology discussed by Senders and 
Moray [1991]. This comprises literature review, logical construction of theories, 
development of a classification scheme and experiments in accident report systems as 
the main methodologies of the research as follows. 
1) Conduct a literature review on human error and design issues. (Chapter 2) 
2) Construct logical relationships between design and human errors. (Chapter 4) 
3) Construct a model of design-induced error consisting of related theories. 
(Chapter 4) 
4) Examine accident reports in terms of the design-induced error concept. 
(Chapter 5) 
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5) Develop an ontology model using knowledge model development software. 
(Chapters  6, 7) 
6) Apply the model and ontology into real accident cases or documents to 
illustrate how the model can be used to capture design issues from the cases. 
(Chapters 5, 8) 
The following describes methodologies to fulfil each objective in the research. 
The first objective to identify the issues involved in design‟s influences on human 
errors was examined through conducting a detailed literature review. This literature 
review covers the investigation of human error theories relating to design issues. With 
the human error theories the role of design in complex systems was investigated. 
The second objective, to develop a collective model taken from related theories that 
describe relations between design and human error, was addressed through the 
examination of underlying structures of related theories. This investigation contained 
the extended design concepts and an ontological paradigm. The examination of current 
views on the concept of design-induced error was also conducted. The development of 
a meta-theory was conducted by adopting a contextual paradigm that represents a 
collective view on related theories. 
The third objective, to analyse accident cases with the framework developed, was 
addressed through conducting an examination of accident investigation reports of the 
Australian aviation accident report system as discussed later in Section 3.5, Chapter 5, 
and Section 7.2.  
The fourth objective, to develop a knowledge model for capturing useful texts in the 
documents describing accidents, was addressed through the investigation of knowledge 
acquisition and sharing technology, specifically in accident report systems. The 
development of a knowledge-based ontology of design-induced error that can be used 
in knowledge management systems was constructed with a computer software program 
of knowledge model development kits. 
The fifth objective, to demonstrate how developed models can help to analyse accident 
cases that include design issues with human errors, was addressed by examination of 
the developed meta-theory and the knowledge-based ontology for knowledge 
acquisition and reasoning process, and an information retrieval process for design-
induced error reasoning in real accident reports and the Worldwide Web. 
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1.7 Limitations of the research  
From the research aims above, it is important to note that there are also boundaries to 
the research: 
 This research is not a pure psychological human error study, but a hybrid 
between cognitive theories and engineering and information technology.  
 This research is limited to the study of Design-induced error, not research 
into all forms of human error. 
 This research is not research on how to construct an entire knowledge-
based system (KBS), rather to develop an ontology of Design-induced 
error that may be used in a KBS. 
 The research will try to use current Web-based reporting systems, but will 
not involve changing accident report systems or content of the reports. 
 
1.8 Thesis structure 
The fulfilment of the research objectives involves the completion of a series of 
activities, which in turn define the structure of the thesis which is summarised in Figure 
1.2.  
Chapter 1 introduces the research issues and research aims/objectives with a broad 
summary 
Chapter 2 reviews literature about human error and design issues in modern 
technologies. This chapter also reviews theories and phenomena relevant to design-
induced error with real accident cases.  
Chapter 3 presents research approaches and methodologies by which the research could 
be conducted.  
Chapter 4 develops a meta-theory of design-induced error by adapting ontological 
assumptions and a contextual paradigm (local rationalities between designer and 
operator). This work is achieved by investigating underlying structure of theories, and 
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examining current concepts of design-induced error. 
Chapter 5 examines accident reports, which were taken from the Australian aviation 
accident report system, with the meta-theory, and shows analysis results for the 
accident cases.  
Chapter 6 briefly reviews knowledge acquisition, knowledge modelling methodologies 
and discusses values of ontology development.  
Chapter 7 presents how a theory-based ontology of design-induced error has been 
developed with a methodology. It includes an overview of the developed ontology of 
design-induced error. 
Chapter 8 discusses, the investigation of the developed methods (a meta-theory, 
ontology of design-induced error) in this thesis in the light of knowledge sharing (e.g. 
reasoning support issue, knowledge acquisition issue, and information retrieval issue).  
Chapter 9 finally summarises achievements of the research, recommendations for 
designers and related authorities, and proposed future works are presented. 
In order to take both theoretical and practical approaches in this thesis, it was necessary 
to review the literature on human error and design issues which is reported in Chapter 3 
as well as the knowledge sharing issues reported in Chapter 6. From these background 
studies a theoretical framework and knowledge-based ontology was developed and is 
reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. Chapter 5 and Chapter 8 are intertwined for 
completing examination of the theories and applying the developed framework to real 
accident cases.   
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter concepts of human error and present design-related human error theories 
are reviewed. This is because the study of human error is the foundation of research 
into design-induced error. However, it should be stressed that the review does not focus 
solely on these studies because this is not a study of the psychology of human error, but 
rather a study of the relationships between design and the consequences of this on the 
occurrence of types of human error.  
 
2.1.1 Aims and structure of the chapter 
The aim of this literature review is to examine theories that present relationships 
between human error and design, and to identify the characteristics of phenomena that 
lead to human error. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to examine issues in design 
of complex and automated systems. This inevitably involves understanding what a 
human error is, and also the manner in which design affects human cognition and 
performance. As a result of the need to investigate both of these issues, this chapter 
contains two main parts. The first introduces a concept of human error, whilst the 
second examines the design characteristics, especially in modern technologies, related 
to human error, together with phenomena acknowledged by researchers that are used in 
this thesis. 
Section 2.2 of this chapter will introduce examples to show why we have to focus on 
human–system interaction failures, and then section 2.3 review the nature and 
characteristics of human error and its forms. Section 2.4 that follows will discuss 
theories related to Design-induced error and their relevance to modern complex 
systems. Section 2.5 reviews theories related to design issues in human error, and 
examine how the role of design has been changed in the theories. The last section 2.6 
will summarise the literature review and present limitations of the current research on 
finding design issues in human error. 
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2.1.2 Conduct of the literature review 
The basis of this review is literature found from searching databases that were believed 
to contain abstracts from scientific papers on human error and design issues. This 
search was conducted using both the web-search engines (such as Ingenta Connect, 
Science Direct, and BIDS) through Athens connection and an electronic journal service 
in the Library of the University of Bath. This search concentrated on papers published 
between the years 1980 and 2005, because many studies on human error have taken 
place since 1980, and made use of the search terms “human error”, “design”, and 
“design-induced error”, together with appropriate synonyms of these. Important papers 
published earlier than 1980 were also reviewed. These searches were conducted both at 
the beginning and at the conclusion of this research project, to allow the identification 
and inclusion of relevant research findings that had arisen during the execution of this 
research project. Accident reports were also collected and analysed. The basic sources 
of information of the topic of the thesis were found in published literature. Related 
literature provided cases of accident/incident that contained human error and design 
issues. The most important sources for collecting accident cases that related to the topic 
of the thesis were official aviation accident reporting systems (e.g. NTSB, AAIB, 
ATSB) as well as safety information networks (e.g. Aviation Safety Network) and 
journals. 
This study was conducted by the author to find relevant examples to verify the 
symptoms of Design-induced error identified from the literature review. Cases were 
again found through querying (e.g. name of accidents) web-based search engines (e.g. 
Google.com) or searching in accident databases (e.g. AAIB, NTSB, ATSB). Well-
known aviation accident databases such as Aviation Safety Network (http://aviation-
safety.net/reports/) were also reviewed.  
Given that the aim of this literature review was to find and collect related theories that 
show human error influenced by design, it was necessary to identify criteria by which 
to gather related theories. The design concepts of complex and automated systems 
constructed by using modern technologies are a main focus of design that affects 
human operators. The complexity and automation in a system should be criteria for 
identifying design-induced error in human–system interactions. Therefore, the 
characteristics of modern systems were reviewed in light of human error. 
The aim of theories is to explain attitudes towards designed systems held by operators. 
If it is assumed that the concept of design-induced error is employed as a means to 
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congregate the value of related theories, then it is necessary to identify the type of 
characteristics that should be examined to determine whether the concept had been 
applied to human–system interaction failures. This inevitably requires the identification 
of possible forms of error outcome. In addition, if a phenomenon is derived from a 
particular theoretical perspective, the concept of design-induced error encompasses an 
inclusion of this theory. Consequently, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the 
theoretical perspective that informs the error. 
 
2.2 Human–system interaction failure  
We can find a number of human–system interaction failures in real accident cases. For 
example, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) argued that 70~80% of aviation accidents are 
attributed to human error. Johnson and Holloway (2004) examined Canadian TSB 
aviation reports between 1996 and 2002 and identified human error as the most 
common causal factor nearly 56%~75%.. This means that in many cases human 
operators have failed to interact with systems properly. What are “human–system 
interaction failures
2”? In order to understand the risks of automation and complexity in 
modern design, we must understand the relationship between human operators and 
automated systems. Sometimes the designer tends to assume that automated systems 
function independently from the human operator. However, research has shown that 
humans and machines are not independent. They should work together to achieve the 
desired purposes of a system [Sarter and Woods, 1995]. The most highly automated 
systems still require human operators to monitor system activities and intervene in the 
case of abnormalities and emergencies [Bainbridge, 1983].  
Human error research has been developed to tackle the issues of human–system 
interaction failures. The approach of this research focuses on the role of humans in 
relation to systems. In other words, most human error research starts from the point of 
view of the roles of humans in complex and automated systems. This research has 
provided new insights to understand human–system interaction failures in modern 
complex and automated systems. For example, the research showed that the human 
operator often fails to monitor a system when he/she is in a supervisory role 
[Bainbridge, 1983]. 
                                                     
2
  Human–system interaction failures refer to human error. It is preferred in this thesis 
to use the term “human–system interaction failures” because it is a more value-
indifferent term than “human error”. 
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2.2.1 Questions for examples of human–system 
interaction failures: Origins and motivation for the 
research 
However, this perspective sometimes fails to show clearly and characterise the roles of 
design in these failures. There still remains a question. What are the exact roles of 
design in human–system interaction failures? In order to investigate this question and 
to illustrate the need for a collective view for human–system interaction failures, the 
following examples of accidents were first considered. 
 
Case 1. Tupolev-154 mid-air collision at Ueberlingen, 
German/ Switzerland (2002) 
On the night of 1 July 2002, there was a collision between a Boeing 757 and a Tupolev-
154 above Lake Constance, Ueberlingenm Germany, at 35,000 feet, resulting in 71 
fatalities. The Tupolev-154 (registered to Bashkirian Airlines) was en route from 
Munich to Barcelona at Flight Level (FL) 360, on a heading of 274 degrees. The 
Boeing 757 (registered to DHL) departed from Bergamo (Italy) to Brussels at FL 260, 
on a heading of 004 degrees. Both aircraft were equipped with the Traffic Collision and 
Avoidance System (TCAS). Their trajectories put them on a converging course at a 90° 
angle in airspace (Figure 2.1).  
At that time of the accident, the Zurich Area Control Centre (ACC) was in charge of 
controlling the airspace. With communication the crew of the Boeing 757, the Swiss 
controller issued clearances of the B757 climbing FL 360 at time 21.26.36. When the 
pilot of the T-154 called in the Swiss controller at time 21.30.11, there was a warning 
from the TCAS systems in both aircrafts. Following this, the controller instructed the T-
154 to descend from FL 360 to FL 350 to avoid collision with the B757. However, the 
pilot of T-154 got an instruction from the TCAS to climb. The crew of B757 also was 
instructed to descend from the TCAS respectively. After receiving contradictory 
instructions, the T-154 pilot decided to follow the instruction of the controller and 
began a descent to FL 350, resulting collision with the B757, which had followed its 
own TCAS advisory to descend. The pilot might not have believed a direction of the 
traffic collision avoidance system, but rather followed the instructions of the controller 
[Nunes and Laursen, 2004].  
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Question: Why the pilot did not follow the instruction of the traffic collision avoidance 
system? 
Case 2. The rail collision accident at Ladbroke Grove in 
London (1999) 
On 5 October 1999, a three-car train passed a red signal as it was leaving Paddington 
Station, London, and continued for some 700 metres into the path of a high-speed train 
with which it then collided. As a result of the collision and subsequent fire, 31 people 
died and 227 were taken to hospital. A large number of people (296) were treated for 
minor injuries on site. This accident, as with all major accidents, was the result of a 
confluence of a series of factors, one of which was the driver‟s actions. In this case, the 
driver inadvertently drove through a signal, signal SN109, which had been showing a 
stop aspect.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Trajectories of B757 and T-154 (from Nunes and Laursen, 2004) 
3
 
 
The train, at the time of accident, had an Automatic Warning System (AWS) which 
consisted of trackside permanent magnets, electro-inductors and inductor suppressors 
                                                     
3
 http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/humfac04/nuneslaur.pdf, 
2004 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 23 
that interface with trainborne AWS equipment. This equipment provides train drivers 
with an aural and visual indicator of whether an approaching signal shows a clear 
aspect, a green light, or not. If the signal does not show a clear aspect, it can show a 
caution aspect, which could be a yellow or a double yellow light, or a stop aspect, 
which is a red light. The two caution aspects show that although the next track block is 
clear, subsequent blocks are occupied and therefore the driver should be prepared to 
stop at the next or next but one signal. If the train travels through a signal showing a 
stop or caution aspect and the AWS warning is not acknowledged, the brakes on the 
train are automatically applied. 
Prior to the collision, the driver of the three-car train had travelled through three 
signals: SN43 which had displayed a green light, SN63 which had displayed double 
yellow lights, and signal SN87, which had displayed a single yellow light. On the 
approach to signal SN109, the three-car train had been coasting. However, on the 
approach to signal SN109, the driver increased power, at a point where the signal was 
not visible, but where other signals on the gantry supporting signal SN109 were. 
Shortly after accelerating the AWS horn operated to warn the driver that the signal was 
not showing a clear aspect. Signal SN109 was showing a stop aspect. However, instead 
of stopping the train, the driver cancelled the AWS warning and began to accelerate at a 
distance of 107 metres from where the collision occurred. 
Question: Why did the train driver pass the signal at red? 
 
Case 3. Chernobyl nuclear accident, USSR (1986) 
On 25 April 1986, prior to a routine shut-down, the reactor operator at Chernobyl-4 
began preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and supply power 
following a loss of main electrical power supply. Similar tests had already been carried 
out at Chernobyl and other plants, despite the fact that these reactors were known to be 
very unstable at low power settings.  
A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown 
mechanisms, preceded the attempted test early on 26 April. As the flow of coolant 
water diminished, power output increased. When the operator moved to shut down the 
reactor due to its unstable condition arising from previous errors, a peculiarity of the 
design caused a dramatic power surge.  
The fuel elements ruptured and the resultant explosive force of steam lifted off the 
cover plate of the reactor, releasing fission products to the atmosphere. A second 
explosion threw out fragments of burning fuel and graphite from the core and allowed 
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air to rush in, causing the graphite moderator to burst into flames.  
Question: Why did the operator perform a dangerous test against safety rules?  
 
Case 4. Three Mile Island nuclear power plant reactor 
overheat, USA (1979) 
The accident began about 04:00 on 28 March 1979, when the plant experienced a 
failure in the secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant. The main feedwater pumps 
stopped running, caused by either a mechanical or electrical failure, which prevented 
the steam generators from removing heat (Figure 2.2). First the turbine and then the 
reactor automatically shut down. Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the 
nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to prevent that pressure from 
becoming excessive, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the 
pressurizer) opened. The valve should have closed when the pressure decreased by a 
certain amount, but it did not.  
Operators in the plant did not recognise the real state of the system. The operator 
misinterpreted a signal showing the position of the relief valve. Signals available to the 
operator failed to show that the valve was still open. As a result, cooling water poured 
out of the stuck-open valve and caused the core of the reactor to overheat. 
Question: Why did the operators not recognise the state of the system?  
In all these cases, it is difficult to identify any specific failure in the design. For 
example, the AWS in the Ladbroke Grove accident functioned in the manner it should 
have, and should have drawn the driver‟s attention to the signal aspect presented. 
However, whilst the design of the AWS did not lead directly to engineering failure, the 
design of the system has helped induce the human operator to develop a specific 
behaviour.  
Use of the system in the above cases appeared to induce a form of automatic or 
phenomenal behaviour of the operator in the system, which could produce errors that 
would be undetectable to the operator. These cases depict a need for investigation of the 
role that design plays in inducing user error, and which can allow designers to gain new 
insight into how particular designs may function. The origin and motivation of this 
research is how we can properly and effectively answer the questions above.  
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Figure 2.2 NRC: Fact Sheet on the Accident at Three Mile Island
4
  
 
 
2.3 What is Human Error?  
It was not until the early 1960s that the notion of “human error” gained acceptance as a 
cause of incidents and accidents by many researchers [Reason, 1990]. The field of 
human error research has expanded to encompass errors that arise in everyday 
experience, such as errors of language use, to errors made in the operation of complex 
systems, such as nuclear power plants. Major incidents and accidents such as those at 
Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) have emphasised the need for research 
into human error in many safety critical domains. Driven by these surprising system 
failures, researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds have begun to re-examine 
how these systems failed and how people in their various roles contributed to the 
operation of the system. The research has revealed that there are many problems 
between human operators and systems.  The reliability of a system greatly relies on 
how the interaction between operators and systems can be achieved. Therefore, human 
error has gained attention as a main objective of designing reliable systems. 
                                                     
4
 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (6 of 6) [3/2/2004 
4:25:40 PM]) 
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2.3.1 Level of human performance  
Why do humans make errors and what causes the error? To solve the problem, 
researchers have attempted to identify the physical and psychological limitations in 
human performance which underlie human error. Those working in the domain of 
human–machine interaction have paid attention to the limitations and biases in human 
cognition that affect the processes underlying attention, perception, memory, and 
logical reasoning  [Reason, 1990]. For example, research shows that humans‟ short 
term memory can be suffer from difficulty remembering more than seven chunks at 
once [Miller, 1956]. 
Reason [1990] suggested that inaccuracies arise in operator models of current and 
future system states from a number of cognitive processes – i.e. “frequency gambling” 
(i.e. humans are apt to interpret a situation with respect to how many times it has 
previously happened) and “similarity matching” (i.e. humans tend to understand a 
problem and find a solution based on how much the problem is similar to previous 
problems). This unique human cognitive process is very effective for humans to do a 
task and to solve a problem, but sometimes leads to error when combined with a poorly 
designed artefact (i.e. not considering the unique human cognitive performance) or 
unusual environments.   
The level of our performance changes depending on our experience with the 
environment, or the artefact. The time taken to act in response to a stimulus will be 
determined by the level of performance enacted, which is determined by previous 
experience.  
Fiture 2.3 shows a widely accepted model of human performance proposed by 
Rasmussen - the skill-rule-knowledge-based human performance model [Rasmussen, 
1983]. His classification scheme is based on the stepladder model of human 
performance. In the stepladder model, performance is statically represented by a 
sequence of states of knowledge, connected together by information processes that 
involve signals, signs and symbols respectively. He defined the three information 
factors as follows. Signals represent time–space variables from a dynamical spatial 
configuration in the environment, signs are related to certain features in the 
environment and the connected conditions for action, and symbols are abstract 
constructs related to and defined by a formal structure of relations and processes, 
including language itself and mathematical equations (p261).    
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Behaviour is divided into three levels: skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based, as 
shown in the simplified diagram in Figure 2.3.   
 
Skill-based behaviour: is an automated process, requiring little or no conscious 
control, activated by signals. It generally occurs only for highly practised activities 
conducted in familiar situations where sensorimotor skills can be utilised (e.g. playing 
piano by a pianist or driving a car).  
 
Rule-based behaviour: is a routine process, and consists of signs (the execution of 
stored rules or procedures) that have preconditions that match the current state of the 
system and its environment (e.g. seeing traffic signs). 
 
Knowledge-based behaviour: is a slow and laborious process, activated by symbols 
with which human problem solving mechanisms work to define objectives, identify 
problems, and utilize reasoning (e.g. finding a street with a map). It relies on symbols. 
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Figure 2.3.  Levels of human behaviour (modified from Rasmussen, 1983) 
 
However, it is not clear what are the boundaries between the three types of behaviour, 
and real performance involves a more complex interaction than just between the three 
levels. Performance can be optimised by the use of shortcuts, which are learned 
through experience. However the model is still useful in the identification and 
organisation of different categories of human behaviour. 
Therefore, it is important for designers to know at which performance level operators 
undertake a task (Table 2.1). Sometimes a task may involve all three levels, for instance, 
a pilot is in that situation during landing (handling the controls is skill-based behaviour, 
however, following the air-traffic controller‟s signal may be rule-based, and checking 
environmental circumstances may be knowledge-based behaviour).  
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Table 2.1.  Examples of design concerns according to performance levels 
 
2.3.2 Model of human error 
Mach [1905] noted the inseparable nature of knowledge and error: “Knowledge and 
error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell one from the other” 
(p.84). It means that the fact that people‟s actions that lead to error are not the result of 
carelessness, but may result from careful reasoning about the system, can lead to 
conclusions that the designer did not anticipate. However, until the 1980s, it was 
assumed that normative processes of judgment and inference would ideally follow 
Bayesian rules.  Error was presumed to arise from the use of processes that acted in 
opposition to normative processes. However research into human cognition has proved 
that this assertion was wrong and that both correct and erroneous performance arise 
from the same processes (e.g. Reason, 1990; Hollnagel, 1998). This provides insights 
for modelling and analysing human error.   
Reason [1990] developed a model of human error called “the Generic Error Modelling 
System(GEMS)”, based on Rasmussen‟s classification of human performance levels. 
According to Reason's model, human errors can be divided into three types: 
 
1) Errors at the skill-based level: which occur during performance of tasks that 
are not consciously attended to as a result of inattention or over attention (i.e. 
slips/ lapses).  
 
PERFORM
-ANCE 
LEVEL 
EXAMPLE DESIGN QUESTION DESIGN RULES 
Knowledge
-based 
Finding a 
location in a 
map 
Where is our destination? 
Is this logical process? 
How to provide reasonable 
ways, methodologies? 
Rule-based Following a 
traffic sign 
Is this rule distinguished 
clearly? 
How to avoid ambiguity 
among signs? 
Skill-based Driving a car Is this equipment 
convenient for a driver to 
handle? 
Does it change or interrupt 
unconscious actions? 
    
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 30 
2) Errors at the rule-based level: which arise from the misapplication of a good 
rule, or the use of a poor rule when the individual has to consciously choose 
between alternative courses of action (i.e. rule-based mistake).  
 
3) Errors at the knowledge-based level: which arise from the selective 
processing of information about a task, an inability to attend to all the relevant 
information, or an undue weighting being given to information that comes to 
mind readily during the individual‟s attempts to define a new procedure on the 
basis of knowledge about the system they are using.  
 
2.3.3 Distributed cognition  
After researching complex systems, and studies on the manner in which information is 
transferred between personnel interacting with the system, Hutchins [1995b] defined a 
theory of distributed cognition which described how operators use artefacts in a socio-
technical system for remembering and understanding situations and performing 
procedures.. This theory emphasises an effective collaborative work between operators 
and artefacts. In a complex system operators are continuously interacting with artefacts 
and other colleagues to complete tasks set. For example, on a ship a crewman has to 
work with other crewmembers and artefacts to complete navigation tasks successfully 
[Hutchins, 1995a]. The theory of distributed cognition could be used to define a 
framework for the analysis of interaction between operators and artefacts in complex 
systems. Other models of errors such as Reason‟s GEMS focussed on errors made by 
the individual and could not describe or explain the form and origin of errors in 
collaborative tasks.  
Hollan et al. [2000] identified three factors that underlie the manner in which operators 
effectively use a complex system. First, cognition within a complex system is socially 
distributed, with representations of the system distributed amongst the operators of the 
system. A distributed cognition analysis would focus on examining how personnel and 
artefacts in a system exploit other crewmembers and artefacts to manipulate, represent, 
and store information. Therefore, research on distributed cognition places emphasis on 
the manner in which activities are conducted within particular organizational contexts 
rather than attempting to identify a series of laws that can be used to describe the 
behaviour of individuals in any setting [Hollnagel, 2001].  
Second, cognition is embodied, emerging from the interaction of the mind of the 
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operator and other components of the system. In other words, the processing conducted 
within the complex system is not merely in the form of representations in the operators‟ 
minds that respond to specific stimuli in the environment [Zhang, 1992]. Rather, the 
artefacts themselves, and the manner in which they are used support specific practices, 
and specific processes. For example, work practices associated with specific artefacts 
may allow the operator to transform a mathematical task into one of visual-spatial 
judgment [Hutchins, 2000]. In doing this, the operator may reduce the chances of 
committing an error as they reduce the demand placed upon working memory, under 
conditions of potentially high mental workload.  
Third, culture in the organisation determines the operation of the cognitive system. 
Within this system, information is propagated with the intention of affecting the 
representations held by specific operators, using particular modes of communication. 
Therefore, the study of cognition was not separable from the study of culture. In this 
case culture was taken to mean the history of social practices in the workplace. The role 
of culture is to provide partially completed solutions to the problems that are frequently 
encountered in the workplace. Culture itself was shaped by the activities conducted in 
particular historical contexts. These principles have been applied to suggest guidelines 
for the development of robust complex systems.  
Hutchins [2000] suggested that there were a number of features that could be 
incorporated into a system of distributed cognition that would increase the robustness 
of the system. Principally, these recommendations focussed on the manner in which 
information was distributed amongst the users of the system and the redundancy 
inherent in the number of representations acquired by users.  
A system may embody consequential communication, in which a system automatically 
provides physical cues that informs users of its operation [Hutchins, 2000]. For 
example, in the case of the trim-wheel on the airliner flight deck and the cue this 
provided, which was removed when the traditional mechanical controls were replaced 
by electronic ones, the mechanical systems on a flight deck may provide the pilot with 
a means of assessing whether a particular action has been conducted by another 
member of the flight crew or not. 
Patterns of information flow that create multiple representations of the same state of 
affairs and the redundant processing of similar information enhance the robustness of 
the system. These patterns of information flow also support error detection as error 
detection depends upon the comparison of representations of the same thing developed 
from different sources or via different processes.  
It may be possible to impose patterns of information flow that help to form shared 
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expectations about task performance by encouraging social distribution of task relevant 
information. Consequently, the absence of an action in a particular procedure can 
become meaningful to another operator in the system, indicating a failure in the 
procedures employed. Such awareness required both operators to know what is 
expected and to know that the other knows what is to be expected [Hutchins and 
Klause, 1998].  
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2.4 Dealing with Errors in Complex Systems 
and Automation 
 
2.4.1 Complexity and other characteristics in modern 
systems 
Before the recent era of computerised complex information, safety concepts were 
generally straightforward. The system was not too complicated and complex to enable 
other people in the system to predict hazards with scientific knowledge. The methods 
for protecting systems and humans were also well developed technically, with norms, 
technical guidelines, etc. for directly measuring hazard (e.g. allowance load or strength 
of a material, temperature of ignition).  
In traditional protection systems the primary aim is to increase the safety factors of 
materials and artefacts according to the hazards of the system. Second, if there is 
hazard in a system, then safety devices are installed to prevent artefacts from entering 
unsafe states (e.g. safety valves in boilers) or to mitigate against their consequences. 
Thirdly, if it is impossible to protect humans who are involved in the system, then the 
aim is protecting them from hazards by prohibiting them from approaching hazardous 
components (e.g. installing safety guards) or by providing them with personal 
protection equipment (e.g. safety helmet, mask).  For designers it was easier to design a 
system in terms of safety and error than it is at present. They could mostly succeed in 
their goal of system safety by simply following and adapting safety rules.  
However, the rapid development of new technologies has caused additional problems. 
The designer encounters new challenges in current complex and socio-technical system. 
From the study of the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1974, 
Perrow [1984] identify two risk-increasing characteristics in modern complex systems: 
interactive complexity and tight coupling.  
In his explanation, interactive complexity refers to the presence of two or more discrete 
failures can interact in unexpected ways in a system. The unexpected sequences of 
events are either not visible or not immediately comprehensible for some critical period 
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of time for operators. The more tightly coupled a system is, the more highly 
interdependent and affected each other the status or operations of sub-components of 
the system is. Small failure of one part, therefore, can cause disastrous failures of the 
whole system. As a conclusion Perrow argued that due to these two intrinsic 
characteristics accidents are inevitable or normal in some technological systems [1984].  
His argument that accidents are inevitable in these systems and therefore systems in 
which accidents would have disastrous results should not be built, however, is criticised 
because of its overly pessimistic view undermining engineering development of 
complex systems [Marais et al., 2004]. He seems to see systems from the too much 
organisational point of view not from the engineering design point of view. 
Although some refutation against his conclusions, Perrow made an important 
contribution in understanding characteristics of current complex systems.  
Contemporary technologies use automation and automation has three main 
characteristics: compacting, complicating, and computerisation (Figure 2.4).  
Traditional
hazard
compact
complexity Computerization
+
Automation hazard
 
Figure 2.4.  Characteristics model of automation with hazard 
Compacting means that equipment has tended to be smaller in size, especially in 
control interfaces with which operators/users control the system. This has produced 
benefits for human users such as more comfort, and greater ease of handling. However 
from the cognitive perspective, it has also increased ambiguity and can lead to errors on 
the part of users by increasing misunderstanding about the system [Reason, 1990]. For 
example, for seat reservations on UK trains, the old system used reservation cards on 
the head of the seat that were placed in manually by train staff. In new trains, the seat 
reservation is written in words on a electronic display over the seat. It is very attractive 
and can be controlled automatically without manual intervention, but it is less easy to 
recognise for users.  
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Complexity is another characteristic of modern technologies. Modern technical systems 
feature large scale processes and combine them together in systems that require the 
definition and application of complex organisational and technological inter-
relationships to function effectively [Roberts, 1988]. If there is a small error or failure it 
may cause the failure of whole systems. This is especially true in dynamic systems such 
as (nuclear) power plants, railway  and subway systems, air traffic control, chemical 
processes, and even in intensive medical facilities.  
Computerisation is an intrinsic component of contemporary technology. 
Computerisation can be defined as the execution by machine, usually a computer, of a 
function previously carried out by a human [Parasuraman and Riley, 1997]. 
Development of automation has arisen with microelectronics and computer 
technologies that are very fast and open a wide range of possibilities. However 
limitations inherent in the human information processing system means that operators 
have great difficulty in monitoring changes to the system and updating their mental 
models of it. There are therefore mismatches and gaps between humans and systems in 
both space and time. Increased use of automation to reduce the influence of human 
weakness does not work. Rather it creates new human errors and amplifies existing 
ones [Lützhöft and Dekker, 2002]. In other word, the key to success of automation 
systems lies in how they support co-operation with their human operators. For 
designers, those changes have posed new difficulties in solving problems related to 
safety and system reliability (Table 2.2).  
There are many other factors that mitigate against system failures and human error. 
Organisational, legal, political and social aspects are also important to achieve the goal 
of safety. This paper, however, will discuss matters only from the standpoint of human 
error with design, because human error is one of critical deficiencies in present 
technologies. It cannot be achieved by technologies alone. We have to know about the 
user‟s perspective to understand human error and system failure. Therefore it is 
proposed to explain several phenomena in a complex system in the light of how the 
perception of operators deviates from the intention of designers about an artefact.   
CHARACTERISTICS MEANING EXPLANATION 
Complexity Intangible  Combined process tends to reject 
showing what is going on a system. 
Automated computerisation Fast It is faster than human cognition. 
Compactness Unrealistic Not matched with human tactical 
perception (e.g. digital screen). 
Table 2.2.  Characteristics of modern systems 
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2.4.2 Temporal decision making conditions in complex 
systems  
Increasing use of computer technology has transformed the operator‟s role in socio-
technical systems [Bainbridge, 1983]. One of the most distinguishable points of change 
is in “temporal decision-making”, that it is the decision making process about the 
progress of an operation, and when intervention in the process should arise [De Keyser, 
1990]. 
In order to design systems that can be effectively used by operators, it is necessary to 
know how operators decide when to intervene in the operation of the system and the 
manner in which they use their mental models of the system to estimate both their 
location in a process, and the duration of the process itself. In addition, there is a need 
to know how operators use cues from the environment to support their decision-making 
under time pressure.  
Systems and artefacts have evolved into complicated and tightly-coupled forms 
[Perrow, 1984], and as a result, the speed of systems has increased, leading to quicker 
completion of actions and faster responses to requests. Operators in the complex 
system are experiencing conditions that they have not previously met. Problems in 
temporal decision-making that are encountered in complex systems arise from 
increases in: (1) time pressure, (2) the number of system functions, and (3) the 
invisibility of system processes [De Keyser, 1990].  
This means that there is a mismatch in the time required for human operators to 
develop mental models of the system and the pace at which the state of the system can 
change. The problem space for using the complex system has increased, which means 
that operators have problems in developing an appropriate mental model of the current 
state of the system. Their mental models are affected by high frequency of immediate 
feedback about decisions taken to meet system demands [Reason, 1990]. 
As noted above, Rasmussen [1983] suggested that there were three levels of 
performance underlying human decision-making, which were: (1) a knowledge-based 
level, (2) a rule-based level and (3) a skill-based level. It is clear that the speed of skill-
based performance level is fastest, followed by rule-based and knowledge-based 
performance lastly. In complex systems, human operators may need a knowledge-based 
performance when they choose to intervene in the system due to complexity of the 
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system. The system, however, does not allow operators such a time, rather it demands 
prompt responses, i.e. skill-based performance from operators. People in complex 
systems have to make decisions under conditions of high time-pressure.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows how a process of operators‟ performance is changed in temporal 
decision environments. They have little chances to use a time-consuming knowledge-
based process such as identification, decision and planning, but to have to jump into 
sensorimotors in their skill-based repository. 
The operator bases his or her temporal strategies on the checking of specific cues. The 
operator will focus upon the critical phases of the system‟s development, where there is 
a need to intervene in system operation. As the technological development has 
relocated his or her traditional area of actions, from the process to the whole system, 
the non-visibility of the team actions increase the complexity of his or her task.  
 
 
Figure 2.5.  A model of the manner in which operators make a temporal decision (modified 
from Figure 2.3) 
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Research on distributed cognition has shown that the operation of a socio-technical 
system relies upon the coordination of the activity of a team of people [Hutchins, 1995]. 
Now operators might just be presented with a single computer terminal that reports on 
the state of the system, but might not provide cues as to the actions of others, whereas 
in older control rooms the layout of the room would make the actions of operators 
visible to others, such as in the use of mimic boards in power stations. 
Temporal decision-making in complex systems has changed the manner in which 
operators communicate with co-operators as well as artefacts and systems. It has been 
suggested that, under time pressure or when facing ambiguous system displays, 
operators use sensemaking to develop their mental models of the system [Busby and 
Hibberd, 2004]. Their performance levels are also affected with regard to changes of 
communication and decision-making patterns from considerable reasoning into such as 
dynamic reasoning, negotiation with systems and instinct. Therefore, the interaction 
problems between operators and artefacts in complex systems should be considered as 
design requirements.  
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 39 
 
2.4.3 Ironies of automation 
(USA blackout, 2003) On August 14, 2003, large portions of the Midwest and Northeast 
United States and Ontario, Canada, experienced an electric power blackout. The 
outage affected an area with more than 50 million people who were left in the dark for 
as long as 36 hours. The initial events that led to the cascading blackout occurred in 
Ohio. Three high-voltage transmission lines operated by an electric company 
(FirstEnergy Corp) short-circuited when they came into contact with trees that were too 
close to the lines. The control room operators were unaware of the fault because 
control room alarm system wasn‟t working properly, and also unaware that 
transmission lines had gone down. Therefore they took no action, such as shedding 
load, which could at that time have kept the problem from becoming too large to 
control. And FirstEnergy operators, being unaware of the growing problems, did not 
inform neighbouring utilities and reliability co-ordinators who could have helped 
address the problem. The loss of three lines resulted in the overloading of nearby lines. 
But there were also problems at the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) the 
entity that co-ordinates power transmission in the region that includes FirstEnergy. 
Apparently MISO‟s system analysis tools were not performing effectively on the 
afternoon of August 14
th
, which prevented MISO from becoming aware of FirstEnegy‟s 
problems earlier and taking action. They were using out-dated information to support 
real-time monitoring, which hindered them in detecting further problems in the 
FirstEnegy system, and that MISO lacked an effective means to identify the location 
and significance of transmission line breaker operations reported by its monitoring 
systems. Having that information would have enabled MISO operators to become 
aware of important line outages much earlier. [US-Canada Power System Outage Task 
Force, 2004] 
As we look at this accident in light of human–system interaction, the operators in the 
control rooms could not clearly figure out the state of the systems and failed to cope 
with the abnormal situation. Consequently whole electric systems were shut down 
although there were several chances to minimise the incident. Automation can hide the 
internal progress of the systems from human operators and hinders the views of 
operator to see the circumstances. [Modern Power Systems, 2003] 
The electricity generating and distribution industry is one of the industries that adapt a 
number of complex and automated control systems. However, the above accident case 
shows how its complex and automated designed systems can easily be vulnerable if 
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human operators fail to intervene effectively in case of abnormal circumstances. This is 
a case of ironies in modern automated technologies. 
Automation is defined as the means by which operations are done automatically at 
some level [Sheridan, 1987; Parasuraman et al., 2000]. The dynamic and complex 
nature of systems and the overwhelming amount of data that must be handled by these 
systems provides automation with a critical role in planning, decision-making and 
execution. Shapes and forms of systems have been changed with the introduction of 
automation. Increasing use of automation is represented in changes to the design of 
control rooms and the introduction of new technologies such as robots and remote 
sensing equipment.  
Designers have tried to construct more reliable systems. According to Bainbridge 
(1983) designers may regard humans as the most inefficient and unreliable components 
of the system, therefore their work has been substituted by automated systems. 
However there still remain problems because it is impossible for designers to design a 
system that can be run with no intervention from a human operator [Bainbridge, 1983]. 
It is impossible for the designer to automate all tasks or to identify all potential states 
that a system might enter, and so there is a need to include a means to mitigate against 
these problems – a human operator. However, automation leads operators to lack 
practice in operating the system. In the above case of the USA blackout in 2003, the 
operator in the control room did not correctly recognise the problem due to their lack of 
understanding in such an abnormal situation.  
Therefore automation can fail in many ways. Bainbridge pointed out three things 
induced by the introduction of automation without considering humans. First, 
automation requires that designers produce systems that can cope with component 
failure rather than rely on operators whose role during operations has been changed by 
automation. These changes require that the designer anticipate and correctly address all 
possible failure scenarios. However, systems sometimes fail to produce corresponding 
response signals to warn operators of problems. For example, the system in the above 
accident case did not provide relevant warnings or information on the relationship 
between the problem and causes. Inaccurate automation-aids may cause errors and 
system failure.  
For this reason, design errors can be a major source of operating problems. In the case 
of the USS Vincennes incident in 1988, when a US warship shot down an Iranian 
passenger plane, the naval crew misidentified the target in the computerised Aegis 
display. In July 1988, the USS Vincennes was patrolling the restricted waters of the 
Persian Gulf with the Aegis missile defence system onboard. The Aegis system 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 41 
displayed an attack by an incoming Iranian F-14 fighter. On the basis of information 
displayed on the Aegis user interface, the crew believed that the fighter was rapidly 
descending to prepare for an attack approach on the ship. The crew of Vincennes fired 
two missiles in order to defend themselves. However, it was not Iranian F-14, but a 
civilian aircraft, Iran Air Flight 655. The missiles destroyed the airplane resulting in the 
loss of 290 lives. [ASN, 1988] 
In later analysis, one of the designers of the Aegis display interface reported that the 
altitude information was difficult to interpret correctly. Aegis is highly automatic. 
Threats are identified and targets selected and tracked. It is an autonomic system with a 
sense-model-act architecture. In this instance, the threatening aircraft altitude was not 
shown on the main display, but required that the operator request it, when it would be 
shown in a sub-window with other ancillary data. And rather than show a rate of 
altitude change (as is common in aircraft displays), the altitude of the threat was shown 
as a numeric display, requiring that the Aegis operator do mental arithmetic to 
determine altitude increase or decrease – difficult in normal circumstances, although 
clearly learnable. But under the stress of battle it would be all too simple to make an 
error in arithmetic, especially while the display is rapidly changing. Thus, it would be 
simple to believe that the unknown incoming jet really was in an attack flight pattern, 
and difficult to believe it was not a hostile aircraft [Russel et al., 2003]. 
Second, automation is included as a means to reduce the degree to which operators 
intervene in the operation of the system as a means of reducing the number of actions 
taken by unreliable human operators. This has led to human operators being given a 
task that they are unsuited to, the monitoring of the system over long periods of time. 
For example, a DC-10 tried to land at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York, in 1984, 
touching down about halfway down the runway and about 50 knots over target speed. A 
faulty auto-throttle was probably responsible. However, the flight crew, who apparently 
were not monitoring the airspeed, never detected the over-speed condition [Wiener, 
1988]. 
Third, as the designer cannot anticipate all conditions that a system may encounter, or 
may make errors in the design of the system, automated systems can reach abnormal 
states that require the intervention of a human operator. As a result, human operators 
still remain as a component of the system, with the role of diagnosing abnormal system 
states. These exceptional states, however, correspond to the most challenging and 
obscure problems. Human operators may be unable to respond to these problems as 
automation leads to an absence of opportunities to practising problem diagnosis.  
Furthermore, operators may not be aware of the state of the system, because humans 
are not suited to maintaining vigilant monitoring of a system over a long period of time. 
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Psychological studies have shown that humans are most prone to mistakes in these 
types of tasks, especially when automation has eliminated normal day-to-day 
interaction with the system. They suffer from detecting abnormal situations due to low 
vigilant ability and degraded skills. Bainbridge named this problem mentioned above as 
“the ironies of automation”. 
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2.4.4 Trust in automation 
(Northwest Airline air crash, 1987) Northwest Flight 255 departed Saginaw for a flight 
to Detroit, Phoenix and Santa Ana, arriving at Detroit (DTW) at 19:42. Pushback for 
departure was accomplished at 20:34 and the crew received taxi instructions for 
runway 3C. During the taxi out, the captain missed the turnoff at taxiway C and new 
taxi instructions were given. At 20:42 Flight 255 was told to taxi into position on runway 
3C and hold, followed by a takeoff clearance two minutes later. Shortly after rotation 
the stick shaker (stall warning) activated. The aircraft rolled left and right and the left 
wing struck a light pole in a car rental lot. Flight 255 continued to roll to the left, 
continued across the car lot, struck a light pole in a second rental car lot and struck the 
side wall of the roof in a 90deg left wing down attitude. The plane was still rolling to the 
left when it impacted the ground on a road outside the airport boundary and continued 
to slide along the road, striking a railroad embankment, disintegrating and bursting into 
flames. 
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The flight crew's failure to use the taxi checklist to ensure that 
the flaps and slats were extended for take-off. Contributing the accident was the 
absence of electrical power to the airplane take-off warning system which thus did not 
warn the flight crew that the airplane was not configured properly for take-off. The 
reason for the absence of electrical power could not be determined." [ASN, 1987].  
Originally, pilots manually extended the flaps and slats, performed any manoeuvring 
needed if a stall did occur, and were responsible for the various other tasks needed for 
take-off. Due to the increase in automation of the cockpit, however, they now depend 
on automation to perform the pre-flight tasks reliably and without incident. Pilots have 
now been delegated to the passive role of monitoring the automation and are to 
interfere in its processes only in emergency situations. The accident was caused partly 
by the crew‟s trust and reliance on the aeroplane‟s automation to configure for take-off 
and failure to confirm the configuration with the use of the taxi checklist. The accident 
provides an example of how automation has transformed the role of pilots [Prinzel, 
2002].  
Bainbridge‟s [1983] discussion of the concept of ironies of automation suggests that an 
operator‟s ability to deal with problems that arise in the operation of a system has been 
decreased by automation. The role of the operator has now become one of system 
supervisor. In order to effectively operate the system, the operator has to place 
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appropriate trust in the automation underlying the system. 
Within social psychology there has been recognition of the importance of trust in 
activity. For example, the performance of an economic system is dependent upon the 
degree of trust that individuals have in it.  If people fail to trust a market system the 
whole system will be disrupted in a moment, as demonstrated by the 1929 great panic 
in America. Based on models from social psychology about how people would trust 
one anther, Muir and Moray [1994] attempted to define a model of trust in automation. 
With the development of automation the concept of trust has became important in 
technological fields as the role of human operators has been restricted to supervision of 
the system. The interface of the system may make it difficult for the operator to 
understand the operation of the system as the mechanisms of computerised and tightly 
coupled systems may be hidden from view. For example, in the Üeberlingen mid-air 
collision accident (2002), the pilot in one aircraft suffered from a decision making 
problem as to which instruction he had to follow, between the air traffic controller and 
the Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) fitted in the aircraft.  
In automated systems, decisions about managing the system depend on the operator‟s 
perception and understanding of data from the system shown on control room visual 
displays. These views represent virtual images because the images of the state of 
systems on the screen represent a filtered view of the system gathered from sensors 
within the system. Therefore, it is important for systems to give operators information 
that can be trusted. It was suggested by Muir that trust is the product of three factors; 
predictability, dependability and faith.  
The theory of trust in automation attempts to describe the manner in which an operator 
develops faith in a system and their attitudes towards the system. If an operator uses a 
tool to help her/him accomplish a task, s/he is seen as trusting the tool to some degree. 
It is related to the dependability of the system as well as the predictability of the system. 
From this perspective, trust in systems depends on the frequency of success the 
operator has had in using the system during recent operations. Although operators may 
place trust in one part of a system‟s automation, this might not extend to all the 
automation within a system. In other words, trust can be partitioned, the operators may 
trust the different sub-systems to different degrees, depending on how these sub-
systems behave. 
Designers would hope that operators would trust a system because trust in automation 
can increase the productivity of the system. For example, operators in a system who 
trust the system may be able to make decisions about system use more quickly than 
those who do not trust the system. To do this it is necessary to increase the perceived 
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reliability of that automation by design. However, there are a number of factors that 
would hinder and reduce the degree to which operators trust the system‟s automation, 
such as unsuitable monitor systems, false alarms, etc. 
As we saw in the discussion of the concept of the irony of automation, systems need 
human intervention even in systems with high levels of automation. For good 
intervention of human operators, the operator has to be aware of the unpredictability in 
system operation that arises from unpredictable environmental conditions, and the 
inherent unpredictability in the system. The following case has been discussed many 
times among researchers as to why the automation system affected the crew in the ship, 
who neglected to check correctly the state of an automation system until the ship was 
close to a critical point. 
In the Royal Majesty incident, on 9 June 1995, the cruise ship Royal Majesty 
which left St George‟s, Bermuda, at about midday bound for Boston had 
sophisticated systems at that time. The ship was equipped with an Integrated 
Bridge System (IBS) consisting of an autopilot obtaining position (NACOS 
25) data from GPS and a navigation unit (Loran-C). While cruising the crews 
did not in doubt about position of the ship. However, the GPS switched to 
dead-reckoning mode because it was no longer receiving satellite signals 
shortly after departure. The GPS antenna was later found to have separated 
from its cable. The autopilot tracked the GPS “data” until the ship grounded on 
the Nantucket shoals. There was substantial cost for the incident.  
[Lützhöoft and Dekker, 2002; Husemann, 2003; NTSB, 1995]  
Trust has negative effects as well as positive, and these have been termed over-trust 
and under-trust. Under-trust leads to disuse (unuse), whilst over-trust leads to misuse 
by operators. Under-trust is represented by failure of trust in automation. When 
automation provides false diagnoses or chooses a tactic to accomplish tasks with which 
the operators disagree, trust declines. Faults in systems also increase mistrust in the 
automation. For example, on 7 February 1993, at London Gatwick Airport, a Boeing 
747-243 suffered problems while landing, the pilot had to make three attempts at 
landing before a safe landing was made. At the second approach, the pilots ignored the 
information being presented to them on the flight deck, which was correct, because in 
their first landing trial they used the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) but it 
failed, so they, therefore, thought the automatic system had deficiencies [AAIB, 1994]. 
However, the most common issue is over-trust.  
Automation-Induced Complacency is another term for inappropriate trust in automation. 
According to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) coding manual [EATMP, 
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2003], automation-induced complacency is defined as “self-satisfaction, which may 
result in non-vigilance based on an unjustified assumption of satisfactory system state”. 
When working in highly reliable automated environments in which the operator serves 
as a supervisory controller, monitoring system states, operators tend to fail to find the 
occasional automation failure [Sarter et al., 1997]. 
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2.4.5 Automation surprises 
(Strasbourg air accident, 1992) On January 20, 1992, an Airbus A320 (Air Inter flew) 
crashed into a mountain on a night during approaching to Strasbourg, France, killing 87 
of the 93 people on board. Following an uneventful flight from Lyons the crew prepared 
for a descent and approach to Strasbourg. At first the crew asked for an ILS approach 
to runway 26 followed by a visual circuit to land on runway 05. This was not possible 
because of departing traffic from runway 26. The Strasbourg controllers then gave flight 
148 radar guidance to ANDLO at 11DME from the Strasbourg VORTAC
5
. Altitude over 
ANDLO was 5000 feet. After ANDLO the VOR/DME
6
 approach profile calls for a 5.5% 
slope (3.3deg angle of descent) to the Strasbourg VORTAC. While trying to program 
the angle of descent, "-3.3", into the Flight Control Unit (FCU) the crew did not notice 
that it was in HDG/V/S (heading/vertical speed) mode. In vertical speed mode "-3.3" 
means a descent rate of 3300 feet/min. In TRK/FPA (track/flight path angle) mode this 
would have meant a (correct) -3.3deg descent angle. A -3.3deg descent angle 
corresponds with an 800 feet/min rate of descent. The Vosges mountains near 
Strasbourg were in clouds above 2000 feet, with tops of the layer reaching about 6400 
feet when flight 148 started descending from ANDLO. At about 3nm from ANDLO the 
aircraft struck trees and impacted a 2710 feet high ridge at the 2620 feet level near Mt. 
Saint-Odile. Because the aircraft was not GPWS
7
-equipped, the crew were not warned. 
[ASN, 1992] 
Thanks to modern digital technologies, the design of control equipment has changed 
and now typically incorporates compact, computerised graphical displays. This has 
certainly been the case in the aerospace industry. The term “glass cockpit8” has been 
introduced in recent years to reflect these changes [Sweet, 1995]. This term refers to 
the current generation of airliner flight decks that incorporate these new technologies. 
These systems were introduced to increase the precision and efficiency of airliner 
operations. 
                                                     
5
 VORTAC: Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Radio Range Tactical Air 
Navigation Aid 
6
 VOR/DME:  VHF Omni-Directional Radio-Range/Distance-Measuring Equipment 
7
 GPWS:  Ground Proximity Warning System 
8
 The term “glass cockpit” is colloquial but has been used in aviation research papers. 
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Such cockpits replace a myriad of gauges, switches, and indicators with several 
computerized display systems. By using computers to manage the on-board systems, 
pilots are able to call up what they want to see when they want to see it. This has 
allowed modern aircraft to require only two crewmembers instead of the three needed 
by their predecessors. However, at the same time, serious problems have arisen related 
to breakdowns in the interaction between human operators and automated systems. 
Great technological advances also place much greater burdens on the designers and 
users of these glass cockpits [Bartolone and Trujillo, 2002].  
Through the graphical displays in a glass cockpit crucial information is conveyed to 
pilots. If the information is misread, misinterpreted, or misunderstood, the results could 
be catastrophic. Knowing this, the developers of such electronic systems must be 
sensitive to how human beings interpret, and misinterpret, data displayed on a screen. It 
has been reported that pilots using FMS (Flight Management Systems) have 
experienced occasionally being unable to maintain awareness of which mode the 
aircraft was in [Sarter and Woods, 1995; Hutchins, 1995b]. 
The term “automation surprise” was introduced by Sarter et al. [1997]. A failure to keep 
the operators informed can lead to what have been euphemistically described by them 
as automation surprises, whereby the system does something which the operators do 
not understand in the current context. Sarter used the term for a glass cockpit situation 
instead of usual term “mode error”. Mode error traditionally refers to the problem that 
the user has in keeping track of the mode a device is in.  The automation surprise 
happens in cases where a system can enter a state that was not explicitly expressed to 
users and not expected by them.[Sarter et al., 1997]. The Bangalore air crash, below, 
illustrates the problem of automation surprise. 
The aircraft departed Bombay at 11:58 hours local time, on 14 February 
1990, for a flight to Bangalore-Hindustan airport, Bangalore. While on final 
approach after being cleared for a visual approach to Runway 09, the aircraft 
descended below the normal approach profile. The steep descent continued 
until the aircraft touched down on a golf course (2300 feet short of the 
runway and 200 feet right of the extended centreline), skidded for several 
hundred feet, impacted an embankment, and caught fire. Failure of the pilots 
to realize the seriousness of a high rate of descent at a low altitude, and 
increase engine power accordingly with the aircraft's Auto-Flight system 
operating in Idle/Open Descent mode was discovered. During the approach 
for landing, the pilots accidentally selected a control mode called “OPEN 
DESCENT”, and were then unable in the time available to work out what 
they had done wrong. In this particular mode, the aircraft cuts back engine 
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power and thereafter maintains its speed by progressively losing height. As a 
result, the rate of descent is immediately too great for safe landing, and, by 
the same token, the aircraft is guaranteed to undershoot the runway. The 
“OPEN DESCENT” mode therefore makes it impossible to maintain a 
meaningful approach to landing, or to override the lack of power, locking the 
aircraft into certain disaster unless and until the mode is cancelled. The pilots 
only discovered their error 10 seconds before impact, leaving them too little 
time for the idling engines to re-spool up to thrust. [ASN, 1990] 
On 24 April 1994 a China Airlines Airbus 300-600 crashed while on approach to 
Nagoya Airport, Japan. During the approach the co-pilot inadvertently engaged the 
aircraft‟s “go-around mode,” which caused the automated systems to attempt to fly 
away from the ground using the aircraft pitch trim system, while the pilots attempted to 
continue the landing approach via input to the elevator. The pilots were unable to 
determine that the pitch trim input of the autopilot system was causing difficulties 
controlling the aircraft. Additionally, the design of the A300 autopilot (at that time) did 
not allow the pilots to override the autopilot by use of opposing control stick pressure. 
Thus, the pilots and automated systems continued to struggle for control, with the 
aircraft eventually pitching up to near vertical, stalling, and crashing on the approach 
end of the runway – killing 264 passengers and crew. In this accident, the pilot 
experienced unexpected performance of the autopilot system in the flight [ASN, 1994]. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 50 
 
2.5 Design Issues with Human Error 
 
Design and human error are related. Many useful theoretical concepts have been 
developed to show how inappropriate design can lead to human error. This section 
introduces several issues related to how design can promote human error. 
 
2.5.1 Problems in the use of Information transfer 
systems 
Designers‟ ideas are produced in the form of artefacts. The ideas and knowledge of the 
designer are embodied in the form and function of the artefact. There is knowledge that 
the designers intend to express. However, the designer‟s knowledge may not be 
apparent to the user of the artefact as a result of limitations in the expression space of 
the artefacts. Users or operators understand the ideas embodied by the designer in the 
artefact through contact with and use of the artefact. However, this use and the 
operator‟s perceptions of the artefact are mediated by their experience and common 
knowledge. Therefore, there is the possibility that operators will misinterpret what the 
designer wanted to deliver to users. 
Psychological research reveals that human beings tend to worry about disconnections 
between information and knowledge [Festinger, 1975]. For example, when an operator 
encounters unknown or unfamiliar artefacts during the conduct of a task, he or she 
tends to carry on with the task rather than try to infer information from the artefact of 
system using his or her experience and cognitive knowledge.  
When we see information flow from designers to users (Figure 2.6), the ideas of 
designers about artefacts are transferred into users through the artefacts. However, the 
meaning of ideas that designers really want to deliver cannot be correctly interpreted by 
users unless the users‟ knowledge and experience match with the ideas of the designers 
because there are no direct contacts between designers and users. If the knowledge and 
information inferred from the artefact by operators is different from that the designers 
expect users to infer, we can say that there is a deficiency in the information transfer 
system. 
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Figure 2.6. A model of the manner in which information is transferred between designers 
and users 
2.5.2 Design affordance 
(Scottsbluff train collision, 2003) On February 13, 2003, about 12:25 p.m., an 
eastbound Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) unit coal train collided with a 
BNSF yard train on the main track in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. The coal train consisted of 
2 locomotives and 124 loaded cars; the yard train consisted of 1 locomotive and 16 
freight cars. Both locomotives of the coal train and 28 cars of coal derailed; the 
locomotive and 3 cars of the yard train derailed. The crew of the coal train consisted of 
an engineer and a conductor. The engineer received minor injuries, and the conductor 
sustained fatal injuries. The crew of the yard train consisted of an engineer, a 
conductor, and a brakeman. The engineer said that he could see the switch banners, 
but not the switch points. According to the engineer, the switch banners were "all 
green" as he proceeded eastward. He mistakenly thought that this indicated that the 
route was lined for a straight movement in the direction of the lead track. Although the 
display indicated that the yard switches were lined for movement down the lead track, 
the green switch banner on the inside switch indicated that this switch was lined for a 
diverging movement onto the main track. Had this switch been lined for movement on 
the lead track, as the engineer intended, its switch banner would have been yellow 
[NTSB, 2003]. They just followed the signal according their cultural perception that 
green sign mean they allow to go. 
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Conceived by Gibson [1977] the term “affordance” refers to the perceived and actual 
properties of an artefact, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just 
how it could possibly be used [Norman, 1998]. For example, a chair affords (“is for”) 
support and, therefore, affords sitting. A chair can also be carried. Every artefact has its 
own affordance. If designers design an artefact with features against the affordance 
perception of users, the user perceives the properties of the artefact in different ways. 
For example, if a knob is installed on a device, a user perceives that the knob has a 
function of changing the setting of the device by controlling the knob, although the 
designer designed the knob for a different purpose. 
For the designer the concept of affordance is closely related to the functions of artefacts. 
Designers include a number of features in an artefact that are related to the artefact‟s 
function. They expect that these features lead users to understand by implication their 
function. On the contrary, the meanings (e.g. function) that the designers intend to 
provide may be not well delivered to operators if the artefact does not have enough 
affordance. Humans intrinsically perceive the functions of things by identifying the 
artefact‟s physical affordance (in shape, size, or sound).  
Modern electronic systems, however, have lost many of the characteristics of physical 
affordance that the previous generation of mechanical systems would have possessed. 
Especially, in automation systems physical affordances are melted down into 
monitoring screen represented as digital numbers or graphics. In these systems 
affordances are represented in the form of graphics on visual display units.  The design 
of human–computer interfaces does not have to include any correspondence between 
the content of the display and the physical system. The affordance of artefacts provides 
indications as to the functions of the artefact. In modern automation technology, 
therefore, it is necessary to expand on the concept of affordance and employ it in the 
analysis of the content of the computerised visual display units and associated aural 
annunciator that form part of many contemporary systems [Norman, 1993]. 
In the case of the Ladbroke Grove train collision (1999), the reason the driver of the 
accident train passed a signal at red while cancelling the warning alarm may be related 
to the concept of affordance. It is conceivable that the driver was not aware that an 
error had been made. The driver was inexperienced, and so may not have noticed that 
the train was proceeding onto the wrong section of railway track. Although the driver 
would be expected to periodically assess the progress in an activity, even following the 
use of an automated set of skills, this requires that there are cues which indicate that an 
action has deviated from that planned [HSE, 2000]. Although there had been previous 
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incidents when signal SN109 had been passed at danger, these had been by experienced 
drivers who had recognised the error when their trains had been directed onto the 
wrong section of railway track. 
It was suggested in the report of this incident [HSE, 2000] that the cancellation of the 
AWS could have been an automatic response. The AWS warning does not distinguish 
between caution and stop aspects. On the approach to a major station, such as 
Paddington, the volume of traffic means that many of the signals that drivers encounter 
would show caution aspects. As a consequence, drivers cancel AWS warnings on a 
regular basis, which could lead to a potential automation of their response. In this case, 
the driver may simply have mistakenly believed that the AWS warning at signal SN109 
indicated that it was possible to proceed. He was not alone in experiencing problems 
whilst driving in the Paddington area. Signal SN109 recorded one of the highest levels 
of Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) incidents on the UK Railtrack network [HSE, 2000]. 
In this case, designers made functions for the warning signals and expected operators to 
distinguish the signals between red and yellow even if the sounds were the same. 
However, the meaning of information is different for the actual operators in the trains. 
Affordance provides strong clues as to the operation of things. For example, slots are 
for inserting things into. Balls are for throwing or bouncing. When affordances are 
taken advantage of, the user knows what to do just by looking; no picture, label or 
instruction is required. Such properties make things easy for the user of an artefact. We 
hold a pencil in such a way that it fits comfortably in the hand, ignoring the myriad less 
appropriate ways that it might be grasped. The pencil affords being held in this way as 
a result of its length, width, weight, and texture, which correspond to the size, 
configuration, and musculature of our hand. Further, we can see most of these 
properties and relationships; we can often tell how to interact with an object or an 
environmental feature simply by looking at it, with little or no thought involved. 
Affordances in the physical world are an intuitive notion, easily described and 
understood through example. Like many such concepts, however, it is difficult to 
define in precise analytical terms. Imagine yourself in the act of sitting down in a chair. 
There are at least four separate affordance-related concepts involved. First are the 
affordances proper: the seat of the chair is horizontal, flat, extended, rigid, and 
approximately knee-high off the ground, all relative to your own proportions and 
position. Second is perception of these properties, the surfaces, distances, areas, 
textures, relationships between parts, and so forth. Third is the mental interpretation 
derived from the perceptions. Fourth and finally is the act of sitting itself. An 
examination of these positions will give a better understanding of the subtleties 
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involved. 
If affordance fails it causes human error. For example, researchers found that in the 
1940s, pilots often retracted the landing gear instead of the landing flaps after landing. 
This was because the designers had put two identical toggle switches side-by-side, one 
for the landing gear, the other for the flaps [Chapanis, 1999]. Pilots might fail to 
identify the gear/switches because of the similarities in their positions and in 
shapes.[Norman, 1992].   
There are three issues in affordance for design. Good affordances allow users to use the 
artefact very easily without laborious cognitive efforts because they are well connected 
with humans‟ expectations in constraints and mapping (e.g. sign “R” means right 
position). Wrong affordance induces wrong action for users. For example, a door has a 
handle suggesting it can be pulled but it does not provide the function correctly. 
Missing an affordance is another problem of affordance. If any artefact does not 
provide any affordance about how it works, people will be confused about what to do 
with the artefact.  
Affordance can be regarded as a series of conceptual spaces that underlie a user‟s 
reasoning about an artefact and its state. Flach and Dominguez [1995] suggested that 
there were three conceptual spaces: an affordance space, a control space, and an 
information space. The affordance space is those functions that can be performed on a 
particular system through the user interface. The control space is comprised of the set 
of inputs that the user can make via the system controls. Information space represents 
the output the system presents to the operator through auditory and visual displays. It is 
suggested that the control space can constrain operators to safe modes of operation. The 
control space also may reduce the working memory load of operators attempting to 
complete specific tasks.  
The concept of knowledge in the world suggests that well developed artefacts can 
provide operators with relevant information that meet the need of the operators to 
represent and manipulate all the information required to complete a task within 
working memory [Norman, 1993].  
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2.5.3 Action cycle and Gulf
9
 of execution/evaluation 
(American Airlines air accident, 1995) On December 20, 1995, At about 18:34 EST, 
American Airlines Flight 965 took off from Miami for a flight to Cali. At 21:34, while 
descending to FL(flight level) 200, the crew contacted Cali Approach. The aircraft was 
63nm out of Cali VOR (which is 8nm South of the airport)) at the time. Cali cleared the 
flight for a direct Cali VOR approach and report at Tulua VOR. Followed one minute 
later by a clearance for a straight in VOR DME approach to runway 19 (the Rozo 1 
arrival). The crew then tried to select the Rozo NDB (Non Directional Beacon) on the 
Flight Management Computer (FMC). Because their Jeppesen approach plates
10
 
showed 'R' as the code for Rozo, the crew selected this option. But 'R' in the FMC 
database meant Romeo. Romeo is a navaid 150nm from Rozo, but has the same 
frequency. The aircraft had just passed Tulua VOR when it started a turn to the left 
(towards Romeo). This turn caused some confusion in the cockpit since Rozo 1 was to 
be a straight in approach. 87 Seconds after commencing the turn, the crew activated 
Heading Select (HDG SEL), which disengaged LNAV and started a right turn. The left 
turn brought the B757 over mountainous terrain, so a Ground Proximity Warning 
System (GPWS) warning sounded. With increased engine power and nose-up the crew 
tried to climb. The spoilers were still activated however. The stick shaker then activated 
and the aircraft crashed into a mountain at about 8900 feet (Cali field elevation being 
3153 feet) [ASN, 1995]. 
Hutchins et al. [1985] described a model of an “action cycle” (Figure 2.7) which they 
believed described the cognitive processes a human employs to attain his or her goals. 
In their model, there are seven processes in the action cycle, that are divided into two 
sets, execution and evaluation. In the execution part there are three stages; the intention 
to act, the description of an action sequence to attain a goal, and execution of that 
action sequence. When we set a goal we formulate an intent to act so as to achieve the 
goal.  
The actual sequence of actions that we plan to conduct is followed by physical 
                                                     
9
 The term “gulf “coined by Norman has been used in human computer interaction to 
describe gap or mismatch between user‟s goal for action and the means to execute that 
goal. 
10
 Approach Plates is a common term used to describe the printed procedures or charts, 
more formally Instrument Approach Procedures(IFR), that pilots use to fly approaches 
during IFR operations. (http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Approach+Plates+) 
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execution of that action sequence. The “evaluation” aspect also has three stages; 
perceiving the state of the world, interpreting the perception according to our 
expectations and evaluation of this interpretation in relation to what we expected to 
happen. As executions are made people try to perceive its sequence and the stage of the 
world where they act. After that we compare and interpret current states with prior state 
and interpret according to our expectations. Finally we evaluate the interpretation with 
what we expected to happen.  
The World
Goals
Intention to act
Sequence of actions
Execution of the 
action sequence
Evaluation of 
interpretations
Interpreting the 
perception
Perceiving the 
state of the world
Execution Evaluation
 
Figure 2.7.  Action cycle (from Norman, 1998) 
A human may need media to contact the world. It means that most our perception and 
actions depend on an interface by which the interaction with the system would be 
mediated. For the action cycle we need intermediate devices to achieve goals. In 
modern technological systems human actions act on control equipment. In the 
operation of complex systems, users typically exchange information with the program 
that controls the physical artefacts within the system through the user interface. 
Designers would like operators to carry out tasks by exploiting artefacts in the manner 
that designers expect. Designers also wish that operators would follow a pre-defined 
problem solving procedure if they encounter problems with the system. However, 
operators may not act in the manner that designers expect. 
Gulf of execution refers to the difference between intended action and the actions that 
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the operator believes that the system will allow. For example, in a computer software 
program an operator wants to interrupt a procedure of the program and change into 
other procedure, but the program (designers) do not expect that case and expect the 
operator to wait until the procedure has finished. The designer does not provide the 
operator with an appropriate menu to cancel the preceding operation and change to the 
other procedure. This is the case of mismatch between the user‟s intention and the 
allowable actions. It is important that a capability of design might exist but that this 
might not be apparent to the user from the user interface.  
The most famous case of gulf of execution was the Therac-25 radiation treatment 
equipment accident in Texas in 1986. A radiation machine called Therac-25 was 
developed in order to treat malignant tumours. The equipment was designed to have 
two modes; “Electron mode” and “X-ray mode”. The first mode was low-energy mode 
and the latter was a high voltage mode with a grid to reduce the radiation density. The 
mode was changed by an operator simply entering the signs („x‟ for X-ray mode or „e‟ 
for electron mode) on the computer screen. In one of the accidents involving the 
machine, when an operator in charge of the equipment in a hospital clicked a start 
button to treat a patient, she immediately recognised she had made a mistake. She 
needed to treat the patient with the electron mode, not the X-ray mode. She pressed the 
up arrow, selected the “Edit” command, hit „e‟ for electron mode, and hit „enter‟, 
signifying she has completed configuring the system and was ready to start treatment. 
There was an error message. She did not understand the meaning of the message. To 
solve the problem, she re-entered a “beam ready” command. She tried it again 
desperately several times. The patient died four months later. The problem was that the 
change of modes never occurred because of the error function, and additionally the grid 
was removed from its position. Therefore the patient was exposed to full power of 
radiation. It turned out that this particular sequence of actions within this timeframe had 
never occurred in all of the testing and evaluation of the equipment. There were no 
feedback and execution cues that operators needed [Levenson and Turner, 1993].  
If a system does not provide users with a semantic result of an action done to achieve a 
goal, there is a gulf of evaluation. The semantic result means that it should be 
represented in the form comparable with the goal (e.g. show achievement/target in a 
graph). The gulf of evaluation refers to the amount of effort that the operator has to 
invest in deciding what the state of the system is compared with a goal. It also refers to 
whether the operator can interpret the state of the system from presented information, 
which might not be the case. For instance, when an operator enters data, but the system 
does not show the entered data with a goal, but just shows the entered data only in the 
screen because the designer expects the user to know well the goal. The user has 
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suffered from not knowing how much he/she has achieved and has to do for the goal. 
This is mismatch between the system‟s representation and the user‟s expectations.  
The phenomenon of the gulf of evaluation have been found a number of accident cases, 
as for example, the case of Methotrexate
11
 toxicity of a patient of the UK National 
Health Service:  
In 2000 a woman died of Methotrexate toxicity. She had been treated for 
rheumatoid arthritis since 1997. Doctors who treated her prescribed a dose of 
Methotrexate 17.5 mg once a week. In January 2000, the patient underwent an 
operation to replace her right knee. As a result the dosage of the drug was 
altered from 17.5 mg weekly to a daily 2.5 mg dose during her entire stay of 
eight days. On 6 April 2000, she and her daughter asked a GP (General 
Practioner) to prescribe Methotrexate in a way that involved taking fewer 
tablets, as experienced in hospital during the patient‟s January 2000 admission. 
The GP agreed and issued a prescription for Methotrexate 10mg tablet, 
entering the prescription “daily” inadvertently into a computer although the 
intention had been 10 mg “as directed”. Therefore, Methotrexate 10 mg daily 
was recorded on the General Practice‟s computer. The community pharmacist 
dispensed Methotrexate 10 mg once daily. Therefore the patient took one 10 
mg tablet daily and total dose of 70 mg a week following the directions printed 
on the medicine bottle. On 12 April 2000, another GP was on duty signing 
repeat prescriptions and received a repeat prescription request from the patient. 
The GP recognized the dose of Methotrexate was incorrect, and interpreted this 
as a one-off error by the staff producing the prescription. It seemed impossible 
to the GP that such a dose could have been previously prescribed or dispensed. 
He therefore crossed out the word “Methotrexate” on the prescription, 
anticipating that a correct prescription would consequently be presented for 
signing. The GP did not inspect or change the patient‟s computer drug record. 
As a result, an incorrect recoding remained on the computer. … No one had 
recognised the symptoms of her condition until after she died. [Cambridgeshire 
                                                     
11
 Methotrexate is a folic acid antagonist and is classified as an antimetabolite cytotoxic 
immunosuppressant agent. It has been used for many years as a therapy for cancers 
such as leukaemias, lymphomas and solid tumours such as breast and lung cancer. It is 
also used to treat severe forms of psoriasis, a chronic skin disease, and has been widely 
used as a disease modifying drug for rheumatoid arthritis. Because of its potential 
toxicity, however, Methotrexate needs to be carefully monitored particularly for 
adverse effects on the bone marrow and liver.  
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Health Authority, 2000]  
It appears that the GP who wrongly prescribed the drug had no intention of changing 
the patient‟s total weekly dose of 17.5 mg, but to simplify it by reducing the number of 
tablets to be taken from seven tablets to four once weekly (1 x 10 mg and 3 x 2.5 mg – 
the patient already had a supply of 2.5 mg tablets). However, it has been identified that 
the GP made an inputting error into the practice-based computer entering the 
abbreviation “od” (once daily) instead of “asd” (as directed) into the computer. This 
error resulted in the prescription being generated from the computer stating 
“Methotrexate 10mg daily”. At the time of this event the practice‟s computer system 
did not have any warning message about Methotrexate and its weekly dosage regime. 
Also the pharmacy computer system did not have any warning message about 
Methotrexate and its weekly dosage regime. 
The suppliers of Methotrexate tablets market 2.5 mg and 10 mg strengths as yellow 
tablets. The 2.5 mg tablet is scored on one side with “M2.5” and is pale yellow, whilst 
the 10 mg tablet is scored “M10” and is a deeper yellow colour. The tablets are the 
same size and shape. 
One of the design problems in this case is how to prevent users from entering wrong 
data inadvertently. Systems were needed to provide users with relevant results of the 
input data for feedback. If the computer system gave a result of the total amount of 
dosage of the drug the doctor would have recognised his fault of input data easily. The 
designer of the computer system omitted evaluating whether the input data is relevant 
or not. The designers may think that users check input data if they thought the data 
were important. However, users of the computer tend to believe the computer system, 
thinking the computer evaluates the data and shows the results when the data are 
invalid. Such types of different understanding between designers and operators on a 
system are shown in many accident reports. For example, in the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant accident in 1979, operators failed to recognise that the relief valve 
was stuck open because the indicator on the control panel misled them. The indicator 
only showed the commanded state of the valve, however the operator thought the 
indicator showed the actual state of the valve [Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1990].  
We can see other example of gulf of evaluation in the case of East Midlands airport 
accident in 1989.  
On 8 January 1989, an aeroplane flew into the bank of the M6 motorway while 
trying to land at East Midlands Airport, UK. The left engine of the aeroplane 
failed, but the crew shut down the right (functioning) engine by looking at 
displays (Figure 2.8). They struggled with the problem for many minutes until 
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the realised their mistake, by which time it was too late to take corrective 
action. The crew believed that their objective was achievable by following a 
particular course of action, but the actions they took closed down the space of 
future interaction possibilities, and the feedback they received did not alert 
them to their misunderstanding of the state of the system until it was too late. 
[AAIB, 1990] 
The cockpit system is very complicated (Figure 2.9). At the time of hectic conditions, 
situations impact on human cognition. The investigation report suggested new designs 
that consider increased human perception (Figure 2.10). The execution gulf happens 
when preparing an action, while the evaluation gulf exists when evaluating the action. 
The causes of these gulfs mainly originate from designers‟ poor expectations about 
operators [Norman, 1998].  
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Figure 2.8 Indicators of both engines (AAIB, Aircraft accident report 4/90, 1990) 
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Figure 2.9 A view of cockpit control room (AAIB, Aircraft accident report 4/90, 1990) 
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Figure 2.10. Recommendation for human-oriented design (AAIB, Aircraft accident report 
4/90, 1990) 
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2.5.4 Risk homeostasis 
(Titanic disaster, 1912) On April 10, 1912, the new Royal Mail Steamer, Titanic, flagship 
of the White Star Line, cast off from Southampton, England, on her maiden voyage to 
New York. She carried 2,208 passengers and crew. 4 days after her departure from the 
port, she was crossing the middle of Atlantic Ocean. At 11:40 p.m. on April 14, one of 
the lookouts, stationed in the crow‟s nest, noticed something in the distance. He rang 
the warning bell three times, signalling the bridge of an object directly ahead, and 
picked up the bridge-crow‟s-nest telephone. A terse exchange over the telephone 
effectively warned the bridge of the impending danger, however, the warning had come 
to late to avert a collision. She broke in two and then sank into the deep sea with over 
1,500 lives lost.  
During the entire voyage the weather was clear and the sea was calm with sunshine. 
On the third day out from port ice warnings were received by the wireless operators on 
the Titanic, and at least three of these warnings came direct to the commander of the 
ship on the day of the accident, the first about noon, from the Baltic, of the White Star 
Line. This message places icebergs within five miles of the track that the Titanic was 
following, and near the place were the accident occurred. The second message was 
sent from the California, another ship which was cruising near the Titanic, reporting ice 
about 19 miles to the northward of the track that the Titanic was following. The third 
message was reported from the Amerika. The final message was sent by the California 
reading “ We are stopped and surrounded by ice.” The reply of the Titanic; “Shut up. I 
am busy. I am working Cape Race.” The Titanic was just following the track where 
reports by other ships warned there was ice. No general discussion took place among 
the officers; no conference was called to consider these warnings; no heed was given 
to them. The speed was not reduced, the lookout was not increased, and the only 
vigilance displayed by the officer of the watch was by instructions to the lookout to keep 
a sharp lookout for ice [USA Senate inquiry report]. 
Why did not the crewmembers in the ship reduce speed and prepare for the danger? 
Why did they ignore the warning signals reported by preceding ships? Why did they 
take the risk? Titanic was constructed with new technology at that time, the designers 
adopted everything that supported the functionality including performance, capacity 
and safety. It was said of the safety of the ship: “In the event of an accident, or at any 
time when it may be considered advisable, the captain can, by simply moving an 
electric switch, instantly close the (watertight) doors throughout, practically making the 
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vessel unsinkable” (The Shipbuilder, 1912). The ship was supposed to stay afloat for 
days until assistance arrived. Operators including the Captain might be confident about 
the technology embodied in the ship. This plan only worked, however, if only four 
compartments were flooded. At the time of the accident, the iceberg breached five 
compartments.  
According to risk homeostasis theory, there is a propensity for human beings to depend 
on systems and to act more dangerously if they think that this system is more reliable 
than one that performed the same function that they had used before [Wilde, 1982]. As 
a result, the introduction of new systems with enhanced safety features may feature the 
same total risk as preceding systems. For instance, car manufacturers develop and 
install safety devices (e.g. ABS, air bags, safety belts) designed to protect drivers and 
reduce risk. However, the driver tends to drive at higher speeds because they believe 
the systems are safer, negating the reduction in total risk that the safety devices were 
designed to promote [Wilde, 1998].  
The designers of the Titanic might have wanted the ship to be the safest as well as the 
most luxurious one in the world. Therefore, a number of newly emerging technologies 
such as safety systems which included a double-skin hull (the bottom space divided 
into 73 watertight compartments), 19 bulkheads and electric doors, 48 lifeboats and 
advanced water pump technology had been adopted to help to increase the reliability of 
the ship by reducing risk. However, the system could not help in avoiding the risk of 
the operator‟s wrong decision [Kozak, 2003].  
The nature of humans is to be risk taking to some degree when they feel the 
circumstances are safer compared to a previous situation. For example, a jaywalker 
may pay more attention when crossing a road than a pedestrian who is crossing at a 
crossing-point designated for them. Safety devices provide better means for increasing 
safety in many areas. However, these devices do not affect people‟s desire to take 
greater risks. Risk homeostasis has also been called risk “compensation theory” by 
Peltzman [1975].  
Peltzman [1975] showed how human beings change one risk to another risk. He 
explained that the decrease in car-occupant deaths in highway fatality rates was exactly 
matched by increases in non-occupant deaths. Therefore offset behaviour of drivers had 
nullified the potentially beneficial effects of the new safety standards. Other studies of 
traffic-related accidents suggested that the introduction of several automobile safety 
regulations (e.g. in the 1970s, safety related rules were introduced in the USA such as 
wearing of seat-belts on highways, etc.) is ineffective in the long run [Geller, 1995; 
Streff, 1998]. They showed that the total level of injury risk may be unchanged if the 
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regulation simply reallocates risk from one activity to another, or from automobile 
users to groups of pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists. 
People have a level of risk they will accept to accomplish a particular task. If a safety 
device is included in a system, they will behave in a manner that is consistent with the 
level of risk they will accept. Consequently, if a car has a safety device such as ABS, 
this means that the individual moving from a non-ABS equipped car will believe that if 
they transfer their non-ABS driving behaviour to the ABS-equipped car, the overall risk 
from driving will decrease. However, as the individual recognises that this is below 
their accepted level of overall risk for driving, they will modify their driving behaviour 
to improve the productivity of the task until they reach the same perceived overall risk 
as would be the case in driving the non-ABS equipped car. 
Reason [1997] also suggested that the reduced risk associated with exploiting a specific 
range of system affordances might lead the user to believe that he or she can exploit a 
greater range of system affordances. In other words, increased protection is exploited as 
a means of gaining increased production, or increasing the efficiency with which a task 
can be conducted. It is argued that efforts to remove causes of human error by 
incremental improvement of system design is ineffective due to the adaptive risk 
compensation of operators [Rasmussen, 1999]. For example, in the case of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, operators in the system did not think it would 
cause an accident even though they knew they violated safety rules. They tried to 
continue tests with getting rid of some safety devices. One of the operators said: “We 
had many experiences of excessive removal of rods, I‟d say – and nothing happened…”, 
“No one of us could envisage those actions could cause nuclear accidents. We knew 
these actions were prohibited, but we never thought …” (quoted in Gorbachev, 2003). 
Designers attempt to reduce risk by increasing the reliability of systems with protective 
equipment such as safety devices. Most work achieved by designers who have tried to 
reduce risk and increase reliability of systems is also related to productivity and 
economic reasons. There are several ways to accomplish risk reduction and increasing 
system productions. These include: accurately computing reliability, increasing use of 
automation, inclusion of safety devices for operators, adding protection to systems, and 
including emergency systems. With these safety systems, therefore, appearance 
(surface) risk seems to be lowered more than in the past for operators, which can lead 
users to have over-confidence in the use of the system. These factors contribute to the 
development of new and unexpected risks [Adams, 1995]. 
Designers have cut down costs of systems by using more accurate computational 
techniques that lead to reduced safety margins as well as reduced risk of failures of the 
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systems. In the past the structures of artefacts and systems were bigger and stronger 
than current artefacts or systems due to larger safety margins provided for system safety. 
The designers of the system involved in the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, 
believed that their safety technology had reduced the risk of a nuclear power plant 
failure. They decided to build the nuclear power plant near to a densely populated 
location to save electrical loss. The plant was constructed without a cover, believing in 
the safety systems and abilities of the operators. 
Artefacts and systems, however, have become more and more slim and compact in 
structures and features. Although the system has become more accurate and complex, 
this change has been accompanied by a reduction in the margin for error.   
When hidden risk induced by safety systems is added to the apparent risk, the real risk 
(actual risk) appears. Hidden risk consists of unexpected risk and new risks induced by 
design of systems. 
Real risk = apparent risk + hidden risk induced by safety systems 
Therefore, although reliability of systems is increased, the real risk remains the same. 
Sometimes significant of the risk may be even higher or bigger than before. In fact, 
actual risk may not be reduced greatly compared with before. Risk hidden in modern 
systems is not well detected due to its scale and the tight-coupled mechanisms of 
system and the inclusion of additional safety devices [Perrow, 1984]. Apparent risk is 
reduced by a number of safety devices, protection systems and emergency systems. 
Human operators, however, tend to assume that apparent risk is the same as the real 
risk. Thanks to increased reliability and amount of safety systems, operators feel they 
have a chance to exploit systems to a greater extent, and to increase the performance 
level of the system. Consequently, they tend to act more dangerously than before, 
which can lead to their encountering an unexpected risk [Reason, 1997].  
Combining human nature on risk taking and over-confidence in systems, users 
occasionally forget the limitations of the system. That leads to negligence or ignoring 
of warning information and sometimes they exploit the systems, violating some safety 
rules. Therefore, the characteristics of risk homeostasis in terms of human interaction 
with systems can be described as risk taking and risk alteration. 
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2.5.5 Decision reasoning and plan delegation 
In complex systems there is a need to prepare some planned behaviour by operator and 
maintenance staff in order to maintain the integrity of the system [Rasmussen, 1987]. 
The roles of that behaviour are called „plan delegation‟ [Busby and Hughes, 2003]. 
Designers expect that operators and maintenance personnel do their work according to 
the process that the designer planned even though it might not be explicitly expressed 
in manuals or instructions. However, the operator and maintenance staff believe that the 
designer has prepared a device that will cope with abnormal circumstances. Absences 
or misunderstandings about plan delegation, therefore, imperil the system. Plan 
delegation is of extreme importance at the time when changes are made to the system 
states (e.g. start-up, shut-down, dismantling and reassembling). 
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2.6 Summary of the literature review 
The literature review that has been conducted has examined two main issues. Firstly, 
there has been an examination of the research on the manner in which error occurs. 
Secondly, there has been an examination of the phenomena that are related to design 
and human error. The purpose of this section is to summarise what we have achieved in 
research on human–system interaction failures, and what is still needed to develop 
methods for use from the results of the research. Table 2.3 summarises the literature 
review. 
Table 2.3 Summary of literature review 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
STEPS 
THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUD 
FINDING (UNDERSTANDING ON 
BEHAVIOUR ON DESIGNED 
ARTIFACT) 
Study for human 
error 
– General Human Error 
Modelling Systems 
(Section 2.3.2) 
– Distributed cognition 
theory (Section 2.3.3) 
– Three modes of human error in different 
human performance levels (skill-based, 
rule-based, knowledge based performances) 
– Cognition in a complex system is socially 
distributed, embedded with representations 
in artificial systems, and they are connected 
each others culturally  
Identifying 
issues in 
complex 
systems and 
automation 
issues  
– Characteristics of 
complex systems and 
automation (Section 
2.4.1) 
– Temporal decision 
making condition theory 
(Section 2.4.2) 
– The complex and automated modern 
systems create new types of situations for 
operators 
– what human operators encounter during 
operation in a complex system are time 
pressure, the number of system functions 
and the invisibility of a system processes 
Finding theories 
related to design 
issues and 
human error 
 
– Ironies of automation 
theory (Section 2.4.3) 
– Trust in automation 
theory (Section 2.4.4) 
– Automation surprise 
(glass cockpit problems) 
theory (Section 2.4.5) 
– Design affordance 
theory (Section 2.5.2) 
– Gulf of execution and 
evaluation theory 
(Section 2.5.3) 
– Risk homeostasis 
theory (Section 2.5.4) 
– Plan delegation theory 
(Section 2.5.5) 
– Although the increase of automation of 
systems, operators suffer from monitoring  
or degraded abilities to deal operational 
condition with such as emergency  
– Operators tend to rely on automated 
systems not to intervene actively 
– Operators often fail to identify 
representations of systems correctly 
– Representations in systems not well 
communicate with operators 
– Reliability of systems increase a 
possibility of trust in the systems 
– Psychologically Uncomfortable design 
lead for operators to making errors 
– Operators expect usability of artefact 
designed on the artefact itself 
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2.6.1 Issues addressed by previous research 
Thanks to psychological studies on human error, that have examined why failures in 
interactions with artefacts arise, we can expand our knowledge of how to produce more 
reliable designs. Reason [1990] illustrated how our cognitive structures can lead to 
error. His error types, such as slip and mistake in terms of levels of performance, 
provide good explanations of the manner in which people perform tasks and the role 
that experience and physical and psychological constraints have on the occurrence of 
error. We also have some understanding of the manner in which human operators 
exploit and communicate within a system. Following is a summary of the literature 
review: 
 Human error is still one of the main concerns of developing a credible system. 
 Indirect human–system failures have increased, as systems have become more 
automated and complex. 
 Theories have developed to explain such failures. 
 There are several theories that concern design issues in human–system 
interaction failures. 
 
2.6.2 Limitations of previous research 
This chapter examined theories related to human error and design problems. The 
theories showed that even though modern design has developed more credible systems 
there has been still difficulty for human operators to make errors while interacting with 
artefacts/systems in modern complex, automated, and computerised systems. Each 
theory explains well specific phenomena of human error in a system, and how designs 
of the system lead the operator in the system to making errors.  
Although each theory uses a different metaphor to explain phenomena, there is a 
common underlying meaning: raising design issues that lead a human operator to make 
an error. The understanding of the operator in a system is different from the original 
purpose of the system. 
However, it is not only one theory that presents design issues in human error. Several 
theories were found that that explain the issues, and none has tried to provide a 
collective view of the theories (e.g. in terms of the role of design in human error). As a 
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result, theories are isolated from each other and appear to explain issues in different 
ways. There is no integrating approach to combine theories with a specific point of 
view, even those theories addressing similar issues. That may confuse readers 
researching design issues in human error.  
The need to conduct this research was prompted by the lack of an integrating model 
that can provide a collective view of related theories. For example, if a designer want to 
analyse his/her system with regard to human error and safety, it is necessary to review 
related theories. It takes time and effort. Sometimes the designer may miss an important 
theory that should be considered in the design. If he/she has a method to see a 
collective view on theories, it will be easier for him/her to recognise design issues than 
before. 
Accident analysts may also have a problem with interpreting human–system interaction 
failures. If they want to try to investigate design issues in the case, they need an 
interpretational tool for the case. None of an integrated model for theories may hinder 
them to pick up the issue effectively.  
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Chapter 3. Research approach  
The literature review in Chapter 2 examined general human error models and 
characteristics of modern design concepts, and highlighted difficulties of human 
operators who have to carry out tasks in temporal decision making conditions that are 
created by employing the modern design concepts, such as automation, complexity and 
abstract features, that are prevalent in today‟s systems. The previous chapter finally 
identified seven theories that explain phenomena in which the design of systems 
exploits cognition and performances of human operators in contact with modern 
artefacts. These theories however have not been classified or integrated for readers to 
understand more systematically the influences of design on human operators. They 
stand alone without connection to each other. This has prompted a need to develop a 
model that contains the theories within the same paradigm (or category) by identifying 
characteristics in the theories relating to each other in conjunction with design and 
human error, which help to identify design issues easily in human error cases. 
This study was carried out to develop methods by which hidden influences on human 
operators can be better understood. Therefore a concept of design-induced error which 
represents unexpected influences of design adverse to human operators or users in a 
system was introduced by integrating current theories which represent these 
phenomena. This study also explored terms and phrases described in accident report 
documents in order to examine the possibility of capturing the concept of design-
induced error in human error cases. 
This chapter describes an overview of the research approach and methodologies that 
were used in this research. In order to achieve this it is first necessary to identify the 
research objectives that need to be addressed and the issues that must be considered to 
meet them. This research had two main aims: developing a theoretical ontology (i.e. 
meta-theory of design-induced error); and developing a practical ontology (i.e. a 
knowledge-based ontology used in knowledge management systems) of design-induced 
error. For the former aim ontological methodology was adopted in order to synthesise 
related theories, which are relevant to a concept of design-induced error, from an 
extensive literature review and investigation of accident cases. For the latter aim an 
ontology editor (i.e. PC PACK) for knowledge acquisition and ontology construction 
tasks was adopted. 
The reason ontology was chosen as a fundamental methodology of this research is 
presented in the first section (Section 3.1). Designing the research approach and 
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description of research processes follow.  
 
3.1 Meeting the research objectives: Why ontology 
was used in the research 
In the introduction (chapter 1), it was stated that the main objective of this research was 
to develop an appropriate model for the explanation of interaction failure between 
humans and systems in terms of the role of design (i.e. a concept of design-induced 
error). The fulfilment of this research objective requires gaining an understanding of 
design issues that would affect human cognition and performances. This, in turn, 
requires the fulfilment of two additional research objectives. 
Firstly, there is a need to identify relevant theories which address design issues that lead 
to human error in order to develop an appropriate theoretical model. The relevant 
theories are comprised in the model developed because the model is a kind of meta-
theory.  
Secondly, there is a need to choose a methodology by which we can capture the 
contextual factors of design-induced error that exist in accident reports. The 
methodology should be applicable for knowledge acquisition and annotation (mark-up) 
and ontology building from accident documents because an accident report system was 
chosen for applying the meta-theory of design-induced error. With the developed 
knowledge-based ontology of design-induced error, a designer can be provided with the 
means to understand and reason on design issues related to human–system interaction 
failures. 
In order to achieve the objectives, this research adopted ontological methodology as a 
conceptual methodology because ontology is considered as the theory of items and 
ontological methodology is a process to create ontology of a specific domain [Poli, 
2002].  
According to realist philosophers of science, the complex nature of phenomena can be 
regarded as an ontological structure instead of scientific knowledge describing discrete 
atomistic development of this nature [Bhaskar, 1978; Harre and Madden, 1975; 
Outhwaite, 1987].  
In order to represent a whole world of design issues with human error (i.e. a concept of 
design-induced error), this research suggest an ontological approach by which we can 
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construct and understand their relation and issues(e.g. why the operators fail frequently 
to recognise the state of the system?) .. An ontological assumption is to search for what 
exists in a domain of interest. The reason for using the ontological assumption to 
represent a concept of design-induced error is that the concept is difficult to explain 
with logical methodologies (e.g. mathematics). It is better to pursue and show what 
kinds of entities exist in the concept (objects) and what are relations or process between 
them. Ontology is the concept of the structures of objects. Good ontology categorises 
relevant entities within the objects semantically.  
This research tried to gather existing theories that would be composed of a concept of 
design-induced error. The category of a concept of design-induced error is based on 
theory. This is a kind of ontological method. Therefore ontology is a methodology as 
well as an objective in this thesis. 
First of all it is necessary to know and define what is an ontology as used in this thesis. 
The term “ontology” terminologically is defined as: (1) a branch of metaphysics 
concerned with the nature and relations of being, (2) a particular theory about the 
nature of being or the kinds of existences (Webster‟s dictionary).  
There are two aspects to the term ontology. From a philosophical point of view, 
ontology refers to the subject of existence, in which the content of a subject remains the 
same independently of the language used to express it. Ontology is a process of seeking 
a definitive and exhaustive classification of entities in all spheres of being in order to 
answer the question of what classes of entities are needed for a complete description 
and explanation of all the goings-on in the universe, which also include the types of 
relations by which entities are tied together to form larger wholes [Smith, 2003]. 
This aspect includes a study of the objects, properties, categories and relations that 
make up the world. Scholars in this area try to develop an abstract model or theory 
about the world.  
The other aspect of the term of ontology is a model or definition of a world interest 
[Guarino, 1998]. People working in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) or 
knowledge engineering use this aspect in order to develop knowledge-based systems. 
They say that an ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualisation (Gruber, 
1993), or a shared understanding of some domain of interest [Uschold and Gruninger, 
1996]. 
Despite the differences between the philosophical (psychological or social) and 
technological application of the term, ontology is in general a methodology to represent 
a domain from which we can enhance our understanding of the domain as discussed 
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further in Chapter 8. 
Sometimes logic and ontology are comparative concepts. Logic is only a system of 
rules for how to argue successfully, and ontology, as a categorical analysis and general 
theory of what there is, is a system of categories and laws about being [Cocchiarella, 
2001]. Different approaches between “form-oriented approach” and “content-oriented 
approach” in artificial intelligence research illustrate a similar distinction of logics and 
ontology [Mizoguchi et al., 1995]. The former deals with logic and knowledge 
representation, the latter with content of knowledge. 
Although a logical approach has achieved a great deal of advancement in AI research 
(e.g. expert systems) by developing powerful logical reasoning tools, it has been 
confronted with a difficulty over the fundamental issue of knowledge itself in current 
knowledge-management systems. It has nearly failed to answer a question about what 
is knowledge, what properties and relations a specific knowledge has. As a result, 
recently, research on ontology, which is a content-oriented approach, has come to 
gather much attention to tackle the problem that has not been solved by a logical 
approach.  
Ontology is proposed here for that purpose. It is a research methodology that gives us a 
design rationale of a concept of design-induced error, a conceptualization of the world 
of interest, definition of meanings of concepts and relations in order to model the 
concept. It also provides an opportunity to share the knowledge captured in information 
systems.  
This thesis uses the term ontology as: (1) a theoretical basis of a concept (i.e. design-
induced error), and (2) computational conceptualisation of the concept that can be used 
in knowledge-based systems. Therefore this thesis will show two types of theory-based 
ontology of design-induced error.  
The former is a theoretical ontology of a concept of design-induced error by which a 
meta-theory (i.e. an error inducing model) was constructed in Chapter 4. The meta-
theory explaining human–system interaction failures can be used as an interpretation 
methodology of analysing such failures. The latter is a knowledge-based ontology (i.e. 
practical ontology) that is suitable in knowledge transfer in order to capture relevant 
knowledge from information systems (accident report systems in this thesis) developed 
in Chapter 7. 
They intertwine with each other. The theoretical ontology helps to develop the 
knowledge-based ontology, and then the knowledge-based ontology helps to capture 
the concept of design-induced error in real accident reports.  
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3.2 Designing a research approach 
A general process of a research approach (e.g. a general design research methodology 
[e.g. Blessing et al., 1995]) for developing a framework in many fields of research such 
as design, management, education, information, or psychological research follows: 
 Identify question/raise issues 
 Develop a model (or theory, hypothesis, propositions) 
 Evaluate the model developed/analyse theory 
 Analyse findings and confirm the model/discussion about results 
The overall research steps employed in this thesis follows below: 
Phase 1: Questionary studies stage: understand general human error models and 
characteristics of modern design concepts, identify phenomena that concern human 
errors and design problems with well reported accident cases. 
Phase 2: Model development stage: introduce a concept of design-induced error, and 
develop a theoretical model (meta-theory) and an information model (ontology) of 
design-induced error. 
Phase 3: Empirical study stage: select a test base of an accident report system, gather 
data from the accident report system, and screen out human error cases from the system. 
Phase 4: Evaluation stage: analyse screened accident data with meta-theory of design-
induced error, populate ontology instances with the data. 
Phase 5: Discussion stage: discuss the result of analysis in previous phase, usefulness 
of reasoning tools, using search engine, recommendations to designers, accident 
analysis, and accident generating authority.  
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Figure 3.1 Overview of the research approach 
 
3.3 Phase 1: Questionary studies 
Phase 1 aimed to find out relationships between design and human errors. The findings 
from this phase helped to generate research questions and explore design issues in 
human error cases. The literature is mainly used to understand the current human error 
models and characteristics of modern design concepts such as automation, complexity 
of systems, and temporal decision making conditions. Accident cases have been 
explored, which were well analysed by researchers, that are considered as having 
design problems in connection with human–system interactions. Eighteen well-known 
accident cases showing design issues in human error were abstracted from journal 
papers, accident database systems etc. The findings from analysis of accident cases 
confirmed strongly the findings from the literature review; design can affect human 
operators adversely, but no correlation between the theories was identified.  
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3.4 Phase 2: Model development 
As mentioned above there were two steps to develop appropriate models of Design-
induced error that represent adverse influences of design to human cognition and 
performances; meta-theory of design-induced error, and ontology of Design-induced 
error. 
3.4.1 Design of the development of a meta-theory of 
design- induced error 
The main methodology of developing the meta-theory of design-induced error (design-
induced error model) is an ontological method. The ontological methodology makes it 
possible to synthesise related theories gathered from the literature review and to 
categorise them in the light of a concept of design-induced error. The development of a 
theoretical model began with a literature review on human error and psychological 
theories that address design issues in human error. Case study (accident analysis) was 
conducted with well-known cases that raised design issues in human error in order to 
test the developed model. The process ended with constructing a new model (i.e. meta-
theory) of design-induced error (Figure 3.2).  
 
support confirm
literature review theories
new model
case study
provide source
source
 
Figure 3.2 An overview of the development process of a theoretical model  
The literature review on human error research was initiated from research questions 
(e.g. why some aspects of design of a system fail to help prevent users from making an 
error? and, can we create a new model that explains design issues in human–system 
interaction failures?). The literature review moved to find theories related to explaining 
design issues to human error. For the theoretical development of Design-induced error, 
a collection of related cognitive theories is an essential requirement because the failures 
of Design-induced error are based on limitations of human cognition and performance. 
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In order to develop and test a model, a case study was conducted as the next step. Case 
study means accident analysis in term of a concept of design-induced error. Conducting 
the case study had two parts. One is on cases found in the literature that was well 
explained with theory. The other part is a specific accident report system (the 
Australian aviation accident/ incident report system). 
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Figure 3.3 Development stages and methodology in theoretical model development of 
design-induced error 
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3.4.2 Design of the development of a design-induced 
error ontology for knowledge-management systems 
As a practical approach, in order to develop a knowledge-based (KB) ontology we need 
to determine a specific domain to be analysed, carry out knowledge acquisition, and the 
knowledge modelling process (Figure 3.4). This process used methodologies used in 
web and hierarchical technology. PC PACK was the main technical methodology used 
in this process. The meta-theory of design-induced error defined in the previous stage 
was a theoretical methodology of analysing accident reports. An accident report system 
in Australian aviation accident reports found on the Internet was a knowledge domain 
for the analysis of the accident. The choice of ATSB is examined in Chapter 8. 
resource
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Figure 3.4 An overview of the development process of design-induced error ontology for 
knowledge capturing 
The reason for choosing the PC PACK as a technological methodology is that PC 
PACK has a knowledge acquisition tool that makes it possible to extract knowledge 
from documents. It has also a web-publishing tool in which annotated (marked-up) 
documents can be categorised according to concepts. It is also compatible with 
Common KADS and MOKA that are used in an engineering domain. 
In the development stages, in order to define the domain document set that contains the 
concept of design-induced error in a clear form, manual description analysis was 
adopted as a method. After extracting the document, PC PACK was used for the 
knowledge acquisition process, ontology template development process, knowledge 
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annotation, knowledge representation process, and web ontology browser producing 
process. Finally, in order to verify and validate the developed ontology, investigation 
was conducted on knowledge retrieval and representation reasoning support. 
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Figure 3.5 Development stages and methodology in practical model development of design-
induced error 
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3.5 Phase 3: Empirical studies: accident analysis  
Having developed models of design-induced error, it is necessary to test the developed 
models in real situations (accident cases, or human–system interactions). For this 
research, analysis of accident reports was conducted as an empirical study. This is a 
kind of case study in order to find various applications of models developed. How 
many cases containing the concept of Design-induced error are there in real accident 
cases? How does the model apply to accident analysis? Does this model make it easier 
to capture the concept than without the model? 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to prove the rightness of models of Design-induced 
error. The model of design-induced error is based on meta-theory that reinterprets a 
theory with a new paradigm. Therefore theoretical proof is beyond the research because 
the main aim of the study is to find methods of application of theories. 
Accident analysis case study using a particular accident database system was chosen to 
develop detailed and intensive knowledge about design-induced error and capturing the 
concept.  
Choice of an accident database set 
Analysis of accident reports is one of the most important sources for identifying 
contributory factors (Johnson, 2000). Many human-error researchers have devoted 
themselves to accident analysis. The choice of an accident report system as an 
empirical data set is a critical stage for achieving relevant research results. Which 
dataset is appropriate depends on the purpose of the research. The following are the 
main criteria to choose an accident data set:  
 Rich information: Does the data contain much relevant information? 
 Web-available: For developing a knowledge based system, it is necessary that 
the target data should be available on the Worldwide Web.  
 Sizeable: A reasonable number of data entries is necessary to confirm the 
model. There is no fixed number of cases needed; however, a larger number 
may be more useful for data gathering and validation than a small number of 
cases.  
 Easy to access or search: If the data cannot be analysed easily, it will be less 
well-known and take more time to identify or analyse. 
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The Australian Aviation Accident Report System (AAARS) was chosen as the 
empirical study of the research. By examining the criteria above, the AAARS was 
chosen as a better dataset for the study compared with other accident data systems. 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of aviation accident report systems 
 AAIB AAARS NTSB CANADA 
ACCIDENT 
DATABASE 
SYSTEM 
RICH 
INFORMATION 
Low Very good Good Low 
WEB AVAILABLE  Good Very good Good Low 
SIZEABLE Low High Very high Low 
EASY TO ACCESS Poor  Very good Poor Poor 
 
Data collection: the data acquired from the AAARS was gathered into a Microsoft 
Excel spread sheet with ten categories. (Table 3.2, see Appendix A) 562 accident report 
cases,   taken from the AAARS database were used  Parts of the collected data which 
are considered as containing design issues in human errors were transferred into the 
Microsoft Access database program. Figure 3.6 shows a snap shot of the main view of 
MS Access program. 
 
Table 3.2 Data tables gathered in the Microsoft Excel spread sheet 
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Figure 3.6 A snapshot of installed accident cases in the Microsoft Access database system 
 
3.6 Phase 4: Evaluation 
After finishing screening human error cases from other accident cases in the accident 
report system, evaluation processes were carried out to examine the usefulness of the 
developed models of design-induced error.  
This research is not a pure quantitative research to validate the design-induced error by 
counting the quantity of captured numbers of accident cases. It is more important to 
develop a more understandable model to recognise issues involved in design and 
human error with the concept of Design-induced error. For the evaluation process, a 
qualitative research process was taken into account. Evidence representing the concept 
of design-induced error was examined in the process.  
In order to evaluate the meta-theory of Design-induced error, the meta-theory was 
applied to the accident analysis processes. Out of a total of 562 accident reports, 287 
cases were identified as human error cases. The author used a reasoning process 
(Figure 3.7) to identify related theories and an analysis sheet (Figure 3.8) to find 
different perspectives between designers and operators on design, which will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8.  
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Figure 3.7 A reasoning process of the design-induced error model 
Chapter 3: Research approach 
 87 
 
Case number  
Accident description 
 
 
 
Human–system interaction failure 
 
 
Perspective of the designer 
 
Perspective of the operator 
 
Design-induced error 
 
 
Related theories 
 
Figure 3.8 An analysis sheet of human–system interaction failures in terms of design-
induced error 
 
When applying the meta-theory of Design-induced error to accident cases, the 
accidents were graded into five levels based on the evidence of the plausibility of 
Design-induced error. This process produced evidential terms and phrases related to 
design-induced errors that could be found in the accident documents. 
 
Table 3.3  Levels of evidence for the design-induced error acquisition 
LEVEL OF 
EVIDENCE 
5 4 3 2 1 
EXPLANATION Strong Good Possible Small No 
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In order to evaluate the ontology of Design-induced error, Accident cases that were 
identified as containing design-induced errors in the previous stage were implanted. 
This process investigated how many attributes can be gained from accident reports. 
Diagrams were automatically produced by the knowledge acquisition program, i.e. 
PCPACK. This formed a small ontology of design-induced error ontology in aircraft 
accidents. This process produced instances of a Design-induced error ontology of 
aircraft accidents.  
 
3.7 Phase 5: Discussion 
The main aim of the research is to make models of design-induced error by which 
designers or analysts can understand adverse influences of design on human cognition 
and performance which lead to human errors. In the course of the evaluation process of 
the model developed in the form of meta-theory and ontology, in-depth qualitative 
feedback on the usefulness of the models was conducted. Firstly, the power of the 
knowledge model of the theoretical model was tested in the empirical dataset. Secondly, 
the knowledge model of design-induced error in information systems discussed how 
the reasoning model is effective to identify design issues in accident documents. 
Precision and recall ratio of concepts was tested using the Google search engine. 
Recommendations to researchers and accident reporting authorities in order to enhance 
accident report systems followed. Finally, future works and the limitation of developed 
models in this research will be presented. 
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3.8 Summary  
This chapter has presented the methodology and research approach adopted in this 
thesis. The two kinds of ontological approach are the basis of the research. Table 3.5 
summarises the research stages, methods and outcomes. 
Table 3.4 Summary of research approach 
RESEARCH 
PHASES AND AIMS 
METHODS APPLIED OUTCOMES 
Phase 1: questionary 
studies 
-to raise research 
questions 
– Literature review 
– Accident analysis 
– Research questions 
formulated 
Phase 2: model 
development 
-to develop models 
being relevant to 
research questions 
– Identify characteristics of 
design and theories 
– Logical approach and 
ontological layers 
– identify concepts and 
relations  
– a meta-theory of design-
induced error developed 
– an ontology of design-
induced error developed 
Phase 3: empirical 
studies 
-to apply the models 
developed into real 
data 
– Gather data from the 
Australian aviation accident 
report system (AAARS) 
– human error cases in 
aviation accident reports 
identified 
– terms and phases 
describing the concepts 
captured 
Phase 4 and 5: 
evaluation and 
discussion 
-to examine usefulness 
of the models 
– Evaluation of captured 
cases with the theoretical 
model (V
2
 analysis ) and 
knowledge based 
information tools 
( PCPACK, Protégé, 
Google) 
– The research questions 
answered 
– Recommendations to 
people concerned and 
identification of future 
works 
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Chapter 4. A Meta-Theory of Design-induced 
Error 
In previous chapters the literature review provided an insight into understanding of 
human–system interaction failures. The characteristics of modern technologies that 
affect human cognition and performance and the role of design were also discussed. 
These issues were examined with accident cases. The theories can explain such issues 
well, but they are isolated from each other. It has been argued that we need a tool (e.g. a 
framework) to see a collective view on the theories. What is the underlying meaning of 
theories? How to link them? In order to tackle the problem, this thesis proposes a meta-
theory of related theories. A meta-theory, a theory about theories is a broad perspective 
synthesising two or more theories [Ritzer et al., 2001], in this thesis is a framework for 
an integrated model of theories which describe design‟s influence on human error. 
This chapter develops “a meta-theory of design-induced error” by proposing a 
contextual paradigm and an ontological assumption in which we can explain 
underlying structures of related theories taken from the literature review.  
With these assumptions each theory can be organised in ontological layers and 
explained in terms of different perspectives between designers and operators instead of 
current scattered views. It can also help to identify design issues in human error 
accident cases.  
There are several theories (perspectives) to bind in a form. Design-induced error is a 
highly complex phenomenon and to hope that a unifying grand theory will explain all 
its aspects is futile. 
As a theoretical framework, a meta-theory will provide a possibility to combine 
theories. Firstly, it will articulate a set of ontological and epistemological principles that 
will help clarify the nature of design-induced error and our possible knowledge of it. 
Secondly, it will help bring together, in a logically consistent manner, some of the 
perspectives on design-induced error. In this way, the relationships between various 
perspectives will be clarified and, ideally, the scope of application of these perspectives 
will be specified. Finally, it will have an explanatory power to describe a human–
system interaction failure with the local rationalities between designers and operators. 
This chapter begins with summarising findings from the literature review (Section 4.1). 
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Which kinds of views on design-induced error are necessary for this research is 
discussed, comparing current views (Section 4.2). These findings were used as the basis 
of development of a meta-theory of design-induced error. A brief description of meta-
theory is introduced in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 addresses development of a meta-theory 
of design-induced error with exploring the course of development of design-induced 
error, units of analysis, and factors that cause design-induced error. Finally, as a 
collective view of related theories, a meta-theory of design-induced error is suggested 
as one of contextual and ontological meta-theories (Section 4.5).  
 
4.1 Findings from the literature review on design 
issues in human–system interaction failures 
 
As summarised in section 2.6, theories of phenomena related to human error and design 
gathered and reviewed in chapter 2 are: 
1) Gulf of execution/evaluation [Hutchins, Hollan and Norman, 1985] 
2) Design affordance [Norman, 1998] 
3) Irony of automation [Bainbridge, 1983] 
4) Trust in automation [Muir and Moray, 1994] 
5) Automation surprise [Sarter et al., 1997] 
6) Plan delegation [Busby and Hughes, 2003] 
7) Risk homeostasis [Wilde, 1982] 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, the following common characteristics were drawn 
amongst the theories: 
(1) They (theories) are talking about failures of design in human–system 
interaction. 
(2) They address design issues relating to human error (e.g. design of a system 
introduces a condition in which operators can easily make an error).  
(3) The problems addressed in the theories are not a direct and intentional failure 
of design but indirect and unexpected consequences of design. 
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(4) The operator could not comply with the operating specification of a system that 
was demanded or implied by its design. 
From these findings it can be concluded that the theories of phenomena are concerned 
with “human error that was induced by design (e.g. an operation of a system or a 
functional state of the system)” especially in the currently prevalent automated complex 
systems. If a system left a human operator puzzling on solving a problem or managing 
an artefact in the system, such a system might be “an error-inducing system”. This 
thesis names such phenomena as “design-induced error” in order to identify design 
issues in human error. Current theories explain well phenomena in which human 
operators suffer from mis-interaction with artefacts.  
Each theory, however, has been developed to explain a particular phenomenon 
respectively. There is no theoretical approach to provide a collective view of the 
theories. In order to understand a whole area of indirect impact of design on human 
operators, it is necessary to recognise these theories together. An integration of these 
theories may provide greater understanding of these phenomena. Designers as well as 
accident analysts may have difficulty in knowing and applying all the theories. 
Providing a collective view of design-induced error can be beneficial to them.  
4.2 Philosophy of Design-induced error 
There are different views on the concept of design-induced error. It is important to 
decide on the kind of view of design-induced error for the research. This section 
reviews current views of design-induced error and suggests a new way that 
encompasses related theories. 
4.2.1 Current views on the concept of design-induced 
error and the limitation of these views 
 Identifying designs that can induce flightcrew errors having undesirable 
consequences early in the design and certification processes would allow 
appropriate corrective action to be undertaken at a stage when cost and 
schedule pressures are less daunting. In addition to the A320 FCU design, 
other examples where flightcrew error analysis may have identified design 
features that have been implicated in serious incidents or accidents are: 
flightcrew awareness that the autopilot is approaching its control authority 
(B747 China Air over the Pacific Ocean) and autopilot designs that allow pilot 
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input to inadvertently create large out-of-trim conditions (A300-600 accident at 
Nagoya, Japan)  As stated earlier, flightcrew errors occur for many reasons 
and have many potential contributing factors. It is impossible to prevent all 
human error without removing the human flexibility and adaptability that 
contributes significantly to safety. Moreover, it is the negative consequences of 
error we wish to eliminate, not necessarily the errors themselves. However, it 
is still desirable to minimize errors that are design or system induced  The 
FAA should require the evaluation of flight deck designs for susceptibility to 
design-induced flight crew errors and the consequences of those errors as part 
of the type certification process.  
[Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Human Factors Team Report, 1996, pp. 96-7] 
The quotation above demonstrates the importance of recognising a concept of design-
induced error for designers to design a credible system. Design-induced error has 
become of particular concern of people in safety design domains because of the advent 
of modern complex systems [Salmon et al., 2003; Harris et al., 2005].  
There has been frequent use of the term design-induced error since Meister‟s [1971] 
comment on the concept of design-induced error. Technology-induced error [Kushniruk 
et al., 2005; Borycki and Kushniruk, 2005] and system-induced error are used 
synonymously with design-induced error. The term design-induced error used in 
literature may be classified according to the following three points of view.  
(1) Meister‟s view: classified errors as system-induced error, design-induced error, 
operator-induced error based on system development. 
(2) Perrow‟s view: this opinion is about organisational considerations in the design 
process. Perrow argued that a design decision structure that affects equipment 
design is important to prevent system failures. 
(3) Harris‟s view: focus on interface design, the most common concept that is well 
recognised by people.  
These views show it is possible to define the concept of design-induced error according 
to different points of view. One is from equipment design point of view. This approach 
focuses on direct interaction between operators and systems (e.g. monitoring a display 
panel or managing a device [Harris et al., 2005]). 
The other is from the point of view of error-inducing social/organisational systems 
[Perrow, 1983; Wagenaar et al., 1990]. According to this point of view, design-induced 
error is not a type of error rather it is one of the contributory factors that form human 
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error. There are several kinds of error- inducing factors i.e. organisational factors, 
individual factors etc. Design-induced error is considered as one of them [Meister, 
1971]. It addresses organisational issues in order to tackle the problem of design failure 
(e.g. decision making process). 
Limitation of current views on the concept are as follows: 
(1) There is not a clear definition of the concept of design-induced error; 
(2) Each concept address part of human performance and cognitive processes; 
(3) Sometimes managerial or cultural issues are included. 
Firstly, the concept of design-induced error has been used without clear definition. It is 
generally accepted that design can induce human operators to make errors in complex 
and automated systems. However, the concept of design-induced error has not yet been 
defined clearly. One reason not to define the concept clearly may be that it is difficult 
clearly to pick up the concept in human–system interaction failures among other factors 
contributory to the failure. The concept of design-induced error can be frequently 
compounded by individual or organisational factors. For example, a monitoring failure 
can easily be interpreted in terms of operator‟s haste or management demands, not 
design of the system. This circumstance may lead to concluding only training issues are 
involved, not design issues of the system.  
Secondly, the current well recognised concept of design-induced error (e.g. Harris et al., 
2005) is also limited to addressing all kinds of design-induced errors in every stage of 
human information processing because they mainly focus on interface design issues. 
Interface design, e.g. display in aviation control systems, is found in an execution stage 
of human information processing. Design-induced error can, however, be found in 
other states of human information processing such as a planning stage. For example, 
the theory of risk homeostasis points out that operators can fail to use a system 
correctly if the design of the system provides the operator with overconfidence in the 
safety of the system. Therefore, the concept of design-induced error related to interface 
design explains only some parts of the concept of design-induced error that would be 
formulated in this thesis.  
Finally, a view that concerns organisational factors in the design process or design 
organisation should be excluded from the concept in this thesis because this research is 
focused on design itself. This research would not touch managerial decisions or 
organisational effects in the design process. Social or cultural aspects are also excluded 
in this thesis. However every system that is current is a socio-technical system [Busby 
and Hibberd, 2004]. As design of a system affects operators in the system socio-
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technically, it should be considered in this thesis. 
It is necessary to look at which stage of human information processing has relations 
with design areas and design-induced error. We can find design-induced error and 
design areas from the planning stage to the execution stage in human information 
processing as discussed  later in Section 4.4.3.. 
 
4.2.2 Related Concepts 
It will be useful to find characteristics of design-induced error if we compare other 
concepts related to error and design. There are concepts that can be compared with the 
concept of design-induced error. This comparison, however, will not try to scrutinise 
the definitions of them because they are not the main objectives of the thesis, but to 
find distinctions among them. 
There are lots of other ways to categorise errors from different perspectives. First of all, 
one thing that needs to be mentioned is a difference from “design error”. The term 
“design error” may have two ways of being interpreted.  First, with regard to who 
makes the errors, “design error” means “designer error”. When we clarify the error in 
terms of who makes the error, they can be categorised as designer error and operator 
error. The other way to interpret “design error” can be functional, constructional or 
process errors of systems in terms of the objective of errors. As a result, the error or 
failure from design error means the direct consequence of the design. For example, if 
the sign of a level-crossing is designed to show a “green” aspect instead of a “red” 
aspect when it needs to prevent passengers from crossing, the design can be called a 
design error. Design-induced error, on the other hand, the consequence of design, is not 
direct but indirect and it is difficult to notice the problem before the interaction failures 
occur.  
Design specifications are important for designers. They are concerned about design 
requirements that meet rules and regulations. The wrong specification is a lack of 
requirements to meet demands in the current environment. On the other hand, design-
induced error does not directly concern what is necessary for design. Design-induced 
error shows problems arising from design during humans tackling tasks in a system. 
Some knowledge gathered from concepts of design-induced error may be developed 
into design specifications.  
This section chooses the concept of operator error and design error (engineering 
failure) as the main concepts comparable with design-induced error because they have 
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some common aspects with design-induced error. Error-inducing factors in the error-
inducing model are also discussed in terms of the differences between them. 
 
4.2.2.1 Design-induced error vs. operator error 
Operator error is one of the most common types of error of many error classifications 
in accident and incident analysis. Design-induced error and operator error have similar 
and different faces (Table 4.1). It is not easy to distinguish between design-induced 
error and operator error because they have a same root, i.e. human error. However, it 
will be useful if we compare each and identify their different characteristics. They are 
all expressed through human activity. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish one from 
another because they may be seem to be very similar. For example, operators can make 
an error by stress, by which operators‟ performance is downgraded in any task. The 
stress leading to the error could have arisen from design problems or from their 
physical weakness at the time of the error. In general, operator error has a broader 
boundary than design-induced error. It contains all aspects including design that affect 
operator‟s physical performances or cognitive processes. The concept of design-
induced error concerns only about design issues, by which affect operator‟s 
performances during interactions with systems. 
 
CATEGORY COMMON DIFFERENT EXAMPLES 
Design-induced 
error  
Human error Design related only Misinterpretation of state 
of system by a poor design 
Operator error  Human error Including physical or 
emotional contributions of 
the individual 
Misreading by fatigue, 
stress by an individuals‟ 
medical condition 
    
Table 4.1.  Distinction between design-induced error and operator error 
 
4.2.2.2 Design-induced error vs. design error (engineering 
failure) 
“Design error”, sometimes called “engineering failure”, is a main concern of every 
engineering project, whether mechanical, electrical, or architectural. “Design-induced 
error” and “design error” (engineering failure) have same origin – i.e. designers. They 
are all failures of design. However, the difference between them is their effects and 
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how these arise. Engineering failure affects artefacts resulting in direct and immediate 
failure, e.g. breakdown of a function to a system.  
In the contrary, Design-induced error affects human operators (users) and as a result, 
the effect of the error would not be seen clearly in the system before the failure of 
human interaction occurs (Table 4.2). It may be said that a design error leads to a 
mechanical failure, and that these arise through normal operation. So a design error 
would not take into account the role of normal erosion that could be expected in the 
environment in which an artefact is used, or the handle to a door breaks because the 
designer did not take into account the forces that would act on it.  
 
 
CATEGORY COMMON DIFFERENT EXAMPLES 
Design-induced 
error 
Design related Human error Misinterpreting state of a 
system by wrong design 
Design error 
(engineering 
failure) 
Design related Calculation error for 
endurance of artefact 
Hardware failure- erosion, 
crack etc. 
software failure – 
computer programming 
bug etc. 
Table 4.2.  Distinction between design-induced error and design error (engineering failure) 
 A design-induced error would be the effect of the system on the operators‟ perception 
of it, which would lead the operator to use an artefact or the system in an unintended 
manner that could compromise the performance of the system. The question then arises 
as to whether design-induced error could be viewed as a subset of design-error, in that 
the designer has failed to take into account the characteristics of the operators, the 
social rather than the physical environment in which the system is used. 
Therefore, design-induced error has both the nature of design error and human error 
that occurs in the form of failures in interactions between the user and the artefact in 
certain circumstances (Figure 4.1). It is caused by designed artefacts or design 
principles that typically have no effect on operator performance but which, under 
certain circumstances can lead to acute or chronic deterioration of operator 
performance, which can lead to active failure on the part of the operator.  
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Figure 4.1.  Location of design-induced error  
4.2.2.3 Error-inducing factors 
The other way to distinguish design-induced error from other concepts is by examining 
the concepts according to error-inducing factors. In the first section there are many 
error-inducing factors and they can be categorised into four domains in which errors 
can be affected and grown. According to Svendung and Rasmussen‟s socio-technical 
model (2002) an accident chain consists of a number of related stakeholders (see Figure 
4.2).  
The concept of design-induced error concerns design concepts, degree of complexity 
and automation, layout of instrument and signal design, and procedure design. The 
concept of management-induced error relates to management conditions such as 
demands of productivity, task pressure, work scheduling, allocation of operations, or 
relationship between managers and operators. The concept of culture-induced error 
concerns on risk perception in organisation or society levels, safety culture in an 
organisation, and collaborative (teamwork) conditions. The personal level of risk 
perception, inherent degree of personal vigilance or concentration characteristics, risk 
taking tendency, or habitual tendency are the main concerns of the concept of 
personality-induced error.. 
Comparing the technical aspect and cultural or training aspect we can divide the 
concepts. The concepts of design-induced error and management-induced error have 
more a technical aspect than the concepts of personality-induced error and culture-
induced error. On the other hand, the concepts of management-induced error and 
culture-induced error have a high degree of cultural/training aspect in the concepts. 
Figure 4.3 shows 4 error-inducing categories. 
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Figure 4.2 Rasmussen and Svedung’s socio-technical model of system operations (adapted 
from Levenson, 2004) 
personality-induced error
-Personal level of risk perception
-Inherent characteristics in 
vigilance, concentration
-Risk taking tendency
-Habitual trait etc. 
management-induced error
-Demanding on productiv ity
-Task pressure
-Work Scheduling
-Allocation of operation
-Relationship manager and 
operators etc.
design-induced error
-Design concepts
-Degree of complexity and 
automation
-Layout of instrument / signals 
design
-Procedures design etc.
culture-induced error
-Organisational or society level of 
risk perception
-Safety culture
-Team work condition etc.
 
Figure 4.3  Different features in Error-inducing systems 
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4.3 Introduction to meta-theory 
This section begins with an examination of two questions before turning to the 
development of a meta-theory of Design-induced error. Firstly what is meta-theory. 
Secondly, what we can do with a meta-theory of design-induced error. In general there 
are two reasons underlying the development of theories, approaches, and methods. The 
first reason is the evaluation of the truth of hypotheses about the world, often through 
logical manipulations of theoretical constructs, intuition, and thought experiments. The 
second reason is that people want to confirm their theoretical musings by empirical 
reference. Both cases require testable hypotheses to be validated or falsified, although 
this view is not shared by all [Shapiro, 1994].  
This research is not to develop a pure psychological theory although its basis is in 
psychological theories of error. Rather, the aim is to develop a methodological tool (i.e. 
a framework) to see a collective view of related theories.  
Therefore, this represents a meta-theory. “Meta theory” is a theory of (or about) 
theories. A meta-theoretical approach is a study about underlying structure, perspective, 
or philosophy of a theory (or theories). A meta-theory is underlying assumptions about 
what a theory is and influences descriptions, explanations, and predictions of a 
theorised model. In other words, meta-theoretical assumptions are those assumptions 
that underlie any given theoretical perspective. It sometimes is referred to as worldview. 
It is said that everyone has a meta-theory even if he/she is not an expert (e.g. a 
psychologist). A meta-theoretical approach can shape how we react to different 
explanations; and how we construct different explanations according to a particular 
paradigm adopted. Meta-theoretical assumptions subsequently influence our 
philosophy of developers (e.g. designers), how we learn and interact with others (e.g. 
users, operators). In a practical sense, an awareness of our own (and others) meta-
theoretical assumptions allows us to understand better why we (and others) behave the 
way we do, thereby influencing (often positively) our future interactions. To a 
researcher of human error and design, an awareness of meta-theoretical assumptions 
allows for an understanding of the rationale behind many theories and research 
investigations, therefore providing a basis for a fair evaluation.  
The value of any theory (including meta-theory) is not “whether the theory or 
framework provides an objective representation of reality” [Bardram, 1998], but rather 
how well a theory can shape an object of study, highlighting relevant issues. For 
example, a classification scheme is only useful to the point that it provides relevant 
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insights about the objects to which it is applied [Barthelmess and Anderson, 2002]. 
Halverson [2002] also identified four attributes that a theory as a tool for research 
should encompass such as description, rhetorical, inferential, and application power. 
The developed methodology can help people to analyse accident reports that contain 
information relevant to the concept of design-induced error and to extract semantic 
meaning from this information. 
However, it is important to address here the aims and limitations of the development of 
meta-theory of design-induced error. As noted previously: 1) the aim of the research is 
to try to find a way of forming a collective view of existing theories of how design 
induces human error, not to replace them; 2) there is not one, unique meta-theory; 3) 
the function of the meta-theory is to help generate an ontology of the properties of 
design-induced error; 4) the purpose of the ontology of design-induced error is to help 
designers interpret reports of particular accident and incidents. 
 
4.4 Development of a meta-theory of design-
induced error 
Theories related to design-induced error, using different theoretical understandings, 
have envisaged the reason why our interactions with a system or artefact fail. Design 
affordance theory mainly describes design issues at the skill-based level of our 
performance on an artefact. Gulf of execution and evaluation theory considers that 
responses and answers of a system to a user should be matched with the cognitive 
perception of the user on the representation of the system. Irony of automation theory 
concerns how automation has degraded the operator‟s abilities of problem solving and 
monitoring a state of the system. Trust in automation theory and automation surprise 
(or glass cockpit problem) raise issues on current digitalised automation systems that 
could be misunderstood or increase reliance of the operator on the system. Risk 
homeostasis theory addresses the idea that our belief in a safety system could be 
compounded by operators. Plan delegation theory shows that unclear allocation design 
can easily lead human operators to make errors. 
This section presents the development of a meta-theory of design-induced error by 
examining underlying structures of theories in following issues: 
 The course of design-induced error development (human–system interaction 
development)  
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 The unit of analysis (whole or (and) part of a system) 
 Factors that cause design-induced error (causal conditions and determinants).  
 
4.4.1 The course of design-induced error development 
In order to understand an error process in theories it is necessary to investigate what 
kinds of interaction occur between a human and a system and which design elements 
are involved. By investigating theories, it can be derived that a system interacts with a 
human operator in the system by categorising different elements of the system. For the 
research design elements that consist of a system are categorised as; feature, function, 
logic, and reliability of a system. Human-system interactions are also classified in this 
thesis by three interaction levels such as affordance level, psychological logic level, 
and trust level according to human cognitive point of view. Figure 4.4 shows design 
elements and their relations according interaction levels. Each bar illustrates 
relationship between design elements with regard to interaction levels. For example, in 
an affordance level feature and function have relation in their understanding. 
 
feature function
psychological 
logic
affordance
design elements/
interaction level
logic
trust
reliabil ity
relationship:
 
Figure 4.4 Relations between human-system interaction levels and design elements that 
constitute a system 
A consistent connection between them is a necessity of a successful system. Feature 
refers to physical appearance of artefact like shape, colour, volume, or array of an 
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artefact. Function means what to do with an object: the purpose of on object. Logic 
means methods of working a system (e.g. a procedure); it is underlying principles of a 
function. Reliability means consistency of a system, not contradiction between lower 
levels of elements (e.g. logics) used in the system. The same systems should have the 
same logic, function, and features. 
When we look at the course of human–system interaction in design-induced error, the 
system elements have connections each other. In general, feature has a connection with 
function, a function with logic, and logic with reliability of a system. Theories can be 
categorised with three perspectives according to connection failures among design 
elements of a system: an affordance level of Design-induced error; a psychological 
logic level of Design-induced error; and a trust level of Design-induced error.  
In order to decrease or avoid cognitive overloads and to increase the efficiency of tasks 
employed, human operators tend towards lower levels of cognitive resources (i.e. 
knowledge-base to rule-base, rule-base to skill-base of performance). They use links 
between design elements by conceiving low levels of design elements for recognising 
higher levels of design elements. For example, a human perceives the purpose of an 
object by seeing a feature of the object.  
In the case of cognitive breakdown of relations between design elements in human 
system interactions design-induced error may occur. It means inconsistence of relations 
of them is main course of design-induced error development.  
Design affordance theory, an affordance level of perspective of design-induced error, 
explains a course of human error in terms of the relationship between feature and 
function of a system. Humans try to perceive a function of a system by recognising a 
feature of the system. For example, dials or toggle switches provide information of how 
to use them. When we watch a dial or a toggle switch we can immediately recognise its 
function of turning the dial or moving up/down the toggle switch by its feature of shape. 
If a feature of a system does not provide an affordable function, a user has a wrong 
perception of the function. It is an affordance issue of design. The upper part in Figure 
4.5 shows that humans perceive artefact‟s function by feature. 
In psychological logic perspective, a user‟s understanding process on the logic of a 
system depends on the function given to the user. For examples, in case of Therac-24 
accident, the operators involved in the accident mistakenly pressed a button that radiate 
wrong voltage. Relevant theories are gulf of execution/evaluation, automation surprise, 
and plan delegation theory. The middle part in Figure 4.5 presents that a human 
understands a system‟s logics by its functions. 
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In the trust level of perspective of design-induced error, it is difficult for a user to 
organise all kinds of logic in a system that consists of the reliability of the system. As a 
result, the user relies on the system according to whether he/she believes in the system 
or not. Trust in automation, irony of automation, and risk homeostasis fall into this 
category. For example in the above Therac-25 accident case the system confused 
operators in a state of malfunction of the system because the system did not provide 
information relevant at that time. The low part in Figure 4.5 illustrates that human 
trusts system‟s reliability by its logics. 
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Figure 4.5 Three patterns of human–system interaction processes in order for human to 
figure out design concepts with design elements of a system 
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4.4.2 Unit of analysis I: Design levels in phenomena 
If one wanted to study design-induced error, what would one look at? This is a question 
of the unit of analysis of design-induced error. For each of the theories, the unit of 
analysis differs. There are two categories of the unit of analysis in general: whole and 
(or) part. 
Those who view design-induced development as direct human–system interaction 
argue that design-induced error occurs in interface (e.g., a monitor display). In other 
words, the development of design-induced error is assumed to occur in a process of 
direct interaction. For example, design affordance theory corresponds with the 
argument because the theory concerns what users contact physically (e.g. seeing an 
object). They can argue that design in design-induced error should be limited to 
equipment design (e.g. interface design). 
On the other hand, those who view design-induced error development as a whole 
process of system operation argue that the development can occur in the human mind 
without direct interaction with an artefact. In other words, development is assumed to 
be a process in which ways of thinking, perception, and/or behaving emerge at specific 
times (stages) in a system. They argue that the boundary of design in the design-
induced error process should be expanded into socio-technical system design. Irony of 
automation theory, for example, needs operators‟ interaction with a system to be 
extended to the whole system design concept. 
It is necessary to determine the boundary of design in this research in order to define 
the concept of design in the meta-theory of design-induced error. There are many 
different views of design concepts in research (Table 4.3). To what extent can design 
concept to be applied in this research? Engineering designers tend to consider that the 
issues of design-induced errors are problems about physical systems and their direct 
interaction problems with operators during operations only. A socio-technical point of 
view, on the other hand, broadens the concept into organisation and society.  
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Table 4.3 Different views of concepts of design 
Component of artefact
Physical design
Architectural system
Procedures, rules, manual
Logical, psychological design
Communication and scheduling 
of operation
Managerial  designOrganisation
Sociological designSociety
DesignSystem
 
 
The terms “design” and “system” are considered as they have different definitions and 
are used differently according to research applications. Design is not only concerned 
with a physical system but also logical, psychological and social aspects.  Design 
consists of concept, methodology and methods (Table 4.4). A “system” is a physical 
form with procedures in order to achieve particular purposes. The system is 
constructions of design concepts and methods. Humans achieve their goals through the 
system. 
 
 
LEVEL OF 
DESIGN 
ERROR INDUCERS IN DESIGN EXAMPLE OF 
DESIGN-INDUCED 
ERROR 
Conceptual design 
(High level) 
A concept forming a system in 
order to achieve a goal of the 
system does not match with human 
cognition and performance 
behaviours  
Misunderstanding a 
protection system 
Methodological 
design (low level) 
Methods used in a system do not 
help human cognitions and 
performance to do a task 
Misreading a number in a 
display panel 
Table 4.4 Levels of design concepts 
Chapter 4: A Meta-Theory of Design-induced Error 
 108 
 
Therefore, the concept of design-induced error can also vary according to the concept 
of design applied (Table 4.5): narrow concept and broad concept of design-induced 
error.  
 Narrow concept:  focus on direct interaction problems between human and 
system, i.e. errors that appear while human and system actively exchange their 
information and activities.  
 Broad concept:  expand into all human–system interaction problems including 
social factors such as organisational or managerial factors.   
Research into human factor is the study of the multiple interactions between the human, 
the tools they use (from simple everyday products to advanced technologies), the task, 
the workplace, the environment and the organisation, and the application of resulting 
knowledge to understanding (and improving) these interactions [Noyes, 2004].  
For example, in the case of the rail collision accident at Ladbroke Grove in London in 
1999, it was suggested in the report of this incident that the cancellation of the AWS 
could have been an automatic response [HSE, 2000]. The AWS warning does not 
distinguish between caution and stop aspects. On the approach to a major station, such 
as Paddington, the volume of traffic means that many of the signals that drivers 
encounter would show caution aspects. As a consequence, drivers cancel AWS 
warnings on a regular basis, which could lead to a potential automation of their 
response. In this case, the driver may simply have mistakenly believed that the AWS 
warning at signal SN109 indicated that it was possible to proceed. To address the 
problem in this case, it is necessary to understand working conditions surrounding the 
driver as well as the artefact itself that interacted with the driver. Therefore, in order to 
tackle the issues arising in design-induced error, designers have to know the conditions 
surrounding operating systems, i.e. socio-technical conditions that affect use of 
artefacts and systems. 
Design has increased the allocation of tasks for operators to do, tasks which must be 
performed nearly simultaneously, or without previous information, in modern complex 
systems. This was not a serious issue in a simple system. However the increased tasks 
with more complexity, mostly procedures, are now too constraining for human 
operators. Therefore many of the procedures should be solved by design. 
The concept of design in this research should be expanded into indirect interaction 
problems i.e. design of procedures, rules and communication produced by designers. 
The term “design” in this research contains principles and expressions of designers to 
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construct a system: (1) methodology of system formation, function, (2) operating 
principles of systems, (3) mechanism of works, (4) methods of task process and 
procedure, (5) logical explanation of interaction among systems and operators, and (6) 
the representation methods of tasks and procedures. 
 
Table 4.5 Comparisons between narrow and broad concepts of design-induced error 
 NARROW CONCEPT OF 
DESIGN-INDUCED ERROR 
BROAD CONCEPT OF 
DESIGN-INDUCED ERROR 
Research 
purpose 
– Finding design problems in 
direct interaction between 
human and system in interface 
design 
– Finding design contributions 
and protective measurements of 
design in all human–system 
interaction failure in terms of 
design perspective  
 
Advantage – Explaining the problems in 
detail  
– Easy to understand the 
causation of error 
– To explain many human errors 
in terms of design aspect 
– To understand indirect 
relationship between design and 
error 
Disadvantage – Too limited concept 
– Not to recognise design 
problems related to indirect 
consequence of human–system 
interaction 
– Easy to be too wide concept 
– Difficult to distinguish from 
general human error study 
 
4.4.3 Unit of analysis II: Human–system interaction 
stages in phenomena 
According to Rasmussen‟s step ladder model of human information, process flows 
from activation to execution [Rasmussen, 1993]. This idea has been adopted in many 
domains such as chemical processing, nuclear power generation and aviation. He 
suggested that systems should support each of the different stages of information 
processing. For this research positions of phenomena on each stage of the human 
information process according to their influence were located. In which information 
process they (phenomena) are (or affect human cognitive processes)? It has been 
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attempted to identify at which stage in the operator‟s information processing each of 
the phenomena has its effect. 
Risk homeostasis is located in activation and observation stages because before people 
exploit a system they are seized with a thought that a protection system will exist. 
Therefore, it happens just before or immediately upon observing a real danger or 
hazard.  
In irony of automation, operators recognise the problem in the stages of observation 
and identification. They are alerted that there are problems from systems. However, 
their ability to deal with the problems has degraded they can only observe and identify, 
they do not go further with actions. 
Trust in automation occurs through observation to interpretation. Operators observe and 
identify what is going on, but it is not based on correct interpretation. They just believe 
or not the state of systems. Therefore, their interpretation is based on trust in 
automation.  
In glass cockpit problems, an operator‟s observations and interpretations based on glass 
cockpit displays were mediated by the sometimes incomplete mental models held by 
the operator. Therefore, their evaluation of the state of systems is vulnerable to error.   
Gulf of execution refers to the difference between intended action and the actions that 
the operator believes that the system will allow. It is important that a capability of 
design might exist but that this might not be apparent to the user from the user interface. 
Also, the gulf of evaluation refers to the amount of efforts that the operator has to 
invest in deciding what the state of the system is. The gulf of evaluation also refers to 
whether the operator can interpret the state of the system from presented information, 
which might not be the case [Norman, 1988]. 
Plan delegation arises when users recognise that artefacts are prepared for a particular 
task. For instance, when an operator starts an engine he or she evaluates and defines the 
engine as prepared for the job. However, when the engine is expected to pre-diagnose 
some functions itself, they fall into plan delegation. Therefore, the user‟s procedure on 
the task cannot be correctly conducted. 
Design affordances exploit unconscious processes of cognition. For example, when we 
see a chair we can just sit down on the chair without any decision reasoning process. 
Therefore, the problem of design affordance occurs in the stage of procedure and 
execution. 
Table 4.6 depicts where phenomena are located in human information processing. It 
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illustrates where phenomena are placed throughout the information process. It means 
that the designers have to consider all stages of the information process while designing 
system tasks. 
 
 ACTIVATE OBSERVE IDENTIFY INTERPRET EVALUATE DEFINE PROCEDURE EXECUTE 
RISK 
HOMEOSTASIS X X       
IRONY OF 
AUTOMATION  X X      
TRUST IN 
AUTOMATION  X X X     
AUTOMATION 
SURPRISE  X X X X    
EXECUTION/EVA
LUATION GULFS   X X X X   
PLAN 
DELEGATION     X X X  
DESIGN 
AFFORDANCE       X X 
Table 4.6. The stage of information processes according to phenomena of design-
induced error (modified from Rasmussen, 1983)  
 
4.4.4 Factors that cause design-induced error: Local 
rationalities between designers and operators in 
phenomena 
Accidents examined in chapter 2 show that the design-induced human errors occurred 
in a condition of temporal decision making environments. Complexity of the system 
contributed to this environment. Therefore, it is pointed out three factors as causal 
factors of design-induced error; complexity of a system, temporal decision-making 
condition, and local rationalities between designers and operators.  
The previous chapter 2 described two factors (i.e. temporal decision-making condition, 
complexity of a system) as major factors that affect human cognition processing. 
Temporal decision-making condition and complexity of a system provide increased 
roles of a system in human–system interaction in modern systems. This section mostly 
discusses local rationality. 
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If we agree that in modern system environments the existence of temporal decision-
making conditions and complexity of a system is inevitable, there remains a 
fundamental question why design of a system has not always coped with failures of 
human–system interaction. Although, the designer has abilities to create such 
complicated systems with modern technologies and logics, a number of reports of 
human–system interaction failures show there is lack of good design knowledge in the 
interaction. 
Engineering designers may not recognise well how their designed systems are used by 
human operators because human cognition and behaviour are not their main concern in 
designing the system. It is said errors may result when the demands the system design 
places on the user exceeds their capabilities. A discrepancy between human mental 
resources and a system‟s demands can cause errors [Rasmussen, 1986]. Therefore, 
design-induced error is a consequence of the mismatch between designers‟ and user‟s 
mental models. Busby and Strutt  [2001] illustrated how and what kinds of different 
perspectives designers and operators of hazardous installations may have.  
Norman [1988] illustrated the different rationalities that exist between designers and 
users with regard to the operation of a system (Figure 4.6). When there is an artefact, 
designers have one concept of system(A) and rationality(A), whilst users form another 
concept that means system(B) and rationality(B) (Fig. 2). This is called local 
rationalities. It is suggested that these local rationalities arise because there is poor 
exchange of knowledge between designers and users. 
 
Woods and Cook [1999] argued that consideration of the local rationality of operators 
such as resolving conflicts, anticipating hazards, accommodating variation and change, 
coping with surprise, working around obstacles, closing gaps between plans and real 
situations is critical for the development of safer systems. 
From this perspective, design-
induced error may be generated 
from as the inconsistencies in 
local rationalities that exist 
between designers and users. 
Designers‟ misunderstanding 
about operators induces 
inappropriate design of the 
artefact and system. For instance, 
in the Three Mile Island nuclear 
Figure 4.6. Local rationalities between designers 
and users (from Norman, 1988) 
Chapter 4: A Meta-Theory of Design-induced Error 
 113 
power plant accident in 1979, operators failed to recognise that the relief valve was 
stuck open because the indicator on a control panel misled operators. The light (valve 
indicator) only showed the state commanded for the valve, but not the actual state of 
the valve [Reason, 1990]. 
Therefore, the causes of design-induced error are determined by how designers 
consider operators in terms of discrepancy of local rationality: (1) Designers do not 
well understand the operator‟s cognitive performance. (2) Designers do not well 
understand the fact that operator‟s cognitive demand is increased when in an abnormal 
situation and do not function at the dynamic moment. (3) Designers do not fully 
understand the fact that a system is not perfect and has inherent deficits causing errors 
and failures, in that situation, there is a need for the involvement of human operators to 
handle the problem, however, designers do not provide information on the state of the 
system and cues of that.  
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4.5 A Meta-theory of design-induced error 
Previous sections examined the underlying structure of the related theories and what is 
(or would be) design-induced error in order to provide a basis (i.e. meta-theoretical 
assumptions) of a meta-theory of design-induced error. This examination revealed that 
each theory has different perspectives. For a meta-theory of design-induced error, in 
order to encompass all related theories, the following assumptions for a meta-theory of 
design-induced error are suggested: 
(1) Human operators have interacted with a system environment resulting in 
developing their own perspective on the system operation (Section 2.5.1); 
(2) The design of a system creates the system environment in accordance with the 
perspective of the designer of the system (Section 2.4.1, 2.4.2); 
(3) When the operator has a different perspective on the system operation from the 
designer, design-induced error occurs in certain circumstances (Section 2.5.3); 
(4) Human–system interaction in a system includes socio-technical interaction (e.g. 
trust in a system) (Section 2.3.3); 
(5) The concept of design in design-induced error should concern not only 
equipment design but also system design such as manuals, and procedure 
design (Section 2.5.5); 
(6) Each theory is understood to occupy one position on the ontological layers of 
the meta-theory of design-induced error (Section 2.6.2, Section 4.4.1). 
(7) The existence of a local rationality between designers and operators is regarded 
as a determinant of design-induced error. The relation between causal 
conditions and a causal determinant decides an occurrence of design-induced 
errors (Section 4.4.4). 
 
A system environment, in this thesis, means all sorts of environments created by design 
of a system, which an operator meets while operating the system. For example, while 
an operator is conducting one task, there remain other planned tasks, procedures or 
processes of the system that lead to haste of the operator, constituting the system 
environments surrounding the operator. 
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Table 4.7 summarises the elements of a meta-theory of design-induced error and its 
assumptions. With the assumptions we can interpret related theories in the meta-theory 
of design-induced error. This is a contextual and ontological meta-theory. From this 
approach we can see a collective view of related theories. 
An ontological assumption assumes the related theories consist of whole phenomena of 
design-induced error. Each theory is, as a result, a part of a category of design-induced 
error. It is assumed to have three different perspectives layers. 
A contextual paradigm of design-induced error, which is based on a distributed 
cognition theory, assumes that the course of development of design-induced error is 
both a technical and psychological (and social) process in a system. In addition, the 
individual (i.e., human operator) and the system environment are both assumed to be 
active participants, reciprocally influencing each other. Development of design-induced 
error is best understood through examination of the whole as well as the parts. 
Metaphorically, the contextual meta-theory can be symbolised as a tennis game. 
 
ELEMENTS OF THE META-
THEORY 
ASSUMPTION 
The course of design-induced error 
development 
Three ontological perspectives layers of 
human–system interaction  
Unit of analysis Whole and parts of a system 
The causal condition of design-induced 
error 
Complexity of a system and (or) tasks  
Temporal decision making condition 
The causal determinant of a design-
induced error development 
Local rationality between designer and 
operator 
Table 4.7 Elements of the meta-theory of design-induced error 
This view assumes that both the cognition of a human operator and the system 
environment (i.e. design) are active participants in design-induced error. Additionally, 
influences are assumed to be reciprocal. This notation can be read as “large 
contributions from the system environment as well as human operator, where both are 
actively influencing the other”. In this paradigm design-induced error refers to an 
imbalance between the reason of a system (i.e. intention of design) and the expectation 
of operators.  
Figure 4.7 shows a model of a meta-theory of design-induced error. In this model each 
theory might be explained using the concept of local rationalities. 
Chapter 4: A Meta-Theory of Design-induced Error 
 116 
 
Figure 4.7 A model of a meta-theory of design-induced error 
 
4.6 Ontological levels of design-induced error 
This thesis proposes a design-induced error model in three levels of ontological layers 
in order to encompass all sorts of related theories. This model is to conceive of design 
either in abstract and indirect activities of a system and the operator in a socio-technical 
system level, or as an equipment design level that just represents physical artefacts. 
① Affordance level 
② Psychological logic level 
③ Trust level 
The three ontological levels of design-induced error bind theories interconnected within 
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the layers. From the surface of a system, which is more related to physical level of 
design, to internal operation of a system, which is more concern about conceptual level 
of design, we can understand phenomena in a collective view.  Figure 4.8 shows 
ontological layers of difference perspectives of design-induced error. When we move 
from an ontological level to other level (e.g. OL3 to OL2) design level and phenomena 
of design-induced error are changed to more conceptual level of design.  
 
conceptual level of 
design
physical level of 
design
OL3: affordance level
OL2: psychological logic level
OL1: trust level
related theory to ontological layers
OL3: design affordance theory
         glass cockpit problem
OL2: gulf of execution/evaluation
         plan delegation theory
         automation surprise
OL1 : irony of automation    
          trust in automation
          risk homeostasis theory
surface of a system
 
Figure 4.8 Ontological layers of different perspectives of design-induced error 
 
Theories that were previously found in the literature are linked with these layers (see 
the box in Figure 4.9). They have been arranged in the ontological layers of design-
induced error (i.e. OL1, OL2, OL3). Different layers show different connections 
between system elements. Deeper theoretical descriptions penetrate further down into 
the object of study and capture new layers. Moving from a phenomenon located at a 
particular layer to the layer immediately below it reveals the conditions in which the 
phenomenon under study is made possible.  
Firstly Affordance level (OL3) is a study of errors related to behaviour identified with 
positions and shapes of artefacts. It has attempted to deal with the directly observable 
practices of design-induced error in carrying out their tasks within specific design (e.g. 
computer interface design). Its perspective comes from the equipment design point of 
view. This type of study is certainly valuable in offering us a picture of what design of 
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feature of an artefact means to the operator, and any further research at this layer will 
have to deal essentially with the connection between feature and function which are 
systematically associated with how a particular feature has a link to a function for a 
human. However, if our description of design-induced error is restricted to the surface 
level (i.e. a direct interaction with an artefact), we are forced to ignore or 
misunderstand other types of design-induced errors that occur gradually over a long 
time. There remain still other relations between different elements of design. For more 
descriptions of design-induced error hence we need for deeper theoretical descriptions. 
Psychological logic level (OL2): What are the role of function and logic in a design for 
human operators? We need to move to a deeper layer of design-induced error to answer 
this question. The psychological logic level of perspective on the nature of design-
induced error provides some answers.  This view is partly from a system point of view 
and partly from an equipment point of view. For instance, the gulf of execution and 
evaluation theory noted by Hutchins et al. [1985] gives examples about certain 
functions that are different from the expectation of operators, causing operators to be 
puzzled in their attempts to recognise the logic of the system. A function provided by a 
system should be matched with cognition of operator as psychologically relevant. 
Similarly, the design concern with both continuity and innovation that has been 
emphasised by Sarter et al. [1997] implies the existence of roles such as resource 
allocation and disturbance handling. As will have, hopefully, become clear by now, the 
reasoning behind this analysis is that for particular design roles to be possible, a certain 
configuration of design tasks characteristics must be in place. 
Trust level (OL3): Finally, how can we humans recognise the reliability of a system? It 
is nearly impossible for a human operator to check all possible conditions in a system; 
especially hectic, modern, complex systems that push operators to do tasks without any 
delay. As a result, operators have to depend on information provided by the system. A 
concept of design-induced error considers such conditions also. In order to answer the 
question above we should consider the nature of design, by locating design into its 
socio-technical context and conceptualising the manner in which this context endows 
design with abilities. The abilities attributed to design reside in the domain of the real 
and are not directly observable in the empirical domain (OL1). This is a whole system 
point of view that considers socio-technical system condition. For example, the 
question arises of how a human operator continuously monitors a display? The risk-
homeostasis theory perspective on design has emphasised the balanced and cooperative 
control design of a system in preventing the transformation of an operator reasoning 
system into an inappropriate trust system in the context of contradictory relations of 
tasks. The excessive concern on a partial system, without consideration of a relation in 
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a whole system makes it easy to commit errors by the operator in the system. It is 
necessary to study capabilities of design that are not prescribed, but may be conceived 
by the operator in relation to other parts of the system. 
The ontological structure can provide answers to questions for a meta-theory of design-
induced error such as: How to connect different design perspectives for design-induced 
error? What kinds of design that are capable of committing design-induced error exist? 
When design-induced error occurs, what is a state of the system in that occurrence?  
The following diagram in Figure 4.9shows how a theory can develop other theories by 
moving from one layer to another layer. 
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leads to reliance on 
the system to meet 
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can lead to failure to 
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event which 
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misinterpretation of 
display s which may 
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lead to failures  in 
planning to deal  with 
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affecting
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Figure 4.9 Phenomena changing between design-induced error theories according to levels 
of design concepts 
 
4.6.1 Causal determinants of design-induced error 
When we look at a structure of human–system interaction, it can be assumed that the 
system can put operators into two states; cooperating or deteriorating state. A 
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cooperating state refers to a good state of operators to achieve a goal of tasks. In this 
state a system and operators in the system cooperate with each other. The system 
provides operators with relevant environments according to changing modes of tasks. It 
does not provoke or degrade human cognition. On the other hand, a deteriorating state 
means a state of design-induced error in which state the system has degraded the ability 
of the operator, leading to making errors.  
How to differentiate one state from other, namely what are the determinants of design-
induced error? In order to answer the question, in the thesis three causal factors of 
design-induced error are introduced: degree of complexity of a system; context of 
temporal decision-making condition; and existence of local rationality between 
designers and operators. Figure 4.10 depicts the way causal conditions in inherent 
system properties lead to design-induced error with a causal determinant. 
 
- complexity
- temporal decision-making 
condition
local 
rationality
deteriorate
cooperate
system design 
properties
human-system 
interaction design
state of operator
design-induced error
existence
non-existence
causal condi tions causal determinant
 
Figure 4.10 Development of design-induced error 
Complexity and temporal decision-making error are conditions in which design-
induced error can occur. From a contextual paradigm, a local rationality is regarded as a 
causal determinant of design-induced error because different perspectives on the 
system environments have led human operators to mis- (or non-)recognition and 
inappropriate performances to the system operation. Causal determinant is a generative 
mechanism of design-induced error. 
 
Causal condition of design-induced error 
 Degree of complexity: complexity of systems or tasks is not only a 
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necessity of modern systems but also a critical hindrance to human 
operators.  
 Context of temporal decision-making condition: appropriately 
conducting tasks in a system depends on the context in which operators 
are situated to perform the tasks. 
Causal determinant of design-induced error 
 Existence of local rationality: how has a system been developed with 
different concepts from operators? 
 
4.6.2 Interpretation of the meta-theory of design-
induced error 
From the meta-theoretical framework above, local rationalities between designers and 
users, the causal determinant of the meta-theory of design-induced error, have a power 
to interpret each phenomenon (Table 4.8). These differences are apparent in the goals, 
ability, and trust that each party attributes to the system. Every theory can be explained 
with the assumption. From the interpretational view of local rationalities between 
designers and operators, the meta-theory appears when designers design a system 
contrary to users‟ intention and ability. Table 4.9 shows the consequences of design-
induced errors in each phenomenon. 
The first theory, risk homeostasis, proposed by Wilde [1982], indicates that designers‟ 
attempts to reduce the risk of catastrophic failure through increased reliability or 
increasing number of hard defences, such as anti-lock braking systems on motor 
vehicles, may be defeated by user behaviour. The users of such systems may assume 
that the changes to the system allow them to safely increase productivity or 
performance. In this case, the user and the designer have different goals, the designers 
have a goal of reducing risk, but the users concentrate on another goal, that of 
increasing productivity. 
The second theory, Bainbridge‟s theory of ironies of automation [1983], suggests that 
designers may believe that the reliability of the system can be improved by excluding 
the human from the operation of the system. However, as Bainbridge noted, it is 
impractical to remove the user from the system. This still appears a plausible 
proposition given that the human user possesses the unique ability to perform at the 
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knowledge-based level of performance, required to solve problems that arise in the 
operation of the system. Automation can gradually erode the ability of operators 
because they are deprived of experience in using the artefact. As a result, the eroded 
operator ability may reduce the operator‟s ability to diagnose faults and plan their use 
of the system.  
The third theory, Muir and Moray‟s theory of trust in automation [1994], noted that that 
as a result of increasing computerisation of systems, the increasing complexity of 
systems, and the degraded ability of operators to deal with problems in the system, 
more and more users tend to place inappropriate trust in the system, and fail to check 
all relevant indicators. This may not match the expected degree of monitoring 
prescribed by the designers of the system. 
The theory of Sarter at al. [1997] of automation surprises suggests that designers and 
users have different views of automation. The designer expects that the user constantly 
monitors the state of the automation and is able to respond to discrepancies in feedback 
that arise which illustrate that an error, arising from either the actions of the user or 
from a technical malfunction, has occurred. However, the users expect the system to 
serve them by providing readily-interpretable feedback about the state of the system 
The theory of Hutchins, Hollan and Norman [1985] of gulf of execution and evaluation 
shows how designers and operators have different views on functions in a system. An 
artefact has functions with which operators can achieve a purpose or task. Problem 
solving is a main characteristic of human cognition. However, the cognitive ability of 
problem solving is limited and not always correlated to system functions. Designers 
expect that users will understand and serve the artefact to achieve its feedback and a 
goal, but users expect the artefact to serve users to achieve their goal by giving relevant 
and semantic feedback.  
The remainder of the theories illustrate the manner in which the perception of the 
affordances of artefacts can lead to unanticipated usage. Busby and Hughes‟ theory of 
plan delegation suggested that designers expect that users are responsible and make 
plans, but users expect that artefacts exist to support the goals they wish to pursue.  
Similarly, Norman‟s [1998] theory of affordance illustrates how the user expects that 
the properties of the artefact will suggest how to complete a task, whilst the designer 
assumes that these represent a means of accessing specific functions of the system. The 
features of an artefact provide different cues to designers and operators. Designers 
think that features represent a means to access functions, while users think that these 
features tell them what they must do.  
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THEORY  
DESIGNERS’ 
RATIONALITIES  
USERS’ RATIONALITIES 
Ironies of 
automation  
Introduction of increasingly 
reliable automation allows 
exclusion of unreliable user from 
the system  
Systems are able to present  
information that is opaque and 
uninterpretable 
Trust in 
automation 
Users are able to generate an 
accurate mental model of the 
system and when monitoring 
should arise 
Monitoring of the system can 
be based on own subjective 
perception of reliability 
Automation 
surprises 
Introduction of automation 
provides protection to the system 
Introduction of automation 
should support reasoning 
about the state of the system 
Design 
affordance  
Affordances of artefact provide 
access to function 
Affordances of artefact 
indicate the procedure 
required to complete specific 
tasks 
Gulf of 
execution/ 
evaluation 
Users serve artefact to achieve its 
feedback 
Artefact serves users to 
achieve his/her goal 
Risk 
homeostasis 
Risk of failure decreased through 
use of increasingly reliable or 
defended systems 
Increased reliability and 
defence can be exploited for 
increased performance 
Plan delegation 
Users are planful in their use of 
artefacts and will deploy in 
accordance with the goals 
prescribed by designers‟ 
recommended usage 
Artefact can be relied upon to 
support acquisition of desired 
goals 
Table 4.8  A contextual (local rationalities of designers and users) meta-theory of design-
induced error 
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PHENOMENA CONSEQUENCE OF DESIGN-INDUCED ERROR 
Ironies of 
automation 
If automation is introduced without considering the 
abilities of operators, the operator will lose their ability, 
especially in monitoring a state of system or diagnosis of 
a problem, to deal with problems. 
Trust in automation If a system needs a decision from human operators while 
conducting an automatic operation without continuous 
communication with the operator, the operator would 
rather rely on their own mind than reason about the 
situation. 
Automation surprise 
 
As a system activates a self-protection program without 
involving operators in the activity, the operator does a 
task expecting a different consequence, resulting in 
errors. 
Design Affordance As forms of signals, shapes, or locations of managing 
artefact is matched with natural human perception or 
physical performance even if an intention is different 
from the signals, users will act inadvertently against 
their will. 
Gulf of 
execution/evaluation 
If a system does not provide information in a form 
psychologically relevant to humans, users will be 
confused with the information while searching for a 
command or diagnosing a situation. 
Risk homeostasis If a system allows users to overestimate or be 
overconfident about the safety or reliability of the 
system, the user tends to exploit to the maximum the 
ability of the system. 
Plan delegation 
 
If a system delegates procedures that rely on human 
memory and does not prepare settings to notice the 
procedure, the operator assumes that the procedures are 
prepared by the system or forgets the procedure. 
Table 4.9 Consequence of design-induced error 
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4.7 Summary 
In this thesis, it has been argued that a meta-theory of design-induced error is necessary 
in order to provide a collective view of design-induced error. Consequently, it was 
necessary: (1) to elucidate the nature of design-induced error, and (2) to bind the scope 
of applicability of various perspectives on design-induced error. By revealing 
underlying structures of theories, and adopting the ontological assumptions and a 
contextual paradigm, a meta-theory of design-induced error has been developed. The 
main components of design-induced error are the following: 
Three ontological layers of design-induced error: Affordance level; psychological 
logic level; and trust level. 
A causal determinant of design-induced error: Existence of local rationalities of 
designers and operators. 
Two causal conditions of design-induced error: Degree of complexity of 
system/tasks; and context of temporal decision making condition.  
Three distinctive perspectives that categorise related theories on design-induced error 
have been presented. Each one of them refers only to certain aspects of design concepts 
in design-induced error. The affordance level of design perspective focuses on the 
observable practices of system and operators. It attempts to offer links between the 
various design features and their function.  
The psychological logic level of perspective illustrates how psychological 
disconnection between logics and functions of a system can lead human operators to 
make errors. According to the psychological logic perspective, the function design in a 
system needs to be carried out in response to given logical requirements and the logic 
should be same in operators‟ psychological logic. Finally, the trust level perspective 
locates design in its wider socio-technical context. It is argued that currently our socio-
technical systems need to be sure human operators in the system can develop a 
reasonable belief in a system, and this failure is the most important characteristic of 
design-induced error in socio-technical context.  
All the preceding perspectives deal with different aspects of design-induced error in a 
manner that may appear too heterogeneous to synthesise. However, drawing on the 
ontological assumption, it has been suggested here that these perspectives can be 
conceived as dealing with three different, yet logically connected, ontological layers of 
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design-induced error. Different layers exhibit different connections between design 
elements (i.e. feature, function, logic, and reliability) depending on humans‟ 
recognition, understanding, and trust in the elements. Each layer constitutes a relatively 
autonomous area of study, and the transition from each layer to the one below it 
denotes an interest in penetrating deeper into the object of study and investigating the 
conditions that render the preceding layer possible.  
The rationale behind the conceptualisation of design-induced error was described with 
a concept of causal factors of design-induced error that are derived from the roles of a 
system and a human operator in a human–system interaction structure. From a 
contextual paradigm, we can assume that different perspectives on the system between 
designers and operators can determine the design-induced error. The causal conditions 
that create adverse environments for operators are external contexts of a system. On the 
other hand, the causal determinant, a local rationality between designers and operators, 
is an internal factor and not shown as a physical context. It appears in human–system 
interaction failures. The degree of causal conditions of design-induced error is 
dependent on the existence of causal determinant.  
This meta-theoretical conceptualisation of design-induced error presents four 
advantages. First, it provides a collective view of related theories that show design 
issues in human–system interaction failures. Against a current situation in which we 
identify only each theory separately, a meta-theory that has ontological layers in which 
we can make connections between layers provides us with a whole view of design-
induced error. 
Secondly, the various perspectives on design-induced error have been logically related 
to each other in terms of design-induced error. These logical relationships elucidate that 
in order to construct a cooperating system each design element should be integrated 
consistently with human cognition and performance. The existence of particular 
features of design-induced error at a particular layer is only a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for the existence of features at the preceding layer. The important 
characteristics of design reveal that designers have to consider what design can do, and 
what design means to the operator.  
Thirdly, the meta-theoretical assumptions proposed move beyond an equipment design 
perspective. Including a socio-technical design point of view is possible. In an 
equipment design, level of design-induced error confines itself to the observable 
design-induced error practices only. This level is unable to offer explanations of the 
possibility of a relationship between high levels of design elements (i.e. logic, and 
reliability of a system). It may difficult to describe, for the equipment design 
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perspective point of view, outlining what design is capable of doing. 
Finally, with an assumption of causal determinant of design-induced error (local 
rationalities between designers and operators), an analytical and explanatory tool for 
what and how a human–system interaction failure is caused has been developed. The 
meta-theory of design-induced error is an interpretational methodology for analysis of 
human–system interaction failures in terms of a role of design. With the methodology, 
any readers who want to understand human–system interaction failures can develop a 
proper reasoning about the failure to find design issues that would easily have been 
missed or underestimated without such a methodology. This meta-theory may be used 
in a design process as well as in accident analysis. The meta-theory will be also 
examined for analysing a specific accident report system in terms of the role of design. 
The result is reported and discussed in chapter 5 and 8.  
There were limitations in this thesis while developing the meta-theory. Firstly, this 
thesis did not create a new theory. It is rather a contextual and ontological combination 
and interpretation of related theories. This approach produced a collective 
understanding of related theories in the light of a relation between design purpose (i.e. 
perspective of designer) and human error (perspective of operator). The meta-theory 
developed in this thesis is not only one meta-theory of design-induced error. Other 
people can make other meta-theories with their own assumptions and paradigms. 
Additionally, the number of theories that appear in the meta-theory of design-induced 
error is not exhausted. There may be other theories that explain the problem above. 
This research, however, used the theories above only because it is not a main focus of 
this research to search how many theories exist but how to provide a collective view of 
related theories. Other researchers can include other theories if necessary. 
A definition of Design-induced Error: In its broadest sense, design-induced error can 
refer to any error made by a user of operator of an artefact or system which is partly or 
wholly attributable to the design of the artefact or system.  In this dissertation this 
definition is acknowledged, but a narrower view is taken, based on local rationalities 
between designer and user.  In this regard, there are two key aspects of any good 
definition of design-induced, the first of which is a definition of what errors are design-
induced and what are not, and the second is a definition of the limitations that go with 
“design-induced”. This means, how to differentiate other human errors from design-
induced error. 
In the proposed meta-theory, design-induced may be judged as a function of different 
perspectives between designers and operators. If an error originates from a difference in 
expectation and intention between designers and operators, it can be considered as 
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having a characteristic of a concept of design-induced error, otherwise not. For example, 
if a pilot made an error by misinterpreting a signal in a cockpit display and the 
misinterpretation was not caused by any malfunction of the pilot‟s physical health but 
due to the human reasoning process of normal pilots, this error can be categorized as a 
design-induced error, because there was a different perspective between designers of 
the system and the pilot. The designers had an expectation that pilots in the system 
would clearly recognise the signal in the display and perform correctly, but the pilot 
had a different expectation of how the design of the cockpit display could provide a 
reasonable feedback (e.g. if the pilot selects a wrong number, then the system alerts the 
pilot in an appropriate manner). 
On the other hand, if a system fails to transfer an intention of designers in a function to 
operators, it should be classified as a “design (engineering) failure”, because this error 
was not caused by different perspectives between designers and operators. The 
intention of designers was not communicated to operators due to a system failure. For 
example, an operator made an error based on wrong information provided by a system. 
A malfunction in the system created the wrong information. In the case of this error, we 
cannot say the operator error was a design-induced error because the system failure was 
not the intention of the designers as part of the design.  
However, it is possible that an error can be classified as design-induced error if the 
designer designed the system with an intention that there would be an error in the 
system, and that the operator could cope with the error. On the other hand, the operator 
conceived that the designer prepared for the system error. In this case there was 
different perspective between designers and operators. 
As an error was not related to the intention of designers, the error may be not classified 
as a design-induced error. This case does not conceive different perspectives between 
designers and operators. For instance, an operator misread a direction in a gauge due to 
fatigue of the operator and the fatigue was not created or increased by tasks related to 
the system. This should be classified as a “personal oriented error”.  
In summary, design-induced error is defined here as error made by a user of operator of 
an artefact or system which is partly or wholly attributable to differences in the 
rationalities of the user and designer of the artefact or system. 
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Chapter 5.  Case Study: Results of the 
meta-theory application to accident cases 
The previous chapter presented a meta-theory of design-induced error. This chapter 
presents case study results of accident analysis with the concept of Design-induced 
error meta-theory. The case study was conducted in order to answer the following 
questions:  
 What is nature of human errors in real accidents? 
 How to capture the concept of design-induced error in the accident 
cases? How can the meta-theory of design-induced error help to identify 
design issues in human errors (mechanisms of errors and implicated 
design concepts that affect human operators)? 
 In which ways can people be helped to understand design issues in 
human error? Is there any way to represent relationships between design 
and human error? 
The case study used the same accident data-set taken from the Australian aviation 
accident report database system that was used during developing the ontology. The first 
section 5.1 of this chapter discusses the overall results of the analysis by summarising 
the quantitative results. Section 5.2 clarifies and examines artefacts or systems that fail 
in the course of human–system interaction. Section 5.3 presents diagram analyses in 
which relationships between human errors and systems may be more easily represented. 
The final section 5.4 presents the summary and limitations of this study. 
5.1 The overall results of the case study 
Nature of Accident involved in human–system interaction failures 
This section shows the quantitative results of this case study. 562 accident cases were 
examined and categorised. The analysed results were reviewed by a human error 
specialist. However, it is important to mention that the results are not strictly statistical 
and the data or findings in the accident reports were accepted as truth. The aim of the 
study is to see a general tendency of human errors in accidents rather than statistical 
exactitude.  
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The first research question is: 
What is the nature of human error in real accidents? 
The question may have the following sub-questions: 
 How many human error cases could be found in accident reports? 
 In which artefacts or systems do human operators make errors frequently? 
 When do such failures occur? 
 What kinds of jobs/tasks are involved in the errors? 
The remaining parts of this section present results of accident analysis. 
The portion of human error cases in accidents 
In order to answer the first sub-question about the portions of human error in accidents, 
the accident data set analysed the categorised accident types. The classification of 
general accident types are; mechanical failure, operator failure, external factors, or 
unknown.  
 Mechanical failure: an accident mainly caused by mechanical failure (e.g.  
failure of a motor). 
 Operator failure: an accident caused by human error (e.g. wrong 
management of a device). 
 External factors: an accident caused by external factors such as bad weather. 
 Unknown: the causation of an accident could not be identified by 
investigation. 
Table 5.1 Accident type 
ACCIDENT TYPE 
NUMBER OF 
CASES 
PERCENTAGE 
Mechanical failure 204 33.01% 
Operator failure 287 46.44% 
External factor 56 9.06% 
Unknown 71 11.49% 
TOTAL 618 100% 
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By analysing accident reports, the study found that 287 cases fall into the human error 
category (operator failure). This is 47% of all accidents examined. If more than one 
accident causation was found, all factors were counted at the same time. For example, 
if there was a failure of a part of a mechanical system and then operators‟ failure was 
also found, that case was recorded the case in the category of operator failure as well as 
the mechanical failure category. Table 5.1 shows the portions of accident types in the 
dataset.  
 
Human error types 
Human error types are further categorised into 14 items in reference to commonly used 
human error terms in many research studies. The “not recognising” error is the top 
cause of errors, “misinterpretation”, “misunderstand”, and “inappropriate performance” 
follow. Table 5.2 shows the result. 
Table 5.2 Human error type 
HUMAN ERROR TYPE 
NUMBER OF 
CASES 
PERCENTAGE 
Misreading 19 5.29% 
Miswriting 8 2.23% 
Misinterpretation 51 14.21% 
Misunderstanding 50 13.93% 
Did not recognize 75 20.89% 
Inattentional activity/ automation mode 13 3.62% 
Inappropriate performance 50 13.93% 
Not following the signs or indications 5 1.39% 
Not keeping monitoring  19 5.29% 
Violation of rules or procedure (if there is other 
benefit for the task or whole system) 
21 
5.85% 
Not doing 6 1.67% 
Not checking 31 8.64% 
Difficult to understand 7 1.95% 
Forgot to do 4 1.11% 
TOTAL 359 100.00% 
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Factors leading to errors 
Operators are often confused with similar conditions and procedures. Design of 
operation and function provided by a system need to be designed more carefully in 
order to misidentify. 
What kind of information systems give operators is an important factor that leads to 
errors. If a system does not give information, operators have to make assumptions 
about the situation. That leads to errors. Table 5.3 shows the result. 
 
Table 5.3 Factors leading to human error 
FACTORS LEADING TO HUMAN ERROR 
NUMBER OF 
CASES 
PERCENTAGE 
Providing different possibility 37 10.54% 
Hiding important property 53 15.10% 
Confusing with amount of information 47 13.39% 
Confusing without information 18 5.13% 
Providing unreliable information 9 2.56% 
Conflict with previous experience etc. 26 7.41% 
Difficult to deal with the artefact 45 12.82% 
Not providing relevant information 7 1.99% 
Too much reliance on the system  28 7.98% 
Difficult to distinguish  55 15.67% 
Providing a method unfriendly and less used 
before  4 1.14% 
Making it easy to do or access a wrong way of 
using  the artifact 22 6.27% 
TOTAL 351 100.00% 
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Meta-theory classification 
In the previous chapter, human errors were analysed in terms of meta-theory 
classification. The gulf of evaluation is the most commonly found among the theories 
in the meta-theory. It means that many of operators involved in failures failed to 
evaluate a current situation or state of a system. Cases of automation trust were found 
as well. The aviation industry has adopted sophisticated artefacts and systems resulting 
in complexity and automation. There have been tendency of operators relying on those 
artifacts or systems. Table 5.4 presents the result. In this classification the theory 
„automation ironies‟ has two sub categories; inability(degraded abilities of operator 
dealing with problems in an automation system) and monitoring failure because the 
theory explains the two phenomena.  
Table 5.4 Meta-theory classification of design-induced error 
THEORIES IN META-THEORY OF DESIGN-
INDUCED ERROR 
NUMBER OF 
CASES 
PERCENTAGE 
Automation ironies (inability) 44 10.76% 
Automation ironies (monitoring failure) 26 6.36% 
Trust in automation 57 13.94% 
Automation surprise 12 2.93% 
Design affordance 39 9.54% 
Gulf of execution 42 10.27% 
Gulf of evaluation 104 25.43% 
Risk homeostasis 33 8.07% 
Plan delegation 52 12.71% 
TOTAL 409 100.00% 
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5.2 Analysis of failed artefacts or systems 
The Australian aviation accident reports system (AAARS) database for the period from 
1994 to February 2005 has been examined, and a dataset provided in the Microsoft 
Excel and Access database for 223 human-error cases. As some occurrences involved 
other accident types, the original dataset of operator errors was higher (n=287) than the 
number in the dataset for the analysis. . A complete list of the dataset is presented in 
Appendix B. 
5.2.1 Overview of failed systems 
The failed systems in human–system interaction failures were grouped into ten themes 
that were identified in the course of accident analysis. Among those cases some 
informative cases were examined in detail. Table 5.5 shows the result. 
Table 5.5 Items of failed systems during human–system interactions 
 
FAILED SYSTEMS TOTAL 
1 Air traffic control system (TAAATS
12
, ASD) 10 
2 Cockpit control system (FMS, FMC, CATIS, chart) 14 
3 Handles or switches (Landing gear/flap, switches) 12 
4 Fuel selection/ fuel management system 24 
5 Warning systems (TCAC, stall warning, weather radar, GPS) 20 
6 Monitoring system 14 
7 Traffic communication system (CPDLC, radio etc.) 92 
8 Procedure/emergency procedure system 16 
9 Wire (power line) detecting system 12 
10 Runway safety system 9 
 TOTAL 223 
                                                     
12
 TAAATS:  The Advanced Australian Air Traffic System 
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The following sections present analysis results according to system themes with 55 
examples. In the example, dotted lines and background shades provided would help to 
identify human error and system functions that led to human errors. Table 5.6 presents 
mark-up index. 
 
Table 5.6 Mark-up indices for identifying design-induced error terms 
MARK-UP INDEX EXPLANATION 
Human error Human errors 
Design deficiency 
Design deficiencies associated with 
human errors 
Modification of design Modification of design after the failure 
 
5.2.1.1 The air traffic control system 
Air traffic control systems are important for organising aircraft on departure, arrival or 
en route in order to prevent air traffic congestion or even collision that can result in 
tragic accidents. Many sophisticated artificial systems have been developed in order to 
provide air traffic controllers and pilots with situation awareness.  
The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS) 
Functions 
TAAATS (pronounced tats) is the hardware and software system used by Airservices 
Australia for Air Traffic Control services. It is a computer based system, which serves 
as an aid to Air Traffic Controllers. It does not control aircraft, but gives the user a 
display of information about an aircraft's position and associated information. It also 
handles communications and other information exchanges [From Wikipedia, November 
2007, available in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Australian_Advanced_Air_Traffic_System ]. 
TAAATS is a sophisticated integrated air traffic control system that provides accurate 
and enhanced information on aircraft movements. TAAATS control station has four 
computer screens: 
Air Situation Display (ASD) : This main screen is basically a map of the sector that 
shows the location of all aircraft in controlled airspace, as reported by one of several 
data sources – radar data processing, flight data processing and automatic dependent 
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surveillance.  
Miscellaneous Information Display : A display providing access to a wide range of 
information including aircraft performance data, weather radar, airport/navigation 
aid/tracking point codes, airline ICAO designators, Standard Arival Route (STAR) and 
Standard Instrument Departure (SID) "plates" and depiction of the airspace setup for 
TMA sectors.  
Voice Switching and Communications Select (VSCS) panel : A touch-sensitive screen 
allows controllers to choose the radio frequency they need to talk to pilots and ground 
staff, or the intercom for talking with other controllers.  
Auxiliary Display : The controller can call up a wide range of information such as 
weather forecasts, flight plans, strip windows, secondary maps and other material for 
the information of themselves and pilots. 
Error modes 
When there are many things to do simultaneously or in an automatic process, operators 
of TAAATS may fail to conduct careful selection of each function displayed in 
computerised systems because most selections can be achieved by just entering a key 
on a keyboard (example 1, example 2). It is an easy task to type in a keystroke, 
resulting in unconscious performances. For instance, in example 1 there were many 
deleting functions in the computerised monitor. The coordinator in example 2 suffered 
from reviewing flight progress strip. With combination of circumstances, if there is not 
a clear preventive function provided by the system, it may lead to operators‟ 
unintentionally entering or deleting data. The configuration of the system may make it 
easy for operators to make errors. 
Example 1  
the Cairns Tower coordinator controller had cancelled the 
aircraft's flight data record in The Australian Advanced Air 
Traffic Control System (TAAATS). … The coordinator had 
assumed that an aircraft on the ground at Cairns was the 
aircraft displayed as airborne and consequently felt that it was 
unnecessary to check further prior to deleting the record. 
TAAATS displays a warning message requesting confirmation 
of the cancellation action when a controller deletes a flight 
data record for an aircraft. This message does not warn 
controllers that they do not have jurisdiction of the aircraft. … 
Airservices Australia have proposed that the warning message 
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for non-jurisdiction flight data records should be amended to 
alert controllers to the fact that coordination is required prior 
to deleting the record. (This is one of many TAAATS software 
modification requests that have been submitted.) ATSB 
occurrence No:199805341 
Example 2 
the Adelaide strip for HYY was accidentally placed on the 
airways clearance delivery console and the Sydney strip 
placed on the surface movement control console. … The 
coordinator did not review the flight progress strip to ensure 
the crew had been cleared before coordinating the Sydney 
flight data record for VH-HYY…. Local safety action: 
Airservices Australia Southern District issued a request to 
amend the TAAATS software to: Show when there is more 
than one record in the system for an aircraft during the 
preactive stage. Amend procedures so a clearance is annotated 
on a flight progress strip only after it is issued. ATSB 
occurrence No:199905168 
 
Air Situation Display (ASD) 
Functions 
The air traffic control air situation display provides controllers with an automatically 
triggered alert when a variation is detected, by radar, between the planned track and the 
actual track being flown. 
Error modes 
When there is data that represent a position or condition of a system, operators consider 
the data displayed as an actual state of the system even the data was input before. If 
there is no correction and checking system, incorrect data input that should have been 
checked could misguide operators to believe the incorrect input data as showing a real 
position through ASD (example 3). In a complex display (Figure 5.1) it is difficult for 
human operators to identify the correct position and procedural tracks of all aircrafts. It 
might not effectively warn operators if there were warning signals illuminating 
routinely. Combined with an ineffective alert system the ASD system may confuse the 
operator causing failure to recognise situations before encountering a serious condition 
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(example 4, 5). 
Example 3 
The position of the Boeing 767 was displayed incorrectly on 
the Brisbane sector controller's Air Situation Display (ASD). 
The aircraft passed ATMAP at 0404 Coordinated Universal 
Time and was estimating Curtin at 0503. At 0404 the aircraft 
was displayed on the ASD just south of Bali with an estimate 
for Bali of 0404. Bali ATC had previously advised Brisbane 
ATC that the aircraft was estimating ATMAP at 0404. As the 
aircraft was not within radar coverage and not fitted with 
Automatic Dependant Surveillance equipment, the ASD 
displayed the aircraft position consistent with the input data, 
not the aircraft's actual position. … The investigation revealed 
that the controller had used the electronic strip intending to 
enter the time of 0404 for ATMAP, but instead entered 0404 as 
the time overhead Bali. ATSB occurrence No: 200000933 
Example 4 
The controller had not established that the two aircraft had 
definitely passed, or that a longitudinal separation standard 
existed in accordance with the MATS, and vertical separation 
reduced to less than the minimum 1000 ft standard. The 
routine display of CLAM alerts for expected events, such as 
the issue of discretionary climb, did little to enhance the 
controller‟s situational awareness in regard to QF31s cleared 
level status. … In addition, The TAAATS Alerts Review and 
Enhancement Project is currently reviewing the processing 
and display of CLAM and other alerts for controllers. Software 
is currently being developed to allow a flight plan conflict 
function display for procedural tracks, including ADS tracks, for 
delivery late in 2006. ATSB occurrence No: 200404707 
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Figure 5.1 Airservices Australia computer replay at 1524UTC
13
 (in example 4) 
Example 5 
The air traffic controller‟s initial scan of the air situation display 
was incomplete and did not detect that a procedural 
separation standard would not exist between the 737 and the 
777, or that he needed to calculate the time that the 10 minute 
longitudinal separation standard was established. … A more 
comprehensive initial scan of the air situation display by the 
controller may have facilitated timely action to avoid an 
infringement of separation standards. ATSB occurrence No: 
200600396 
 
Computerised automatic terminal information system 
(CATIS) 
Functions 
                                                     
13
 The replay was created from recorded data, used for investigation purposes, by 
Airservices Australia. It was not taken directly from the air situation display (ASD) that 
the controller was viewing, and does not necessarily reflect all the information, or the 
display setup, presented to the controller at the time of the incident. Airline flight 
number QF31 is displayed on the ASD as QFA31 and TG991 is displayed as THA991. 
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The computerised automatic terminal information system (CATIS) is used to broadcast 
operational information to pilots. The CATIS was normally broadcast on the non-
directional navigation beacon (NDB) and a very high frequency (VHF) radio 
transmitter. 
Error modes 
In the example 6, operators have trusted information provided by the CATIS and not 
checked further. However, limitations of the system meant that it could not include all 
the information that should be available. 
Example 6 
The controllers in the Adelaide Air Traffic Control tower had 
previously included information that the LLZ
14
 and the GP
15
 
were not available on the computerised automatic terminal 
information system (CATIS) that is used to broadcast 
operational information to pilots. When the LLZ was returned 
for operational use, they abbreviated the advice to `localiser 
available‟, due to system constraints on the amount of 
additional information that could be included. The information 
that the GP was not available was not included in the CATIS. 
ATSB occurrence No: 200400856 
 
The console of the air traffic control system 
Error modes 
Insufficient operating positions (limited space in example 7 and 8, position of the 
controller pilot datalink and the sector 8 operating console in example 9) increase 
possibilities of errors by controllers. Especially, in very busy times, operators are easily 
distracted, resulting in them making errors or missing information. 
 
Example 7 
KAL362 was incorrectly given a clearance to climb to FL290 
                                                     
14
 LLZ:  Localizer 
15
 GP:  Glide Path 
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by the Bangkok Sector 3 controller, … A high level of 
interaction and cooperation was required between the radar 
and procedural controllers to effectively manage the sector's 
airspace. The flight progress strips for each aircraft were 
required to be retained in the procedural display until the crew 
reported at the next position. This was to enable controllers to 
observe that an aircraft was in transit between the previous 
and next positions. However, due to limited space to display 
the strips, the Sector controllers had developed a habit of 
removing flight progress strips at the earliest opportunity to 
make space for new strips. ATSB occurrence No: 199702691 
Example 8 
Both controllers had earlier noted the possibility for conflict 
between the two aircraft and annotated their respective flight 
progress strips with an Oodnadatta position, and the 
calculated estimates for that position. … During the following 
90 minutes, the traffic level steadily increased …He was 
unable to monitor the Sector 1 controller's air-ground-air 
program on a continuous basis due to the conduct of 
coordination actions. The work at the console was difficult, 
with three controllers working in an area normally used by only 
two controllers. ATSB occurrence No: 199804690 
Example 9 
The distraction and subsequent failure of the sector controller 
to regularly scan the flight progress strips. … The positioning 
of the controller pilot datalink and the sector 8 operating 
console restrict the ability of controllers to maintain an effective 
scan of the flight progress strip board. Controllers are required 
to divert their gaze and attention from the board to operate the 
controller pilot datalink keyboard. Modification of the console 
layout to enable more ready access to the controller pilot 
datalink or alternatively, provision of a controller to operate the 
controller pilot datalink during busy traffic periods would 
alleviate the problem. ATSB occurrence No:199802755 
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The surveillance radar (SURAD) 
Functions 
The surveillance radar (SURAD) equipment is designed to help the air traffic controller 
to identify the tracks of aircraft. 
Error modes 
In case of example 10 where errors were associated with SURAD, the SURAD did not 
have identification labels or height information (facilities that were available on more 
modern equipment) and that limitation increased the workload on the controller. 
Example 10 
The controller had omitted to issue the 7,000 ft restriction even 
though it was still a requirement to ensure separation with 
inbound aircraft. … Additionally, the SURAD was unreliable in 
its ability to provide constant, accurate position information 
within 10 NM of Williamtown. The controllers were aware of 
those restrictions as they were documented in aeronautical 
publications. The military sector controller was using the 
Interim Radar Display System (IRDS). Although that system 
had labels and a Mode "C" height reading capability, the 
Macchi was not equipped with a Mode "C" capability. 
Consequently, the sector controller did not have a radar 
indication of the height of the Macchi. … flight progress strip 
management made the task of remembering an additional 
restriction more complicated. Consequently, the trainee 
approach controller forgot to issue the 7,000ft requirement to 
the crew of the Macchi. ATSB occurrence No: 200004806 
 
5.2.1.2  The cockpit computer system 
In order to help pilots to identify situations, computerised cockpit systems have been 
developed such as the flight management system, flight management computer etc. 
These systems fitted to the aircraft provide various functions such as lateral and vertical 
flight path guidance as well as performance information to the crew. The systems can 
also provide control and guidance information to the autopilot. Most systems are 
displayed on the monitor fitted in the cockpit.  
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Flight Management Computer (FMC) 
Functions 
A Flight Management Computer is a computer carried on an aircraft to integrate the 
functions of navigation and performance management. It is composed of two kinds of 
database: Navigation and Performance of a certain aircraft. The FMC is the heart of the 
modern aeroplane‟s electronic systems, and gathers information from other subsystems 
(Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_Management_Computer).  
Error modes 
Before the FMC can be utilised to provide vertical navigation guidance, it needs to 
compute a descent path, which conforms to the requirements of the instrument 
approach. Waypoints and associated altitude constraints required by the FMC to 
compute an accurate approach profile that correspond to the LOC/DME approach path 
gradient should be input by the crew. It is necessary to input data (e.g. altitude 
constraints) into the FMS in order to intercept waypoints. However, the screen can be 
changed into other modes without notice during the work. Figure 5.2 shows the display 
of example 11 cases before entering data and the display change into other mode 
automatically in Figure 5.3. When the system did not provide protective measurements 
against the crews‟ inadvertent performances, the crew omitted waypoint/altitude 
constraint data from the flight management computer (FMC) LEGS page (examples 11, 
12), or mistakenly entered data in the active flight plan page on the multi-function 
control and display unit of the flight management system (FMS). The columns moved 
automatically without the operators noticing (example 13). 
 
Example 11 
The flight crew misinterpreted the holding pattern limit from the 
runway 35 ILS approach chart. … The flight crew did not 
monitor the Canberra DME to check distance on the holding 
pattern outbound leg until they had proceeded beyond the 
holding pattern limit. Significant factors 1. The MEL applied to 
the aircraft allowed continued operation when elevated 
temperatures caused the environmental conditions on the 
flight deck to become abnormally hot, contributing to pilot 
fatigue during a long flight sector. 2. The assistance of air 
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traffic control radar services, which is normally provided, was 
not available to the crew. 3. The holding pattern limits 
published for CCK, did not contain the referenced DME 
identifier (Canberra) in the limit notes. 4. The copilot, under the 
direction of the pilot in command, entered incorrect data in the 
FMC. 5. The pilot in command did not detect the incorrect 
entry in the FMC. 6. The flight crew did not employ effective 
means to verify the navigational performance of the FMC. 
ATSB occurrence No: 200402747 
 
 
Figure 5.2 FMC CDU display showing hold page before the leg distance had been entered. 
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Figure 5.3 FMC CDU display showing hold page after the leg distance had been entered. 
 
Example 12 
The crew selected the appropriate approach and landing 
charts and programmed the flight management computer 
(FMC) for an arrival to runway 15. Three minutes before the 
crew commenced descent, the ATIS was changed to indicate 
that arriving aircraft from the south could expect to carry out 
the runway 33 Locator/Distance Measuring Equipment 
(LOC/DME) approach to runway 33. The crew was not aware 
of the change … During that interaction the crew did not select 
waypoint HENDO as the IAF when prompted by the FMC to 
do so and consequently critical „Not below 6,500 ft‟ altitude 
constraints at the HENDO and 20 DME Cairns waypoints were 
omitted. ATSB occurrence No: 200401904 
Example 13 
In order to ascertain the predicted altitude that the aircraft 
would overfly Mackay, the crew removed the constraint 
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altitude relating to the overhead Mackay position. It is likely 
that, when the crew reinstated the overhead Mackay altitude 
constraint, the altitude constraints for subsequent flight plan 
segments were applied to the immediately preceding segment. 
A break (or discontinuity) in the predicted track on the map 
display screen (a normal feature in the operation of the 
system) distracted the crew during the inbound turn, during 
which time the aircraft descended below the step altitude 
(2,200 ft). … The sequence of FMS entries advised by the 
aircraft manufacturer provided an explanation of how the 
2,500 ft step altitude, once removed, could have been 
incorrectly reinstated into the active flight plan. This meant that 
the FMS contained an incorrect step altitude for the inbound 
turn and that the automatic flight system would allow the 
aircraft to descend below the step altitude unless the crew 
intervened. The crew believed that they had operated the FMS 
system appropriately and were unaware that the constraint 
altitude had been changed. It is likely that they expected that 
the aircraft‟s automatic flight system would not infringe the 
vertical profile limits of the approach. However, it was apparent 
that they became distracted during the inbound turn by the 
track break or discontinuity on the map display. ATSB 
occurrence No:200302433 
 
Chart in the cockpit computer system 
Error modes 
Design tries to put more information in a single form of data display. As a result the 
depiction on the form may be complicated and small, which sometimes make it 
difficult for people to identify a position wanted from other positions. If depiction in a 
chart is difficult to identify, it may impair identifying positions in the chart in example 
14. Example 15 illustrates confusion of same letters displayed in a chart.  
Example 14 
The crew of a Boeing 767 (B767) had been cleared to taxi for 
departure from runway 01, intersection "A7", at Brisbane. They 
proceeded along taxiway "B" then, incorrectly, initiated a turn 
onto taxiways "B5" and "A", which was in conflict with rapid 
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exit taxiway "A5S". A BAe146 vacating runway 01 via "A5S", 
was instructed by ATC to hold short of taxiway "A" in order to 
avoid the B767. … The operator of the B767 advised that they 
had tried a new system of printing aerodrome charts from a 
computer application compact disk. However, the print format 
was such that the pilot in command of the B767 was not able 
to correctly read the notes provided on the chart with respect 
to taxiway routes and directions. ATSB occurrence No: 
200105351 
Example 15 
After a Boeing 747 had landed on runway 34L the crew was 
instructed to taxi via runway 25 and taxiway Yankee (Y). 
Jeppesen Sydney terminal chart 10-9, dated 18 December 
1998, was used to provide taxi guidance to the crew. That 
chart depicted taxiways G3 and Y leading off to the north of 
runway 25. However, the chart was ambiguous in that there 
was another letter "Y" displayed to the south of runway 25. 
The crew interpreted taxiway G3 to be taxiway Y on the basis 
of that information. The crew subsequently turned the aircraft 
onto taxiway G3, which was closed. The aircraft was then 
stopped until cone markers and unserviceability lights, which 
marked taxiway G3, had been removed. … Jeppesen were 
advised of the ambiguity displayed on the chart and have 
since re-issued the chart to more accurately reflect the current 
amendments to the taxiway system in that part of the airport. 
… ATSB occurrence No:199900153 
 
QNH barometric altimeter 
Function 
QNH
16
 is a Q code. It is a pressure setting used by pilots, air traffic control (ATC) and 
low frequency weather beacons to refer to the barometric altimeter setting which will 
cause the altimeter to read altitude above mean sea level within a certain defined region. 
This region may be fairly widespread, or apply only to the airfield for which the QNH 
                                                     
16
 QNH:  Atmospheric Pressure (Q) at sea level – i.e. the altimeter setting that allows 
the altimeter to read altitude about mean sea level 
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was given. An airfield QNH will cause the altimeter to read field elevation on landing 
irrespective of the temperature. ((Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QNH , 
November 2007) 
 QNH is the mean sea level pressure derived from the barometric pressure at the station 
location. The local QNH at an airport is normally derived from an actual pressure 
reading. Australian aviation regulations require that, when an accurate QNH is set on 
the pressure-setting subscale of an altimeter planned for use under the Instrument Flight 
Rules, the altimeter(s) should read the nominated elevation to within 60 ft. QNH should 
be set on the altimeter pressure-setting subscale of all aircraft cruising in the altimeter 
setting region, which extends from the earth‟s surface to the transition altitude of 
10,000 ft in Australia. QNE
17
 is the standard pressure altimeter setting of 1013.2 hPa 
that is set for flight above the transition altitude.  
Error modes 
Normally as it is not necessary to adjust barometric pressure in QNH, the pilot does not 
concern about resetting the barometer. In this case studied, the operator forgot to reset 
the barometer of QNH. There was no warning system at this case (example 16). 
Example 16 
As the aircraft approached 500 ft above ground level, the rate 
of descent was assessed as too high … during this check that 
the pilots realised that the barometric settings on the altimeters 
had not been set to the airfield QNH of 1028 hectopascals 
(hPa) but rather had been left on 1013 hPa; the setting required 
for flight above the transition altitude (10,000 ft.) ATSB 
occurrence No: 200301990 
 
5.2.1.3  Handles or switches 
Pilots and air traffic controllers use operating devices such as handles or switches. 
Users have to remember how to use such operating devices and perform correctly in 
order to achieve the system‟s goals. 
Landing gear/flap 
Error modes 
                                                     
17
 QNE:  1013.25 Mb Altimeter Subscale Setting (International Standard Atmosphere) 
Chapter 5: Case study: Result of the meta-theory application to accident cases 
 149 
There were four cases of wrong landing gear selection incidents. In most cases, the 
pilots involved in the accident unintentionally moved the flap/slats near the landing 
gear handle instead of the landing gear. They do not know the reason why they failed to 
perform the operation correctly. The position of artifacts and skill-based performances 
may be associated with the errors. In example 17, 18 show that pilots moved the 
flaps/slate instead of the landing gear.  
Example 17 
Following a normal take-off the pilot in command (PIC), the 
handling pilot, called for the landing gear to be retracted. A 
short time later, he noticed an amber warning appear on the 
airspeed scale on his primary flight display (PFD) screen. … 
he noticed that the flaps/slats lever was at the `slats retract' 
position. … Interviews with the PIC and copilot did not reveal 
any obvious issue that might have led to the copilot retracting 
the flaps/slats instead of the landing gear. ATSB occurrence 
No: 200302037 
Example 18 
After TJC became airborne the co-pilot, observing indications 
of a positive rate of climb, called for "gear up". The pilot in 
command reported that on hearing the "gear up" call, he 
observed his airspeed indicator to be at the speed when flaps 
would normally be retracted from the FLAPS 5 position to the 
FLAPS 1 position. Noting this airspeed, he positioned the flap 
lever to the FLAPS 1 position instead of positioning the 
landing gear lever to the UP position. However, he did not call 
"flaps 1 set" when the flaps reached the FLAPS 1 position, 
which should have been done in accordance with the 
operator's standard operating procedures. … The co-pilot was 
concentrating on maintaining the aircraft's flightpath and did 
not notice that the pilot in command had retracted the flaps 
instead of the landing gear. … As a result, on hearing the call 
for "gear up", and on noting that the airspeed was in excess of 
the initial flap retraction speed, he inadvertently substituted 
flap for gear and consequently retracted flap instead of the 
landing gear. ATSB occurrence No: 199903131 
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Bleed air switches  
Error modes 
In the cases studied in which performance of bleed-air switches was a factor, pilots 
failed to perform correct movements of intended switches. The pilot in the example 19 
moved other switches near to the target switch (see Figure 5.4). The bleed-air valve 
switch was moved instead of vent fan switches.  Example 20 also shows same pattern 
of an inadvertent move in a hectic situation (e.g. becoming occupied with 
reprogramming the aircraft‟s GPS setting.  
Example 19 
The switches were placarded bleed-air valve (left and right), 
and the individual switch positions were (as read from the top 
selection to the bottom) OPEN, ENVIR OFF, and INSTR & 
ENVIR OFF. … The cabin pressurisation instruments were 
positioned low on the centre instrument panel, and were 
partially obscured by the engine and propeller control levers in 
flight. … The aircraft also had two vent blowers that forced air 
through underfloor ducts to assist with cabin ventilation. The 
vent fans were switched on when the aircraft was on the 
ground to prevent the ducts from overheating. As the aircraft 
climbed through 10,000ft the aft blower was normally switched 
off, and the vent blower was normally switched from HI to 
LOW. The vent fan switches were positioned directly above 
and below the right bleed air switch on the co-pilot‟s 
environmental sub-panel. The switches were of a similar 
shape to most other toggle switches on the instrument panel, 
and did not require pulling out of a detent before changing 
position. The switches were smaller and dissimilar in shape to 
the nearby bleed air switches. … Both bleed air switches were 
inadvertently selected to ENVIR OFF at about 10,000 ft in the 
climb. ATSB occurrence No: 199902928  
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Figure 5.4 Beech 200 cockpit layout, and an expanded view of the environmental sub-panel 
in example 19 
Example 20 
Following take-off, at about 2,000 ft, the air traffic controller 
instructed the pilot to intercept the 173 radial at 120 NM from 
Tindal, and then to track along that radial to Tindal. That had 
been necessary to avoid the now active Military restricted area 
R248(B). The pilot reported that he had then become occupied 
with re-programming the aircraft's Global Positioning System 
(GPS). During the climb to the cleared level, Flight Level 130, 
the pilot reported that he believed that he had actioned all the 
required checklist items. … Once established at 10,000 ft, the 
pilot discovered that both the left and right bleed air OFF 
green advisory annunciators were illuminated, and that both 
bleed air switches were in the ENVIR OFF position. In that 
position, no bleed air was available for aircraft pressurisation. 
The pilot had then selected both bleed air switches to OPEN, 
and restored normal pressurisation. ATSB occurrence No: 
200105188 
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Landing gear inhibit switch 
Functions 
The two-position (NORMAL and INHIBIT) landing gear inhibit switch is normally 
guarded (by a plastic cover to confirm position) to the NORMAL (OFF) position. The 
INHIBIT position provides an open electrical circuit to the landing gear-down solenoid 
of the gear selector valve, preventing normal operation of the gear and also preventing 
illumination of the LDG GEAR INOP caution advisory light. Selecting the landing gear 
inhibit switch to the INHIBIT position idled the normal landing gear extension system 
actuators to ensure unhindered operation during alternate extension. Alternate extension 
of the landing gear uses the freefall characteristics of the landing gear, and is used for 
emergency extension of the gear. The landing gear inhibit switch is also selected in 
flight crew training to provide the crew with realistic practice in using the alternate 
landing gear extension system. 
Error modes 
A normal setting (e.g. positioning of switches) can be changed by unexpected results 
(such as maintenance work as in example 21). If there are no proactive procedures or 
alert systems, the human operators may assume the setting would be as normal and not 
in an exceptional position. 
Example 21 
… when the flight crew was preparing for landing, the main 
landing gear failed to extend following normal selection. 
While maintenance personnel were completing their checks of 
the aircraft following maintenance, the flight crew interrupted 
the task in order to expedite the flight. That resulted in the 
position of the main landing gear inhibit switch not being 
verified by maintenance personnel. When the flight crew 
prepared the aircraft for flight, they did not confirm the 
position of the main landing gear inhibit switch. … When the 
flight crew selected the landing gear to the down position 
(extended), the landing gear inhibit switch was in the INHIBIT 
position, thereby preventing normal extension. No caution 
advisories were illuminated. Had they been illuminated, the 
crew would have been directed to the ALTERNATE 
LANDING GEAR EXTENSION/ LANDING GEAR 
MALFUNCTION checklist and that would have led them to 
check the inhibit switch for position. … The BEFORE START 
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checklist used by the crew, did not have such a requirement. 
ATSB occurrence No: 200105743 
 
5.2.1.4  Fuel selection/ fuel management system 
 
Functions 
In order to prevent engine stop because of fuel exhaustion, fuel management systems in 
aircraft provide three systems to indicate fuel quantity; a manual check by putting a 
dipstick into a fuel tank, a fuel quantity indicator in cockpit displays, and a fuel log 
system that records fuel consumption in a written log.  
Error modes 
There are many cases of human error in managing aircraft fuel management systems. If 
there are differences in positions (see Figure 5.5), procedures etc. from previous 
experience, operators could fail to conduct correct procedures in the system (example 
22). 
In practice, the aircraft can be operated with the minimum fuel sufficient for safe flight 
in order to maximise payloads. Consequently, the fuel tanks would rarely have been 
filled to capacity. As filling the fuel tanks to capacity provides one of the only 
opportunities to accurately determine a datum for the assessment of fuel quantity, any 
subsequent inaccuracies in the system of assessing fuel quantity would have 
compounded over extended periods. In example 22, as most of the pilot‟s previous 
flying experience had not involved working in situations where it was necessary to 
carefully balance the requirements of payload against fuel, it is possible that he did not 
recognise the critical need to carefully monitor such aspects of the operation (examples 
23, 24), 
A Fuel Selector System requires a specific procedure. In example 25, two fuel selector 
controls were attached to the cabin floor between the pilot and co-pilot seats. The 
selectors enabled the fuel selector valves, located behind the engine firewalls, to be 
positioned to the corresponding tank, crossfeed, or off. In the Normal Procedures 
section of the handbook, pilots were cautioned that they should “Feel for (the) detent” 
when placing the fuel selector at the desired position. The operator‟s standard operating 
procedures required pilots to operate the fuel supply cross feed for 60 seconds to verify 
normal operation. Also, pilots were to ensure normal operation of the fuel valves by 
positioning the fuel selectors to the off position to observe a decrease in fuel flow. The 
fuel system pre-flight checks specified in the operator‟s Cessna 402C Operations 
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Manual differed from the procedures specified in the manufacturer‟s Pilot‟s Operating 
Handbook. 
Example 22 
At impact, the left propeller was in the feathered position and 
fuel to this engine had been shut off. … The investigation 
revealed that, apart from a 2-hour flight the previous day, the 
pilot had no other experience in SPP. It was also revealed that 
there were two significant differences between the fuel system 
in SPP and that of other Aero Commander models the pilot 
had flown. These differences concerned the time taken for the 
outboard fuel tanks to empty and the orientation of the cockpit 
fuel selector switches. The analysis concludes that these 
differences probably led to mismanagement of the fuel system 
by the pilot and to failure of the left engine due to fuel 
starvation, followed a short time later by failure of the right 
engine, also due to fuel starvation. ATSB occurrence 
No:199403314 
 
Figure 5.5 A sketch of comparison of the fuel control panels for SPP and KAC/FGS ( for 
example 22) 
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Example 23 
There were two systems available to a pilot to monitor fuel 
quantity - a fuel quantity indicator and a fuel log. The fuel 
quantities as determined by each system should have been in 
agreement. During the accident flight, however, the pilot had 
covered the fuel gauge due to intermittent and unreliable fuel 
indications, which made one system unusable. In addition, the 
fuel-log system was not being applied with rigour and did not 
provide an accurate indication of the actual fuel quantity. This 
had masked any opportunity to reveal differences in estimated 
and actual consumption rates, when compared with the fuel 
gauge. As a result, at the time of the occurrence the aircraft 
had substantially less fuel on board than the pilot believed to 
be the case. ATSB occurrence No:199804432 
Example 24 
The checks conducted by the pilot prior to the flight were 
inadequate to the extent that the pilot significantly over-
estimated the quantity of fuel available for the flight. The right 
engine failed due to insufficient fuel in the right tank while the 
aircraft was in a climb attitude. … The pilot apparently over-
relied on the tachometer and manifold pressure gauge 
indications, but lacked an understanding of those indications. 
ATSB occurrence No:200200047 
Example 25 
The pilot did not move the fuel selectors to the off position as 
part of the pre-flight checks. This was because the Fleet 
Manager had advised his intention to amend the pre-flight 
check to delete the requirement. … The manufacturer's Pilot's 
Operating Handbook did not specify checks for crossfeed 
operation or positioning the fuel selectors to the off position to 
observe a decrease in fuel flow. ATSB occurrence No: 
200001827 
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5.2.1.5  Warning systems 
In order to avoid unexpected events, such as collision with other aircraft or 
depressurisation, some systems, such as TCAC, have been designed.  
TCAC system 
Functions 
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is a computerised avionics 
device which is designed to reduce the danger of mid-air collisions between aircraft. It 
monitors the airspace around an aircraft, independent of air traffic control, and warns 
pilots of the presence of other aircraft that may present a threat of mid-air collision.  
Error modes 
There may be specification of time to warm up before the operation of a transponder 
for TCAS. If this specification of design has no plan to achieve the procedure before 
the operation, it may fail to do it (example 26). A state of operator‟s cognition at the 
time of a traffic alert is highly demanding. In this condition, a human operator has no 
time to conduct a knowledge-based performance. Unclear direction may lead to an 
operator misunderstanding the message (example 27). 
Example 26 
The operator instructed pilots to ensure that aircraft 
transponders are selected "On" and warmed up for five 
minutes before departure. ATSB occurrence No:200104280 
Example 27 
As the 737 descended towards FL220, the crew was faced 
with the apparently conflicting demands of an ATC clearance 
and a TCAS resolution advisory. Given that the 737 was above 
the Brasilia, it would be normal for the initial TCAS advisory to 
have been a `reduce descent‟ or a climb advisory. … It is 
possible that the crew may have misidentified the TCAS aural 
warning. Prompt action was required to resolve the apparent 
ambiguity and the crew may have been guided more by the 
aural warning than by the IVSI display. That may have been, at 
least in part, due to the limitations of the IVSI display, where a 
pilot may initially rely more on the aural alert. Compared with a 
TCAS IVSI display, traffic information that is displayed on an 
EFIS screen increases the crew‟s situational awareness. 
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However, pilots are trained to use all the information at their 
disposal and an aural alert would be the trigger to look at the 
IVSI display immediately. Therefore if the green band of the 
IVSI was indicating a required rate of descent of 1200-1500 
ft/min, then the correct procedure would be to disengage the 
autopilot and smoothly adjust the pitch to attain that rate of 
descent. … Since the incident, the operator‟s TCAS software 
has been updated to Version 7. The objectives of the Version 
7 update were to further increase the safety benefits of TCAS, 
make TCAS more compatible with the procedures used by 
ATC and to address operational concerns identified by pilots 
operating the older versions of TCAS. Improvements to the 
aural annunciations included a change from `reduce descent, 
reduce descent‟ to `adjust vertical speed, adjust‟. ATSB 
occurrence No:200201725 
 
 
The cabin altitude warning system 
Functions 
When an aircraft enters higher altitudes than flight levels at normal pressure, the crew 
need to notice altitude in order to avoid depressurisation in the cabin. 
Error modes 
In example 28, the crew entered a higher flight level without noticing their altitude.  
Example 28 
As the aircraft climbed through FL125, the flight nurse noticed 
that the passenger oxygen masks had deployed and conveyed 
that fact to the pilot. The pilot was unaware of the deployment 
and had immediately turned around to assess the situation. 
When he turned his attention back to the instrument panel, the 
pilot noticed that the cabin ALT WARN caption positioned on 
the glare-shield mounted Master Warning panel was 
illuminated. Both Master Warning captions were also flashing. 
… Some vital checklist actions from the PRE TAKE OFF 
checklist and the AFTER TAKE OFF checklist were not 
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completed by the pilot. … The non-standard clearance 
instruction, received soon after take-off, required re-
programming of the GPS. That action captured his attention 
during the climb, and distracted the pilot from performing parts 
of the AFTER TAKE OFF checklist and the Transition Altitude 
Procedure. The pilot had expected the routine illumination of 
the green auto feather advisory annunciators during the 
takeoff and for part of the climb. Consequently he did not 
identify that additional green annunciators, in the form of the 
bleed air off indications, were illuminated. … The operator's 
instruction that permitted completion of the AFTER TAKE OFF 
check "as workload permits", allowed for postponement of a 
critical check on cabin pressurisation until well above 10,000 ft. 
Postponement of the AFTER TAKE OFF check also 
maintained the Auto Feather in an active state, and kept the 
green annunciator lights illuminated. … Signification factors 1. 
The pilot did not complete the Pre Take Off and After Take Off 
cabin pressurisation checks. 2. The pilot became pre-occupied 
with programming the GPS after receiving a track change 
instruction. 3. The aircraft was allowed to climb above 10,000 
ft in an unpressurised state. 4. The effectiveness of the 
aircraft's cockpit warning system was reduced by the 
operator's practice of allowing postponement of the After Take 
Off check. … ATSB occurrence No: 200105188 
 
 An Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation into a 
Beechcraft King Air 200 depressurisation incident, 
BO/199902928, issued three recommendations on the subject 
of cabin alert aural warning systems. The final report 
contained an additional recommendation on the same subject.  
 
Recommendation R20000288 stated: … "The ATSB therefore 
recommends that CASA mandate the fitment of aural warnings 
to operate in conjunction with the cabin altitude alert warning 
systems on all Beechcraft Super King Air and other applicable 
aircraft". 
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Figure 5.6 Beech 200 cockpit instrument panel layout, indicating caution, advisory and 
warning annunciators in example 28 
 
 
 
The stall warning system 
Functions 
The stall warning system fitted to the Saab 340 consists of two independent dual 
channel stall warning computers, left and right angle-of-attack sensors, two stick 
shakers (one mounted on each control column) and a stick pusher actuator connected to 
the left control column. A mechanical linkage also transfers the stick push to the right 
control column. There are stall warning lights on each of the pilot‟s instrument panels, 
and three amber stall warning system failure lights on the centre warning panel. 
Error modes 
In this case studied (example 29), the investigation found that despite being certified to 
all required certification standards at the time, the Saab 340 aircraft can suffer from an 
aerodynamic stall whilst operating in icing conditions without the required warnings 
being provided to flight crew. The investigation also found a number of other 
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occurrences involving Saab 340 aircraft where little or no stall warning had been 
provided to the crew while operating in icing conditions. This problem had been 
recognized and modified stall warning system in advanced models of the aircraft. The 
safety system has been mandated for aircraft operated in Canada. I found other incident 
of same type of the aircraft in aviation accident reports.  (ASN, Saab 340B Hazelton 
Airlines, 28 June 2002, available at http://aviation-
safety.net/database/record.php?id=20020628-0 , September 2006) 
Example 29 
The crew interpreted this ice deposit as being less than that 
required for them to activate the de-ice systems on the wing 
leading edges, in accordance with the aircraft flight manual 
procedures. As the aircraft approached Melbourne the crew 
were instructed to enter a holding pattern … Shortly after the 
aircraft entered the holding pattern it suffered an aerodynamic 
stall … The crew was not provided with a stall warning prior 
to the stall. … a number of recommendations were made in 
1998 and 1999 concerning flight in icing conditions and 
modifications to the Saab 340 stall warning system. ATSB 
occurrence No:199805068 
 
Weather Radar 
Functions 
The colour weather radar fitted in aircraft has a radar antenna transmitting microwave 
energy in the form of pulses, which, if reflected off precipitation ahead of the aircraft, 
would be returned to the antenna. The radar beam is a narrow cone with a beam width 
of 8 degrees. The mount of energy reflected back to the antenna is converted into a 
colour code for presentation to the crew on their flight instruments. There are four 
colour codes directly related to precipitation intensity, ranging from black (no 
precipitation), green (minimum detectable moisture), yellow (medium moisture level), 
to red (strong to extreme moisture level). 
 
Error modes 
However, due to the system limitations, heavy rainfall could reduce the ability of the 
weather radar to provide a complete picture of the weather ahead. Attenuation may 
reduce reflected precipitation readings, which the weather radar interprets as an area of 
decreased rainfall. As a result, the colour could be downward. The colour displayed to 
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the crew may indicate a lower level of precipitation intensity than is actually occurring. 
In this case, what would normally be displayed as a red return (indicating strong to 
extreme rainfall rates, with the possibility of associated hail) is displayed as a yellow 
return. 
Due to this limitation of the airborne weather radar and possibly the radar antenna 
setting, it is possible for the flight crew to misinterpret the depicted weather radar 
returns as seen in example 30.  
Example 30 
The flight crew did not appear to understand the limitations of 
the airborne weather radar. The aircraft was inadvertently 
flown into an area of severe convective weather activity. The 
weather encountered by the crew was as forecast. Action taken 
by preceding aircraft confirmed the crew's expectation that 
they would have to divert to the left of track when en route. 
After leaving controlled airspace, the crew had to rely, for 
operational decision-making, on their interpretation of 
information derived from the airborne weather radar. … The 
crew incorrectly interpreted the radar display of green and 
yellow returns as being acceptable. However, the heavy 
precipitation and hail produced by the storm cell was likely to 
have resulted in significant attenuation of the radar beam. 
Attenuation would have reduced the ability of the weather 
radar to accurately depict the precipitation intensity. Further, 
the radar antenna setting of 3 to 4 degrees up, as reported by 
the crew, would have resulted in the radar beam scanning 
above the level at which the aircraft was flying, and into an 
area that was above the freezing level. It is likely that above 
that level the hail was dry. As such, it would have provided a 
low reflectivity target for the weather radar, and may have 
contributed to the inability of the radar to provide the crew 
with an accurate picture of the precipitation intensity.  …  with 
inadequate radar derived information, the crew did not 
recognise the significance of the convective weather, and the 
aircraft entered the storm cell. ATSB occurrence 
No:200201228 
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GPS system 
Functions 
GPS refers to the Global Positioning System (GPS) which utilise a constellation of 
orbiting satellites that transmit precise microwave signals. The system enables a GPS 
receiver to determine its location, speed, direction, and time. 
Error modes 
Errors associated with GPS are found in highly workloads in this case studied. The 
problems associated with the procedure of GPS setting that can affect operators‟ 
cognition and performance did not well consider at the design stage. For example, case 
31 shows that there was no design for detecting the limitations of GPS system that 
could lead to human error.  The other cases 32 and 33 demonstrate that an additional 
work added to operators can confuse the operator. The GPS setting procedure did not 
consider that the procedure can take time and provoke cognition of operators. Just 
putting a procedure prompts for human operator to commit errors.  
Example 31 
Due to errors in the Orion‟s navigation system, the aircraft 
failed to remain inside its assigned search area. The 
navigation errors were a function of equipment limitations and 
inadequate monitoring of the aircraft‟s position by the crew. 
Consequently the Orion crew inadvertently searched in the 
area assigned to the Cessna 402. At the time of the incident 
most members of the Orion crew were highly fatigued, having 
been awake in excess of 24 hours. ATSB occurrence No: 
199805874 
Example 32 
As the aircraft reached the cruise level of FL250, the controller 
contacted the pilot, indicating that the aircraft was not 
maintaining the assigned track. The pilot acknowledged this 
transmission. A short time later the passenger in the co-pilot 
seat noticed that the pilot was again attempting to program the 
GPS, and was repeatedly performing the same task. The 
controller advised the pilot again that the aircraft was still off 
track, however the pilot did not reply to this transmission. 
Shortly after this, the pilot lost consciousness. ATSB 
occurrence No: 199902928 
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Example 33 
Following take-off, at about 2,000 ft, the air traffic controller 
instructed the pilot to intercept the 173 radial at 120 NM from 
Tindal, and then to track along that radial to Tindal. That had 
been necessary to avoid the now active Military restricted area 
R248(B). The pilot reported that he had then become occupied 
with re-programming the aircraft's Global Positioning System 
(GPS). During the climb to the cleared level, Flight Level 130, 
the pilot reported that he believed that he had actioned all the 
required checklist items. ATSB occurrence No: 200105188 
 
5.2.1.6  Monitoring systems 
 
Functions 
The crew or controller should monitor developing situations.  
Error modes 
In example 34, a distraction occurred as a crew member monitored the weather radar 
and assessed the meteorological conditions that the aircraft was encountering during 
the climb. At the time of the infringement, the B737 was being manually flown by the 
pilot in command who was distracted from his primary task of controlling the aircraft‟s 
flight path. 
 
When there are two systems with the same value, it may confuse people to identify 
which is being used. For example, a unit of weight may be either in imperial or metric 
units. People involved in checking or converting such units of measurement may make 
errors. (example 35) 
Example 34 
After take-off, the B737 entered cloud and encountered 
turbulence as it climbed through 3,500 ft. The pilot in 
command was monitoring the aircraft's weather radar and 
stated that he became distracted while assessing the 
meteorological conditions. Although the co-pilot gave the 
1,000 ft to assigned altitude call at 4,000 ft, he was also 
observing the weather situation and did not monitor the flight 
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instruments as the aircraft approached the assigned altitude. 
ATSB occurrence No:200200463 
Example 35 
When the agent who handled freight at Honolulu for the B767 
operator received the pallet weights, she did not check the 
figures against the loadsheet issued by Load Control. 
Consequently, she did not realise that the weights stated on the 
loadsheet had already been converted to kilograms, and 
applied the conversion a second time. Also, as the agent for the 
US operator was confident that she had passed the correct 
weights to the B767 agent, she did not recheck to ensure that 
the B767 agent had received the correct weight information. 
The 220 kg and 10 kg weight discrepancies affecting the other 
two pallets were probably the result of weighing or recording 
errors. ATSB occurrence No:200100596 
 
5.2.1.7  Traffic communication system 
It is necessary to communicate among controllers and pilots in aviation. The general 
method of communication between an air traffic controller and a pilot is voice radio, 
using either VHF bands for line-of-sight communication or HF bands for long-distance 
communication. One of the major problems with voice radio communications used in 
this manner is that all pilots being handled by a particular controller are tuned to the 
same frequency. This increases the chances that one pilot will accidentally override 
another, thus requiring the transmission to be repeated. (Wikipedia, Novenber 2007, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPDLC) There has developed many communication 
systems in order to improve efficiency in communication and reduce burdens of people 
involved in communication. 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) 
Functions 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) is a method by which air traffic 
controllers can communicate with pilots over a datalink system. CPDLC is a data link 
application that allows for the direct exchange of text-based messages between a 
controller and a pilot. CPDLC greatly improves communication capabilities in oceanic 
areas, especially in situations where controllers and pilots have previously had to rely 
on a Third Party HF communications relay. Apart from the direct link, CPDLC adds a 
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number of other benefits to the ATS system, such as; allowing the flight crew to print 
messages; allowing the auto-load of specific uplink messages into the Flight 
Management System (FMS); allowing the crew to downlink a complex route clearance 
request, which the controller can re-send when approved without having to type a long 
string of coordinates. [ATC data link news, 
http://members.optusnet.com.au/~cjr/CPDLC.htm]. 
 
Error modes 
The preformatted message function in CPDLC helps to reduce the crew‟s workload. 
That was reported to be a common practice and assisted with workload management. 
Pre-formatted messages configured in the system such as seen in example 36 and 37, 
however, could be sent without careful checking by operators, especially if there was 
some change in situations. Operators who have used computerised systems tend to rely 
on the system (example 38). 
 
Example 36 
The controller intended to send the message to the crew of the 
north-east bound B747 once they had passed the south-west 
bound B747 and a separation standard had been established. 
However, he unintentionally sent the message before the two 
aircraft had passed. … The air traffic controller had planned to 
assign FL350 to the crew of the north-east bound B747 to 
maintain a separation standard with a third B747 travelling on 
B200 at FL330 in the opposite direction. However, FL350 was 
not available to the north-east bound B747 crew until the 
controller in Tahiti could established a separation standard 
with the south-west bound B747 travelling in the opposite 
direction at FL340. … The controller had prepared a pre-
formatted controller-pilot data link communication (CPDLC) 
message for transmission to the crew of the north-east bound 
B747. … However, he unintentionally sent the message before 
the two aircraft had passed. ATSB occurrence No: 200200190 
 
 
Chapter 5: Case study: Result of the meta-theory application to accident cases 
 166 
Example 37 
… the crew of OED then contacted Tahiti ATC via HF radio 
and advised that they could reach FL350 by time 1140 
universal coordinated time. The controller responded via HF 
radio and instructed the crew of OED to maintain FL330. The 
crew of OEB then requested, via CPDLC, climb to FL330. The 
CPDLC response provided to the crew of OEB was 'climb to 
and maintain FL330 due to traffic' even though FL330 was not 
available. The message was selected by the controller from 
the menu of pre-formatted messages available in the system. 
The controller had not intended to assign FL330 to the crew of 
OEB and did not realise that they had been assigned FL330, 
or that they had climbed to FL330 and subsequently returned 
to FL320. ATSB occurrence No: 200200094 
Example 38 
The flight crew and controller were communicating via 
controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC). The crew 
requested approval to climb to and operate between FL290 
and FL330. The controller sent an approval at 0659 on the 
CPDLC for the crew to climb to the block level. … The B747 
crew maintained their aircraft at FL290 and immediately 
reported via the CPDLC that they were unable to comply due 
to traffic. This message was sent at 0659 but was not received 
at the controller's terminal until 0706. The delay was believed 
to be due to network lag. The traffic was subsequently 
identified as a British Aerospace 146 (BAe 146), en route from 
Norfolk Island to Sydney at FL310. … The controllers' 
understanding of the operation of the CPDLC appeared to be 
limited and it was this aspect, in conjunction with an 
inadequate appreciation of the potential conflict, that led to the 
occurrence. Once the controller recognised that the approval 
message had not been placed on hold, HF radio should have 
been utilised to ensure the B747 crew were to maintain FL290, 
rather than rely on the CPDLC. Any delay to the crew 
receiving this instruction may have compromised the safety of 
the two aircraft. ATSB occurrence No:199804129 
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Radio Communications 
Error modes 
In example 39 the deficiencies related to the depiction of holding patterns on en-route 
charts, the appropriateness of the use of non-standard holding patterns, and associated 
radiotelephony phraseology may lead to error of misunderstanding between the pilot 
and controllers.  
In the case 40, the air traffic controller had insufficient time to establish 
communications with both crews and provide them with sufficient information to 
enable them to take action to prevent a near collision. 
Example 39 
Air traffic control had issued the crew of a foreign Boeing 767 
(B767) with an instruction to hold at Bindook. Although the 
published holding procedure required a left pattern, the crew 
turned the aircraft for a right pattern. The right turn 
subsequently placed the aircraft into conflict with a Boeing 747, 
which was being radar vectored to the south of Bindook. … An 
investigation revealed that the crew did not locate the holding 
pattern on the Jeppesen terminal chart. The depiction of the 
holding pattern was difficult to distinguish from other markings 
on the chart and the pattern was not displayed on the 
appropriate Standard Arrival Route (STAR) chart. In addition, 
the holding pattern was not loaded in the aircraft's flight 
management computer database. The Captain of the B767 
reported that in the USA, where a holding pattern is not 
displayed, or in the absence of other information, a "default" 
right hand pattern is to be flown. There is no such procedure in 
Australia. As a result, the Captain elected to fly a right hand 
pattern without checking with air traffic control for holding 
pattern information. ATSB occurrence No:199803921 
Example 40 
The crew of the Jetstream did not hear the King Air crew's 
inbound broadcast on the mandatory broadcast zone 
frequency. The crew of the King Air did not hear the Jetstream 
crew's taxi broadcast on the mandatory broadcast zone 
frequency; nor did they hear the transmissions made on the 
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Brisbane control frequency by the air traffic controller that 
provided essential traffic information regarding the Jetstream, 
and instructed them to maintain 6,000 ft. ATSB occurrence No: 
199805078 
 
Air traffic control instructions 
Error modes 
In example 41, the instructions of the local air traffic controller at Cairns (Queensland) 
stated that a clearance to aircraft to track via the “southern shores” was meant to 
provide wake turbulence separation between an aircraft departing Cairns via a runway 
15 SID and an aircraft over the southern shore of the Cairns inlet. A term not correctly 
defined may lead to error of interpretation of the term. 
Example 41 
The controller issued a clearance to the pilot of the Cessna 
that was, to the aerodrome controller, a specified route but one 
that was not known to the pilot. The aerodrome controller was 
not aware that the pilot‟s understanding of the 'southern 
shores' differed from his own. The meaning of the term 
'southern shores' was not available to the pilot of the Cessna 
and therefore the potential existed for the misunderstanding 
between the pilot and the aerodrome controller that resulted in 
this occurrence. ATSB occurrence No: 200202385 
 
5.2.1.8  Procedure/ emergency procedure 
Simultaneous opposite-direction parallel runway 
operations (SODPROPS) 
Functions 
SODPROPs refers to one specific method of coordinating the arrival and departure of 
planes. In a situation where there are two parallel runways, it means that planes are 
arriving on one runway and departing from the other at the same time. This method of 
operation has developed to utilise runways and increase flight departures and arrivals. 
(Airspace, 
http://www.newparallelrunway.com.au/content/standard1.asp?name=Airspace_faqs). 
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Error modes 
The process is very fast so operators involved in the system that cannot easily reverse 
or correct a procedure when a mistake happens (example 42).  
Example 42 
The crew mistakenly dialled 155 degrees into the aircraft's 
flight control unit (FCU) on the glareshield as the aircraft lined 
up on the runway, but correctly acknowledged to air traffic 
control (ATC) the assigned heading of 115 degrees. After 
takeoff, … The aerodrome controller saw that the A320 did 
not turn left as instructed, but as the crew had already 
transferred to the departures south (Departures (S)) frequency, 
he was not able to instruct them to turn left onto the correct 
heading. … The SODPROPS procedure was introduced to the 
Sydney Airport environment with neither the regulator nor the 
airservice provider having adequately analysed the risks 
associated with the implementation of the standard. ATSB 
occurrence No: 199700052 
 
Blanket clearance 
Functions 
Blanket clearance allows aircraft to occupy or cross a runway without a specific 
clearance from the ADC. The use of a blanket clearance reduces the need for 
segmented taxi clearances. 
Error modes 
In this case studied (example 43), the controllers did not conduct an effective scan of 
the runway. They were distracted by other tasks. The blanket clearance departure 
procedure negates a safety defence by reducing time, eliminating one safety check 
procedure. 
Example 43 
The local procedures in the Adelaide tower for a blanket 
clearance of a runway release required the use of a bright 
yellow coloured flight progress strip with the words "RUNWAY 
12/30 OCCUPIED". Although a strip was correctly placed in 
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each of the strip presentation bays in front of both the SMC 
and the ADC to indicate that a blanket clearance was issued, 
that procedure failed to attract the attention of the ADC.  …The 
ADC did not conduct an effective scan of runway 30 or the 
flight progress strip display prior to clearing the Pilatus to take 
off. The presentation of the yellow flight progress strip did not 
alert the ADC that a runway 12/30 blanket clearance was in 
place. The ADC did not hear the SMC issue a clearance for 
the crew of the B737 to cross runway 30, nor did the SMC 
hear the ADC issue a take-off clearance to the Pilatus. The 
ADC did not observe the B737 moving towards runway 30. 
The SMC was distracted from a surveillance role by other 
tasks. ATSB occurrence No 199804069 
 
Emergency procedure 
Error modes 
A state of emergency (e.g. failure of some systems) makes operators become involved 
in a hectic situation. According to psychological studies, their perception and reasoning 
models are very restricted compared with their normal state. In the case of example 44, 
the crew did not find the reason for the failure of the electronic flight information 
system (EFIS) screens. They then omitted the first item of the emergency checklist (see 
Figure 5.7) for EFIS failures. One reason for their oversight may be that there was no 
reasonable relationship between the observed DC starter generator failure and the 
symptom of EFIS failure. There was no alert for generator failure. Example 45 shows 
that performances of operators in a state of emergency are not always logical, contrary 
to what designers assume. 
Example 44 
While on climb through FL180, the copilot‟s two electronic 
flight information system (EFIS) screens on the right side of 
the aircraft‟s instrument panel failed. After the crew had 
consulted the EFIS failure/disturbances checklist, the central 
warning panel ice protection annunciator and then the cabin 
pressure annunciator illuminated. … During the investigation it 
became apparent that in some Saab 340 aircraft a starter 
generator could fail without taking the generator off line and 
alerting the crew, resulting in low system voltage. On this 
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occasion the crew overlooked the first item of the EFIS 
failure/disturbances checklist, which required a check of the 
generator voltage. Consequently, the crew did not recognise 
the developing low voltage condition that led to the cascading 
series of warnings, cautions and failures. …This occurrence 
also demonstrates the need for well-designed checklists to be 
available to pilots during abnormal or emergency situations. It 
further demonstrates the need for pilots to be familiar with the 
systems of the aircraft they operate and the actions to be 
taken in the event of abnormal or emergency situations. The 
investigation determined that the modification to reduce the 
risk of the consequences of a delayed generator failure 
warning was highly desirable. ATSB occurrence No: 
200105715 
 
 
Figure 5.7 EFIS failure/disturbances checklist (in example 44) 
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Example 45 
The flight attendant did not don an oxygen mask during the 
incident. … The procedures permitting discretionary use of 
supplemental oxygen following activation of the cabin altitude 
warning system did not recognise that, in some circumstances, 
the crew's decision-making may already have been impaired. 
The response to such a warning should take that factor into 
account. The aircraft manufacturer's QRH checklist (following 
an illumination of the cabin altitude warning light) did not 
include a checklist item for the crew to don oxygen masks, 
potentially exposing them to the effects of hypoxia while 
performing the checklist items. ATSB occurrence 
No:200003725 
 
Flight plan system 
 
Error modes 
In example 46, the flight plan for the A320 included a manoeuvring time for the aircraft 
prior to setting course. The air traffic control strip printing system was unable to allow 
for a discrete manoeuvring time in the strip preparation. The Melbourne Sector 4 
controller did not conduct a cross-check calculation on the flight progress strip notation 
for the A320‟s estimated time of arrival at SUBUM. 
Example 46 
The Adelaide Sector 4 controller checked his flight progress 
strips and noticed that the A320 was early at Portland but 
estimated to be "on time" at SUBUM. He considered that this 
discrepancy was probably due to a flight planning error that 
had been corrected by the Melbourne controller. … The air 
traffic control strip printing system's interpretations of the 
A320's flight plan led to a latent error in the flight progress 
strips for the A320 that was not present in the B737 strips. 
ATSB occurrence No: 199702620 
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The runway 15 SWIFT standard instrument departure  
Functions 
The SWIFT 2 standard instrument departure was designed to counter the limitations of 
high terrain surrounding Cairns airport and the tracking requirements of inbound 
aircraft from the south and east. The procedure required crews to turn their aircraft at 
the earlier of 400 ft or the departure end of the runway and then track to 030 degrees 
until climbing through 4000 ft. At that point the aircraft should be turned right onto a 
track of 170 degrees M to intercept the 139 degrees radial of the Cairns VOR (VHF 
navigation aid).  
Error modes 
In this case studied (example 47), both crews had been cleared via the runway 15 
SWIFT 2 standard instrument departure. The performance of the B737-400 series 
aircraft was superior to that of the B737-300 series aircraft. CZC, the B737-300 series 
aircraft, had taken 1 minute 56 seconds to reach 4000 ft whereas TJW, the B737-400 
series aircraft, took only 1 minute 27 seconds to pass the same altitude. However, 
controllers thought that the aircraft were “like types” for the purposes of departure 
standards. The procedure allowed the possibility of a following aircraft turning inside a 
preceding aircraft. The use of minimum departure separation standards was 
inappropriate. 
Example 47 
The approach/departures controller had approved a request 
for a change of level from a pilot of an aircraft that had 
departed Cairns approximately 7 minutes earlier. After issuing 
the departure clearances, the controller commenced the 
process of making the change in the air traffic computer; an 
action that required nine clicks of the mouse. In order to make 
this change, the controller looked away from the air situation 
display (which was on the main screen) and used the auxiliary 
screen to observe the flight plan window while using the 
keyboard to input the data. … The performance of the B737-
400 series aircraft was superior to that of the B737-300 series 
aircraft. Controllers at Cairns considered that the aircraft were 
"like types" for the purposes of departure standards … The 
design of the SWIFT 2 standard instrument departure did not 
guarantee separation assurance. Whenever the second 
aircraft reached 4,000 ft prior to the first aircraft (whatever the 
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reason) a reduction in horizontal separation was likely.  ATSB 
occurrence No: 199902003 
 
V1 cut procedure 
Functions 
It is one of take-off techniques. The V1 cut procedure itself required precise control of 
the aircraft. Aircraft performance would have been rapidly eroded if the attitude was 
not set accurately and if appropriate yaw and roll inputs were not made. It was 
important to retract the landing gear early to reduce drag. 
Error modes 
The crew assumed that the procedure is permitted. Interpretation of the procedure was 
different from that of the designers (example 48). 
Example 48 
During the briefing prior to the second flight, the check-and-
training pilot indicated that he would give the co-pilot a V1 cut 
during the takeoff. The co-pilot questioned the legality of 
conducting the procedure at night. The check-and-training pilot 
indicated that it was not illegal because the company 
operations manual had been amended to permit the procedure. 
… an inadequate Metro III endorsement training syllabus in 
the company operations manual; ATSB occurrence 
No:199503057 
 
Minimum equipment list (MEL) 
Functions 
MEL refers to minimum equipment list. MEL list is a categorized list of instruments 
and equipment on an aircraft allowing it to be operated with some of those instruments 
or pieces of equipment inoperative. In this case studied, the aircraft departed with a 
MEL 36-11-07 restriction applied following the failure of the right engine high-
pressure valve (HPV). Part of the MEL restriction required that the right engine bleed-
air HPV be locked in the closed position by a locking pin. The operation of the engine 
HPV normally supplemented the bleed-air supply to the aircraft at low engine speed. At 
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higher engine speeds, such as occur during normal flight, the bleed-air system was 
supplied with enough air to operate the airconditioning pack, even with the HPV locked 
closed. The MEL was part of an operator-customised publication, which had been 
developed from the aircraft manufacturer‟s master MEL. Part (b) of the “Operations” 
section of the operator‟s MEL stated: 
(1) At low engine power (around idle thrust) setting: 
(a) Associated bleed is selected OFF. 
Error modes 
Example 49 demonstrates how an ambiguous phrase in the instruction for the MEL 
operation leads pilots into misinterpretation of the instruction. The MEL was part of an 
operator-customised publication, which had been developed from the aircraft 
manufacturer‟s master MEL but differed from it in wording. 
Example 49 
While cruising at Flight Level (FL) 370 on a flight from Perth to 
Adelaide, the crew of the Airbus A320 noticed that the left 
engine bleed-air fault warning had illuminated. The aircraft 
pressurisation and airconditioning systems then automatically 
shut down, and the cabin pressure altitude began to increase 
at approximately 700 ft per minute. The crew made an 
unsuccessful attempt to reselect the left engine bleed air to on, 
and the aircraft auxiliary power unit (APU) was started. … The 
crew interpreted the operator's MEL to mean that at engine 
"idle thrust" they were to turn the bleed air from that engine to 
off. That prevented any supply of bleed air for the 
pressurisation and airconditioning system coming from that 
engine. They then opened the bleed air cross-bleed valve and 
operated both airconditioning packs from the right engine only. 
… Since the occurrence the operator has amended and 
strengthened the contents of the operations area of MEL 36-
11-07 to reflect the intention of the manufacturer's MMEL. This 
was done to "reduce the possibility of incorrect system 
operation with one HP bleed source inoperative". ATSB 
occurrence No:200003533 
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The emergency power lever (EPL) procedure 
Error modes 
In this case studied (example 50), the pilot‟s operating handbook (POH) contained a 
requirement to place the engine ignition switch in the ON position during an actual 
malfunction of the fuel control unit (FCU). However, because the aircraft manufacturer 
only included requirements for an actual FCU malfunction, the POH did not address 
the engine control settings for training of this type. 
The pilots assumed that the use of the EPL for familiarisation training in-flight was 
acceptable. Their assumption was based on there not being a description of prohibition 
for the procedure in the manual. 
Example 50 
The pilots of CYC were conducting in-flight simulated engine 
failure training, which involved activation of the emergency 
power lever (EPL). The engine ignition switch was not in the 
ON position during the initial operation of the EPL during this 
training. The POH contained a caution which stated that the 
use of the EPL was for emergency purposed only, and did not 
mention the use of the EPL for in-flight or ground 
familiarization training. The engine manufacturer‟s Service 
Information Letter (SIL) noted the use of the EPL for 
familiarization training, while suggesting that this training be 
completed on the ground. The discrepancy between these two 
documents may have led to the flight crew‟s belief that the use 
of the EPL for familiarization training in-flight was acceptable. 
That procedure was not contained in the aircraft 
manufacturer‟s pilot operating handbook. However, the engine 
manufacturer‟s documentation contained information on the 
use of the emergency power lever, which did not preclude the 
use of the emergency power lever for in-flight familiarization 
training. ATSB occurrence No:200400443 
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5.2.1.9   Wire detecting system 
 
Functions 
There are lots of wires (e.g. power lines) crossing plains and over mountains and hills. 
Sometimes it is difficult for pilots to notice or identify the power cable lines due to 
unclear distinction of cable lines from the air. When an aircraft needs to fly low near 
wires, the wire strike protection system (WSPS), helps pilots to identify objects in 
order to avoid collisions. 
Error modes 
In example 51, wires were aligned on 060 degrees magnetic, with a maximum height of 
31.5 metres for the upper wire and 30.1 metres for the lower wire. The position of the 
wires was not annotated on the relevant Visual Terminal Charts and they did not have 
high visibility devices attached. The pilot did not notice the wires. There was not a 
WSPS fitted to the helicopter. 
Example 51 
The pilot of a Bell Long Ranger 206L-1 was returning to base 
following an agricultural crop-spraying task. While transiting 
a ridgeline of the Connors Mountain Range, the helicopter 
collided with wires and impacted the ground in a densely 
wooded area about 200 metres beyond the wires. ATSB 
occurrence No:200100443 
 
5.2.1.10 Runway safety system 
In order to prevent conflict in departure, landing or taxiing of aircraft from obstructions 
on runways, air traffic controllers (aerodrome controllers (ADC), departure controllers, 
approach controllers and surface movement controllers (SMC)) should cooperate with 
each other.  
Functions 
Supportive devices for controllers to recognise the situation of runways have been 
developed. Designation signs and strips are the most common systems of runway safety 
systems. For example, in example 52, there was a runway selection system. The 
procedure for release of the runway from the ADC to the SMC was for both the ADC 
and SMC to de-select their respective runway selection buttons for the appropriate 
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runway. Both buttons would become illuminated when selected, indicating that the 
runway was active. De-selecting each button had the reverse effect. Should the button 
be selected or de-selected on one side only, both lights would flash to alert the 
controllers to a mismatch. 
Error modes 
There were ten cases of runway safety failures in this study. In order to utilise runways 
for taking increasing quantity of traffic, runway systems have become complicated. 
There are many runways that cross each other. That makes it difficult for controllers to 
monitor runways continuously. When there are other people involved in scanning 
runways, operators can easily assume other colleagues have done the scan and make no 
further check (example 52). 
In order to prevent conflict in runway between aircrafts and cars, designation systems 
are provided. However, it is an arbitrary system to change strips. In example 53, the 
ADC did not change the “runway designator” strip to indicate that Car 23 had entered 
the runway. The ADC did not adequately scan the runway prior to issuing a landing 
clearance to the crew of WBA. If there is no effective memory makers to help operators 
to recognize situation the operators may make errors (example 54). 
Example 52 
The crew of a Metro 23 was cleared by the surface 
movement controller (SMC) at Perth to enter runway 11 
and taxi to the threshold of runway 21 prior to departure. 
However, as the aircraft approached the runway 11 
holding point, the crew checked the final approach path 
and saw a Cessna C402 landing on runway 11 in front of 
them. … The SMC did not conduct an effective scan of 
the airfield prior to advising the ADC of "no traffic". The 
ADC did not conduct an effective scan of runway 11 or 
the flight progress strip display prior to clearing the C402 
to land. The flight progress strip display, and the 
controller's management of the console, did not provide 
the controllers with an accurate representation of the 
traffic situation. The airfield layout increased the 
potential for a runway incident. ATSB occurrence 
No:199803910 
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Example 53 
Although he scanned the runway prior to clearing WBA 
to land, the aerodrome controller did not expect to see a 
vehicle, as he was aware that the tractors were no 
longer obstructing the runway. Both strips had been in 
the bay for some time, which could have served to 
further diminish possible recall that Car 23 was now on 
the runway. It is also likely that the white colour of Car 
23 made it difficult to see against the background of 
white runway markings or white gable markers. 
Consequently, without an effective alert to the presence 
of the vehicle on the runway, the controller's scan was 
inadequate to see Car 23. ATSB occurrence 
No:199804072 
Example 54 
After landing on runway 27 at Melbourne during land and hold 
short operations, VH-CZH, a Boeing 737, vacated the runway 
via the parallel taxiway Echo which crossed runway 34 at a 
distance of 2,333 m from the threshold. The surface 
movement controller instructed the crew to hold short of 
runway 34 because VH-OGK, a Boeing 767, was landing. 
…VH-EAL, a Boeing 767, was taxiing for a runway 34 
intersection departure at taxiway Juliet, 773 m from the runway 
34 threshold. The aerodrome controller did not scan runway 
34 before issuing the take-off clearance. There was no tactile 
memory marker alerting the controllers that an aircraft had 
been cleared to cross an active runway.  ATSB occurrence 
No:199803972 
Localiser 
Functions 
The Instrument landing system (ILS) is a ground-based instrument approach system 
which provides precise guidance to an aircraft approaching a runway, using a 
combination of radio signals and, in many cases, high-intensity lighting arrays to 
enable a safe landing during Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), such as low 
ceilings or reduced visibility due to fog, rain, or blowing snow. An ILS consists of two 
independent sub-systems, one providing lateral guidance (Localizer), the other vertical 
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guidance (Glideslope or Glide Path) to aircraft approaching a runway. Aircraft guidance 
is provided by the ILS receivers in the aircraft by performing a modulation depth 
comparison. The localizer provides for ILS facility identification by periodically 
transmitting a 1020 Hz morse code identification signal. (Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_Landing_System, November 2007)  
Error modes 
Crews of aircraft with advanced technology are required to exercise extreme caution in 
tuning and identifying navigation aids to ensure that the correct navigation aid 
frequency has been selected. However, it is difficult for humans to concentrate their 
attention on clearly identifying frequencies every time. Operators have a possibility of 
failing in setting numbers or signs in the system. Depending on the configuration of the 
selected navigation display mode, there may be insufficient cues displayed which 
would alert the crew that an incorrect navigation aid has been manually selected 
(example 55).  
Example 55 
Both pilots incorrectly tuned the Cairns runway 33 localiser on 
109.5 MHz instead of the runway 15 localiser on 109.9 MHz 
and subsequently misidentified the morse-code identifier. 
Their errors represented inadvertent failure to carry out routine 
and highly practised tasks. The crew had operated into Cairns 
the previous night and on that occasion the runway 15 
localiser was not operating properly. On the night of the 
occurrence, although both pilots had the incorrect frequency 
selected for the runway 15 localiser, they incorrectly assumed 
the localiser was still experiencing service difficulties. This 
assumption arose because neither crew member was 
receiving a glideslope indication on his flight instruments. …. 
As a result of this occurrence, the ATSB (formerly BASI) 
issued Safety Advisory Notice SAN19990083 concerning un-
notified back beam radiation from a localiser. The safety 
deficiency noted that back beam radiation from a localiser may 
give false course indications if the navigation aid frequency is 
inadvertently selected for an approach. There are no 
published procedures for the conduct of a precision approach 
using course guidance from a LLZ back beam. However, it is 
possible for an aircraft intercepting the back beam of the LLZ 
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for runway 33 at Cairns (identifier ICN, frequency 109.5 MHz) 
when making a LLZ approach to runway 15 at Cairns 
(identifier ICS, frequency 109.9 MHz), if the incorrect approach 
aid frequency is manually selected. Other locations within 
Australia where similar localiser configurations exist may 
cause similar problems. ATSB occurrence No:199902874 
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5.3 Diagram Analysis 
How can the meta-theory of design-induced error help people to identify implicated 
design concepts and affected forms of human errors? 
Is there any way to represent relationships between design and human error in accident 
reports? 
The concept of design-induced error means to pursue relations between design and 
human error. However, it is not easy to find such relationships in an accident because 
contributory factors such as influences of design on human errors may be not well 
noticed during investigation of the accident and hardly recorded as having a direct 
relationship in the accident reports. Therefore, analysts should investigate and analyse 
accident reports thoroughly. This takes effort and is time consuming.  
In order to facilitate understanding design issues in human errors from accident cases, 
many methods have been developed. Diagrammatic methods could be useful tools for 
the purpose. For example, Jun [2007] presents results of ten methods (i.e. stakeholder 
diagram method, information diagram method, process content diagram method, 
flowchart method, swim lane activity diagram method, state transition diagram method, 
communication diagram method, sequence diagram method, data flow diagram method, 
and IDEF0 method) of analysing a questionnaire on people who work in the healthcare 
sector. He found the flowchart diagram method was the easiest method to understand 
and most helpful in clearly understanding care processes and analysing task-related 
hazards.  
This section presents analysis results with a concept of design-induced error and a 
diagram method that has been modified from the V
2
 analysis method. 
5.3.1 Method 
The V
2
 analysis method was chosen for diagram analysis. The Violation and 
Vulnerability (V
2
) analysis method has been suggested for analysing the root cause of 
safety-related incidents and accidents [Johnson, 2005]. Among other event-based 
techniques for safety analysis [Livingston et al., 2001], V
2
 focuses on using diagram to 
reveal hidden relations between violation and vulnerability. For systematic examination 
of specific findings the method involves finding the related probable causes and 
contributing factors to an accident [Johnson, 2005. The method provides depiction of 
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the arguments that connect the findings and evidence with diagrams. It takes 
descriptions from accident reports and then shows relations between violation (e.g. 
human error) and vulnerability (e.g. system feature or functions) with arrows. This aids 
us to recognise and understand hidden relations. Some modification of the V
2
 diagram 
methods has been made in order to adopt the research purpose. Johnson‟s diagrams 
have five legends; violation, event, continuation, contributory factor, and vulnerability. 
The author uses eight legends in this dissertation: system/artefact, operator, 
features/function, event/task, condition/emergency, vulnerability, violation/human error, 
and continuation/result (Table 5.7).  
For the dataset of accident reports for applying the diagram method, 52 cases which 
have design issues in human error were chosen. 
Table 5.7 Legends in diagram analysis 
NAME OF 
LEGEND 
LEGEND EXPLANATION 
System/ artefact 
system/ 
artefact
 
System or artefact associated with 
human errors 
Operator operator
 
Operators (e.g. controllers, pilots) 
involved in case of failure of 
human–system interaction 
Features/ functions 
features/
functions
 
Features or functions that failed to 
comply with designed goals 
Event/ task event/ task
 
Events or tasks that appear at the 
time of human–system interaction 
failure 
Condition/ 
emergency 
condition/
emergency
 
Special condition or emergency 
condition in which human 
operators failed to conduct correct 
functions 
Vulnerability vulnerability
 
Vulnerabilities of systems or 
artefacts for human–system 
interactions that may lead to 
human errors 
Violation/ human 
error 
violation/ human 
error
 
Violation or human errors 
committed by operators 
Continuation/ result 
continuation/ 
result
 
Connection from events or 
failures to next events or results 
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The analysis was qualitative and grounded. The process was, for each case, as follows: 
(1) To develop a causal network that expressed the basic structure of events and 
influences described in the report. 
(2) To identify a human–system interaction failure.  
(3) To identify artefacts implicated in the failure. The artefacts failed contain 
organisational artefacts as well as physical artefacts. 
(4) To express design concepts related to an artefact implicated in the failure in terms of 
the human–system interaction it coordinated. It means to find the expectation of 
designers of the system or artefacts. How did designers expect operators to use the 
system or artefacts designed in a particular manner?  
(5) To identify the manner of the design-induced error that occurred in the way people 
in the system dealt with the situations and the artefacts. This was the most subjective 
step of the analysis, and none of the reports referred to design-induced error in any 
direct way. For example, in some cases the design-induced error appeared to be about 
distraction – about failure of short term memory in the operator when a system 
requested simultaneous tasks. A pilot, for example, seemed to be distracted about what 
to do now (the next procedure) while conducting urgent tasks. In other cases, design-
induced error can appear in the form of “relying” – about finding ways of performing 
that would minimise a person‟s cognitive loads if stability of a system continued. A 
pilot, in one instance, seemed to make sense of what he should rely on in a system in a 
similar situation by finding a course of action that could be defended against 
exploitation of cognition. But this kind of inference was typically based on little direct 
evidence, so this part of our analysis remains highly theory-based. 
(6) To describe the failure mode in terms of how this design of artefact undermined the 
coordinating function of human–system interaction resulting in design-induced error 
and ultimately contributed to the accident.  
(7) To identify the influences of design implicated in the failure.  
5.3.2 Results 
Fifty two cases were examined and represented in diagrams. Short descriptions of the 
accidents, failed systems, and error modes are provided in the appendices. Figure 5.8 
show an example of the diagram analysis. 
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take off 
checklist
repositioning  
the vent blower 
switches
inadvertent move 
of bleed air 
switches
enter 
depressurizing  
area
reprog ramming  
GPS
additional 
instruction 
from ATC
distract his 
attention
not recognize alert
illumination of 
the cabin altitude 
warning  system
not provide 
effective 
alert system
hypoxia
near position 
of two 
switches
 
Figure 5.8 An example of diagram analysis (ATSB Occurrence number: 199902928) 
ARTEFACT COORDINATING DESIGN CONCEPTS 
Takeoff check lists All necessary itineraries could be included in the list that would be 
performed by operators without difficulty or error. 
Operating of 
automatic level–up 
into a pressurising 
zone  
Operators could recognise and respond to a critical state by 
continuously checking the current state of a system.  
Alert systems  Operators could recognise warning signals provided by a system. The 
operator will look for alerts at any time or any circumstance. 
FAILURE CASE FAILURE MODE IN TERMS OF DESIGN-INDUCED ERROR 
Incomplete takeoff 
check lists 
Many items were included into an after take-off checklist procedure 
without considering the fact that a task, in case of failure or difficulty 
of the parts of jobs, delay or confound with other tasks. This led to 
puzzling of operators when they encounter an uncontrolled condition. 
Unrecognised level-
up into a pressurising 
zone 
There were many itineraries to conduct on take-off check lists. If a pilot 
had to do one task in labour intensive cognition, this led to distracting 
operators‟ focus on continuously checking current altitude. 
Misidentified location 
of a switch 
Location of switches in similar shape but different functions plays an 
important role to the performance of operators. Many switches are 
similar shapes in close proximity. This led to unintended action while 
the operator was busy with other tasks. 
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5.3.3 Findings 
Several expectations of designers towards both design of artefacts and operators were 
identified. The following are some of them:  
 Trust in operation of many functions in a feature/procedure. For example, 
designers assume that the operator would operate without difficulties many 
functions in a feature or a procedure. The designers expect benefit of these 
designs would increase effectiveness or efficiency of a system / artefact and 
decrease product costs. 
 Sensitivity of recognition of warning signals. Operators will perceive alerts 
without difficulty. 
 Human ability to distinguish and to correctly manage devices located in close 
proximity can be decreased even in hectic conditions. 
 Continuous monitoring tasks belong to human operators‟ responsibility in a 
procedure design. 
 Changed design features which are different from previous designs in similar 
types of system could be coped with operators. 
 Miscellaneous tasks such as data entry should not affect ability to conduct 
main tasks. 
 An emergency check list could be listed without considering failure symptoms 
and achieved step by step from the first item to the final item. 
 A generator failure could be easily found by operators because it causes an 
electricity cut. Therefore it is not necessary to prepare a specific check list for 
the failure. 
 If design can put many functions into a system it will helpful for operators. It 
is not an important thing to consider how the operations of these functions 
would be different from the previous functions in operator‟s identification of 
the functions. 
 A chart installed in a flight computer system. However, in the printing out it is 
difficult to identify characters in the printed chart. 
 The responsibility to detect ice deposit in wings belongs to pilots. There is no 
need to provide a warning process. 
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 The operator could check a warning process before deleting data. There are 
many tasks, such as scanning runways, watching radar/computer screens, 
listening to radio for communication. It is easy to “click” a procedure; the 
operators have experience of lots of clicking manoeuvres.  
 Automatic mode changes in computerised systems can increase flexibility of 
systems and utilise functions. Human operator can recognise these changes.  
 Different designs of flight plans would be corrected by cross check by air 
traffic controllers. 
 Limitations of systems would be well recognised by operators.  
 After take-off, check lists could be achieved by pilots. The GPS configuration 
task would not distract the pilot‟s cognition. 
Those expectations of designers, however, have failed during human-system 
interactions by different expectation of operators‟ on artefacts or systems. Followings 
are some examples of such failures. 
– Many items were included into an after take-off checklist procedure 
without considering the fact that a task, in case of failure or difficulty of 
the parts of jobs, delays or confounds other tasks. This led to puzzling of 
operators when they encounter an uncontrolled condition. 
– There were many itineraries to conduct on take-off check lists. If a pilot 
had to do one task in a labour intensive way. This led to distracting the 
operators‟ focus on continuously checking current altitude. 
– An automatic warning system should have alerted operators to recognize 
a hazard. But operators being in a state of distracted cognition due to 
other tasks could not respond to a weak warning such as a light or a 
message in a screen display. This led to not recognizing the alert.  
– The performance of the B737-400 series aircraft was superior to that of 
the B737-300 series aircraft. There was no effective process to check the 
different performance. That led to controllers considering that the aircraft 
were like types for the purposes of departure standard. 
– The approach/departure controller elected to input data to the air traffic 
computer during the departure sequence. This was labour intensive and 
diverted his attention from the air situation display. This led to not 
monitoring the departure process of two aircraft. 
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– There is no alert system for a voltage failure, and the symptom of the 
failure looked like a display error. It might be a right decision that the 
voltage failure is not a cause of the warnings because cascade warning 
illuminations showed there was enough electricity in the system. That led 
the crew to overlooking the first item of the EFIS failure/disturbances 
checklist, which required a check of the generator voltage. 
– The configuration of the Sector 3 console provided insufficient space to 
adequately display all relevant flight progress strips. As a result, 
controllers had developed the habit of removing strips at the earliest 
opportunity, thereby creating the potential for vital information to be 
missed. 
– Computer based printed charts in a small size are difficult for pilots to 
read correctly. That led to misidentifying a correct taxiway.  
– Without a clear prohibition standard, it is easy for humans to ignore 
unclear evidence and then consider as normal as routine practices. This 
led to misidentifying the ice deposit on wings. 
– Without an alert, operators could not identify aerodynamic stall in 
advance. 
Human errors related to design-induced error could be categorised as follows below.  
 Distracting 
 Puzzling 
 Not recognise/ Lack of alert 
 Differentiating from systems 
 Autonomous performance in similarity cases 
 Confusing with ambiguous condition 
 Relying on a system in systems 
 Routine tasks 
Table 5.8 summarises design implications in human errors. Those error modes of 
design-induced error are categorised according to the most important issues that lead to 
cognitive failures of operators while operating a system. Each mode is explained in the 
table. 
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Table 5.8 Modes of design-induced error 
MODE EXPLANATION 
Distracting 
The operator should remember data in order to accomplish a job. 
Most data appearing in current tasks are stored in short term memory 
(SM) in human cognition. These data are easily distracted by 
simultaneous tasks because they are stored in SM. A subtask apart 
from a main task is also easily confounded by the main task. Design 
of tasks that require an operator to conduct two or more tasks 
simultaneously may cause distraction of operators. Such errors are 
termed skill-based errors. 
Puzzling 
The operator should interpret the situation and state of a system by 
examining external representations of the system. If a system does not 
give enough time and clues to identify and evaluate relevant logics of 
a system, logical errors may appear. Not enough representations also 
lead to such rule-based errors.  
Not recognise/ 
Lack of alert 
The degree of warning system should account for difficulties of tasks 
or safety degree of a system. If an operator does not have time to look 
around due to other tasks, the design of warning system not 
considering work environment degree would cause the operator not to 
notify the alert. 
Differentiating 
from systems 
If a system does not communicate continuously with human operators 
in the system by operating excluding the operators, the system would 
gradually deprive the operator dealing with the system of skill. 
Human operators, in such a condition, have differentiated from the 
system. 
Autonomous 
performance 
in similarity 
Various forms of similarity in design cause human errors. For many 
cases similar shapes, sounds or visual messages make operators 
commit errors because these tasks are conducted in skill-based 
performances. 
Confusing 
with 
ambiguous 
condition 
Ambiguity of procedures and operating methods that are not apparent 
to operators, create the possibility of other interpretations of the 
design methods such as procedure etc. in different ways. 
Relying on a 
system in 
systems 
The dependence on a reliable system is a human tendency. 
Automation and internal operations have increased the reliance on the 
system for operators. Without an effective communication system 
between operators and systems, an external or internal mode change 
would fail to attract the operator‟s focus or attention. 
Routine tasks 
Most jobs are routine tasks. Skill-based tasks save operator‟s 
cognition. If a system needs a task that is beyond routine procedure, 
the design of task should be such as to alert the human operator‟s 
cognition that has been adapted to a routine process.  
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5.3.4 Discussion 
We have tried to identify human–system interaction and failures of the interactions. An 
analysis of accident reports followed. The kinds of design concepts implied in the 
failed interactions were examined. With the studies of literature reviews in Chapter 2 
and accident report analysis in the previous section 5.2, design of human–system 
interactions may be categorised into five categories:  
(1) Representation design: design for shape, location, or array of feature 
(2) Alert design: design for operators to recognise an emergency state of a system 
(3) Reliability design: design for a system itself sustaining the system 
(4) Procedure or Rule design: design of procedures or rules in which operators 
conduct a function or accomplish a goal 
(5) Communication design: design for an operator to communicate with other 
operators or systems 
There are general assumptions by designers that limitations of design specification 
could be compensated by operators. Therefore expectations of design (designers) to 
operators play a vital role in the design-induced error process in the man–machine 
interaction process when operators have to get to grips with complex operational 
systems. If a design of a system just lets it operate automatically, not involving 
operators, this can lead to an error of operators who fail to notice a state of the system. 
People‟s compensation process often occurs in conditions where information is 
incomplete and ambiguous, and people necessarily fill in the gaps. In man–machine 
interaction, operators resort to various practices to achieve this. The practices are 
results of operators having gained experience. Operators have continuously analysed 
and tried to interpret the symptom of conditions in a system. Those analysing processes 
are to investigate the underlying meanings of the design of a system. Many evidences 
show operators‟ misunderstandings of what are the purposes of design because in their 
previous experiences the assumption of design was correct.  
The compensation process is a dichotomy: trust or distrust. If an operator has good 
experience in similar conditions, she (he) believes representations of a system actually 
so as not to pursue further investigation of other evidences. Development of false 
assumptions of human operators on system operation is a causal factor of design-
induced error.  
Who is responsible for these errors? It is not easy to answer the question. But the 
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concept of design-induced error suggests that not only operators but also designers 
should consider contributory factors of their design to errors. 
Table 5.9 Design Categories of human–system interactions 
DESIGNS ERROR-INDUCING DESIGN CONCEPTS IMPLIED BY 
DESIGNERS 
Representation design  Similarities of positions, array, colour, shapes of artefacts 
make it difficult to distinguish one artefact from other 
artefacts. 
Alert design When a system continues a procedure which could go into an 
emergency state if people fail to do proactive action before 
entering the state, no or a weak alert system that could alert 
people who were in a state of focusing on other tasks. 
Reliability design Automatic compensation or control system that could not 
communicate with people or not show the state of system. 
Procedure design Complicated procedures or a procedure that is not prepared for 
failing, conducting a previous procedure or delay of the 
procedure. 
Rule design Rules that clearly approve or prohibit a procedure or 
committing of a task 
Communication 
design 
Congested communication, difficulty of communication or  
ineffective checking system for communication 
 
Error-inducing design 
These issues above may not be well conceived by designers due to the unreasonable 
nature of these events for the designers. Designers consider well-defined procedures in 
accordance with logical operations of a system. Their mathematical and mechanical 
logic, however, could fail in human–system interaction operations if they did not 
prepare and consider the fact that the mind and behaviour of human operators, who 
interact with artefacts, would be affected by the design. It is important to consider a 
margin in human–system interactions like safety factors. 
Error-inducing design refers to the design of a system that does not provide operators 
with proper knowledge to overcome a stereotypic procedure, or assumes that operators 
would act correctly or respond exactly to the demands of a system at the time of hectic 
operation circumstances, which leads to the operators making errors. 
There are two main patterns of error-inducing design. The first involves designs that do 
not provide people with proper knowledge to overcome a stereotypical procedure. They 
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are the misusages of design. Design has some functions to provide information to 
operators. However people in the system would be misled by the information, if 
presentations of the information are not relevant for human operators to identify or 
evaluate a state of systems, particularly in temporal decision making conditions, and 
the representation has been used in different ways. The system only provides 
superficial information for operators, even if not for designers.  
For example, when an emergency procedure is slightly different from a previous design 
of the procedure due to technical changes, operators can easily fail in the new 
procedure in certain circumstances. Human operators have accumulated habit in the 
procedure. The emergency procedure would be operated in hectic conditions. As a 
result, the operators follow the previous procedure unconsciously. 
Features and functions of systems also can be involved in failures in human–system 
interactions. For example, design concepts and rules that simplified a continuously 
variable world into straightforward and abstract forms (e.g. a red sign means stop) or 
representations (such as array, colour, shapes, and procedures) which support a natural 
kind of understanding, by which people understand the functions of a system in order 
to make their problems tractable.  
However, there will be some situations in which their agreements are not clear or one 
part of them changes the rule of design. For example, a change in an array of switches 
in a display panel may confuse operators who manage the system, if the change was not 
fully realised by the operator. And at the time of unfavourable circumstances these will 
present much higher risks. In a system like an aircraft, which is complicated in degree, 
large in scale, even a moderate difference of some design rules will mean that operators 
in the system can easily fail to understand correctly the changes within fairly short 
time-spans and many operations. Thus consistent manners in both the design rules and 
operator‟s understanding provide adequate protection of system operations. It is a 
problem of understanding in tasks or functions of a system. 
The second pattern is design omission. Designers, in this case, miss designing functions 
or features in a system because they think the design is not necessary, taking it for 
granted that it belongs to operators‟ cognition. For example, in one case a pilot had 
forgotten to conduct a compensation task for a depressurising condition, recognition of 
his or her memory failure would be difficult because the pilot have other tasks to 
conduct and the aircraft will level up automatically above the maximum altitude of 
depressurisation. Automatic mode change would not be noticed without an effective 
alert system design. Missing the design could lead to failure of whole procedures. 
Although the system might have an artefact (e.g. an indicator showing height of 
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altitude) that was meant to detect the state of a system, the system relied on the 
operator‟s noticing, and being prepared to take action. It required of the operator 
continuous and strong consciousness for the task, for some aspect of a state of system 
that indicated the aircraft had passed over the limitation of permitted altitude.  
In the course of human–system interactions, the operator‟s recognition remains in an 
assurance of system reliability and does not make an effort to detect unexpected 
consequences of the operations. It means that in the absence of effective stimulants to 
indication of a state of a system, people assume that there had been none to involve to 
the system. Research has shown that this is a natural default decision of humans [Busby 
and Hibberd, 2004]. Findings point out that whether it is a time for an operator to 
involve in a system activities are highly cognitive demanding tasks, which need to 
continuously explore a state of a system. Therefore, in such a system human operator‟s 
cognition is exploited. It makes the protection of a system vulnerable and the system‟s 
goals ineffective. It is a problem of how to provide relevant means to improve 
recognition or perception of operators on the state of a system. 
As a conclusion of this case study, effective design must consider that safety of a 
system needs necessary coordination between designers‟ understanding of operators‟ 
cognition and performances, and operators‟ perspectives of a system. Designers should 
identify potentially misused designs and design omission. It may be subtle and difficult 
to identify such problems. Since operators can never perform in a mechanically logical 
manner for all circumstances, design must provide the operator of effective means for 
human-system interactions. It also must be consistent with the experiences of operators 
and intended functions, otherwise human operators undermine designed functioning. It 
may be important that design should improve flexibility and creativity of human 
operators.  
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5.4 Summary and limitation of the analysis 
5.4.1 Summary 
The case studies revealed two things that make sense. Firstly, there are many cases of 
human errors in human–system interactions. As many human error researchers have 
suggested, such errors could not be prevented or negated only by the efforts of human 
operators. The design of systems should contribute in order to overcome these failures. 
Secondly, it is hard to identify relationships between design and human errors. Many 
accident reports could not comment on reasons for errors. Such difficulties stem from 
inherent limitations of investigation into human errors. People involved in an accident 
may find it difficult to explain why they failed because they may reason that the 
failures are psychological effects or symptoms.  
 
Table 5.10 Summary of case study results 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
RESULTS CROSS 
REFERENCE 
What is nature of human 
error? How human error 
cases could be found in 
accident reports? Etc. 
Human–system interaction failures were found 
in more than 40% of all accidents. Human error 
types, factors leading to errors, and meta-theory 
were also examined. 
Section 5.1 
In which artefacts or 
systems do human 
operators make errors 
frequently? 
Ten systems themes were grouped and 
examined in detail by marking up on the 
document. Human–system failures cases are 
found in various artefacts or systems including 
automated systems.  
Section 5.2 
Is there any way to 
represent relationships 
between design and 
human error? 
A diagram representation method is proposed. 
The diagram analysis which shows relationships 
of design and human errors in diagrammatic 
form was developed and conducted in 50 cases. 
Section 5.3 
How can the meta-theory 
of design-induced error 
help to identify 
mechanisms of errors 
and implicated design 
concepts that affect 
human operators? 
There were not many examples of clear 
description of relationship between design and 
human error. Without meta-theory most cases 
may be interpreted as just human errors. 
Theories provide a possibility to recognise their 
relations. 
Section 5.2 
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Furthermore, if human operators who were involved an accident are dead, they are not 
able to reveal the reasons for any errors. Hence, the meta-theory and the diagram 
analysis are proposed to help people, including designers, to recognise relationships 
between design and human error. Table 5.10 summarises results of the case study. 
 
5.4.2 Limitation of the case study 
It is inevitable that there are possible biases and limitations for the case study. This 
research, analysis of relationships between design and human error, is focused on 
qualitative analysis rather than quantitative analysis in methods. In order to prevent 
misunderstanding of results of the study, it is important to present limitations of the 
case study, of which the author was aware during research. 
 
Generalisation issues 
This study may not be generalised for two reasons; limitation of a dataset and area of 
cases. If this study was to be generally applied to other fields or industries, the dataset 
should be gathered from various accident databases. The study used 562 cases from the 
Australian aviation accident report system. The more data that can be gathered, the 
more the research can generalise the result of case studies. However, the result of the 
case study may utilise a prototype study by which research can develop experimental 
sets for more extensive studies.  
For contextual limitation, the case study focused on the aviation system. There may be 
some deviation to other industries for example if the case study was conducted in the 
chemical industry, manufacturing or health care etc. The findings of this case study 
may be more applicable to the sophisticated domains, such as nuclear power plants that 
adopt highly automated systems. 
Validity of the analysis 
The analysis was conducted by the author. Therefore, the result of the case study is very 
subjective. However, many human error researchers have used same technique of 
subjective analysis, because analysis of human errors needs human interpretation on a 
case. Therefore, precise statistical results are not of much importance for this research. 
According to an issue with the evaluation methods, the following steps were taken to 
identify design-induced error cases.  
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 Identify human errors 
 Identify systems that interact with humans 
 Identify modification of the system after the failure. 
As recommendations in accident reports touch many items, it is difficult to connect the 
relationship between design and human error. The reports comment on various items to 
prevent such errors recurring, including training, and emphasise operators‟ attention to 
following procedures. Therefore, it is necessary to develop methods by which people 
can find specific relations in various expressions.  
Even this method is not fully matured, it could help to find design vulnerabilities to 
human–system interactions. 
According to an issue with the diagram representation, the diagram method is not fully 
tested. It is a prototype method which needs further development and evaluation.  
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Chapter 6. Knowledge Acquisition and 
Sharing Methodologies 
Previous chapters discussed design issues related to human–system interaction failures, 
and then developed a meta-theory of design-induced error by adopting meta-theoretical 
assumptions. As a practical approach to the concept developed, the remaining chapters 
will investigate ways the developed theory can assist designers as well as people (e.g. 
accident analysts) who want to recognise design issues in human–system interaction 
failures. The research particularly concerns knowledge-management systems that are 
an emerging area of the field of knowledge acquisition and sharing, in future as well as 
currently. The application of the methodology focused on developing an ontology and 
on accident reports that contain the concept of design-induced error. 
This chapter briefly reviews knowledge-management techniques, knowledge 
acquisition techniques, knowledge modelling, and knowledge organisation structure (i.e. 
ontology), and their benefits. This chapter also reviews the ways the field of 
engineering design has used ontologies and how ontologies would help designers in 
this case of research (e.g. accident analysis). 
 
6.1 Problems in knowledge sharing of human 
error  
The meta-theory of design-induced error has argued that the different perspectives 
between designers and operators should be considered as a main causation of design-
induced error theories. From this assumption an important way to bridge the gap 
between them is to share the knowledge addressed in theories. If designers had a 
chance to understand operators‟ perceptions on the design of a system, the design could 
be assisted with possibilities of human–system interaction failures identified, and a 
more cooperative system designed. If we agree this notion, there is a question to help 
designers: How to share the knowledge of design-induced error?  
Psychological knowledge that explains phenomena of human behaviour is important 
information for designers and system developers, especially those who design highly 
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critical systems (e.g. aviation, nuclear power plants). One finding has suggested that 
human errors are attributed to many aviation accidents [NASA, 2002] and many other 
human error studies have produced similar results. However, it is one of the difficult 
areas to capture useful knowledge from research in order for it to be used in the design 
process. 
Accident reports which are very standardised and therefore most likely to be amenable 
to automation, contain a number of items of information that can be used by designers 
to understand the effect of their design on human behaviours. A number of accident 
reports have being generated in many countries by those who have responsibility for 
investigating accidents and recommending safety issues including design issues of 
systems. The use of accident reports in order to understand the role of design in 
minimising those human errors is therefore an invaluable resource.  
However, since accident reports exist in the form of unstructured texts, it is difficult to 
extract specific knowledge from the unstructured documents systematically (or 
automatically) for use in a knowledge-based system due to ambiguity and the diversity 
of expressions of related concepts. Additionally, as reports may describe a number of 
factors that contribute to an accident, the reader may easily lose his/her focus and be 
confused by the amount of information [Johnson, 2000]. 
Therefore it will be useful for designers, in order to understand the knowledge 
interpreted from a particular point of view (e.g. in this thesis a meta-theoretical point of 
view of design-induced error), if we can develop a methodology that can identify 
concepts and their relations related to the point of view in a collection of accident 
reports in an effective way. It is also helpful for use of the information contained in the 
accident report in computer-based systems (e.g. the Web) if the accident reports are 
transformed into easily accessible formats.  
There have been many attempts to improve the accessibility of the accident report 
systems. Most of them have focused on developing database systems (e.g. National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Accident Database & Synopses, USA). However, 
knowledge that can be extracted from database systems is limited by their structures 
and formats. When we construct a database system, parts of the knowledge contained in 
an original document may therefore inherently be lost. 
Now, the obstacle to sharing the knowledge of human-error theories with designers is 
how designers can gain the information and knowledge more effectively and easily 
than before. The aim of this research was therefore to examine and demonstrate the 
possibility of capturing psychological concepts (i.e. design-induced error) from 
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documents and representing their relations in an effective form (e.g. a graph, a 
network) by developing an ontology that formalises related concepts of error and 
design which match psychological human error theories.  
 
6.2 Knowledge, knowledge management, and 
knowledge acquisition 
“Knowledge management”, the capture of knowledge for further reuse, is one of the 
prevalent technologies taken up by industry in recent years [McElroy, 2003]. Many 
researchers have argued that managing knowledge is the best practice in current 
organisational management [e.g. Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995]. Techniques of knowledge management (KM) have been developed for capturing 
knowledge that could be easily lost without intensive, deliberate effort [Wielinga et al., 
1997]. Techniques of KM are divided into two broad categories: knowledge 
acquisition/extraction and knowledge modelling [Schreiber et al., 2000; Preece et al., 
2001].  
Milton et al. [1999, pp.620] summarised five key KM activities as the following: 
“Personalisation is the activity of sharing knowledge mainly through person-to-person 
contacts. This can be facilitated by investment in current IT systems [Hansen, Nohria 
and Tierney, 1999]. There is also an opportunity for knowledge technology to enhance 
this process by providing tools to allow employees to communicate more effectively, 
e.g. by ensuring they are clear in their terminology and the ways in which they 
conceptualise a domain. 
Codification is the activity of capturing existing knowledge and placing this in 
repositories in a structured manner. This is the most likely area where a knowledge 
technology based on knowledge acquisition techniques might be applied, the aim being 
to make the process more efficient, for instance by using generic models, and more 
effective, by using a range of specialised techniques.  
Discovery is the activity of searching and retrieving knowledge from repositories and 
databases, such as using intranet and internet systems. There is potential here for 
knowledge technology to aid in search procedures such as automatic construction of 
ontologies. 
Creating/ innovation is the activity of generating new knowledge, vital if an 
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organisation is to remain competitive [Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995]. Present 
technologies have fallen short of providing any significant impact on knowledge 
creation [Bond and Otterson, 1998], and there seems little doubt that in the foreseeable 
future this is likely to remain a primarily human endeavour. There is, however, an 
opportunity for knowledge technology to be of assistance if only in providing 
sophisticated brainstorming tools. 
Capture/ monitor is the activity of capturing knowledge as people carry on their normal 
tasks such as interacting with people and computer systems. This is an attractive notion, 
as it does not have the overhead of taking people off-line in order to capture their 
knowledge. One promising opportunity is to provide knowledge tools that both aid 
people in their activities and in so doing capture important knowledge, such as 
providing an audit trail of decision making.” 
6.2.1 What is knowledge? 
In knowledge management, data, information and knowledge are distinguished. 
However, there are many ways to define these concepts. In many definitions of the 
concepts, “data” is in general considered as a raw source. “Information” is structured 
data, in which we can gain knowledge from the information in a certain context. 
However, it is difficult to make a decision only with information because information is 
not clearly associated with contexts. “Knowledge” is information associated with 
contexts. For example, when we see traffic signs we understand the meaning of signs 
and activate our action according to our knowledge of signals. “Red”, “green”, “stop”, 
and “go” are data. “Red sign is to stop” and “green sign is to go” is information. The 
knowledge is that we know which sign we have to follow when we see the sign because 
the meaning can be changed according to our position, such as a pedestrian or a driver.   
Knowledge is considered harder to detect than information because it is a kind of 
beliefs and commitment [McMahon et al. 2004]. A question of “what is knowledge” is 
a difficult question to answer because that is in a human‟s head. For example, 
knowledge of driving a car is something one has in his/her head. Therefore knowledge 
is ability, experience, information, or aptitude etc. of our own. Knowledge can be 
divided into two kinds: declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge. Declarative 
knowledge is what we know (e.g. the laws of motion, the structure of DNA). On the 
other hand, procedural knowledge is the way we know how to do things (e.g. driving a 
car, boiling an egg). 
The other ways to categorise knowledge have been discussed in many research studies. 
The most famous categorisation in KM may be explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge 
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[Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995]. There are various explanations about tacit knowledge 
(Table 6.1). Tacit knowledge [Polanyi, 1966] may be a kind of reflection of experience. 
It is essential for expert performance, and experts often do not know they use tacit 
knowledge. As a result, experts find it very difficult to describe their tacit knowledge. 
However, it is essential to capture and share with others. The task of knowledge 
engineering in KM is to transfer tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge in various ways. 
 
EXAMPLE SOURCE 
legal expertise – determining critical case factors; 
identifying precedents; developing analogies; building an 
argument 
Marchant & Robinson 
1999 
knowing how to handle face to face selling; how to 
maximise high probability sales situations; salesmen‟s 
rules of thumb 
Wagner et. al. 1999 
setting up a scientific experiment – e.g. the care taken in 
clamping the apparatus; in preparing experimental 
materials (polishing a metal suspension thread; greasing a 
silk suspension thread) 
Collins 2001a 
riding a bicycle; dancing Collins 2001b; Cook and 
Brown 1999 
applying social rules; following conventions Collins 2001b; Janik 1988 
speaking acceptable phrases Collins 2001a 
“knowledge ... manifested in traditions” Collins 2001b; 1974 
nurses intuitions about patients‟ conditions Herbig et. al. 2001; 
Josefson 1988; Leonard & 
Sensiper 1998 
managing oneself (knowledge about the importance of 
tasks), and managing others (how to assign tasks) 
Wagner & Sternberg 1986 
deciding which journal to submit an article to Wagner & Sternberg 1986 
drawing inferences from various news stories Baumard 1999 
doctors‟ rules of thumb for psychosocial problems Andre et. al. 2002 
making, and playing, musical instruments Cook and Brown 1999 
baker‟s ability to make tasty bread Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995 
Table 6.1 Examples of tacit knowledge (Gourlay, 2004) 
Type, source and context are main considerations used in knowledge management to 
characterise information [Court, 1995; Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002]. Which type of 
information or knowledge we have to develop is an important element for knowledge 
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management research. It means what kind of information is required to undertake a 
particular task. For an accident report analysis, we need a particular structure for the 
classification of information (this was a consideration of developing an ontology of 
design-induced error). 
The source of information and knowledge is where we have to seek the information and 
knowledge. Experts, documents, or data are main sources of knowledge extraction. For 
this research, accident report documents were adopted as a knowledge source. To 
provide reliable information and knowledge they need some criteria such as availability, 
accessibility, applicability, authenticity and amount [Turner, 1977]. Accident reports are 
created by investigators who mainly come from a governmental body (e.g. Air 
Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the Department of Transport for aviation 
accident investigation in the UK). These days they provide accident reports in the form 
of pdf or html files on websites. Although it is possible to access such documents 
readily, there are still issues of identifying relevant knowledge from the documents. 
From which context we are to try to acquire information and use knowledge is 
important. Accident reports are produced by investigators who follow documentary 
reporting rules. They want to include as much information as possible because the 
reports may be used by persons from a number of fields such as regulators, 
psychological researchers, and designers. As a result, the reports contain a range of 
information on matters such as personnel who were involved in the accident, system or 
artefact (e.g. aeroplane), external factors (e.g. meteorological information), medical, 
and technical analysis (e.g. fire or explosion). 
 
6.2.2 Making tacit knowledge explicit 
The main quality of knowledge is what the knowledge pertains to, and how to represent 
the knowledge. While knowledge exists in two ways: formal (i.e. explicit) and informal 
(i.e. implicit or tacit), knowledge creation in organisations is flourishing when tacit 
knowledge is mobilised and converted into explicit knowledge [Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995]. However, owing to its unstructured and uncodified forms, implicit knowledge 
and tacit knowledge cannot be easily shared between designers [McMahon et al., 2004]. 
Making tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge is an important issue in knowledge 
management systems and AI (Artificial Intelligence) fields. 
The development of knowledge management techniques with research on psychology 
give now a room for a possible way to understand tacit knowledge (e.g. in this thesis, 
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design-induced error) and turn this knowledge into a reusable form. In order to make it 
possible, knowledge exploitation processes have been suggested [Milton et al., 1999]. 
This process in general begins with a knowledge elicitation process, and ends in a 
knowledge modelling process (Figure 6.1). 
Knowledge 
Acquisition
Knowledge Analysis Knowledge Modelling
knowledge 
elicitation
knowledge 
extraction
knowledge 
objects
concepts
attributes
relations
ontology
validation publishing
experts document
 
Figure 6.1 A knowledge modelling process (from Milton et al., 1999) 
We can conceptualise our knowledge in terms of knowledge objects. Knowledge 
objects are concepts, relationships between objects, and properties of the objects (i.e. 
attributes and values). It is important when capturing knowledge to break down 
(analyse) knowledge into conceptual “nuggets” (i.e. knowledge objects), and present 
these „nuggets in clear ways to validate, extend and communicate the knowledge 
[Milton et al., 1999]. 
Concepts, core of knowledge objects, are things that constitute a domain. Physical 
entities (e.g. products, components, machines), information (e.g. ideas, plans, goals), 
information sources (e.g. documents, databases), people and organisations (e.g. roles, 
groups), domains and techniques (e.g. physics), functions (i.e. purpose of objects or 
roles), issues (e.g. problems and solutions, pros or cons), phenomena (e.g. physical 
mechanisms), other behaviour or constraints etc.  
Attributes are the qualities or features belonging to a class of concepts. For example, 
physical objects have a weight, a shape and an age. Jet engines have a weight, a thrust 
and noise level. Ideas have a source, a format and an importance. Organisations have a 
number of employees, a turnover and a product range. 
Values are the specific properties of a particular concept such as its actual weight, age, 
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and format. There are two types of values: numerical (e.g. 10 years old, 100kg) and 
adjectival (heavy, young) values. Each value is associated with a particular attribute. 
For example, the value 120℃ applies to the attribute of temperature. Only one value 
can be associated with a particular concept. For example, the colour of a car cannot be 
associated with both blue and red. 
Relationships are the way concepts or other knowledge objects are related to one 
another. The most important relationships are “is a” relation that shows classification 
(e.g. car is a vehicle) and “part of” relation that shows composition (e.g. a wheel is part 
of a car). Relationships can be related to a value (e.g. an elephant is heavier than a 
mouse). Relationships usually are represented as labelled arrows in a diagram. 
 
6.2.3 Knowledge acquisition techniques 
Knowledge acquisition involves the activities of knowledge eliciting, data analysis and 
domain conceptualisation [Scott et al., 1991]. Aims of knowledge acquisition are: (1) to 
capture or elicit knowledge (mainly from experts) as efficiently as possible, (2) to 
structure knowledge, (3) to validate (check) the knowledge is correct, relevant, best 
practice and useful, (4) to publish knowledge in a form that can be used for end-user 
documentation (e.g. web pages) or software implementation (e.g. design specification) 
[Milton et al., 1999]. In order to develop an ontology of design-induced error, we need 
to know how to capture the underlying meanings and then how to conceptualise the 
meanings captured. Figure 6.2 shows a general framework of knowledge acquisition 
(KA) from various knowledge sources (Selbig, 1986, in Wagner, 1990). 
Data 
samples
Texts(Books, 
Protocols)
Expert(s)
Learning 
systems
Text 
understanding 
systems (NLP)
Knowledge 
Extraction and 
Knowledge 
extraction tools
Instruction 
systems
Knowledge 
system
Inference 
engine
Knowledge 
source
Knowledge 
Acquisition 
mechanism
 
Figure 6.2 Descriptive KA Framework (adapted from Selbig, 1986 in Wagner, 1990) 
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Knowledge acquisition needs a knowledge elicitation methodology from experts 
[Hoffman et al., 1995].  Milton et al. [1999] proposed general steps for knowledge 
acquisition as follows: 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the expert to (a) find the scope of what knowledge 
should be acquired, (b) determine to what purpose the knowledge should be put, (c) 
gain some understanding of key terminology, and (d) build a rapport with the expert.  
This interview (as with all encounters with experts) should be recorded on either 
audiotape or videotape for later analysis. 
2. Transcribe the initial interview and analyse the resulting document (called a 
“protocol”) to produce a set of questions that cover the essential issues across the 
domain and that serve the goals of the knowledge acquisition exercise. 
3. Conduct a second interview with the expert using the pre-prepared questions to 
provide structure and focus.  (This is called a “semi-structured interview”.) 
4. Transcribe the semi-structured interview and analyse the resulting protocol, looking 
for knowledge types: concepts, attributes, values, classes of concepts, relationships 
between concepts, tasks and rules. 
5. Represent these knowledge elements in a number of formats, for example, 
hierarchies of classes (taxonomies), hierarchies of constitutional elements, grids of 
concepts and attributes, diagrams, and flow charts.  In addition, document, in a 
structured manner, anecdotes (“war stories”) and explanations that the expert gives.   
6. Use the resulting representations and structured documentation with contrived 
techniques to allow the expert to modify and expand on the knowledge you have 
already captured. 
7. Repeat the analysis, representation-building and acquisition sessions until the expert 
is happy that the goals of the project have been realised. 
8. Validate the knowledge acquired with other experts, and make modifications where 
necessary. 
The above steps constitute knowledge acquisition activities (Table 6.2). Knowledge 
engineering techniques have been developed to assist such processes and activities.  
Chapter 6: Knowledge acquisition and sharing methodologies 
 206 
Knowledge acquisition techniques are divided according to information formats and 
types. When information is captured we need to extract useful meanings from the 
information. For the knowledge acquisition approach we have to decide preliminary 
knowledge sources (e.g. experts, expert-domain map, end users, documentation). Then 
we need to validate the captured knowledge, e.g. validation plan, validation resources 
(commitment from expert). Knowledge analysis consists of the tool/method of analysis, 
knowledge objects, and quality of transcript analysis. 
 
PHASE STEPS ACTIVITIES 
Planning Understand the 
domain 
Learn terminologies, concepts, and problem-
solving strategies 
Identify domain 
experts and users 
Identify primary experts and users 
Define the problem 
scope 
Meet with experts, users, and managers to 
define the problem 
Identify the type of 
application 
Investigate problem characteristics and identify 
the type of applications 
Develop process 
models 
Perform task analysis and identify key 
processes 
Plan KA sessions Develop session agenda 
Extraction Explain KA approach Introduce KA concepts and methods to experts 
Discuss objectives of 
KA sessions 
Explain objectives and procedures of KA 
sessions 
Conduct KA sessions Employ KA techniques to acquire knowledge 
Debrief experts Conclude KA sessions 
Analysis Analyse KA session 
outputs 
Identify concepts, objects, or entities 
Identify attributes associated with each concept, 
object, or attribute 
Identify possible values of attributes 
Identify class-instance, part-subpart 
relationships 
Identify heuristic rules 
Transfer knowledge 
into representation 
Use diagrams to represent knowledge structures 
Transfer object-attribute relationships into rules 
Transfer part-subpart relationship into rules 
Verification Develop test scenarios Create test scenarios 
Collect problem scenarios from experts and 
users 
Verify knowledge with 
experts 
Verify knowledge structures and rules 
Table 6.2 Summary of steps and activities of a knowledge acquisition methodology 
(adapted from Liou, 1990) 
Between knowledge capture (extraction) and knowledge modelling, knowledge 
analysis is necessary (Milton et al., 1999). Knowledge analysis begins with identifying 
key knowledge from a text document, and then selecting the appropriate types of 
knowledge (e.g. concepts, properties, problems). Highlighting text using coloured 
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highlighter pens often performs in this process. An ontology should be developed 
during the early stages of analysis in order to identify what main types of knowledge 
objects are there, how these knowledge objects are related to one another, and how the 
knowledge will be presented using knowledge models. 
Transcript analysis involves analysing a transcript or other document to identify the 
relevant knowledge. The analysis must be driven by the aims and requirements of the 
project. Therefore, the analysis plan should be developed before analysis begins: what 
sizes and types of knowledge to pick out, how to model the knowledge. 
To plan knowledge acquisition we have questions such as which domain, how much 
data and how to capture the knowledge?  Table 6.3 briefly presents various techniques 
and technologies of capturing and analysis of information and knowledge. Such 
technologies have recently been developed and are still under development. 
There are two criteria to find the areas of knowledge that will provide the best business 
benefits. First, we have to consider the importance for customers: how important is the 
knowledge for the end-user? Second, how easy is it to capture and deliver the 
knowledge to the end-user? For capturing knowledge we have to breakdown the 
categories of the knowledge into useful forms with relevant criteria. 
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FORMAT 
AND TYPE 
OF 
KNOWLE
DGE 
CAPTURE TECHNOLOGIES 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE 
EXTRACTION OF MEANING 
T
ex
tu
al
 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 
Paper/ electronic format 
Handwriting recognition (Tablet PC, 
digital pen) 
Electronic notebooks (MECE, PENS, 
EEN, NMR) 
Knowledge acquisition techniques. 
PC PACK 
IBM Intelligent Miner for Text: provides a suite 
of text analysis and text search tools. 
Knowledge modelling techniques. 
Knowledge engineering methods: EboK, 
MOKA, PICK, CORMA, XPERTS, 
CommonKADS. 
U
n
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 
Paper/ Electronic format. 
Handwriting recognition (Tablet PC, 
digital pen) 
Electronic notebooks (MECE, PENS, 
EEN, NMR) 
Liveboard/Tivoli: interactive 
whiteboard application for group 
meetings. 
InBASED: Intranet Based System for 
Engineering Design, prototype for improving 
communication in product development project 
by using visualised project data. 
Design rationale system 
V
er
b
al
 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 
Audio/Video equipment. 
Manual transcriber: a software tool 
for manually transcribing recorded 
audio into text has been developed. 
Speech recognition software: 
navigation systems, used mainly for 
telephony applications with a 
restricted vocabulary. 
Speech recognition: multimedia indexing 
applications, spoken document retrieval through 
text query input. 
Audio notebook: when used to take notes from a 
structured discourse. 
WASABI project: applies a variety of 
applications to a transcript of a live broadcast to 
identify information elements, to generate 
queries and extract relevant data to the ongoing 
discourse. 
Rough‟n Ready: an identical goal to WASABI 
but analysis is done offline. 
U
n
st
ru
ct
u
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d
 
Audio/Video equipment. 
Manual trascriber: a software tool for 
manually transcribing recorded audio 
into text has been developed. 
Speech recognition software: speech 
into text software (Via Voice, Dragon 
Speech) 
SpeechSkimmer: a system for interactively 
skimming recorded speech. 
W3: making and using near synchronous, pre-
narrative video. 
Audio notebook: when used to take notes from a 
meeting. 
MeetingMiner project: text transcripts from 
speech recognition software are analysed and 
prompt questions during meetings. 
P
ic
to
ri
al
 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 CAD software: capture standard 
engineering drawings. 
Space Pen: enables designers to make 
annotations on virtual 3D models, generating 
web-based pages. 
CAD/CAM links: knowledge from CAD model 
is transferred to CNC machines. 
U
n
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 
Liveboard/ Tivoli: interactive 
whiteboard application for group 
meetings. 
Tablet PC to capture sketching? 
W3: making and using near synchronous, pre-
narrative video. 
Audio notebook: when used to create sketches 
during a meeting. 
sKEA project: sketching knowledge entry 
associate, a system designed for knowledge 
capture via sketching. 
Table 6.3. Technologies that can be used for knowledge capture and extraction (Huet, 
2004) 
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6.3 Knowledge modelling and knowledge 
organisation structures 
Knowledge acquisition is not useful if the knowledge cannot be shared with other 
persons (e.g. designers) and reused. Therefore, knowledge modelling is important for 
constructing a knowledge-based system that facilitates reuse of the knowledge.  The 
development of knowledge organisation structures (KOS), such as classifications and 
ontologies, is at the core of knowledge modelling process. There are many knowledge 
modelling techniques such as “CommonKADS” [Schreiber et al., 1999], “Protégé 
2000”, or Multi-perspective modelling [Abdullah et al., 2002; Gennari et al., 2002]. 
The term “model” refers to any structured knowledge that reflects the world of interest 
(i.e. a system). It helps us to make sense of the world. We can use a model to capture 
essential features of a system. Models exist both internally as 'mental models' and 
externally as “cognitive artefacts”. Cognitive artefacts can take many forms: written 
texts, graphs, diagrams, pictures, equations, computer-simulations, etc. While these 
different kinds of models vary greatly in their form and function, they all share certain 
desirable properties. Creating a model can be achieved by breaking a system down into 
more manageable parts that are easy to understand and to manipulate. 
Knowledge modelling involves constructing a structured representation (e.g. diagrams, 
grids, hypertext) of knowledge objects. Knowledge models can help users to think 
clearly, be organised and be analytical. These also help to validate the knowledge with 
experts. It can be possible to communicate, to use and re-use the knowledge with the 
developed knowledge model. 
A knowledge model should be clear and unambiguous [Abdullah et al., 2002]. It should 
not be too small or too big. Most of all it should provide a particular perspective of the 
knowledge. There are important types of knowledge models: network diagrams, 
various types of matrix (grid, table), and annotation. Network diagrams comprise nodes 
and links. Nodes are shapes with associated text and they represent knowledge objects. 
Links are lines or arrows (sometimes labelled) and represent relationships. Hierarchical 
forms of networks are represented in the style of a tree.  Maps can be used for non-
hierarchical forms of network diagrams. Matrices are two-dimensional grids with 
filled-in grid cells. There are two main types of matrix: attribute matrix and relationship 
matrix. An attribute matrix is concepts versus properties (values). A relationship matrix 
is used for problems versus solutions or processes versus resources. Cell entries can be 
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symbolised by a symbol (e.g. ticks, crosses, question marks), colour, number, or text.  
Annotation pages are a collection of pages detailing the knowledge in the domain. They 
consist of one page per relevant knowledge object. Annotation pages use structured text, 
diagrams and pictures. Annotation pages summarise all relevant knowledge and form 
the basis for the content of web pages. Annotation pages should use generic headings to 
clarify and aid description. Generic headings are sets of headings applying to a class of 
knowledge objects. They provide an annotation page that is a form to be filled-in. The 
structure of annotation pages is a special form of frame. It provides a checklist for 
knowledge capture, and helps clarify what has and has not been captured. 
An ontology, a kind of knowledge model, is a “formal description of the entities within 
a given domain: the properties they possess, the relationships they participate in, the 
constraints they are subject to, and the patterns of behaviour they exhibit” [Uschold and 
Gruninger, 1996]. Ontology provides detailed entity and relationship definitions that go 
beyond anything provided by reference models. 
 
6.3.1 What is ontology in knowledge engineering? 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the term ontology has two meanings philosophically and 
knowledge technically. For knowledge management researchers, ontology is a model or 
definition of a world interest.  
Ontology is one of the important parts of knowledge management systems (KMS) that 
have been identified as one of the key technologies in current and future engineering 
design [Guarino, 1998; Abar et al., 2004]. The ontology has been used for the basis of 
exploitation and use of accumulated knowledge because an ontology is a classification 
structure.  
KMS technologies have improved communication between human and machine as well 
as between human and human. How to create and share knowledge in communities is a 
key challenge to knowledge management (KM). In order to organise and share 
knowledge in KMS it is necessary that domain knowledge should be transformed into 
machine accessible and applicable forms and structures. Such tasks are called 
“codification of knowledge” [McMahon, 2002]. Codification is a methodology to 
collect and organise knowledge that can be used and shared in KMS. However the 
difficulty of organising knowledge partly stems from knowledge itself, i.e. its 
terminology and relationship. Knowledge, unlike information, is regarded as a deeper 
understanding of a fact. It represents a belief in a fact associated with actions and 
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processes of information [McMahon, 2002]. Knowledge has a diversity of expression 
of a phenomenon (e.g. terminological diversity). Ontology provides a solution to tackle 
such a problem. 
Knowledge consists of concepts and their relations in knowledge-based systems. An 
ontology is a hierarchical basis to codify concepts and relations with hierarchical 
structures and mapping a natural language in text with ontology in KMS because 
ontology is defined as an explicit specification of a conceptualisation [Gruber, 1993]. 
The term “concept” can be defined as “a collection of propositions about a separable 
component of the world and is designated by a label” [Darlington, 2002].  Relation 
refers to a link between concepts from the point of view of a specific domain in order 
to specify the particular knowledge. 
From a knowledge-based systems point of view, an ontology is “a theory (system) of 
concepts/vocabulary used as building blocks of information processing systems” 
[Mizoguchi and Ikeda, 1996]. Formal structures for concepts and vocabularies are of 
interest in assisting humans in organising, sharing and browsing document collections 
and also in their potential for supporting inference based on knowledge collections 
[Chandrasekaran et al., 1999]. 
Current KM encompasses non-explicit knowledge such as unstructured documents and 
interviews as well as data-oriented information that has been organised in the form of 
tangible documents, which is prevalent in first-generation KM. To tackle implicit 
knowledge is to design concepts and their relationship for a specific setting. Therefore 
ontology can play a key role in KM such as knowledge organisation, knowledge search 
and retrieval, knowledge presentation, and knowledge acquisition and structuring. That 
is the reason why ontology has evolved or changed from previous knowledge systems, 
i.e. database systems, expert systems, or artificial intelligence systems. 
Noy and McGuinness [2003] identified five reasons for ontology development: 
(1) To share common understanding of the structure of information amongst 
people or software agents (communication) 
(2) To enable reuse of domain knowledge (reusability) 
(3) To make domain assumptions explicit (reliability) 
(4) To separate domain knowledge from optional knowledge (specification) 
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(5) To analyse domain knowledge (specification). 
Currently, information overload is one of the important issues knowledge management 
needs to address because people suffer from the difficulty of choosing the right 
information quickly and easily in conditions of over-abundant information [Heylighen, 
2002]. A lot of information is now circulating around the world in the current era of the 
Internet in which we use web-based systems and documents. Therefore searching for 
relevant information is a great task for designers and knowledge management systems 
are needed to tackle the issue. The use of ontologies may be one of the answers to 
address the issue . 
The main purpose of developing an ontology is to communicate between human and 
machine  [Darlington, 2002]. Human language and machine language are different 
which results in a communication disconnection between human and machine. 
Therefore, to overcome gaps of information-gathering channels between human and 
machine, we have to know how knowledge (not information) evolved in a computer. 
We, also, should find possible ways to communicate meaning, by means of description, 
between human and machine in order to share knowledge between humans and 
machines.  
The purpose of ontology development is to provide a means of communication between 
humans and agents (i.e. computer systems). For humans it represents a means of 
acquiring knowledge more easily and understanding the knowledge more explicitly. On 
the other hand, in the communication between humans and computers it can be used as 
an interaction device between their heterogeneities. 
There are number of ontology editors (development tools), from conceptual knowledge 
modelling to specific domain terminological modelling. One study has surveyed 94 
ontology editors [Denny, 2002 and 2004]. For this research it was considered necessary 
to choose an ontology editor that should be: (1) easy to use for people who are not 
knowledge engineering experts, (2) able to capture knowledge objects from documents, 
and (3) capable of knowledge analysis and knowledge modelling.  
6.3.2 How has ontology been used in engineering design 
domains? 
The affordances of ontology such as extended communication and sharable knowledge 
have provided an opportunity not only for specialists in computer engineering fields but 
also those in engineering design fields to use the methodology. From the general 
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purpose of development of ontology, people in engineering design have focused on 
their own usages. The followings are examples of such uses: 
(1) To obtain interoperability of knowledge used in different programs (e.g. CAD) 
(2) To increase communication knowledge between producers and users (e.g. e-
commerce, online procurement)  
(3) To integrate and manage various types of knowledge in the design process 
(4) Knowledge capture and representation of design rationale.  
With regard to the first point, in modern engineering design, designers suffer from 
handling large amounts of information that exist in different formats. This means that 
interoperability of a concept is needed for sharing the same meaning in different 
systems. For example, different CAD systems have different formats to represent the 
same objects. That makes it confusing and time consuming to coordinate information 
used in different design environments. Semantic conflicts are an important issue in 
solving the integration problem. 
Cross-functional, distributed design teams  use CAD and other tools along with 
available knowledge to develop the physical form, logic, specifications and all other 
information that defines a product. Additionally, multiple source vendors, sub-
contracted manufacturers, distributors, and sales partners also add value to the product 
by using existing information and generating more knowledge [Dutta and Wolowicz, 
2005]. These resources are typically of different types (databases, expert systems, 
application software, etc.) because they serve the needs of different domains. Thus, an 
essential feature of product information is well-defined meaning (semantics) in a 
particular context. Further, growth in the use of the Internet has facilitated 
communication between the information resources.  
The use of ontology in e-commerce has addressed these issues. It has been an early-
adopted area of ontology because of the commercial benefit. Ontology provides, for 
example, interoperable tools for communication of engineering catalogues.  
With regard to point (3), there are usually several independent information resources in 
a design process. In order to integrate systems, ontologies can be used to facilitate 
representation of different systems [Patil et al., 1992]. Such integration is especially 
important in the design of product/manufacturing process management systems (e.g. 
Product Lifecycle Management) in which various stakeholders participate. It is 
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essential to take into account all kinds of knowledge from various stages of the process 
in the development of a product. This requires a meaningful formal representation of 
product data semantics throughout the product‟s lifecycle.  
Finally, fundamental and semantic issues that a designer encounters every day include 
reasoning on a design, such as why a design was chosen and what are alternatives for 
the design. This refers to design rationale. Design rationale exists in the heads of 
human designers. In order to capture design rationale we have to have discourse with a 
person who has the knowledge. Sometimes that exists in the form of unstructured 
speech or text, e.g. engineering documents, interviews, conversations, memos, emails 
or meetings that present designers‟ rationale in the design processes. Ontologies have 
been designed to help the reasoning process with identifying and reconstructing the 
knowledge contents from such unstructured formats. 
 
6.4 The value of developing an ontology on design 
and error 
To examine the value of an ontology is to answer the following questions: 
(1) Why will the developed ontology help people? 
(2) How will the developed ontology help people? 
The first question is related to how to provide people with effective reasoning methods 
to understand the concept of design-induced error. This is how to overcome a difficulty 
of a domain analysis of psychological theories on unstructured documents. It needs 
clear structure and relations of the concepts. 
The second question concerns methodologies that extract and show the knowledge. A 
number of methodologies have been developed to help people to understand knowledge 
in effective ways. These include visual representation tools (e.g. tree-style hierarchy 
browser, diagram showing relations graphically), and an annotation (mark-up) system. 
The main user of the methodology developed in this research would be a designer. 
Designers may not have enough knowledge about psychology e.g. human error theories, 
and the methodology would assist them in taking such theories into account in their 
work. They have questions on human–system interaction failures but suffer from 
reasoning about why the operator has done inappropriate things that were not expected 
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by the designer. These errors could not be predicted, calculated or simulated using 
general engineering methodologies because they are related to psychological and 
behavioural phenomena.  
It still is a difficult and time consuming task to extract relevant knowledge from 
accident reports even if designers do have knowledge of psychology. It is also the same 
for experts, e.g. accident analysts or related researchers. The developed ontology may 
help them to search for interesting areas of reports faster than before. The ontology 
therefore should be easy to use, easy to understand, and straightforward to format in 
terms understandable to, for instance, an engineer 
Finally, authorities that produce accident reports may gain a benefit from developing 
ontologies. There are a number of different formats in accident reports according to 
which authority produces them. It is difficult and moreover not reasonable to accord 
such diversity of formats into a fixed formation. That reduces the usability of 
documents. An ontology is an alternative because it can be developed in a number of 
styles as required.  
Usability is important for accident report providers. If we develop a particular ontology 
for a certain domain, a researcher has a tool to search accident reports more effectively 
or easily than before. Ontology does not damage an original description in the 
document by annotating with a mark-up language. Current data-based analysis systems 
have to decompose descriptions into data sets resulting in loss of the original 
description. That makes it difficult for other researchers to try to analyse the material in 
a different way. 
There are many different points of views which analyse a document. An analyst, for 
instance, wants to know relations between engineering design and accident types. 
Another analyst needs to analyse physical conditions of operators which lead to errors. 
Different perspectives can apply to interpret a symptom or relations. Psychologist tries 
to translate an accident in a manner from engineers. Therefore, it is better to leave an 
original paper undamaged. However, if the documents remain in unstructured text 
formats, it is an issue how easily to access documents that they want to find. 
The difficulty can be overcome by using annotation methodologies with a mark-up 
language technique in a current web environment. Ontology plays the role of a template 
for the application of the annotation. 
Therefore, the values to develop ontology in this thesis may be summarised as follows; 
(1) To provide a methodology to recognise psychological knowledge 
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systematically from accident reports in an easily accessible format that can be 
used in knowledge management systems 
(2) To provide multiple view points on an accident 
(3) To facilitate knowledge transfer from authorities to ontology browsers in a web 
site 
(4) To help readers to access knowledge effectively by representing related issues 
in a visual form 
(5) To visualise the relationship(s) between design and error 
(6) To define terminologies related to design issues with human error, 
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Chapter 7. Development of an ontology of 
design-induced error 
The previous chapter reviewed the advantage of knowledge sharing and organisation 
methods in the current knowledge-management system environment. This present 
chapter concerns the application of the method discussed in the previous chapter to the 
development of a knowledge-based “theory based ontology of design-induced error” 
which specifies in detail a representation for capturing design issues relating to human 
error from accident reports. 
As has been discussed, there are a number of reasons to develop ontologies in 
knowledge management systems. In this thesis, the development of the ontology was 
carried out to provide the designer with an effective methodology to recognise and 
search for the concept of design-induced error and related design issues from accident 
reports as well as to gain a better understanding of the concept. This aims translated 
into the following objectives: 
(1) To formalise relations between design of a system and human error in light of 
the concept of design-induced error by analysing accident reports 
(2) To examine the possibility of capturing psychological knowledge from text 
documents 
(3) To demonstrate a knowledge model showing relations between design and 
error and a process of design-induced error in effective forms (e.g. a visual 
form). 
For this purpose, a “design induced error ontology” has been developed in this research. 
The ontology includes three parts in order to reveal domain knowledge in these subject 
areas that could be applied to searching for related issues in the context of accident 
report documents as a basis for support of the design-induced error reasoning process. 
These three parts are; the error-inducing design ontology part, the design-induced error 
theory ontology part and the human- error ontology part. 
This ontology development process was conducted by the author and after discussion 
with supervisors and a knowledge engineering expert at the University of Cambridge.  
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7.1 Methodologies  
For the research, to extract useful knowledge from accident reports for delivering to 
designers and sharing the knowledge obtained with designers, theoretical and technical 
methodologies are adopted. 
(1) Theoretical methodology 
a. Meta-theory of design-induced error (Chapter 4) 
b. Knowledge acquisition and modelling process [Milton et al., 1999] 
c. Logical ontology development methodology [Noy and McGuinness, 
2003] 
(2) Technical methodology 
a. PC PACK: for generating the ontology, knowledge acquisition, and 
knowledge representation development [O‟Hara et al., 1998; Shadbolt 
and Milton, 1999] 
b. Protégé 200318: for building an open source implementation of the 
developed ontology [Noy et al., 2000] 
PC PACK was chosen for the main technical methodology for this research because it 
provides tools that are necessary for this research (e.g. a protocol tool for knowledge 
extraction from documents, diagram and ladder tool for knowledge modelling, and a 
publishing tool for annotated web pages). This research focused on the knowledge 
acquisition and knowledge modelling of related concepts rather than taxonomical or 
ontology languages (e.g. RDF, OWL). PC PACK has been used in many engineering 
design fields as well as other domains for knowledge construction. According to Denny 
[2002 and 2004], PC PACK provides easy and useful tools (e.g. by providing highlight 
pens in a protocol tool) for users (even for non-experts of knowledge engineering) to 
extract knowledge objects from documents (Table 7.1).  
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Tool  Modelling 
Features/Limitations  
Base 
Langu
age  
Web 
Support 
& {Use}  
Import/ 
Export 
Formats  
Graph View  Consist-
ency 
Checks  
Multi-
user 
Support  
Merging  Lexical 
Support  
Inform-
ation 
Extract-
ion  
Comments  
The software tool 
for editing 
ontologies  
The representational and logical 
qualities that can be expressed in 
the built ontology  
The 
native or 
primary 
language 
used to 
encode 
the 
ontology  
Support for 
Web-
compliant 
ontologies 
(e.g., URIs), 
and {use of 
the software 
over the 
Web (e.g., 
browser 
client)}  
Other 
languages 
the built 
ontology can 
be serialized 
in  
The extent to 
which the built 
ontology can be 
created, 
debugged, 
edited and/or 
compared 
directly in 
graphic form  
The degree to 
which the 
syntactic, 
referential 
and/or logical 
correctness of 
the ontology 
can be verified 
automatically  
Features 
that allow 
and facilitate 
concurrent 
development 
of the built 
ontology  
Support for 
easily 
comparing 
and merging 
independent 
built 
ontologies  
Capabilities for 
lexical referencing 
of ontology 
elements (e.g., 
synonyms) and 
processing lexical 
content (e.g., 
searching/filtering 
ontology terms)  
Capabilities 
for ontology-
directed 
capture of 
target 
information 
from content 
and possibly 
subsequent 
elaboration 
of the 
ontology  
Pertinent information about 
methodology, availability and 
support, additional features, etc.  
PC Pack 4  Knowledge acquisition and 
modelling.  Multiple 
inheritance; n-ary relations; 
rules and methods.  User 
definable templates for 
modelling formalisms like 
CommonKADS and Moka.  
XML  {HTML 
output via 
XSLT}  
XML  ER 
diagrams; 
class 
hierarchies; 
OO views  
Only 
logically 
consistent 
models can 
be created.  
Yes  No  No  No  Suite of many integrated 
KADS inspired tools.  
Protégé-2000  Multiple inheritance 
concept and relation 
hierarchies (but single class 
for instance); meta-classes; 
instances specification 
support; constraint axioms 
ala Prolog, F-Logic, OIL 
and general axiom 
language (PAL) via plug-
ins.  
OKBC 
model  
Limited 
namespa
ces; {can 
run as 
applet; 
access 
through 
servlets}  
RDF(S); 
XML 
Schema; 
RDB 
schema 
via Data 
Genie 
plug-in; 
(DAML+O
IL 
backend 
due 
4Q'02 
from SRI)  
Browsing 
classes & 
global 
properties 
via 
GraphViz 
plug-in; 
nested 
graph views 
with editing 
via 
Jambalaya 
plug-in.  
Plug-ins for 
adding & 
checking 
constraint 
axioms: 
PAL; FaCT.  
No, but 
features 
under 
developm
ent.  
Semi-
auto-
mated via 
Anchor-
PROMPT
.  
WordNet plug-
in; wildcard 
string 
matching (API 
only).  
No  Support for 
CommonKADS 
methodology.  
Table 7.1 Features of PC Pack and Protégé ontology builders (extracted from Denny, 2004)
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PC PACK also supports building of an ontology template for a MOKA
19
  [Stokes, 
2001] type ontology that is familiar to engineering designers.  
PC PACK is an integrated suite of knowledge tools designed to support the acquisition 
and use of knowledge. It can assist people who want to capture knowledge to produce 
an intranet site or to develop a knowledge-based system, such as an expert system with 
the following activities: 
• To analyse knowledge from documents 
• To structure knowledge using various knowledge models (such as trees, diagrams, 
grids and hypertext) 
• To acquire and validate knowledge from experts 
• To publish or implement the captured knowledge 
• To re-use knowledge across different subject areas and domains. 
There are 10 toolkits in PC PACK as shown in the diagram (Figure 7.1) including the 
following main tools. 
   The Protocol Tool, which is used to analyse documents  
 The Ladder Tool, which is used to construct hierarchical diagrams (trees/ladders)  
 The Diagram Tool, which is used to construct diagrams  
 The Matrix Tool, which is used to construct matrices  
 The Annotation Tool, which is used to create structured web pages  
 The Publisher Tool, which is used to create websites  
 The Diagram Template Tool, which is used to define diagram formats.  
                                                     
19
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Figure 7.1 A diagram of PC PACK Toolkits (Epistemics
20
, 2005) 
 
7.2 Dataset  
A collection of accident reports relevant to the concept of design-induced error was 
essential for the research. There are available sources in websites, mostly government 
websites (e.g. Air Accidents Investigation Branch, National Transportation Safety 
Board). When data was gathered it was necessary to consider both the quality and the 
quantity of the data. For effective research, relevant accident reports that contain the 
concept of design-induced error need to be gathered because of the need to accumulate 
the amount of reasonable knowledge relevant to design-induced error.  
                                                     
20
 http://www.pcpack.co.uk/PCPACK5/Help/en/General/pcpackquickguide.htm#usinghelp 
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ACCIDENT  
INVESTIGATION BODIES 
(WEB SITE) 
AVAILABLE SOURCES 
NUMBER OF 
INVESTIGATION 
REPORTS 
HSE (Health and Safety 
Executive, UK; 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/) 
Industrial accident report and 
reviews 
Not available on the 
web 
AAIB (Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch, UK; 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/) 
Aviation accident reports  37  
– full reports 
MAIB (Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, UK; 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/)  
 
Marine accident investigation 
reports  
29 (2003), 40 (2002), 41 (2001), 40 
(2000), 18 (1999) 
168 
– full reports, with 
some short reports 
 
NTSB (National Transportation 
Safety Board, USA; 
http://www.ntsb.gov/) 
  
Aviation, railway, highway, marine, 
pipeline and hazardous materials, 
accident investigation reports in 
USA 
 
For Aviation only –  
Database: 140,000 
Full reports: 41 (for 
10 years) 
ATSB (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, Australia; 
http://www.atsb.gov.au) 
 
Aviation (678), railway (21) and 
marine (205) accident investigation 
reports in Australia 
904 
 – some short reports 
TSB (Transportation Safety 
Board, Canada; 
http://www.tsb.gc.ca) 
 
Aviation accident reports (476) 
5 (2003), 40 (2002), 62 (2001), 66 
(2000), 40 (1999), 48 (1998), 46 
(1997), 47 (1996), 44 (1995), 66 
(1994), 12 (1990-93) 
Marine accident reports  
 
Rail accident reports  
Pipeline accident reports  
Aviation: 476  
– full reports with 
short reports 
 
Marine: 255  
(1990–2003) 
– short reports 
Rail: 88 (1995–2003) 
Pipeline: 11 
OSHA (Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration, USA; 
http://www.osha.gov/) 
 
Industrial accident investigation 
reports in USA 
Not available on the 
web 
US Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board 
(http://www.cbs.gov) 
Chemical accident reports in USA  24 (1998–2004) 
- full reports 
Table 7.2.  Available sources of accident reports on the web, as at December 2004. 
After reviewing several sites (Table 7.2) the Australian aviation accident/incident 
reports (available at website http://www.atsb.gov.au/) were selected for this research. 
The reasons for choosing the Australian accident aviation reports for a dataset in this 
research are that (1) the reports are well formatted in HTML, (2) the descriptions in 
documents contain more relevant terminologies for searching the concept of design-
induced error than other accident reports systems, and (3) they have a larger number of 
cases than other authorities for developing an ontology in research levels.   
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7.3 Development of the ontology of design-
induced error  
Issues addressed in research for the development of any form of a knowledge-based 
system concern a clear definition of knowledge objects, knowledge elements, and 
knowledge processes [Hicks et al., 2002]. Epistemics proposes a PCPACK knowledge 
acquisition process (see Figure 4.1). Noy and McGuinness [2003] suggested the 
following ontology development steps: (1) determine ontology domain and scope, (2) 
consider reusing existing ontologies, (3) enumerate important terms in the ontology, (4) 
define the classes and class hierarchies, (5) define the properties of classes-slots, (6) 
define the facets of the slots, (7) create instances.  
Through discussions with knowledge engineering experts and examination of current 
methodologies, the following development process was adapted as shown in Figure 7.2. 
As steps for ontology development, the methodology developed by Noy and 
McGuinness [2003] was in general adopted here. As a knowledge acquisition and 
modelling process, the PCPACK process was used. Details of steps of the knowledge 
acquisition and ontology development process will be addressed in the remaining 
sections of this chapter. 
Initially, the domain and scope of the ontology needed to be determined. Considerations 
of constraints of the development of the ontology were the main concern in this stage 
such as: (1) this is a new type of ontology that should provide designers with an insight 
into knowledge about design issues with human error; (2) the ontology is based on 
psychological theories; and (3) it is focused on accident reports. From those 
considerations a conceptual map of the ontology and important terms was drawn. 
Secondly, knowledge elicitation followed. Knowledge is difficult to capture as well as 
to understand. It is necessary to conduct a knowledge elicitation process in order to 
find: (1) what kinds of knowledge exist in the design-induced error domain, (2) how to 
and what is the best way to clarify the knowledge, and (2) what are key concepts in the 
knowledge. There are a number of ways of knowledge elicitation, e.g. interview, survey, 
brainstorming and so on. This research adopted a description analysis of accident 
documents as a knowledge elicitation process because the main purpose of this research 
is how to capture relevant knowledge from accident reports. This analysis examined the 
contents of accident reports in order to identify accident reports that contain design-
induced error.  
The characteristic words or phrases that present design-induced error were determined 
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and then extracted from the accident reports for categorising an ontology of design-
induced error. With this process of testing, documents (domain documents) that might 
be considered to contain the concept of design-induced error were selected for the next 
steps. 
Thirdly, concepts and relations were generated with the PC Pack ladder toolkit [Milton 
et al., 1999] based on the results produced in previous steps. A knowledge acquisition 
and modelling process was followed. These tasks adopted knowledge representation 
methodology with PC Pack protocol, diagram, and annotation toolkits. 
Finally, by conducting a verification and validation of the developed annotation and 
web browser, and by refining the concepts and relations several times, an ontology of 
design-induced error was formulated. This process led to the publication
21
 of web 
browseable design-induced error ontology.   
This study used a web-based ontology methodology (i.e. PC Pack) because of 
considerations of usability of the ontology. 
 
                                                     
21
  The web browseable ontology is not yet published externally but available in an 
internal system only. 
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Figure 7.2. Process of ontology development and applied methods 
 
7.3.1 Stage 1: Determining the domain and scope of the 
ontology 
A first step to develop an ontology is to determine the domain and scope of the 
ontology [Noy and McGuinness, 2003]. The domain of the ontology is determined by 
identifying the purpose of the ontology. This research concerned how to provide an 
effective tool for reasoning on human–system interaction failures by developing 
relevant knowledge extraction and representation methodology to find design issues 
related to human error from accident reports.  
In order to determine the scope of the ontology of design-induced error, a list of 
questions that a knowledge base based on the ontology should be able to answer was 
sketched as competency questions [Gruninger and Fox, 1994]. In the design and human 
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error domain, The followings were created as possible competency questions: (For 
designers, researchers, and authorities producing accident report systems) 
 
(1) Which terms can we find in accident reports that represent the concept of 
design-induced error? 
(2) Which design-induced error characteristics should I consider when 
designing a system? 
(3) How do operators think about a system when I design the system in 
order to prevent accident and increase safety? 
(4) How does design lead operators to make an error? Which design concept 
can make operators fall easily into design-induced error phenomena (e.g. 
gulf of evaluation)? 
(5) Is there any case that shows trust in automation phenomena? For 
example, does trust in automation occur in GPS systems? 
(6) What kinds of design-induced error are related to a particular design e.g. 
the Flight Management System? 
(7) What kinds of design factors related to automatic systems contributed to 
operators‟ inability to solve a problem? 
(8) What are the different perspectives between designer and operator in 
human–system interaction failures? 
These questions will serve as the litmus test during development: Does the ontology 
contain enough information to answer these types of questions? Do the answers require 
a particular level of detail or representation of a particular area? Thus we can conclude 
as follows: 
 The domain covered by this ontology: Accident reports, especially 
Australian aviation accident and incident reports (see Table 7.2).  
 The purpose of the developed ontology: To assist in searching for and 
identification of relevant design issues in human error (human–system 
interaction failures) cases in accident reports. 
Reuse of existing ontologies was considered but unfortunately a relevant reusable 
ontology was not found. The ontology had to be developed from scratch. However, it 
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is necessary to mention that this process is important in development of ontology. 
There are a number of ontology libraries (e.g. the Ontolingua
22
 or DAML libraries
23
) 
from which people can import relevant existing ontologies for their own ontology 
development. 
 
7.3.2 Stage 2: Knowledge elicitation: Defining testing 
documents 
Although the domain and scope of ontology was determined, there was no clue as to 
how to construct the ontology of design-induced error to be identified. In order to 
tackle the problem, it is necessary to elicit relevant knowledge concepts from existing 
domain knowledge or experts. It is said that the knowledge elicitation process has an 
important advantage in order to develop an ontology [Gruber, 1993]. This process helps 
to identify the domain of knowledge that people want to capture and organise.  
There are a number of knowledge elicitation methodologies, e.g. an interview with 
domain experts, a brainstorming with experts, or collecting documents that contain 
domain knowledge [Liou, 1990; Milton et al., 1999]. The research adopted a manual 
description analysis of accident reports as a knowledge elicitation methodology 
because a knowledge source in this research is accident reports. This process was 
conducted by the author and by discussion between the author and experts in design 
and human error at the Innovative Manufacturing Research Centre (IMRC) at the 
University of Bath. The process examined and analysed accident reports in terms of the 
concept of design-induced error in order to identify relevant knowledge structures for 
constructing the ontology by the following process (Figure 7.3).  
(1) Screening for documents that contain “human–system interaction failure” by 
picking up cases that were caused by “operator error”. 
(2) Analysing the screened cases in terms of design-induced error by applying 
theories identified in Chapter 4. 
(3) Clustering necessary concepts (e.g. error-inducing design, human error) for the 
                                                     
22
 http://www.ksl.stanford.edu/software/ontolingua/ 
23
 http://www.daml.org/ontologies/ 
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ontology development.  
(4) Enumerating important terms (or phrases) by categorising terminology 
(keywords) that appear frequently or are used to express a concept. 
(5) Classifying documents according to evidence. 
(6) Selecting domain documents (testing documents) that will be used for the 
knowledge acquisition and representation process. 
 
screening 
documents
analyzing the 
screened cases
clustering 
necessary 
concepts
enumerating 
important 
terms
classifying 
documents
selecting 
domain 
documents
 
Figure 7.3  Knowledge elicitation process 
For the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 step, the author analysed 562 Australian aviation accident reports 
(Figure 7.5) in the ATSB website (Figure 7.4). The reviewed data set of accidents (from 
1995 to February 2005) were entered into the Microsoft Excel spread sheet with 88 
column (10 categories, see Appendix A) for the data sheet.  Figure 7.6 show part of 
analysis results; accident types and phenomena.  
During description analysis the 3
rd
 step clustering categories of keywords or phases 
were developed such as defective cognition, performance problem, knowledge problem, 
distracted cognition, and reliance on systems (see Table 8.3). For the 4
th 
 step terms and 
phrases related to theories selected from the accident reports were input to the 
Microsoft Excel data sheet.  These process will be discussed in Section 8.2.  
Documents then were classified in the 5
th
 step according to the evidence of design-
induced error based on Table 8.1 discussed in Section 8.1. The results of classification 
of accident cases according to evidence levels shown in Table 8.2. The human error 
data set then were input to the Microsoft Access database (Figure 7.7).  
 
Chapter 7: Development of an ontology of design-induced error 
 229 
 
Figure 7.4 A screen shot of the aviation accident report database in ATSB website (list) 
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Figure 7.5 A screen shot of an aviation accident report in ATSB website (a case) 
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Figure 7.6 A snapshot of part of the Ms Excel spread sheet 
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Figure 7.7 A snapshot of the Ms Access database 
Result: 562 cases were taken from the Australian aviation accident report web site for 
analysis and were examined. After conducting the manual description analysis by partly 
applying a text-mining methodology, 52 cases were then selected as domain documents 
(i.e. testing documents) for an ontology construction process because these reports were 
considered as containing descriptions relevant to the concept of design-induced error. 
The data was marked and saved in a database system (Microsoft Access) for further use 
and analysis. 
 
7.3.3 Stage 3: Knowledge extraction  
A knowledge extraction process was applied to the defined domain documents. The 
Protocol Tool of PC PACK was used to analyse transcripts of accident reports chosen 
in the previous stage. The tool provides the means to identify the important knowledge, 
for example, the concepts, attributes, and relationships as well as instances. The tool 
simulates the way someone would mark-up a page of text using highlighter pens. Each 
type of knowledge is associated with a different colour, for example, blue for “design” 
concept, red for “human error”. This process was conducted simultaneously with a 
knowledge analysis (described in the next stage). Basic concepts, attributes, and 
relationships were predefined by the knowledge analysis. Terms and phrases in the 
domain document were extracted as instances of concepts.  
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Figure 7.8 A screen shot of the PC PACK protocol tool for knowledge acquisition (mark-
up) 
 
7.3.4 Stage 4: Knowledge Analysis: Generating concepts 
and relations 
As discussed in the previous chapter, knowledge analysis is a task to define knowledge 
objects (concepts, attributes, and relationships). Knowledge analysis and the knowledge 
extraction process are intertwined with each other.  
With the knowledge elicited in the previous stage from the categorisation and 
decomposition of accident reports, the next stage generated concepts and relations that 
make an ontology model of design-induced error. This process was to answer questions 
such as: What are the related concepts located in this process? How many of them can 
we capture in order to formalise them? 
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(1) Defining the classes (concepts) and class 
hierarchy 
When we think about a process of human error, the theories related to design-induced 
error tell us that there are different processes operating – one is from the designer‟s 
perspective and the other is from the operator‟s. Enumerating the classes (i.e. concepts) 
of the design-induced error ontology starts by considering these processes.  
This ontology is based on the meta-theory and on accident reports. The classification of 
concepts and the class hierarchy are therefore categorised and defined according to how 
the classification and terminology effectively capture the concepts.  
The purpose of this research is to provide people with a methodology of searching for 
psychological phenomena from accident reports (chapter 1). Since the ontology will be 
used for extracting knowledge from accident reports it is necessary to adopt as effective 
a way as possible in order for it to be: (1) familiar to people, and (2) easy to understand 
and recognise related terms in the accident reports in order to assist searching for the 
design issues with human error. From this viewpoint the classification pursued for the 
research needs to accord with both engineering and psychological classification. The 
terminology and classification adopted in this ontology is not defined correctly 
according to engineering or psychological terms. 
According to the meta-theory of design-induced error (chapter 3) the following 
assumptions are inducted: 
Assumption 1: Design-induced errors are induced by design 
(design, human error) 
Assumption 2: Human error arises from human–system 
interaction failures (problem area, system) 
Assumption 3: Theory can explain such failures (theory, human 
error) 
Assumption 4: There are different perspectives between 
designers and operators (designer, operator) 
From assumptions 1, the concepts of “design”, “human error”, from assumptions 2 
concepts of “problem area”, “human–system interaction method”, “system”, from 
assumptions 3 concept of “theory”, from assumptions 4 concept of “designer”, 
“operator” are introduced.  
In addition, from accident report, concepts of “accident report”, “airplane”, “aeroplane”, 
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“airport”, “airfield”, “aerodrome”, “accident” are added. 
 
Figure 7.9 A screen shot of the PC PACK ladder tool for constructing an ontology template 
 
With these preliminary defined concept categories, the classes and the class hierarchy 
were constructed using the PC PACK ladder tool (Figure 7.9). Knowledge captured in 
the previous step, a knowledge extraction step, can be automatically put into the related 
concepts. 
 
(2) Defining the relationships between classes 
In order to define the relationship between classes an ER (Entity and Relation) diagram 
was first drawn with concepts (Figure 7.10). This conceptual ER diagram shows how 
the concepts are relating to each other.  
A conceptual ER diagram to express design-induced error could be three parts of 
entities: designer, operator, and design-induced error theory. From the design part 
“designer” has perspective “intention” and has “design” ” in order to achieve goals. 
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Designers‟ ideas are embedded in a “design” that produces a “product” called an 
“artefact” or “system”. The artefact or system provide “human-system interaction 
method”. On the other hand “operator” has perspective of “expectation” on the design 
for operating the artefact or systems. The operator interacts with “human-system 
interaction method” in order to reason about “issue”. If the issue could not be solved by 
the operator, it is called “human error” that result in “accident”.  
Finally, the “design-induced error theory ” explains that the relation between design 
and human error with the different perspectives of designers and operators, and then the 
intention of designers can be frustrated by a different expectation of operators.  
From this conceptual ER diagram, 16 relations were defined (Figure 7.11). 
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Figure 7.10 The ER diagram of design-induced error process 
The PC PACK Ladder Tool and Diagram Template Editor were used to build concept 
and relation hierarchies (Figure 7.11). The ladder tool provides for construction of a 
tree-like hierarchical diagram by putting entities into ladders. There are a concept 
ladder, a relation ladder, and an attribute ladder in the tool.  
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Figure 7.11 A diagram template of relationship between concepts (PC PACK diagram 
template tool) 
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7.3.5 Stage 5: Knowledge modelling 
The Diagram Tool is used to create and edit diagrams. Concepts and relationships can 
be represented in the diagrams in the form of nodes and links. Nodes in a diagram 
represent knowledge objects in the knowledge base, and links represent relationships 
between the knowledge objects. A diagram template determines the types of nodes and 
links used in a diagram. Forty accident report documents cases were reconstructed with 
the tool (Figure 7.12).  
 
Figure 7.12 A diagram of an accident case (example) constructed by the PC PACK 
diagram tool 
The Annotation Tool allows a page of information to be created and edited for each 
knowledge object (e.g. concept, attribute, task). The user can enter text or pictures to 
annotate what is known about that particular knowledge object. The tool uses a 
hypertext (html) format, hence words can be highlighted and linked to other pages. This 
allows Worldwide Web-like knowledge-structures to be constructed that can be based 
on the hierarchies produced in the Ladder Tool (if desired). Templates are used to 
define the structure, style and contents of annotation pages. These can include special 
commands to insert information automatically from the knowledge base into the 
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annotation page. 
7.3.6 Stage 6: Validation and publishing of the developed 
knowledge 
This step helped the researcher by allowing previous steps to be look back on to check 
missed or wrong concepts or relations and then to revisit previous steps in order to 
modify inappropriate results. Annotated documents were internally published in the 
form of a website and then the concepts and relations were checked several times. This 
process should continue for further examples and It is expected that the ontology will 
be continually refined because the ontology development is not exhausted. Experts in 
human error and users (e.g. designers) can participate in a further validation process.  
The PCPACK Publisher Tool was used to publish the knowledge base of design-
induced error on a website (e.g. Figure 7.13). As it was published in this way, 
PCPACK is no longer required to access the knowledge base. Therefore, it is possible 
for the knowledge base contents developed to be sent to other people and viewed by 
them without the need for PCPACK. This research provides 40 cases as instances of the 
ontology in the knowledge base. 
 
Figure 7.13 The published ontology browser by the PC PACK publisher tool 
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7.4 The theory-based ontology of design-induced 
error 
With the development steps as described in the previous section, “a theory-based 
ontology of design induced error” was formulated. This ontology model is proposed to 
capture design issues relating to the concept of design-induced error in accident reports. 
It attempts to identify the relationships amongst objects that exist in the domain of the 
design-induced error. The ontology is intended to represent related concepts of design-
induced error and their relations. In the course of the investigation into the use of 
ontology for capturing the concept of design-induced error, three main parts of the 
ontology – “error-inducing design part‟, “human error part”, and “design-induced error 
theory part” – were constructed as the discourse of domain knowledge of design-
induced error. This section describes the main concepts and relations in the ontology 
developed with the three important parts of the ontology; 
The error-inducing design ontology part: This part is for identifying design concepts 
that induce human error. 
The human-error ontology part: This part is for what kinds of errors human operators 
make in human–system interaction failures.  
The design-induced error theory ontology part: Each one of these sub-classes 
contains one of the design-induced error theories with a different viewpoint between 
designers and operators. 
 
7.4.1 The design-induced error model ontology 
This model (Figure 7.14) consists of ten main concepts that appear in the process of 
design-induced error. The design-induced error process begins from “designers”. 
Designers‟ ideas are embedded in a “design” that produces a “product” called an 
“artefact” or “system”. The artefact or system performs “operations” in order to achieve 
goals. In order to operate the artefact or systems, human operators are needed. Their 
activities are designed to help the artefact/system achieved the goals. However, the 
“theory of design-induced error” explains that there are different perspectives between 
designers and operators, and then the intention of designers can be frustrated by a 
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different expectation of operators. Unintended design outcomes called “error-inducing 
design” lead human operators to make “human errors” resulting in an “accident” in a 
real context. There is a “problem area” that human operators encounter when they 
interact with a system. Figure 7.15 presents main hierarch of concepts. 
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Figure 7.14 An ontology model of design-induced error 
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Figure 7.15 The main concept tree of design-induced error 
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Concepts (classes): 
Error-inducing model is the main concept that consists of concepts such as Accident, 
Aeroplane, Airport, Date, Design, Designer, Human error, Operator, Problem area, 
Product, Theory. 
Design concept has Error-inducing Design and Modified design. 
Error-inducing design has a sub-class of Interface design and Work environment 
design. 
Interface design concept expresses failed design in direct interaction between human 
operators and artefact, in which Conflict with previous experience, Confusing with 
amount of information, Difficult to distinguish, Difficulty of dealing with artefact, 
Hiding important property, Increasing dependency on automation, Making it easy to do 
it the wrong way, Not providing information or functions, Providing ambiguous 
information or functions, Not providing effective alert functions, and Providing 
different possibility. 
Work environment design concept expresses failed design that exists in the 
surroundings of operators and does not need to be directly connected to the error but 
affects cognition and performance of the operator while conducting a task. Creating 
complexity of tasks, Creating simultaneous tasks, Creating time constraint, Creating 
high workload, Abnormal external factors, and Failure of the other parts of system are 
sub-classes of work environment design. 
Modified design concept expresses a modification or change of design that was 
recommended by the investigator or conducted by an operator who is responsible for 
the system. 
Human error concept has four parts; Distracted cognition, Reliance on system, 
Knowledge problem, Performance problem. 
Knowledge problem concept has sub-classes of Misreading, Misinterpretation, 
misunderstanding, Not recognising, Difficulty of understanding, Forgot to do, Violation 
of rule or procedure. 
Performance problem concept has sub-classes of Inattentional activity, Inappropriate 
performance, Not following signs, Not checking or doing, Miswriting, Not keeping 
monitoring. 
Problem area concept expressed Location of target, Operation, Procedure, State of the 
system, What to do next, and Protective measure. 
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Product concept has sub-classes of Cockpit control system, Traffic control system, 
Other system. 
Theory concept consist of the theories of; Gulf of execution or evaluation, Irony of 
automation (degraded ability), Irony of automation (monitoring failure), Trust in 
automation, Design affordance, Automation surprise (Glass cockpit problem), Plan 
delegation, and Risk homeostasis. 
These concepts have relations each other. Ten relations are defined in order to express 
the relevant knowledge of a concept of design-induced error. For example, the concept 
of error-inducing design has a “has_effect_on” relation with the concept of operators. 
The concept of human error has a “has_error_inducing_design” relation with the 
concept of error-inducing design. In Table 7.3 relations between concepts are presented. 
Figure 7.16 shows a diagram of concepts and relations in design-induced error ontology. 
Concept trees are illustrated in Figure 7.17 
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Table 7.3 concepts and relations 
NO CONCEPT 1 CONCEPT 2 RELATION 
1 Operator Expectation Has_perspective 
2 Operator Problem area Has_reasoning 
3 Operator Human-system 
interaction method 
Interact 
4 Operator Human error Has_error 
5 Designer Intention Has_perspective 
6 Designer Design Produce 
7 Design Error inducing design Part_of 
8 Design Artefact Has_component 
9 Artefact Human-system 
interaction method 
Provide 
10 Human-system 
interaction method 
Human error Is_failed_by 
11 Human-system 
interaction method 
Problem area Support 
12 Problem area Human error Is_unsolved_by 
13 Human error Design-induced error 
theory 
Has_explanation_of 
14 Error inducing design Human error Has_error_inducing_design 
15 Error inducing design Design-induced error 
theory 
Is_explained_by 
16 Error inducing design Operator Has_effect_on 
17 Accident Human error Is_caused_by 
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Figure 7.16 A diagram of concepts and relations of design-induced error ontology 
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Figure 7.17 The concept tree of design-induced error 
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7.4.2 The error-inducing design ontology part 
Error-inducing design ontology part is a part of design concept (Figure 7.18). The 
model of design-induced error ontology has two categories of design; “error-inducing 
design” and “modified design” in order to capture relevant information on design from 
accident report documents. The concept of “modified design” is to represent 
information if we find a description about a recommendation on a modification of 
design of a system that had design issues in the course of an accident investigation.  
design
modified des ign
error inducing 
design
interface design
work 
environment 
design
 
Figure 7.18  The classes of a design concept 
The concept of “error-inducing design” has two sub-classes of “interface design” and 
“work environment design”. 
According to the meta-theory of design-induced error, we can induce the following 
propositions:  
Proposition 1: Design of a system creates “temporal decision making condition” in 
which operators have difficulties recognising problems dealing with a task by 
introducing simultaneous tasks. 
Proposition 2: Design of complexity and automation creates ambiguous interaction 
between operators and systems.  
From these propositions, the class of error-inducing design has two subclasses; 
“interface design”, and “work environment design”. 
Low-level concepts of the two subclasses were determined by examining accident 
reports. The low-level concepts were classified in the light of searching relevant 
concepts in the text (Figure 7.19, Figure 7.20). 
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Figure 7.19  Sub-classes of an interface design concept 
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Figure 7.20 Sub-classes of a work environment design concept 
The concept of error-inducing design has four relations with main concepts. It has an 
“is affected by” relation with the concept of operator, an “is explained by” relation with 
the concept of theory, an “is induced by” relation with the concept of human error, and 
an “is unsolved by” relation with the concept of problem area (Figure 7.21). 
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Figure 7.21 Relations of an error-inducing design concept 
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7.4.3 The human-error ontology part 
This is not a pure psychological classification of human error. The concept of human 
error in this thesis is categorised by four sub-classes. Each sub-class represents parts of 
the descriptions in accident reports. For example, a description of “the pilot in 
command was distracted with other tasks…” in an accident report is captured in the 
category of “distracted cognition” (Figure 7.22).  
human error
distracted 
cognition
reliance on 
system
knowledge 
problem
performance 
problem
 
Figure 7.22 Sub-classes of a human-error concept 
The concepts of “knowledge problem” and “performance problem” occur in a lot of 
forms of human error. They have several low-level classes that represent part of failures 
of human operators. The concept of knowledge problem encompasses mainly 
perceptual errors of operators (Figure 7.23), while the concept of performance problem 
captures activities of the operators (Figure 7.24). They are not comparative concepts 
because they can appear together in the same document. 
knowledge 
problem
misreading misinterpreta tion misunderstanding not recognising forget to do
violation of 
rules or 
procedure
difficut to 
understand
 
Figure 7.23 Sub-classes of a knowledge-problem concept 
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Figure 7.24 Sub-classes of a performance-problem concept 
Relations in the concept of human error have several links. It causes an accident with 
“has cause” relation. Other relations are shown in Figure 7.25. 
is affec ted by
is explained by
is caused by
is unsolved by
has use of Human error
error inducing 
design
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accident
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system
 
Figure 7.25 Relations of a human error concept 
 
7.4.4 The design-induced error theory ontology part 
There are seven theories to represent the concept of design-induced error (Figure 7.26). 
The ontology has a concept of “design-induced error theory”.  
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Figure 7.26 Sub-classes of a design-induced error theory concept 
Theory has a relation of “has explanation of” with a concept of “human error” and 
“error- inducing design” (Figure 7.27). 
has explanation has explanationtheoryhuman error error inducing 
design
 
Figure 7.27 Relations of a design-induced error theory concept 
 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter developed a theory-based ontology of design-induced error. The idea at 
first to hypothesise a “meta-theory of design-induced error” that addresses relations 
between human error and design (see in Chapter 4) was used in this thesis in order to 
be used as a theoretical basis of interpreting human–system interaction failures. The 
meta-theory of design-induced error explains phenomena with which some design 
characteristics provide human operators with false recognition of the system in various 
ways, resulting in errors. According to the meta-theory, design and human error have 
relations between them but it is difficult to notice the relationship in real contexts 
because their relations are indirect and weak. This means that the interpretation of 
functions and features of the artefact or system that affect human cognition and 
performance need to be more clearly described. 
It is argued that if we can draw the relations more clearly than before, even if they are 
weak links, it will help designers to understand and reason about human–system 
interaction failures. From this point of view, the concept of design-induced error 
therefore is not only a definition of a particular error form but also refers to a 
methodology to find weak links between design and errors for a knowledge-capturing 
purpose. With this point of view of the concept of design-induced error, this research 
demonstrated relationships produced by the ontology that show relations between 
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human error and design captured in real accident cases. These relationships also 
depicted relations between design issues and errors with a visual form (i.e. SVG, 
scalable vector graphics diagrams). 
This research especially tried to show that an ontology browser developed with a web-
based annotation tool can be used for searching for and understanding a particular 
knowledge effectively instead of just reading and reasoning on the contents of texts, 
which inevitably takes a large amount of time and effort in order to understand the 
knowledge in current documentary systems.  
It is believed that the outcome of this research can be used for further development of 
methodologies to understand underlying meanings in unstructured text-based web 
documentation. For example, although accident reports, which were used in this study, 
may have a large quantity of information, it is still difficult to extract relevant 
knowledge automatically from the reports because the report is composed in the form 
of natural language. The ontology developed in this research can be used for tackling 
such a problem with the natural language processing (NLP) methodology and machine 
learning process.  
It is hoped it can be also extended into developing a simulation technique of human–
system interaction failures, which show people a visual demonstration of a failure, from 
accident reports. Those efforts may increase the usability of accident report documents 
for different approaches of accident analysis without damaging their original contents.  
The next chapter will examine the developed ontology in terms of knowledge sharing: 
Is this ontology useful for sharing knowledge of design-induced error (e.g. reasoning 
support, knowledge retrieval)? It will then discuss related questions arising during 
development of the ontology. 
Finally, it is necessary to mention about limitations of this research of ontology 
development: (1) It was not a detailed and complete constitution of ontology research 
but a prototype study for the subject of the research, i.e. in order to examine and 
demonstrate effective ways to capture and represent implicit psychological knowledge. 
(2) The area of developed ontology presented in this thesis was specific and limited to 
the Australian aviation accident incident reporting system. As a result, it is necessary to 
extend and modify the ontology further if one wanted to apply the ontology into 
another domain. 
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Chapter 8. Investigation of the developed 
ontology in the light of knowledge sharing  
The previous chapters developed a theory-based ontology model of design-induced 
error. This chapter investigates what to do with the developed ontology (including the 
meta-theory). When we develop an ontology it is necessary to examine applications of 
the ontology according to the purpose of ontology development. The developed 
ontology has knowledge acquisition tools (e.g. a mark up template, annotation template, 
ladder tool) and knowledge modelling and representation tools (e.g. an ontology 
browser, diagram tool). Such features are expected to help users to capture relevant 
knowledge with connection of related concepts. The ontology developed should have 
an effective form and methodology to disseminate the concept of design-induced error. 
The investigation of developed ontology is therefore focused on the needs. 
There will be a number of questions to investigate the design-induced error ontology. In 
general, the investigation issues in this research can be divided by three categories; a 
knowledge retrieval issue, a knowledge representation issue, and a reasoning support 
issue, because the purpose of the ontology is to deliver the knowledge of design-
induced error to designers and to share the knowledge with them (Figure 8.1).  
 
ontology
information 
retrieva l
(knowledge 
search)
knowledge 
representation
reasoning support
is this method useful for searching for relevant 
knowledge in a unstructured document?
does this method wel l represent the concept?
does this method support a user to reason on a 
specific knowledge?
 
Figure 8.1  Investigation issues on the ontology developed 
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 Is it effective way of knowledge representation (KR) of the concept of 
design-induced error? 
 How does the developed ontology help people to think about design 
issues in human error? 
 Is it a better methodology of knowledge retrieval and acquisition than 
manual description analysis? 
 Is there any possibility to extract related concepts in effective or 
automatically? 
 Is there any recommendation for document structure for effective 
knowledge sharing of the concept of design-induced error? 
 
This chapter begins with an evidence issue of design-induced error (Section 8.1). 
Evidence for a concept is important and the most fundamental issue is to search for the 
concept and related knowledge, and to validate ontology of a concept. The issue 
continues in section 8.2 of knowledge retrieval from accident reports. Several 
examinations were conducted for tackling the knowledge extraction issues. . A keyword 
search methods for DIE is examined in this section. Section 8.3 discuss the knowledge 
reasoning issues with the meta-theory application and propose two reasoning support 
tools for the concept of Design-induced error. These sections review how the method 
developed could be applied to finding design issues in accident cases. The issue about 
how well the developed ontology represents a concept of Design-induced error, i.e. a 
knowledge representation issue, is investigated in the Section 8.4. Section 8.5 expresses 
the usefulness of knowledge acquisition in the PCPACK ontology tool. Finally section 
8.6 summarises the investigations. 
8.1 Evidence issue 
In the course of the research two different viewpoints on the concept of design-induced 
error were discussed. One comes from a psychological point of view and the other from 
a knowledge engineering point of view.  
The former viewpoint argues that the concept of design-induced error can be used for 
reasoning about human error cases. This view focuses on how to apply the concept to 
understand human–system failures more than on what kinds of characteristics the 
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concept has. For this purpose, it is not a main task to clarify characteristics or to prove 
the concept (a meta-theory) because theories that conceive the concept of design-
induced error have been proved in the previous researches. A meta-theory does not 
create any new theory that needs to be proved. The concept provides a possibility of the 
interpretation of design-induced error in any human error cases if there are system and 
human–system interaction failures unless other factors are found that affect the failure.  
The latter needs countable evidences that show a concept of design-induced error. From 
this stand of application it is not reliable and realistic to recognise the concept in 
knowledge-based systems, if there is no physical evidence in an accident report to show 
the concept. As a result, the knowledge associated to the concept could not sharable 
between users in the system. 
However, both approaches are at the same time useful and necessary to understand a 
concept of design-induced error. The former help to develop a meta-theoretical 
methodology of reasoning on design issues in human error. A psychological approach 
adopts such a view. The discussion in chapter 4 contributed in this case. The next 
section discusses the issue. The latter helps to formulate the ontology of the concept 
that represents the concept, and to search for the concept in knowledge-based systems. 
This is an important issue of ontology development (chapter 7). It is, in any case, 
important to investigate the evidences of a concept. 
Questions arising for investigating an evidence discussion are:  
1) How to support the concept of design-induced error?  
2) What are characteristics of design-induced error? 
If we focus on finding a particular type of human error in accident reports, we have to 
find evidences that show the error. Does a particular document describe characteristics 
of design-induced error or not? How to differentiate design-induced error from other 
errors? As mentioned in chapter 4, theoretically a distinction is assumed between the 
design-induced error and other errors depending on the fact that the error has different 
perspectives between the designer of the system and the operator in the system. This is 
a fundamental difficulty to differentiate design-induced error from other types because 
it is difficult to elicit such a different perspective without intensive investigation on the 
design concept of the system and the operator‟s perception of the system‟s operation. 
While conducting an analysis of accident reports, it was clear that there is no way to 
differentiate design-induced error forms from the other error forms. Error forms that 
describe an error are same (e.g. misinterpreting, mismanaging etc.). The fact that we 
can find any different error form between design-induced error and the other human 
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errors was verified during accident analysis of accident reports. For example, case 1 
(O.N. 199902928) describes an operator error, “the pilot inadvertently moved both 
bleed air switches”. However without reading other parts of the report, contextual 
circumstances surrounding the pilot at the time of making the error, such as a re-
programming task of GPS and an instruction of ATC, we cannot say the error of the 
pilot was induced by the design of the system.  
Therefore it is necessary to know the relationships between contextual factors and 
human error in order to identify design-induced error. They need to investigate 
intention of the design of a system and expectation of the operator involved in the 
accident. This is an intensive investigation task of investigators that is not normally 
conducted.  
In spite of this difficulty it was found that parts of accident reports provide some 
evidence to show the concept of design-induced error. Based on the description of 
accident reports,  evidence levels were categorised 5 scales ( Table 8.1). Scale 5 and 4 
has relatively strong evidence because expression in documents exactly matches with 
phenomena theory describes and accident investigators also mention design issues. 
Sometimes the reports described that a design has been modified after the accident.  
SCALE OF 
EVIDENCE 
(STRENGTH) 
SIMILARITY 
TO ISSUE 
STATEMENT 
CRITERIA RULE AND 
EXAMPLE 
+5 Equivalent to 
issue statement 
Report contains design problems 
with regard to human–system 
interaction and recommends 
modification of the design 
Evidence level 4 
+ 
[design 
improvement] 
+4 Equivalent to 
issue statement 
Reports contains design problems 
with regard to human–system 
interaction 
Evidence level 3 
+ 
[design issue] 
+3 Similar to 
issue statement 
Reports describe possible 
relationships between degraded 
operator's cognition or performance 
and design 
Evidence level 1 
+ 
[may lead to 
error] 
+2 Similar to 
issue statement 
Reports describe breakdowns of 
relationships between operator's 
cognition or performance and 
system's activities 
Evidence level 2 
+ 
[high work load] 
 
+1 Analyst unsure Reports do not clearly show the 
relationships, but theory supports 
possibility of the part of a concept 
of design-induced error if there is 
no other contributory factor. 
[misperformance], 
[automatic 
response], 
[distracted], 
[unaware]  
0(U*) Analyst unsure Reports express operator error 
without reason given for the error 
[operator error] 
* U : undefined 
Table 8.1 Scale of evidences 
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Scale 3 and 2 has medium evidence because expression in documents roughly matches 
the phenomena theory describes but investigators did not clearly mention design issues. 
In case of scale 1 and 0, tt is difficult or impossible to judge design issues with human 
error from the expression in documents itself. 
 Result: From description analysis of accident reports from the Australian Aviation 
Accident Reports System, 287 human error accident cases were extracted for evidence 
analysis. These cases were classified into six levels of grade scales (5 to 0) according to 
above evidence levels of the concept of design-induced error. Table 8.2 shows evidence 
classification of accident cases that contain human error. It was found that the accident 
reports of below 2 on the scale of level of evidences are not useful for knowledge 
acquisition process due to lack of information. From this classification therefore, 52 
cases out of 287 accident reports, above 3 scale (with grey background colour), were 
chosen as domain documents for use in the ontology development in the knowledge 
acquisition and modelling process. 
Table 8.2 The result of classification of accident cases according to evidence levels (ATSB, 
1995 –February 2005) 
SCALE OF 
EVIDENCE 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
A NUMBER OF 
CASES 
11 20 21 44 47 144 
 
Discussion: This evidence searching process revealed some important characteristics of 
accident reports that must be considered in the process of ontology development. 
(1) It is not possible to differentiate a design-induced error form from other 
human error without considering contextual environments during the process 
of an error.  
(2) It is hard to extract clear and direct evidences of a concept of design-induced 
error from accident reports. 
(3) Terminologies used in reports to express a similar situation or condition vary. 
(4) Many reports lack information on design issues related to human error. It 
would be possible to capture such information if the accident investigation 
was conducted in more detail and was more concerned about the issue. 
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8.2 Investigation on a knowledge retrieval issue 
Knowledge retrieval (i.e. information retrieval) is to extract information in a form of 
concept relation from a source. It means that knowledge retrieval is a methodology to 
search for a relevant information chain to an issue in data that is not predefined. For 
knowledge retrieval in unstructured documents, technology has developed several 
methodologies (e.g. text mining[Dörre et al., 1999; Hearst, 1999]) in order to extract 
knowledge from unstructured documents. 
The primary methodology of knowledge retrieval is a key word type that has been used 
in many search engines. The other ways, such as a text-mining method or the 
Dempster-Shafer method, are based on statistical or Bayesian techniques that need a 
quantity of data. 
In the knowledge elicitation process (chapter 7) it was revealed that the concept of 
design-induced error cannot be formulated with only one set of a concept. It needs 
relations between different concepts, i.e. human error and error-inducing design (Figure 
8.2).  
is affec ted by
is explained by
is caused by
is unsolved by
has use of Human error
error inducing 
design
theory
accident
problem area
system
 
Figure 8.2 Human-error relations 
There is no way of extracting the concept without a complicated process. Extracting 
material relevant to design-induced error from accident report documents cannot 
depend only on one method. Some files were examined and tested with different 
information retrieval methods (e.g. a text-mining method, Dampster-Shafter method). 
However these methods were not relevant to extract a concept of design-induced error 
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from the accident reports. Their methodologies depend on statistical relations between 
documents. In the case of the concept of design-induced error, the underlying meaning 
of expressions in a document is important. The number of items of good evidence of 
expression for the concept was low (as discussed in Section 8.1) resulting in making a 
statistical approach difficult. Therefore, text-mining methods (e.g. Tropes, QDA Miner 
software) were used only for analysing keywords. Through this examination, It was 
possible to define keywords in two concepts, i.e. human error and theory relating to 
design-induced error (Table 8.3, Table 8.4).  
This process finds keywords or sentences that represent a human error. For example, 
the human error appears in a document in terms such as, “the pilot inadvertently moved 
both bleed air switches” in an accident case example (Figure 8.3).  
 
Occurrence Number: 199902928 
Occurrence Date: 21/06/99   
The additional workload created by instructions from ATC, and from attempting to re-
program the GPS at the time when he was completing his climb checks may have captured 
his attention, thereby reducing his capacity to notice deviations from normal procedure.  
Normal procedures included re-positioning blower switches at this stage of the flight. These 
switches were located very near to the bleed air valve switches, and it is probable that the 
pilot inadvertently moved both bleed air switches to ENVIR OFF during the climb checks 
instead of moving the two blower switches. An inadvertent repositioning of the bleed air 
switches would not be detected by the sequenced monitoring of the pressurisation 
instrumentation in the climb checklist, as the pressurisation check was before the 
airconditioning and aft blower checks.  
1. Both bleed air switches were inadvertently selected to ENVIR OFF at about 10,000 
ft in the climb.  
2. The cockpit warning system did not adequately alert the pilot to the cabin 
depressurisation.  
3. The oxygen mask deployment doors were incorrectly orientated during installation, 
so that the masks would not automatically deploy when required.  
4. Hypobaric training did not provide an effective defence to ensure that the pilot or 
passengers would identify the onset of hypoxia. 
 
Figure 8.3 An example of accident reports description analysis (in ATSB, 1995 – February 
2005) 
Discussion:  With a keyword-type approach we can categorise relevant keywords in 
rough. However, there is no one keyword for capturing the concept of design-indced 
error. Several terms are correlated each other. In order to extract the concept of design-
induce error we need to identify relations between related terms.  
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Table 8.3 The category of keywords related to human error (ATSB, 1995 – February 2005) 
DESCRIPTION 
CATEGORY 
KEYWORDS 
Defective cognition Distracted, late decision, did not notice, without checking, 
assuming, unable to communicate effectively, did not get a 
response, incorrectly identified, misread, not been made aware, 
convinced, error of expectancy, not provide, false impression, 
did not see, neither crew being aware, unlikely considered, did 
not adequately monitor, confusion, their attention had been 
directed, no coordinated response, etc. 
Performance 
problem 
Should have alerted, did not advise, recorded incorrectly, did 
not conduct an effective scan, not appreciate, ignore, overlook, 
inadvertently steer, did not hear, incorrectly indicate, 
inadvertently select, did not change, the controller‟s scan was 
inadequate, without an effective alert, not appreciate the 
potential for conflict, incorrect display, initiated a missed 
approach, diverted from, poorly constructed, misinterpreted, etc. 
Knowledge problem Assume, did not appreciate, probably assumed, not adequately 
scan, did not provide, did not issue, not accurately judge, no 
assurance, did not recognise, not clearly defined, did not inform, 
did not appear to understand, developed incorrect mindset, 
without broadcasting, etc. 
Distracted cognition Distracted, diverted his attention, familiar with, never seen this 
approach, did not consult with, controller‟s recognition, 
assumption, assumed, considered, not familiar with, not in the 
practice, was rare, his decision was influenced by the fact, have 
been developed over several years, previous occasions, etc. 
Reliance on systems Rely on, considered unreliable, was confident, relied 
exclusively on, assumed, different expectation, incorrect 
estimate, relied solely on, over-reliance, this belief may have 
resulted in, was surprised by, surprised at, believed, was 
surprised when, dependent on, mislead, etc. 
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Table 8.4 The category of key words related to theories of design-induced error (ATSB, 
1995~2.2005) 
CATEGORY KEY WORDS CASES 
Design Affordance Inadvertent deletion, inadvertent selection, inadvertent 
failure, misread, inappropriate/inadvertent flap slat 
selection, displayed incorrectly 
11 
Gulf of 
execution/evaluation 
Assume, misinterpret not display, was not provided, 
difficult to read, overlooked, misidentify, erroneous 
entry, difficult to distinguish, the chart was ambiguous, 
difficult to see, erroneous perception, unaware, 
misinterpret, misread, incorrect display, did not fully 
understand 
43 
Irony of automation 
 
Not monitor, not notice, not recognise, inadequate scan, 
distracted, unaware, decision was inappropriate, 
diverted his attention, inadvertently selected wrong 
code, unable to detect, not notice, misplace, 
misinterpreted the data link, less vigilant in his 
monitoring, did not appreciate the potential conflict, 
inadvertently omitted, neither controller realised  
15(inabili
ty) 
46(monit
oring 
failure) 
Trust in automation Believe, over-reliance, expect, incorrectly interpret, 
without warning, did not review 
9 
Automation surprise Not understand, not recognise, surprise 1 
Plan delegation  Forget, did not check, relied exclusively on, overlook, 
not recognise 
11 
Risk homeostasis Rely on their interpretation, did not preclude, did not 
follow 
9 
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8.2.1 A keyword search method for the human error and 
design issue document retrieval 
 
Although it is not exact knowledge extraction methodology, a keyword type search 
method has still good merits such as easy and effective applicability for general users 
than other methods. This study tested an applicability of the keyword search method 
and discussed its limitations. 
The keyword type information search method is not a semantic search method. 
However, it is a useful method to sort out accident reports in amount of document file 
into relevant cases (for example NTSB accident database system has 140,000 cases). 
While insufficient description evidences of human and design errors existing in 
accident reports, as a first step to developing automatic knowledge extraction methods, 
this will help to retrieve relevant cases of DIE reasoning from accident report systems.  
I propose a method to extract relevant documents. The “relevant document” of DIE in 
this paper refers to a document that contains (1) human error and (2) relationships 
between the human error and activities or existence of systems or artefact. Such 
documents are called as “reference document of DIE” because we can refer the 
document for reasoning on design issues in human errors.  
Reference documents have not only documents that contain exact cases of design-
induced error, but also documents that have a possibility of design errors related to 
human error. It is important not to exclude useful documents for DIE reasoning 
analysis by analysts. 
 
Retrieval Process 
Step 1. Querying with combined terms between engineering related terms (i.e. system / 
artefact) and design-induced error theory related terms. 
- Engineering related terms (e.g. “landing gear” or “autopilot”) + design-induced 
error theory related terms (e.g. “inadvertently” or “rely”) 
Step 2. Sort out returned documents by eliminating irrelevant documents 
- Eliminating documents clearly irrelevant cases that is not describe operators 
and systems or artefact (e.g. …he rely on God….) 
Step 3. Analysing sorted cases with the related theories. 
Chapter 8: Investigation of developed ontology in light of knowledge sharing 
 263 
- Reasoning on design-induced error in the retrieved documents (why the 
operator at the time of the accident made errors? Is it possible to explain the error with 
design-induced error theories?) 
Finding different perspectives of designers and operators in the case 
 
8.2.1.1  An experiment of information retrieval for design-
induced error reasoning.  
 
This experiment examined two theories of design-induced error: a theory of design 
affordance and a theory of trust in automation.  From preliminary analysis of accident 
reports in the Australian aviation accident report system, two keywords of the theories 
were taken and used for the information retrieval task. 
· The term “inadvertently” for the design affordance theory 
· The term “rely” for the trust in automation theory 
Three accident report systems were examined for the experiment Table 8.5). NTSB has 
one of the largest aviation accident database system containing 140,000 accident cases.  
Table 8.5 Accident report systems used for the experiment 
ACCIDENT DATA BASE 
SYSTEM 
NUMBER OF 
CASES IN THE 
DATABASE  
PERIO
D 
RESOURCE 
ATSB (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/) 
780 1994- Aviation accident and 
incidents in Australian  
ASN (Aviation Safety Net, 
http://aviation-
safety.net/database) 
12,200 1943- Aviation accidents 
around world 
NTSB (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb) 
140,00 1962- Aviation accidents and 
incident in USA 
 
As search engines the Google search engine and NTSB database query system were 
adopted. 
· Google search engine 
· Database Query system in the NTSB Accident Data & Synopses system 
Query terms in Google search engine (examples):  
- (relied OR rely OR relying)  AND autopilot  site:http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/ 
- "not detect" -mair -train -rair 
site:http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/ 
- human error site:http://aviation-safety.net/database/ 
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8.2.1.2 Results  
As the first test some keywords were put into the search engine system. Table 8.6 
shows the results. The reason of different results between Google and NTSB search 
engines is that they may use different algorithms.   
Table 8.6 show the result of terms “inadvertently”, “rely”.  
Table 8.7 query results combined with a term “inadvertently” from the Google search 
engine (for design affordance theory).  
Table 8.8 query results combined with a term “rely” from the Google search engine (for 
trust in automation theory) 
 
Table 8.6 Query results from the Google search engine (10 June 2006) 
Query terms ATSB NTSB ASN 
Inadvertent(ly) 77 67,000 (2,820)* 302 
Rely(ied, ing) 66 138 (134) 29 
Design 203 17,700(1,562) 316 
Design AND inadvertent(ly) 20 113 (47) 17 
Design AND rely(ied) 17 7 (30) - 
Pilot failure 1 
69,800 (more than 5,000 
returns**) 
146 
Pilot failure AND 
inadvertently 
- 847 (778) 15 
Pilot failure AND rely - 6 (-) - 
Error 83 645 (308) 596 
Error AND inadvertently 17 24 (20) 1 
Error AND rely 19 6 (6) - 
Human error 28 10 (6) 31 
*( ) results from the NTSB database system query returns 
** returns are too many, the system can not display all retrieval (the NTSB system 
display is being limited to the first 5000 records) 
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Table 8.7 Query results combined with a term “inadvertently” from the Google search 
engine (for design affordance theory) 
COMBINED TERMS ATSB NTSB ASN 
Without combined terms 77 67,200 (2,820) 302 
Control 64 21,400 (1,090) 113 
Autopilot 19 46 (31) 29 
System(s) 59 26,200 (335) 77 
Landing gear 31 972 (355) 38 
Computer(s) 15 32 (30) - 
Display 23 55 (91) 1 
Flap(s) 29 794 (281) 41 
Throttle 11 356 (154) 22 
Trim 19 142 (91) 15 
Switch(es) 24 327 (205) 17 
Gauge(s) 11 70 (46) - 
GPS 12 42 (34) 1 
Select(ed, ion) 42 297 (245) 27 
Similar(ly) 36 95 (66) - 
Retract(ed, ion) 17 11,300 (266) 28 
Stall(ed) 18 29,400 (1,772) 79 
 
 
Table 8.8. Query results combined with a term “rely” from the Google search engine (for 
trust in automation theory) 
Combined terms ATSB NTSB ASN 
Without combined terms 66 140 (134) 29 
Gauge(s) 9 44 (36) - 
Autopilot 10 9 (9) 1 
System(s) 51 75 (59) - 
Instrument(s) 37 63 (50) 14 
Computer(s) 11 6 (8) - 
Display 22 2 (20) - 
GPS 12 10 (10) - 
 
The return results of the query were screened. For example, in the theory of trust in 
automation the query term “rely” returned 138 cases in NTSB in the Google search. 
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After screening irrelevant documents manually from retrieved documents, 59 relevant 
documents were identified as matching with the concept. Precision of relevant 
documents was calculated (Table 8.9). 
 
Table 8.9. Precision of retrieved documents for design-induced error according to terms 
TERM RETURN MATCHING PRECISION 
“rely” 138 59 0.42 
+display 2 2 1.0 
+autopilot 9 7 0.77 
+computer 6 3 0.5 
+gauge 44 37 0.84 
+system 74 35 0.47 
+GPS 10 4 0.4 
 
Precision is a percentage of number of reference documents in retrieved documents/ 
number of all retrieved documents. However, it should be mentioned that the precision 
in this study is exact precision of DIE because not all reference documents are exact 
cases of DIE. We cannot determine recall (number of relevant documents in retrieved 
document/ number of all relevant documents) because it is impossible that the number 
of all relevant documents. However, from the preliminary experiment at the Australian 
aviation accident report system this approach retrieves most of cases identified by the 
manual description analysis.  
One interesting result from this retrieval is that many of cases of related to the term 
“gauge” were found in the search. The finding shows that pilots have heavily relied on 
gauge in a cockpit display. The theory of trust in automation has not told about artefact 
that is not directly related to automation systems. This result may imply we need to 
study this issue with the concept of design-induced error, and to expand current 
theories into these cases or to develop a new theory. 
 
8.2.1.3  Limitation   
This approach (i.e. reference document search) has a merit to include documents 
relevant to DIE reasoning as many as we can. However, its drawback is inaccuracy of 
retrieved documents searching for exact cases. This method still suffers from the 
inaccuracy retrieval issue. In order to increase accuracy we need methods to scrutinise 
returned documents. Main problems in this method are two: firstly, how to overcome 
diversity of expression of related concepts, and secondly how to define relationships 
between them. Machine has to understand the higher level of meaning of lexicon and 
their relations.  
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8.2.2 The proposed approach to DIE extraction 
The proposed approach uses semantic annotations that annotate the reports with pre-
defined semantics. The semantics are the defined concepts and relations in the ontology 
developed for this research. An ontology is an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization [Gruber, 1995]. The conceptualization is to give explicit definitions 
to domain concepts and their relationships using shared vocabularies. It is well known 
that the ontology improves information sharing and reuse [Noy and McGuinness, 2003]. 
In our research, the ontology is concerned with extracting information from 
unstructured texts, e.g. accident reports. In addition, the ontology supports to organize 
the DIE concepts into a hierarchy.  
8.2.2.1  DIE ontology 
The ontology development involved defining DIE related concepts and their 
hierarchical organization and their inter-relationships. The ontology has a capability to 
express the meaning above in related concepts and relations. Concepts in the ontology 
of DIE are entities that are needed to identify DIE such as HumanError, 
HumanErrorInducingDesign, Artefact etc (Figure 8.4). Relationships are essential for 
expressing the concept of DIE by connecting related concepts e.g. HasError, 
HasExplanation etc. Chapter 7 describe the ontology development in detail. 
8.2.2.2  Annotation scheme 
Figure 8.4 shows an example of using the annotations to identify the DIE concepts. 
That is, with the annotations we can easily identify a relationship between design and 
human error. For example, it is noticed that different types of design (e.g. operation 
methods, positions of switches etc.) in the fuel system induced the pilot in accident 
causing errors. 
However, adding annotations manually is a time consuming and error-prone task, and 
more over, it is difficult to reuse the annotations across domains. This research is 
closely related to the application of an ontology-based semantic annotation within the 
Semantic Web (SW). The idea of the SW is to interpret information instead of just 
ranking it according to its popularity, the approach popularized by current search 
engines. 
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HumanError
HumanErrorInducingDesign Theory
The investigation revealed that, apart from a 2-hour flight the previous day, the pilot had no
other experience in SPP. It was also revealed that there were two significant differences
between the fuel system in SPP and that of other models from the same manufacture
the pilot had flown. These differences concerned the time taken for the outboard fuel tanks to
empty and the orientation of the cockpit fuel selector switches. The analysis concludes that
these differences probably led to mismanagement of the fuel system by the pilot and to
failure of the left engine due to fuel starvation, followed a short time later by failure of the right
engine, also due to fuel starvation.
affect explain
explain
design affordance
theory explains such
failure can happen
when design of a
system is different
from previous design
for similar systems
that was familar to
operators
Human make
 
Figure 8.4 An example of the relations among four main entities 
The Artequakt project [Kim et al., 2002] focused on generating dynamic biographies of 
artists using the information harvested from the Web. The biographies were then 
rendered according to user preferences using one of a number of pre-defined templates 
[Kim et al., 2002]. Rodrigo et al. [2005] created a search engine that exploited 
ontological knowledge in answering users‟ natural language queries that looked for 
specific information instead of whole documents. 
Both systems used the techniques of Natural Language Processing (NLP) especially 
Information Extraction (IE) method for extracting information from the Web pages. IE 
performs well in extracting domain objects, e.g. people names, locations, product 
names, and their attributes using shallow lexical-syntactic patterns. However, since the 
potential influence of design weaknesses on fatal accidents is mostly described 
implicitly or ambiguously, the IE method might not be suitable for extracting such 
descriptions. 
Instead, using certain cue phrases is helpful when it is hard to find regular patterns that 
constrain the occurrences of domain objects. Abdalla and Teufel [2006] proposed an 
approach that incrementally enriched cue phrases with variants. The cue phrases tested 
were pairs of transitive verbs and objects, e.g. introduce and method. While the method 
demonstrated high accuracy, it is not suitable for our task: although the pairs of verb 
and object are useful, other types of cue phrases, i.e. nouns (or noun phrases), or verbs 
without objects, are included in our case. In addition, our cue phrases can occur either 
within a single sentence or across sentences, in contrast to the cue phrases that Abdalla 
and Teufel tested which were only applicable to a single sentence. 
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The author is interested in cue phrases consisting of single word or phrases having 
some semantics that indicate certain types of sentences. For example, by identifying the 
phrase “did not notice” in a sentence, it may be feasible to assign the “recognition 
error” category as a type of “human error”.  
Whereas these phrases clearly act as linguistic markers, because of syntactic and 
semantic variations, without checking, relying on cue phrases only can lead to low 
coverage and ambiguity. For example, it is difficult to identify a sentence containing 
“did not notice” as NOT being relevant to design error simply by looking up the cue. 
That is, it is necessary to define the context under which a cue phrases is not applicable. 
To address these limitations, we refer to the ontology definitions, especially by using 
the ontology triples, which allow incorrect detections to be filtered out by constraining 
which entities should be associated with specific relations. 
That is, three elements found as necessary to direct correct identifications are: (1) the 
existence of cue phrases, (2) the relations defined in the ontology, and (3) relations 
between human and design induced errors described in texts. 
This thesis proposes “evidential sentences of DIE” that contain cue phrases of DIE 
related concepts (see italicized phrases in Table 8.10). Our hypothesis is that an 
ontology based cue phrase method can help to identify relevant knowledge. We argue if 
we can extract related sentences it will help to understand related knowledge. 
Evidential sentences are classified according to the concepts defined in the ontology. 
Two evidential sentence term category schemes are used in order to find design issues 
related to human error: Human error and Error inducing design. This classification may 
be expanded into subclasses as follows. 
Human error category has following subclasses: 
- Distracted cognition (DC) 
- Reliance on system (RS) 
- Performance error (PE) 
- Recognition error (RE) 
Human error inducing design category has: 
- Human-system interaction design issue (HIDI) 
- Work environment design issue (WDI) 
- Modification of current design (MD) 
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8.2.2.3  Dataset and methodology 
Dataset: The ATSB reports were selected for this research as described in detail in 
chapter 7. Methodology: For the ontology development the PCPACK tool kit was used. 
PCPACK provides protocol tools for annotating the reports with the concepts and 
relations according to the DIE ontology, a diagram and ladder tool for ontology 
modeling, and a publishing tool for viewing the annotated reports [Shadnolt and Milton, 
1999].  
8.2.2.4  Results 
Semantic meaning is connected with rhetorical aspects of documents. The corpus of 52 
accident reports that were selected from the ATSB system was a difficult test bed 
because they were identified by hand. 
334 evidential sentences were extracted from the corpus manually. Table 8.10 shows 
some examples of extracted evidential sentences. It is small set but useful to develop a 
method to identify human error and its relation to design issues. 
The annotation work was conducted with the PCPACK Protocol tool kit that makes it 
possible to mark up text by highlighting the text. Figure 7.13 show an internally 
published web page developed using the Ontology. Users can browse related concepts 
by clicking annotated concepts. This browser provides relations between potential 
design errors and human errors. 
8.2.2.5  Discussion  
This study discussed the issue of supporting engineering designers in accessing 
aviation accident reports especially for accidents caused by operators when interacting 
with the equipment in aircraft systems. Incomplete designs or differing perspectives 
between designers and the users with respect to the way in which the aircraft are used 
can contribute to the accidents. A main focus was to identify and extract the concepts 
related to human and design errors from the texts, and map the concepts to 
psychological theories. 
Manually collected evidential sentence and cue phrases were used to discover 
extraction patterns and the patterns were further constrained by referring to the 
ontology definitions. 
However, this is not an automated annotation work, as mentioned in previous sections 
manual annotations are an error prone and time consuming task, automatic annotation 
will be more effective and useful tool for capturing knowledge from documents. 
Therefore future works will be focused on developing automated annotation methods. 
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In order to develop such methods we have to overcome diversity of expression in 
concepts and to develop machine understandable grammars. 
 
Table 8.10 Examples of evidential sentences 
Distracted Cognition (DC): 
-This aspect in conjunction with his operation of the controller pilot datalink probably 
caused the sector controller to be distracted to the extent that he was unable to maintain 
an adequate scan of the flight progress strips. (ATSB, 199802755) 
Reliance on system (RS): 
-The use of Operational Data Information for coordination between units was accepted 
as a standard operating procedure. On some occasions the overuse and over reliance on 
Operational Data Information coordination may lead to lack of situational awareness. 
(ATSB, 199900192) 
Performance error (PE): 
-The possibility of this occurring had been recognised by management and the 
instructions were issued in an endeavour to prevent inadvertent deletion of a flight data 
record. (ATSB, 199805341) 
Recognition error (RE): 
-Both pilots reported that they incorrectly identified the morse-code ICN signal on 
frequency 109.5 MHz as ICS, the morse-code identifier for the runway 15 ILS on 
frequency 109.9 MHz.( ATSB, 199902874) 
Human-system interaction design issue (HIDI): 
-The air traffic control strip printing system did not provide for a specific manoeuvring 
segment. (ATSB, 199702620) 
Work environment design issue (WDI): 
- The pilot reported that he had then become occupied with re-programming the 
aircraft's Global Positioning System (GPS). (ATSB, 200105188) 
Modification of current design (MD): 
-As a result of the investigation, the company operating the A320 has amended its 
flight-planning process by making a modification to the flight-planning system. (ATSB, 
199702620) 
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8.3 Investigation on reasoning support issue 
8.3.1  a meta-theory application issue 
As conducted in Chapter 5 V
2
 analysis presented a way how to capture design issues in 
human error cases. From the meta-theoretical point of view, a meta-theory of design-
induced error can be used for recognising design issues in human–system interaction 
failure cases. This approach is expected to have an ability to support designers by 
providing an effective tool to show design issues related to human error in terms of 
design-induced error. In order to apply the meta-theory of design-induced error into 
analysis of human–system interaction failure, an analysis method below is proposed in 
this section. 
Method: Analyse according to following procedure and record on an analysis sheet 
(Figure 8.6). V
2
 analysis also combines with the process in order to find vulnerability 
of design and error modes.  Figure 8.5 shows the process. 
(1) Find human error cases in the accident reports 
(2) Define human–system interaction failures 
(3) Examine design purpose of a failed system (perspective of designers) 
(4) Examine reason of human errors (perspective of operators) 
(5) Extract design-induced error by comparing different perspectives of designers 
(step 3) and operators (step 4) 
(6) Test related theories that match with meanings that arise in the previous steps  
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Figure 8.5 A reasoning process of the design-induced error model 
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Figure 8.6 An analysis sheet of human–system interaction failures in terms of design-
induced error 
Application of the developed meta-theory of design-induced error was conducted with 
data from the Australian aviation accident/incident report system. Two kinds of study of 
application of meta-theory were conducted: (1) clear cases of a design-induced error 
(according to evidence levels defined in the previous section), and (2) purely human 
error cases. Case studies conducted using the developed method are appended to this 
thesis.  
8.3.1.1  Study 1: cases with good evidence of design-induced 
error 
The cases taken from accident reports with good evidence of design-induced error i.e. 
scale of evidence 5 were examined. These cases were analysed according to the design-
induced error analysis method (Figure 8.5) using the accident analysis sheet (Figure 
8.6).  
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The following five cases are examples of high-evidence cases analysed in terms of 
design-induced error. From this methodology it is expected that we can gain a more 
clear understanding of different perspectives between designers and operators.  
 
Case number 1 
Date of 
occurrence  
21/06/99 Source ATSB Occurrence 
number 
199902928 
Accident description 
Accident system: Beech 200 Super King Air aircraft/ depressurising alert system/ vent 
blower switches selection procedure  
Progress: After take-off, as the aircraft climbed through 10,400 ft, the pilot began the 
„climb checklist‟ actions. While performing these checks he received a tracking change 
instruction from Air Traffic Control (ATC). The passenger in the co-pilot seat noticed 
that this appeared to temporarily distract the pilot from the checklist as he attempted to 
reprogram the global positioning system (GPS). The pilot then completed the checklist. 
During this, the passenger in the co-pilot‟s seat saw the pilot reposition the engine 
bleed air switches from the top to the centre positions.  
As the aircraft reached the cruise level of FL250, the controller contacted the pilot, 
indicating that the aircraft was not maintaining the assigned track. The pilot 
acknowledged this transmission. A short time later the passenger in the co-pilot seat 
noticed that the pilot was again attempting to program the GPS, and was repeatedly 
performing the same task. The controller advised the pilot again that the aircraft was 
still off track, however the pilot did not reply to this transmission. Shortly after this, the 
pilot lost consciousness.  
The passenger in the co-pilot seat took control of the aircraft and commenced an 
emergency descent.  
Human–system interaction failure 
 The pilot did not notice the illumination of the depressurising alert. 
 The pilot inadvertently selected bleed air switches instead of the nearby vent 
blower switches. 
 The pilot did not finish after-takeoff checklist tasks (e.g. GPS setting) before 
entering a critical flight level. 
Perspective of the designer 
 Pilots have an ability to do tasks as scheduled in the design. 
 Pilots will check the position of switches correctly.  
 The more the automatic system, the more operators wll be helped.  
 Operators would be alerted by illumination of the warning system. 
Perspective of the operator 
 If there is a something to do urgently during a procedure, the attention of an 
operator should be focused on the task.  
 The array of switches would be arrayed according to the user‟s intention. 
 While conducting an important task, it is difficult to recognise other issues. The 
system should help. 
 The system should alert operators in an effective way.  
Design-induced error 
 As design of the procedure increased after-take-off checklists (e.g. GPS setting), 
the complexity and time constraints make it possible for a flight to climb 
automatically into a critical flight level. 
 The increased complexity distracted operators from checking other tasks, resulting 
in skill-based level of performances. 
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 The close position of bleed-air switches and blower switches may lead the pilot to 
inadvertently moving the bleed-air switches to off. 
 Illumination of a warning system may not effectively alert people in the cabin to 
recognise depressurising problem before the pilot in command loses consciousness 
because there are a number of items of information to be checked in a cockpit 
display. 
Related theories 
Gulf of evaluation, design affordance 
 
Case number 2 
Date of 
occurrence  
03/05/99 Source ATSB Occurrence 
number 
199902003 
Accident description 
Accident system: ATC air traffic computer, VH-CZC (had taxied for departure), VH-
TJW (had taxied after CZC, also for a departure from runway 15) 
Progress: Both crews had been cleared via the runway 15 SWIFT 2 standard instrument 
departure. After issuing the departure clearances, the controller commenced the process 
of making the change in the air traffic computer; an action that required nine clicks of 
the mouse. In order to make this change, the controller looked away from the air 
situation display (which was on the main screen) and used the auxiliary screen to 
observe the flight plan window while using the keyboard to input the data.  
While the controller was performing the information change task, the crews of the 
departing aircraft contacted him as required. The controller acknowledged the radio 
broadcasts then returned to the data input task. He did not continue to check the 
positional information on the air situation display.  
A few moments later, he glanced at the display and realised that TJW had turned earlier 
than CZC and was also out-climbing that aircraft. The vertical separation standard of 
1,000 ft had not been achieved at the time. The controller immediately cancelled the 
standard instrument departure for TJW. Both crews subsequently reported that they 
received a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) advice.  
Human–system interaction failure 
Controllers considered that the aircraft were "like types" for the purposes of departure 
standards and neither the aerodrome controller nor the approach/departures controller 
considered increasing the separation requirements specified in Local Instructions. 
However, the performance of the B737-400 series aircraft was superior to that of the 
B737-300 series aircraft. The use of minimum departure separation standards was 
inappropriate. 
The approach/departures controller elected to input data to the air traffic computer 
during the departure sequence. 
Perspective of the designer 
 The controller will verify the minimum departure standard design before 
confirming the procedure. 
 The controller will recognise different performance abilities between B737-300 
series and B737-400 series. 
 The controller will check progress by keeping monitoring the relevant instruments. 
 The data entering work is not the main task but one of the sub-tasks and the sub-
tasks do not affect the execution of the main task.  
 The controller will easily update traffic information after finishing a main task. 
Perspective of the operator 
 Similar types of aircraft have similar performance ability. 
 Progress of the departure procedure will be developed as designed so that it will be 
possible to conduct the data entering work during the development. 
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 While conducting the data-entering job, the controller cannot concentrate on 
monitoring traffic situation. 
Design-induced error 
 In busy traffic conditions, it is a time consuming task to verify pre-designed 
departure standards.  
 There was no specific design to recognise different performance of similar types of 
aircraft.  
 There is no reserved schedule or designed procedure for the data-entering task 
only. The data-entering task is one of mandatory tasks, however, it is labour 
intensive and diverted the controller‟s attention from the air situation display.  
Related theories 
Irony of automation – Monitoring failure 
 
Case number 3 
Date of 
occurrence  
05/12/01 Source ATSB Occurrence 
number 
200105715 
Accident description 
Accident system: a Saab 340B 
Progress: While on climb through FL180, the copilot‟s two electronic flight 
information system (EFIS) screens on the right side of the aircraft‟s instrument panel 
failed. After the crew had consulted the EFIS failure/disturbances checklist, the central 
warning panel ice protection annunciator and then the cabin pressure annunciator 
illuminated. An emergency descent was initiated and the crew broadcast a PAN call to 
Air Traffic Services (ATS) and reported that they were returning to Trepell. 
During the descent a number of other cockpit warnings and cautions activated and 
some aircraft systems failed. The crew became aware that the right DC electrical 
generation system was operating abnormally. Their attempts to rectify that situation 
were unsuccessful. The crew diverted the aircraft to Cloncurry and landed. 
Human–system interaction failure 
The crew overlooked the first item of the EFIS failure/disturbances checklist, which 
required a check of the generator voltage. 
Perspective of the designer 
 The pilot will check the emergency checklist according to the order designed.  
Perspective of the operator 
 There will be a warning sign if a generator failed.  
 During emergency checks the pilot focuses on specific reasons of the screen failure 
at first in the EFIS checklist, not general issues such as a generator failure.  
 Generator failure is a too general a problem to recognise. As a result, if the 
generator failed, it is reasonable the other parts of system also failed. 
Design-induced error 
 There was no generator failure warning sign. In case of a failure of the EFIS 
screens, the emergency checklist was designed in order from generic checks to 
specific checks. In some Saab 340 aircraft a starter generator could fail without 
taking the generator off line and alerting the crew, resulting in low system voltage.  
 On this occasion it is easy for the crew to overlook the first item of the EFIS 
failure/disturbances checklist, which required a check of the generator voltage. 
Consequently, the crew did not recognise the developing low voltage condition that 
led to the cascading series of warnings, cautions and failures.  
Related theories 
Gulf of evaluation, Design Affordance 
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Case number 4 
Date of 
occurrence  
20/08/97 Source ATSB Occurrence 
number 
199702691 
Accident description 
Accident system: Bangkok Area Control Centre (BKK ACC) Sector 3 
Progress: QFI6, a Boeing 747, had departed Bangkok for Melbourne and was tracking 
southbound on airway G463 at flight level (FL) 290. The aircraft was in contact with 
Bangkok Area Control Centre (BKK ACC) Sector 3. Sector 3 was a combined radar 
and procedural control sector. At 0212:54 QF16 reported passing ALGOR at FL290, 
estimating KABAS, the flight information region (FIR) boundary, at 0221. Just prior to 
reaching KABAS, the aircraft would pass the intersection of G463 and B219 at 
KATKI. These positions were all located beyond radar coverage, over international 
waters, within the procedural control portion of BKK ACC Sector 3 airspace.  
A Korean registered Boeing 747, KAL362, had departed Kuala Lumpur for Seoul, 
tracking via B219 at FL270. Approaching KANTO, located to the west of KATKI, the 
aircraft was transferred to the BKK ACC. The crew of KAL362 contacted Bangkok 
Sector 3 and reported passing KANTO at FL270, estimating KATKI at 0219, and 
requesting climb to FL290. The next reporting position was SINMA, to the east of 
KATKI. At 0217:20 Bangkok Sector 3 cleared KAL362 to climb to FL290. KAL362 
reported leaving FL270 for FL290. At 0220:21 the pilot in command of QF16 advised 
the Sector 3 controller of having received a traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
(TCAS) traffic advisory (TA), and that the aircraft had  climbed to FL300 to avoid a 
collision with KAL362, but was now descending to FL290.  
Human–system interaction failure 
KAL362 was incorrectly given a clearance to climb to FL290 by the Bangkok Sector 3 
controller, and that the crews of both QF16 and KAL362 were acting in accordance 
with the clearances issued to them. The procedural controller was responsible for 
issuing clearances to aircraft under procedural control, as was the case in this event. 
The role of the radar controller was to pass on the clearance to the aircraft. By not 
consulting with the procedural controller, the radar controller bypassed the established 
system of control, leading to a breakdown in safety. The KANTO flight progress strip 
for KAL362 should have been retained on the procedural board until the crew reported 
at SINMA, the next position. The removal of the KANTO strip by the radar controller 
removed the only reminder available to all controllers that the intended tracks of 
KAL362 and QFI6 would cross. Inclusion of the KATKI position on all flight progress 
strips for aircraft using the intersecting routes would have enabled controllers to more 
readily assess separation requirements in the procedural airspace. If the strips had 
required the KATKI position it is probable that the details for QFI6 and KAL362 
would have been displayed under the same designator on the board, allowing 
controllers to recognise the potential conflict. 
Perspective of the designer 
 A controller with normal ability can deal with the problem. 
 The controllers will cooperate each other in order to check flight progress. 
Perspective of the operator 
 It is difficult to evaluate the progress of all flights without a memory assistance 
device such as a progress strip bay. 
 Monitoring frequency that requires continuous concentration of operators can 
easily fail. 
 In order to save space and as a short cut of procedure, a practice of removing strips 
that may be obsolete information is practical and does not harm the system. 
Design-induced error 
The design of the Sector 3 console did not allow for all relevant flight progress strips to 
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be displayed. The configuration of the Sector 3 console provided insufficient space to 
adequately display all relevant flight progress strips. As a result, controllers had 
developed the habit of removing strips at the earliest opportunity, thereby creating the 
potential for vital information to be missed.  
The inability to monitor the control frequency while conducting coordination reduced 
the likelihood of the procedural controller maintaining a complete appreciation of the 
disposition of traffic.  
Design of the console may not provide supportive space for controllers' memory.  
Design of console and procedure may not provide an effective protective measure 
against information loss. 
Design of console may not consider monitoring difficulty of operators. 
Related theories 
Gulf of evaluation, Irony of automation- monitoring failure 
 
 
Case number 5 
Date of 
occurrence  
04/11/01 Source ATSB Occurrence 
number 
200105351 
Accident description 
The crew of a Boeing 767 (B767) had been cleared to taxi for departure from runway 
01, intersection A7, at Brisbane. They proceeded along taxiway B then, incorrectly, 
initiated a turn onto taxiways B5 and A, which was in conflict with rapid exit taxiway 
A5S. A BAe146 vacating runway 01 via A5S, was instructed by ATC to hold short of 
taxiway A in order to avoid the B767. The crew of the BAe146, although not expecting 
to have to hold short of that taxiway intersection, had reduced speed to an extent that 
they were able to comply with the instruction. 
Human–system interaction failure 
The operator of the B767 advised that they had tried a new system of printing 
aerodrome charts from a computer application compact disk. However, the print format 
was such that the pilot in command of the B767 was not able to correctly read the notes 
provided on the chart with respect to taxiway routes and directions. 
Perspective of the designer 
 The new system of computer application will increase efficiency of control and 
automation. 
Perspective of the operator 
 The computer applicable system should provide information in relevant forms.  
Design-induced error 
 The new system that could not be printed in large format made it difficult for the 
pilot to distinguish characters between points in the chart.  
Related theories 
Gulf of evaluation 
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8.3.1.2  Study 2: cases of purely human error  
The primary accident analysis on the research dataset showed that 47% of all accidents 
in analysed documents were caused by “operator error” that was assumed to contain a 
concept of human–system interaction failures (Table 8.11). 
Table 8.11  Different causations of accidents (ATSB, 1997 – February 2005) 
 Type  Number of cases* Percentage 
 Mechanical failure 204 33% 
 Operator failure 287 47% 
 External factor 56 11% 
 Unknown 71 9% 
 Total 618 100% 
* Double counting is allowed  
With the documents that contain human error, the kinds of phenomena and how many 
times a concept of design-induced error appeared in the each case were examined. This 
answered the question: What kinds of theory can be applied into a human–system 
interaction failure if you assumed that the failure contains phenomena of a concept of 
design-induced error? This question and the resulting answers are useful to identify 
design issues in accident documents. 
Theory explains the concept of design-induced error but it is not easy to describe all of 
such phenomena because they are psychological phenomena that need intensive 
investigation from a psychological point of view. It may be suggested therefore a 
proposition in this research that if a document describes a symptom of human error, 
then it may have been assumed that the case has a concept of design-induced error to 
some degree. Table 5.4 lists the categories of theory used (previously identified in 
chapter 4), and the numbers of report documents showing evidence of these theories.  
 
Discussion: A meta-theory may help to recognise design issues in human–system 
interaction failure cases by applying the theory into the cases when we cannot exactly 
identify the issue due to lack of information in accident reports. Limitation of the meta-
theory could be overcome by developing an investigation technique on human–system 
interaction failures. 
Chapter 8: Investigation of developed ontology in light of knowledge sharing 
 281 
 
8.3.2  Reasoning supporting with the developed ontology 
It is necessary for a designer to understand in a design process how his/her design will 
be working with the operator because there are many unanticipated consequences of 
systems. In order to understand why an artefact has failed, the designer has to look 
through data or documents that have recorded previous experiences. This reasoning 
process is a kind of design rationale process because the reasoning is to find a reason 
behind decisions. Many reasoning support methodologies such as IBIS (Issue Based 
Information System)[ Conklin, 1996] and PHI (Procedural Hierarchy of Issues) 
[McCall, 1991] have been developed [Lee, 1997].  
One of the issues in the design reasoning support system is to enrich issues or questions 
for reasoning on searching for alternatives. Operators (i.e. users) in many cases live in 
another world from designers, which makes it difficult for designers to discourse with 
them. Capturing knowledge from users of a system is limited, not to mention failures. 
As a result, much knowledge comes from previous reports of failures. The concept of 
design-induced error can be treated as one of the design issues. The ontology developed 
may help designers to understand unreasonable consequences of design in a system. 
This thesis suggests two reasoning processes that can be used with the developed 
ontology. 
8.3.2.1  consequences – cause – reasoning process 
First, a “consequences – cause – reasoning process” can be applied for a design-
induced error reasoning process. This process starts with searching for a consequence 
with concepts (i.e. “occurrence number”, “occurrence data”, or “accident”) when a 
reader wants to see an unreasonable human–system interaction failure resulting from 
design.  
The reader then moves to a cause phase. In this stage the reader checks what kind of 
error the operator made, and what was the uncompleted task in the error. In the 
reasoning phase, there are two steps. First, he/she can find what kind of design failed in 
human–system interaction by searching for “system” and “error-inducing design” 
concepts.  
Finally, the reader can understand why the design failed and the operator‟s perspective 
in the occurrence by matching the design-induced error theory with human error.   
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An example of this approach is shown in the following case. 
 
Consequences – Cause - Reasoning  case: 
[Consequence] 
Occurrence number: “199403314” 
Occurrence date: “09 November 1994” 
Incident: “failure of the left engine due to fuel starvation” 
[Cause] 
Human error: “mismanagement of the fuel system” 
Problem area: “the time taken for the outboard fuel tanks to empty, the orientation of 
the cockpit fuel selector switches” 
[Reasoning1: design issues with human error] 
System: “fuel system” 
Error-inducing design: “there were two significant differences between the fuel 
system in aircraft SPP and that of other Aero Commnader models the pilot had flown” 
[Reasoning2: theory and recommendation for designers] 
Theory: design affordance theory explains how such failure can happen when a design 
of a system is different from the design of a similar system that was familiar to 
operators. 
Recommendation: When designing a modification of a system from previous systems, 
it should be considered what the differences are from previous or other system in 
format (e.g. position, operation, or procedure) of the system and then test whether such 
changes have a possibility to confuse operators in a critical condition. 
This case is shown in a diagrammatic form, based on developed in Chapter 7, in Figure 
8.7. 
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Figure 8.7 An example of ontology of accident cases 
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8.3.2.2  issue – idea – argument process 
Secondly, the “issue – idea – argument process” can be used for a design-induced error 
reasoning process. In this process issue refers to human error, idea refers to error-
inducing design, and argument refers to design-induced error theory (Figure 8.8).  
It begins with a question that raises a human–system interaction failure by questioning 
“why the operator mismanaged the artefact at the time of the accident?” in the above 
case. An idea then prompts, “the feature of the artefact was different from other models 
of similar type of the system” by looking at a concept of error-inducing design.  
The design-induced error theory including the ontology can help to raise an argument 
of design issues with human error: “a different feature in a same type of artefact can 
make human operators easily confused with the feature because they have in mind that 
similar systems have similar features in operation.” 
  
issue
idea
the feature of the artefact was 
different from other models of 
similar type of the system.
why the operator 
mismanaged the artefact at 
the time of incident?
argument
a different feature in a similar 
type of artefact make it easy for 
human operators to be 
confused with the feataure 
because they have in mind 
that similar type systems have 
similar feature in operation.
human error
error 
inducing 
design
theory
 
Figure 8.8 The issue–idea–argument method for reasoning on the concept of design-
induced error 
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8.4 Investigation on knowledge representation 
One of important roles of ontology is to analyse domain knowledge [Noy and 
McGuinnes, 2003]. The hierarchy of ontology represents entities and relations in a 
concept that might be mapped ontologically when attempting to provide a full set of 
conceptual areas, in which we can identify the areas of interest for supporting discourse 
during design-induced error capture. In order to represent the concept well, it is 
necessary to define clearly the related concepts and their relationships. The ontology 
developed has three main parts in the relation map: design, human error, and theory 
(Figure 8.9). 
 
produce
part of
has component
provide
has reasoning
has error
is caused by
has perspective
has perspective
is failed by
interact
is unsolved by
is explained by has explanation of
support
has effect on
has error inducing  
desig n
desig n-induced 
error theory
desig ner
operator
desig n
error inducing 
desig n
artefact
human-system 
interaction method
problem area 
(issue)
human error accident
intention
expectation
 
Figure 8.9 The ontology of design-induced error with the concepts and relations 
The developed web browser in PCPACK shows the relation between related concepts 
(Figure 8.10). From this browser users can work through design and human error by 
clicking a related term in a page. This makes it easy to search for a relation between 
design and human error. 
For example, if a designer selects an artefact or system (left side in the PCPACK 
browser) he or she can see related cases of human errors or phenomena (right side in 
the PCPACK browser). 
Discussion: If the cases of design-induced error can be accumulated it will be more 
useful to present relationships between design and human error. 
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Figure 8.10 The published ontology browser by the PC PACK publishing tool 
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8.5 Investigation on a knowledge acquisition issue 
Manual description analysis of the accident reports revealed that a domain analysis for 
searching for a specific issue (for example, in this research, finding design issues in 
accident reports) is a time consuming task. The analysis of accident reports in terms of 
design-induced error took several months. 
The developed ontology in PCPACK can aid people to acquire knowledge in which 
they are interested with an annotation (mark-up) tool. The Protocol tool saves files in a 
form of XML formation with marked text. 
The ontology provides items of concepts, attributes, relations related to the ontology. 
Readers can mark up domain documents according to the predefined concept categories. 
While reading a document a reader can annotate words or sentences by using highlight 
(mark-up) pens in the Protocol tool if he/she finds that the description is matched with 
defined concepts. The annotated reports are saved in a form of XML file (see Figure 
8.11).  
After that the PCPACK Diagram tool helps to connect between annotated texts by 
using defined relations in the ontology. The reader can link concepts by clicking nodes. 
If this work has been done, the ontology browser automatically captures and represents 
the relationships between marked concepts in web pages. The reader can also review 
relations between concepts in tree or diagram forms. 
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>  
- <Protocol Origin="file://RPC-ENPIJS/C/Documents and Settings/shin/My 
Documents/accident analysis/accident reports txt file/200001827.txt"> 
- <Markups> 
- <Markup ID="648" Position="19" ContextOffset="19"> 
  <Parent ID="33" NAME="Occurrence_Number" />  
  <Text>200001827</Text>  
  <Context>Occurrence Number: 200003056</Context>  
  </Markup> 
….. 
- <Markup ID="706" Position="9121" ContextOffset="0"> 
  <Parent ID="132" NAME="Not_Providing_Information_or_Functions" />  
  <Text>The manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Handbook did not specify checks for 
crossfeed operation or positioning the fuel selectors to the off position to observe a 
decrease in fuel flow</Text>  
  <Context>http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2000/AAIR/aair200
003056.aspx</Context>   
  </Markup> 
……….. 
 
  </Markups> 
  <PostIts />  
  </Protocol> 
Figure 8.11 An example of annotated XML files 
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8.6 Summary 
Table 8.12 presents the summary of investigation on knowledge sharing issues 
examined in this chapter.  
The investigation of the developed ontology revealed what is possible and what is not, 
of the research aims and objectives. 
(1) It may not possible to distinguish design-induced error from other types of 
human error because the error forms are the same. 
(2) It is necessary to design evidence levels for a specific domain in order to find a 
design-induced error in accident reports because the evidence of a concept of 
design-induced error depends on description of documents. 
(3) It may not possible to extract a case of design-induced error automatically 
because of the diversity of expression of design issues related to human error and 
the evidence issue in (1) above. 
(4) An annotation scheme (mark-up) in accident reports will improve to formulate 
a concept of design-induced error. 
(5) The meta-theory of design-induced error is useful to recognise different 
perspectives between designers and operators in a case of human–system 
interaction failure. 
(6) The ontology developed may be helpful for designers to recoginse relationships 
between design and human error. 
(7) The ontology browser can help people to reason about design issues in human–
system interaction failures. 
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Table 8.12 The summary of investigation on knowledge sharing issues 
INVESTIGATION 
ISSUES 
METHODS APPLIED OUTCOMES REFERE
NCE 
Evidence issue 
– How to provide 
evidence of 
design-induced 
error in accident 
reports? 
– Manual description 
analysis on ATSB 
reports 
– 5 scales for 287 cases Chapter 5 
Knowledge retrieval 
issues 
– What are the 
keywords of 
design-induced 
error? 
Is there any 
possibility to extract 
related concepts in 
effective or 
automatically?  
– Manual description 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
– Keyword search 
method for the human 
error and design issue 
(Google search 
engine), 
– Annotation scheme 
with Ontology  
– Identify keywords and 
clarify 4 description 
category of them 
(defective cognition, 
performance problem, 
knowledge problem, 
distracted cognition, 
reliance on systems) 
– One case study Two 
terms examined in 
ATSB 
– 52 annotations in 
developed ontology 
Chapter 7 
Knowledge 
reasoning issues 
– How does the 
developed 
ontology help 
people to think 
about design 
issues in human 
error? 
 
– Evaluation of 
captured cases with 
the theoretical model 
(V
2
 analysis ) and 
knowledge based 
information tools 
( PCPACK, Protégé, 
Google) 
– Consequences-cause-
reasoning process, 
issue-idea-argument 
process 
– Tested with examples 
(with Chapter 5 case 
study) 
– Web browser in 
PCPACK 
one example presented 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 7 
Knowledge 
representation issues 
Is it effective way of 
knowledge 
representation (KR) 
of the concept of 
design-induced 
error? 
– PCPACk template 
– PCPACK browser 
– Protégé hierarch 
– Knowledge model 
diagram in PCPACK 
– Users can find the 
relations in the 
PCPACK web browser 
or Protégé 
Chapter 7 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
The research described in this thesis considered design as one of the important factors 
influencing human error. This thesis was tried to answer the questions: how design 
affects human operators; how such adverse influences can be analysed; and the benefits 
of analytical tools developed in this thesis.  
This thesis has presented a proposed model of human error influenced by design in the 
meta-theory of design-induced error. An ontology that categorises human error and 
related design issues has been developed using a knowledge-based software 
methodology. The developed model (a meta-theory of design-induced error) and the 
ontology (a knowledge model) particularly were tested using report documents of real 
accident cases.  
The literature review indicated that previous research in this field has attempted to 
explain phenomena that arose during operations in the field, such as cases of 
automation surprise [Sarter et al., 1997] in the domain of aviation. The cases studied 
show that even if there were no apparent engineering failures in the accidents, rather 
they seemed to be just caused by a human operator, it is possible , however, to pick out 
hidden issues as fundamental causations of human errors. The theories that have 
explained phenomena related to human–system interaction failures are, at least partially, 
affected by the design of the system. It is also discovered that designers‟ understanding 
of operators‟ performance is principally limited to their own expectation and 
experiences.  
Many of these theories, however, stand alone, with little attention being given to their 
relationships with each other. No one has tried to integrate these theories with regards 
to local rationalities between designers and operators that could affect human–system 
interaction failures. Each theory would indicate design issues in human–system 
interaction failures in a particular condition but not all conditions. It does not explain 
whole design issues in human–system interaction failures. Therefore, the designer 
would find it difficult to capture all the relevant knowledge contained in theories.  
Three research issues have been raised to help people who want to develop safer 
systems: 
• What is the nature of the hidden influences of a design in modern 
complicated and automated systems? 
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• In what ways could a designer be assisted to recognise design issues in 
human error? 
• While several theories explain the issues respectively, is there any effective 
way to deliver a collective view of related theories to people who need to 
recognise the issues?  
This research attempted to introduce a meta-theory in order to provide a collective view 
on the theories with a concept of design-induced error. The concept of design-induced 
error, in this thesis, refers to inappropriate roles of design in human–system interaction. 
A “meta-theory” makes it possible to provide a collective view of the theories by 
adopting meta-theoretical paradigms and assumptions taken from investigation of 
underlying structures of theories. The paradigm in this meta-theory of design-induced 
error is a contextual paradigm of different perspectives between designers and 
operators that are considered as playing a key role in the phenomena. We can interpret 
each theory in terms of local rationalities. In order to combine related theories, an 
ontological assumption was used with three layers of human–system interaction 
perspectives; affordance level, psychological logic level, and trust level. The three 
perspective layers could explain all levels of phenomena that express design issues in 
human–system interaction failures.  
In order to make up a meta-theory of design-induced error, seven theories that present 
design issues in human–system interaction failures were identified and applied to 
design-induced error in this thesis: gulf of execution/evaluation; design affordance; 
irony of automation; trust in automation; glass cockpit problem and automation 
surprise; risk homeostasis; and plan delegation. In the model the phenomena of design-
induced error are interpreted by local rationalities between designers and operators.  
For a practical point of view of this thesis, knowledge management technologies were 
used. A web-based knowledge management system and technologies are a promising 
area to share knowledge between experts (e.g. psychologists in human error) and users 
(e.g. designers). In order to deliver the issue above effectively, this research had 
extended into developing an ontology of design-induced error based on the meta-theory, 
in which the ontology helps people to recognise design issues in human error cases. 
This process included the work of classifying entities and identifying relationships 
between the entities in a concept of design-induced error. 
Accident reports provide an important resource for the designer to understand human 
activity, the mechanisms underlying error, and the development of effective 
countermeasures to prevent the recurrence of these errors [Petroski, 1994; Bruseberg et 
al., 2003]. Nowadays, many of these reports appear on World-wide Web in HTML (or 
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XML) Form. The trend will grow so rapidly in future that the development of 
knowledge capturing and reasoning methodology in the system will be a more 
important issue than before for designers as well as accident analysts.  
As a prototype experiment of knowledge acquisition and knowledge modelling for 
design-induced-error reasoning, Australian aviation accident and incident reports were 
tested and evaluated. The NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board, USA) and 
ASN (Aviation Safety Network) accident database systems also were used for 
information retrieval experiments in design-induced error reasoning. The developed 
web-based ontology browser of design-induced error with relevant accident cases is 
presented as a CD with this volume. Additionally, the limitations of this model and the 
research methods employed are also discussed. 
9.1 Concluding arguments 
It is said that designers have a different view of a system from operators [Norman, 
1998; Woods, 2000 etc.]. Many human-error researchers have shown how some kinds 
of design have failed to prevent human error and indeed have exaggerated and 
contributed to such errors.  
Human-error experts have argued that design, especially in modern complex and 
automated systems, inherently affects an operator‟s cognition and performance, 
resulting in human error (termed “design-induced error” in this thesis). They have 
described phenomena of design leading to human error in various theories. 
Designers, however, have difficulty understanding the knowledge that human error 
experts have suggested because: (1) Theories that explain design issues in human error 
are not unified and they are scattered in different theories; and (2) Meanings in theories 
need to be interpreted by psychological theories with phenomena and symptoms, not 
the engineering logics that are familiar to engineers.  
It has been argued in this thesis that in order to encourage designers to have correct 
reasoning on human–system interaction, it is important to share the knowledge that 
human-error experts have. And one of issues of improving knowledge sharing on 
human error is to provide designers with “an effective reasoning support tool” that can 
help them to search for and infer issues related to design and human error. 
In order to achieve the goal of enabling designers to have the same view on human 
error as human error experts, this research aimed: 
(1) To provide “an interpretational tool” (i.e. a theoretical methodology) that can help 
people to search for design issues in cases of human–system interaction failures by 
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developing an integrated model synthesising related theories; 
(2) To develop “a knowledge-based reasoning support tool” that can be used for 
understanding relationships between design and human error in accident cases by 
visualising the relationships. 
Accident reports are used as a repository basis in this research for developing and 
applying a knowledge-based ontology model of design-induced error because they have 
lot of information including the concept of design-induced error. They are good sources 
for gathering lesson-learned knowledge. From these failures, we have an opportunity to 
know how operators think about systems. However, it is still difficult to search for and 
understand the concepts in the documents without effective methodologies. 
 
1. Development of an interpretational tool (meta-
theory of design-induced error) 
When you look at an accident report that contains human error, without any knowledge 
of human error, it is difficult to find design issues without a relevant interpretational 
tool. Rather you may assume or get the impression that the error in the accident case 
originated from wrong human thinking or performance, not from design-related issues. 
However, equipped with a reasonable human-error interpretational tool, you can raise 
the question of design issues influencing human error from the same case. 
An integrated model synthesised related theories that explain design issues in human–
system interaction failures. 
The tool developed in this research will help people to have reasoning on design issues 
from human error. For example, if you found a case where the automatic reaction of an 
operator was involved in causing an accident, you can refer to a concept of “design 
affordance”, which explains that if two functional designs of a system are similar in 
form, it will induce a user to make an error in certain circumstances. You can 
understand what kinds of design issues can appear in a human–system failure by 
applying meta-theory in the tool into an accident case.  
 
2. Development of a knowledge-based reasoning tool 
(a knowledge representation model for design-
induced error) 
This research was based on two methodological practices: (1) web-based knowledge 
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acquisition and representation methodology, (2) use of ontology.  
Web-based knowledge acquisition and representation techniques are useful in current 
and future design environments. This research has provided a web-browser style visual 
knowledge representation tool that can help to search for and understand the concept of 
design-induced error. 
Ontology has been used for codification of domain knowledge. It will be useful if we 
can develop a formal description of design-induced error. However, the project did not 
intend to develop an extremely formal and detailed ontology of design-induced error, 
but a conceptual and prototype ontology (with a small and particular domain, i.e. 
Australian aviation accident reports). 
The developed tool aims to support designers to reason on design issues as follows: 
To provide possible relation categories in a web browser, in which people can search 
related concepts and instances systematically by clicking a concept in which they are 
interested because the browser shows related concepts, which are stored in the ontology, 
in a page; 
To provide diagrams of accident cases, in which people can capture a relationship 
between design and human error because the diagram shows concepts graphically, with 
lines connecting each concept. 
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9.2 Achievements 
The aims of this thesis presented here are to examine the influence of design on human 
error, and to find effective methods to share knowledge taken from human error 
theories that describe human–system interaction failures (i.e. human error) in terms of 
the role of design. For its aims the thesis proposed a meta-theory of design-induced 
error, an integrated and collective view on these theories, in order to present better 
understanding of how design induces human errors. This thesis then developed an 
ontology of design-induced error based on the meta-theory in order to make it possible 
to capture the issues from accident reports. They are main objectives of the research. 
The main aim of this research was; to develop a meta-theory of design-induced error 
suitable for use in human–system failure analysis that enables the designer to 
understand such phenomena in terms of the role of design. For the aim, five objectives 
presented in Chapter 1 have been fulfilled through the research. 
9.2.1 Objective 1 
To identify the issues involved in influence of design on human 
errors 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on human-error theories in order to identify related 
human error theories and issues involved in the influence of design on human errors. 
The chapter reviewed a general human-error model developed by Rasmussen and 
Reason that is recognised by most human-error theorists. Seven theories were identified 
as showing relationships between design and human error: gulf of execution/evaluation, 
design affordance, trust in automation, glass cockpit problem, automation surprise, risk 
homeostasis, plan delegation. Each theory was examined with accident cases. The 
theories theorised the manner in which the performance and cognition of humans are 
influenced by design while interacting with an artefact or systems. The influences are 
sometimes not apparent because they have slowly degraded the abilities of human 
operators. The characteristics of modern design adopting computerised and automated 
functions and systems were also examined. The review identified that temporal 
decision-making conditions are identified the main characteristics and issues of the 
influences of current design.  
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9.2.2 Objective 2 
To develop a collective model taken from related theories that 
describe relations between design and human error 
The underlying characteristics of related theories were investigated in chapter 4. The 
chapter also examined the design concept assumed in related theories. The local 
rationality theory was adopted as a paradigm to binding these theories. By the adopted 
paradigm, the theories can be shown in a collective model.  
The next step was to categorise design types and human–system interaction patterns 
into four design types and three interaction patterns. The four design types are; feature, 
function, logic, and reliability design, and they have relations with the three human–
system interaction levels;  affordance, psychological logic, and trust level of 
interactions. It is assumed in the model that a failure of human–system interaction 
occurs when each design does not match with related levels of interactions. 
9.2.3 Objective 3 
To analyse accident cases with the framework developed 
Chapter 5 examined the collective model by applying it to accident cases. The 
Australian aviation accident report system (AAARS) was chosen to provide data for the 
experiment.  
 
9.2.4 Objective 4 
To develop a knowledge model of capturing useful texts in the 
description of accident documents 
The fourth objective was addressed through a literature review of knowledge-
management methodology, and the application of a knowledge-management software 
to the development of a knowledge model of design-induced error (chapter 7). 
 
9.2.5 Objective 5 
To demonstrate how developed models can help to analyse 
Chapter 9:  Conclusions 
 297 
accident cases that include design issues in human errors 
The last objective was achieved through investigating accidents in chapters 5 and 8. 
The following are the achievements of the research: 
(1) A concept of design-induced error has been developed in order to understand 
human–system interaction failures effectively introduced in Chapter 1. 
(2) An interpretational method (model) of human–system interaction failures has 
been developed (i.e. a meta-theory of design-induced error) developed in Chapter 4. 
(3) Current theories relevant to design issues and human error have been integrated 
into the model developed in Chapter 4. 
(4) The concept of design-induced error has been formalised in terms of local 
rationalities between designers and operators in Chapter 4. 
(5) A theory-based ontology of design-induced error has been created in Chapter 7. 
 (6) Visualisation of the concept of design-induced error and its relationships with 
other concepts has been provided by developing an ontology-browser of design-
induced error developed in Chapter 7. 
(7) This has been tested in accident reports and used to interpret the accident cases 
in terms of the concept of design-induced error in Chapter 5. 
(8) The understanding of design issues in relation to human–system interaction 
failures has been improved by providing a knowledge acquisition and 
representation methodology to take the place of the manual description analysis of 
accident reports when searching for design issues in human–system failure report 
documents discussed in Chapter 8. 
(9) A mark-up method (annotation technique) for the knowledge acquisition of a 
concept of design-induced error in accident report systems has been provided 
developed in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 9:  Conclusions 
 298 
9.3 Recommendations and further works  
Human-error research has contributed to the development of safety design. Various 
models help people to understand related issues. Although these models have been 
developed, there has been no synthesised model to illuminate the role of design on 
human errors.  
The model of the meta-theory of design-induced error (in chapter 4) may provide 
valuable insights into ways to recognise adverse results of design in the early stage of 
design process.  
The findings from the evaluation of accident reports in terms of design-induced error in 
chapter 5 and the ontology developed in chapter 7 may be useful to capture design 
issues in accident documents. It would be hopeful that these findings fill gaps between 
designers and users in understanding of the consequences of a design innovation or 
modification. 
9.3.1 Recommendation for those interested in human–
system interaction failures 
For designers and systems developers who produce artefacts and systems: 
(1) It is necessary to understand operators‟ expectations as to designers‟ intentions 
in the design of an artefact or a system. 
(2) The designer should consider the possibility of unexpected use of artefacts or 
systems when developing or modifying them. 
(3) In order to understand how design affects the performance and cognition of 
operators, the functions, procedures and appearance of an artefact or a system 
should be checked and tested in design processes in terms of the concept of design-
induced error. 
For authorities who investigate accidents and produce accident reports: 
(1) It is necessary to develop techniques to rectify design issues in operator failures. 
This research identified that some accident reports do not have enough discussion 
about the role of design issues in human–system interaction failures. 
(2) It is necessary to develop systematic methods for investigation and description 
of design issues that affect operators‟ cognition and performance. 
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(3) More concern should be taken over design-induced error by comparing design 
intention and operator expectation with design expectation and operator intention. 
① They should develop mark-up tools for users to interpret the accident reports 
for their own purposes. 
For readers/researchers who interpret accident reports in order to identify design-
induced error:  
(1) To understand the role of design is important to analyse human–system 
interaction failures. 
(2) To use the interpretational tool (the meta-theory of design-induced error) to 
identify design issues in human errors. 
 
9.3.2 Limitation of the research 
For the research, there were areas of limitation of the research methodology, research 
area, and developed model or ontology. 
Limitation of research methodology; 
(1) This research is not a pure ontology study or psychological human-error study, 
but a hybrid between cognitive theories and engineering and information 
technology.  
(2) This research is limited to study of Design-induced error, not research on all 
forms of human error. 
(3) This research is not research on how to construct an entire knowledge-based 
system (KBS), rather to develop an ontology of Design-induced error that may be 
used in a KBS. 
(4) The research has tried to use current Web-based reporting systems, but it does 
not involve changing accident report systems or content of the reports. 
 
Limitation of the development of meta-theory of design-induced error: 
(1) The aim of the research is to try to find a way synthesising existing theories of 
how design induces human error, not to replace them. 
(2) There is not one, unique meta-theory. 
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(3) The function of the meta-theory is to help generate an ontology of the 
properties of design-induced error. 
(4) The purpose of the ontology of design-induced error is to help designers 
interpret reports of particular accidents and incidents. 
 
Limitation of the developed knowledge-based ontology of design-induced error: 
(1) It was not a detailed and complete constitution of ontology research but a 
prototype study for the subject of the research, i.e. in order to examine and 
demonstrate effective ways to capture and represent implicit psychological 
knowledge.  
(2) The area of developed ontology presented in this thesis was specified and 
limited to the Australian aviation accident incident reporting system. As a result, it 
is necessary to extend and modify the ontology to apply the ontology in another 
domain. 
 
9.3.3 Further work 
It has been my experience that the proposed idea was useful for interpreting human–
system interaction failures, and the ontology that had been developed in order to extract 
and represent relevant knowledge and their relationships would be advantageous to 
understand the psychological concepts. Work could be undertaken in order to develop 
more useful models to interpret human–system interaction failures from the model 
suggested in this thesis. The ontology developed in this thesis for a prototype can be 
developed further in practical areas such as aviation. Several areas of the documented 
research could be investigated further. These included: 
Firstly, the most important area requiring further investigation is how to enrich and 
make more concrete the meta-theory of design-induced error. This would involve 
investigation of other theories that explain design issues in human errors. Further 
investigation to clearly define the relationship between design purpose, design concept, 
and human–system interaction type would help the task. 
Secondly, guidelines for identifying design issues in human–system interaction failures 
in accident investigation need to be formulated. The guidelines would be helpful for 
accident investigation authorities and engineering designers to refer to. They should 
also be formulated to provide useful information about design questions to designers.  
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Thirdly, the ontology developed in this thesis needs to be further tested, modified, and 
extended into applied areas. It would be of great interest and applicability to further 
develop this work for other domains. This could then ensure that the ontology of 
design-induced error can be applicable in other domains. The more instances populated, 
the more useful the ontology. 
Fourthly, the ontology developed in this research can be used for tackling this type of 
problem with the natural language processing (NLP) methodology and machine 
learning process. This can be used for developing a fully machine-understandable form 
of accident reports. Limitations of understanding human-generated documents could be 
overcome with knowledge technologies. 
Finally, the research can be used for developing a simulation technique of human–
system interaction failures, which show people a visual demonstration of a failure, from 
accident reports. Those efforts may increase the usability of accident documents for 
different approaches of accident analysis without damaging the original contents of the 
document.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION OF CATEGORIES USED IN DATA SET OF 
THE CASE STUDY (ACCIDENT REPORTS IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN AVIATION ACCIDENT REPORT SYSTEM) 
 
① description of the accident (occurrence number, date of accident, time of 
accident, accident type, cause of failure, failed system, defective artefact, 
failing system, improvement of system, design feature, types of operation at 
the accident, critical circumstance, trust in system) 
② people involved in the accident (pilot in command, co-worker, controller, 
maintenance staff, other people) 
③ condition in operation (start-up or preparation, during operation, changing 
mode, landing emergency) 
④ state of mind of operators (normal, high work-load, complexity, time 
constraint, simultaneous work, failure of part of the system, abnormal external 
factor) 
⑤ failed systems: system failures (display, gauge instrument, switches, internal 
system, managing devices, communication system, planning, 
space/view/location) 
⑥ failed design: design failures (identifying a state of the system, location of 
target, procedure, protective measure, operation, what to do next)  
⑦ causes of the error (different possibility, hiding important property, confusing 
with amount of information, confusing with case of information, providing 
unreliable information, conflict with previous experience, difficult to deal with 
the artefact, not providing relevant information, too much reliance on the 
system, difficult to distinguish, providing a method unfriendly or less used 
than before, making it easy to do or access a wrong way in using the artefact) 
⑧ error types (misreading, miswriting, misinterpretation, misunderstanding, did 
not recognise, inattentional activity or automation mode, inappropriate 
performance, not following sign, not monitoring, violation of rules or 
procedures, not doing, not checking, difficult to understand, forgot to do) 
⑨ theory (gulf of execution/evaluation, plan delegation, design affordance, irony 
of automation (inability), irony of automation (monitoring failure), trust in 
automation, automation surprise, risk homeostasis) 
⑩ cause of accident (mechanical failure, operator failure, external factors, 
unknown) 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF ACCIDENTS OF FAILED SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN 
HUMAN ERROR (CASE STUDY IN SECTION 5.2) 
 
 
occurrence number System/artefact/process 
200403722 runway 
200404285 wire detection system 
200205901 Windsock 
200100596 weight unit conversions (pounds to kilograms) procedure 
200201228 weather radar display 
199902928 warning system, bleed air switches 
199503057 V1 cut procedure 
200105618 turbine engine 
199903790 traffic information for conflicting traffic 
200203094 traffic communication system, non-standard route 
199905438 traffic communication system, lateral separation 
200004082 traffic communication system, flight strip 
199901012 traffic communication system 
199901070 traffic communication system 
200004880 traffic communication system 
199904312 traffic communication system 
199902511 traffic communication system 
199903436 traffic communication system 
199804135 traffic communication system 
199902459 traffic communication system 
199904771 traffic communication system 
200401273 traffic communication system 
200202709 traffic communication system 
200104881 traffic communication system 
199905466 traffic communication system 
199805078 traffic communication system 
199802472 traffic communication system 
200102905 traffic communication system 
199800870 traffic communication system 
199901959 traffic communication system 
200402065 traffic communication system 
200201846 traffic communication system 
199905463 traffic communication system 
199902458 traffic communication system 
199805323 traffic communication system 
199801905 traffic communication system 
199804856 traffic communication system 
200102139 traffic communication system 
199804984 traffic communication system 
Appendix B: A list of accidents of failed systems involved in human error 
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occurrence number System/artefact/process 
200004882 traffic communication system 
200203449 traffic communication system 
200004709 traffic communication system 
200106230 traffic communication system 
199802964 traffic communication system 
200402622 traffic communication system 
200005295 traffic communication system 
200305235 traffic communication system 
199804849 traffic communication system 
200201725 traffic communication system 
199903768 traffic communication system 
199904284 traffic communication system 
200002379 traffic communication system 
200403800 traffic communication system 
200402714 traffic communication system 
200202896 traffic communication system 
200205540 traffic communication system 
199902014 traffic communication system 
199903590 traffic communication system 
199900970 traffic communication system 
200105942 traffic communication system 
200100135 traffic communication system 
199702768 traffic communication system 
200006013 traffic communication system 
200003093 traffic communication system 
200101996 traffic communication system 
199903602 traffic communication system 
200100889 traffic communication system 
200103344 traffic communication system 
200002485 traffic communication system 
200401411 traffic communication system 
199702957 traffic communication system 
200002060 traffic communication system 
200003847 traffic communication system 
200003594 traffic communication system 
200103164 traffic communication system 
200101080 traffic communication system 
200105559 traffic communication system 
199902415 traffic communication system 
199901401 traffic communication system 
200000869 traffic communication system 
199902001 traffic communication system 
199803437 traffic communication system 
Appendix B: A list of accidents of failed systems involved in human error 
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occurrence number System/artefact/process 
199900192 traffic communication system 
199701423 traffic communication system 
200302403 traffic communication system 
200003793 traffic communication system 
199802135 traffic communication system 
199900844 traffic communication system 
200104280 Traffic collision alert system(TCAS) 
200005030 thrust lever position 
199802755 the positioning of the controller pilot data link 
200004914 the air situation display 
199903711 TCAS 
199902114 taxiway visibility 
199900153 taxiway system, runway sign 
200103240 taxing speed 
199802817 taxing after landing 
200401661 takeoff weight 
199502837 takeoff weight 
199900833 takeoff technique 
199905168 TAAATS 
199805341 TAAATS 
199600094 steep clime after takeoff 
199805068 stall warning system 
199905121 spatially disorientated 
199904842 spatially disorientation 
200003233 spatial disorientation, darkness 
199700052 SODPROPS 
200300894 separation between aircrafts 
199703150 navigation system 
200303726 runway entrance 
200003862 runway indicator 
200102695 runway entrance 
200103433 runway entering 
200403720 runway entrance 
199803910 runway control, runway selection button, flight pr 
199804072 runway 
200202710 runway 
200104399 radio altimeter antenna 
199902615 radar display 
200002644 propeller RPM indication 
199900645 power line cable detection 
200004186 power lines 
200400437 power line 
199905026 power line 
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occurrence number System/artefact/process 
200201723 power line 
200100252 power line 
200401181 power line 
200000868 power line 
200402949 power line 
200404286 power cable marks 
200004914 positional information display system 
199902679 nose landing gear 
199805348 navigation/communication system 
199805874 navigation system 
199802022 mid-air collision preventing  
199902550 mid-air collision preventing  
199703850 mid air collision preventing  
200003533 MEL procedure 
200302433 MCDU, Flight management system(FMS) 
200002899 low rotor RPM caution 
200102455 loss of cabin pressurisation, select function ALT  
200003293 loss f tail rotor effectiveness 
200002693 load weight 
200002989 load control 
199902117 load 
200003321 load 
199800262 load 
199904972 lateral separation diagrams 
199903131 landing gear, flaps 
200000148 landing gear warning 
199403038 landing gear 
200105698 landing gear 
199701900 landing below the minimum altitude 
200302037 landing gear, flaps/slats handle 
199704041 landing gear 
199902874 instrument landing system 
200105743 inhibit switch, landing gear failure 
200404460 hypoxic 
200003951 hypoxia 
199803921 holding pattern 
199802757 GPS arrival 
199805603 fuel type error 
200102253 fuel tank filler cap unlock 
200200885 fuel system 
200001827 fuel selector system, operation manual 
200402049 fuel selection, emergency restart producer 
199403314 fuel selection system 
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occurrence number System/artefact/process 
200001434 fuel quantity system 
199702841 fuel quantity system 
200002018 fuel quantity indication system 
200000765 fuel quantity indication system 
200003056 fuel quantity check, dipstick 
200200047 fuel quantity check 
199804432 fuel quantity checking system 
200303599 fuel quantity 
199702601 fuel quantity 
200404700 fuel quantity 
199905596 fuel quantity 
200400265 fuel quantity 
200100348 fuel management system 
200403210 fuel management system 
200402797 Flap/slat 
200200007 fuel gauge system 
199900820 fuel 
200004806 flight progress strip management, traffic communication system 
199702620 flight planning system, air traffic control strip  
200401904 Flight Management Computer (FMC) 
200402747 Flight Management Computer (FMC) 
200200463 flight instruments 
199901009 flight in adverse weather 
199802529 flap 20 asymmetric approach 
200000492 engine failure simulation 
200400443 emergency power lever 
200105715 emergency checklist 
199800640 elevator input 
199800442 dynamic rollover situation 
200301435 door open warning display 
200205307 donning of oxygen masks during emergency 
200004671 donning of masks at emergency 
200003725 don oxygen masks 
200100443 detecting hazard of wire 
200302172 descent below the MDA 
200203074 de-ice, stall warning system, autopilot 
200200094 CPDLC 
200200190 CPDLC 
199804129 controller-pilot data link communication, CPDLC 
200402060 contamination of fuel 
199804690 console, annotation of flight progress strips 
199702691 console 
199803972 conditional crossing clearance 
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occurrence number System/artefact/process 
200005967 communication, frequency selector gears 
199902487 chart 
200105351 Chart 
200300008 cabin pressurisation 
200105188 bleed air off warning system 
199804069 blanket clearance 
200203171 battery 
200400856 Automatic terminal information system(CATIS) 
199900990 APU 
199501246 approach chart 
200301990 altimeter 
200302847 allowable take-off weight 
200202385 air traffic control instructions 
199902003 air traffic computer 
200000933 Air Situation Display (ASD ) 
199804347 aerodrome chart 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF ACCIDENTS USED FOR THE CASE STUDY AND 
ONTOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (CHAPTER 5 AND 7) 
 
CASE NUMBER 
(OCCURRENCE 
NUMBER) 
FORM OF HUMAN SYSTEM INTERACTION FAILURE 
1 
(199902928) 
An aircraft entered into a depressurizing level of altitude without 
relevant action. The pilot in the aircraft failed to follow tack-off 
checklist actions. He did not finish operating GPS setting. He did not 
recognize the aircraft passing over a limited level and an alert sign of 
depressurizing. He inadvertently switched a vent fan switch instead of 
an engine bleed-air switch.  
2 
(199902003) 
Two aircrafts conducted a consecutive departure. The superior 
performance of the later departure aircraft to that of the previous 
departure aircraft resulted in reducing separation. The controller did not 
recognise this difference while instructing. 
3 
(200105715) 
While on climb through FL180, the copilot‟s two electronic flight 
information system (EFIS) screens on the right side of the aircraft‟s 
instrument panel failed. While the crew had consulted the EFIS 
failure/disturbances checklist, they failed to recognise the problem 
arose. They omitted the first item of a generator failure in the checklist. 
4 
(199702691) 
Two aircrafts flied same level of altitude, and resulted in a breach of the 
collision avoidance limitation having received a traffic alert and 
collision avoidance system (TCAS) traffic advisory (TA). As the 
controller removed strips on the aircraft, they missed to instruction 
before the conflict occurred. 
5 
(200105351) 
The crew of a Boeing 767 (B767) had been cleared to taxi for departure 
from runway 01, intersection "A7", at Brisbane. They proceeded along 
taxiway "B" then, incorrectly, initiated a turn onto taxiways "B5" and 
"A", which was in conflict with rapid exit taxiway "A5S". 
6 
(199805068) 
Shortly after the aircraft entered the holding pattern it suffered an 
aerodynamic stall and rolled approximately 126 degrees to the left and 
pitched nose down to approximately 35 degrees. The pilot did not 
identify the possibility of aerodynamic stall before conducting the 
holding pattern. 
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7 
(200201725) 
An infringement of separation standards occurred 70 NM east of 
Darwin, NT, between a descending Boeing 737-376 (737) and an 
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) that was maintaining level flight. The 
pilots misunderstood information from TCAS aural warning. They did 
not scan IVSI display. 
8 
(199805341) 
Without notice, the display in the Brisbane Air Traffic Control Centre 
changed to an uncoupled black track without label data, resulting in the 
sector controller losing situational awareness. The controller deleted 
information on the computer display without checking.  
9 
(200402747) 
The flight crew of a Boeing 737-838 aircraft, registered VH-VXF, 
received a terrain proximity caution from the aircraft‟s enhanced 
ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) while descending to the 
south-south-east of Canberra Airport. The crew inadvertently 
commanded the FMC to establish the aircraft in a wrong position in the 
FMC hold page. 
10 
(199702620) 
As the B737 had reached FL300 before the crew received the 
instruction to descend, and as the vertical separation standard was 
2,000 ft, an infringement of the separation standards had occurred. The 
controllers failed to identify correct time of passing a point and did not 
crosscheck the information.   
11 
(200004806) 
As the Macchi climbed through 8,000 ft, while approximately 6 NM 
south of Williamtown, it passed within 1 NM of the C340. There was 
an infringement of separation standards. The sector controller failed to 
identify the location in the radar display system. 
12 
(200105188) 
The pilot did not complete the Pre Take Off and After Take Off cabin 
pressurization checks. He did not recognize the illumination of warning 
light.  
13 
(199803972) 
The controllers issued two aircrafts in cross runways. The operation of 
a conditional clearance for a taxiing aircraft to cross an active runway 
failed. 
14 
(199503057) 
During V1 cut procedure at night, the aircraft struck a tree due to the 
loss of control. The pilot understood the V1 procedure was allowed. 
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15 
(199804129) 
The communication between air traffic controllers and flight crew via 
the controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC) system was 
failed. 
16 
(199403314) 
The right engine failed due to the mismanagement of the fuel system in 
the aircraft.  
17 
(20003725) 
The plot in command did not don oxygen masks during the initial 
descent in order to avoid a pressurization problem. 
18 
(199804690) 
The sector controllers failed to recognize conflict between two aircraft. 
19 
(199805078) 
The crews of two aircraft were not acknowledged traffic information 
transmitted. As a result there was a conflict between two aircraft. 
20 
(199805874) 
The pilot of search rescue aircraft inadvertently searched in the area 
assigned to the other rescue aircraft. The reconfiguration of GPS setting 
was not conducted. 
21 
(200001827) 
The fuel selector valve did not position the valve to the right tank. The 
pilot failed to check balance of both fuel selections during the pre-flight 
check. 
22 
(199803921) 
A pilot conduct a wrong holding pattern procedure without checking 
further information assuming it is right to apply a general rule which he 
had experienced before. 
23 
(199803910) 
Two aircrafts landed and departed at a same runway at a same time. 
Both the aerodrome controller and the surface movement controller 
issued to land and to depart for two airplanes at the same time. 
24 
(199900153) 
The crew interpreted taxiway G3 to be taxiway Y on the basis of that 
information. The crew subsequently turned the aircraft onto taxiway 
G3, which was closed. 
25 
(199804432) 
The engines had stopped because of fuel exhaustion. The pilot did not 
correctly check fuel quantity before the flight. 
26 
(200200047) 
The right engine failed due to insufficient fuel in the right tank while 
the aircraft was in a climb attitude. The pilot did not correctly check 
fuel quantity before the flight. 
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27 
(200400856) 
During the ILS Glide path approach the aircraft commenced to descend 
bellow the limited ground level. The controller was unaware that only 
the localiser was available. The controller did not recognise the 
limitation of information displayed in the Computerised Automatic 
Terminal Information System (CATIS). 
28 
(199802755) 
Five minutes prior to reaching LEMIB the crew of the B767 received a 
traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning. 
There was other aircraft within the separation standard. There was 
distraction and subsequent failure of the sector controller to regularly 
scanning the flight progress strips. 
29 
(200105743) 
When the flight crew was preparing for landing, the main landing gear 
failed to extend following normal selection. When the flight crew 
selected the landing gear to the down position (extended), the landing 
gear inhibit switch was in the INHIBIT position, thereby preventing 
normal extension. When the flight crew prepared the aircraft for flight, 
they did not confirm the position of the main landing gear inhibit 
switch. 
30 
(200003533) 
The aircraft pressurisation and airconditioning systems automatically 
shut down, and the cabin pressure altitude began to increase. The 
aircraft departed with a minimum equipment list (MEL) in which 
restriction applied following the failure of the right engine high-
pressure valve (HPV). The crew interpreted the operator's MEL to 
mean that at engine "idle thrust" they were to turn the bleed air from 
that engine to off. 
31 
(200100443) 
A helicopter collided with wires and impacted the ground in a densely 
wooded area about 200 metres beyond the wires. The pilot did not 
identify the wire. 
32 
(200202385) 
A Cessna 172 (Cessna) conflicted with a departing Boeing 747-300 
(B747) while the B747 was climbing through the altitude of the 
Cessna. The aerodrome controller issued the pilot of the Cessna with a 
clearance to track via the 'southern shores' intending the 'southern 
shores of Trinity Inlet'. However, the pilot of Cessna wrongly 
understood the term as the shoreline on the southern side of Cairns 
airport (which was the northern shore of the Cairns harbour).  
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33 
(200400443) 
While conducting an in-flight familiarization of advancing the 
emergency power lever (EPL) to simulate manual introduction of fuel 
to the engine, there were high engine temperature. The engine ignition 
switch was not in the ON position during the initial operation of the 
EPL during this training. The pilot understood the procedure is 
acceptable. 
34 
(200302433) 
During the final approach, there was missed approach due to the 
aircrafts‟ intercepting wrong altitude. The altitude constraint in the 
flight plan (in FMS) for the inbound turn was replaced by the (lower) 
altitude constraint for the next flight segment. The pilots did not 
identify their wrong data input to the FMS. 
35 
(200104280) 
A Boeing 767-336 (B767) was on final approach to runway 27 at 
Melbourne and passing 1,400 ft on descent, when the crew received a 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) traffic advisory 
(TA) with an aircraft 600 ft below. The pilot did not aware of 
inoperability of transponders for five minutes warm-up. 
36 
(199900192) 
The crew of the Fokker was conducting the overshoot onto a radar 
heading which placed the aircraft in close proximity to the Cessna. The 
approach controller issued the overshoot instruction without reference 
to the departure controller. 
37 
(200200007) 
The left engine low oil pressure and generator warning lights had 
illuminated. The aircraft's engines failed due to fuel exhaustion. The 
pilot did not correctly check the fuel quantity before the departure. 
38 
(200200094) 
Another aircraft that was on a reciprocal track at the same level of 
OEB. The vertical distance between OED and OEB reduced to 800 ft, 
and to 700 ft between OED and the third aircraft. There was an 
infringement of separation standards. The controller sent a wrong pre-
formatted message to the crew of OEB through CPDLC. 
39 
(200201228) 
After setting course for Canberra, the conditions suddenly became 
dark, associated with an increase in the turbulence level and rain 
intensity. The aircraft was inadvertently flown into an area of severe 
convective weather activity. The flight crew misinterpreted the depicted 
weather radar returns.  
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40 
(200200190) 
There was an infringement of separation standards. The controller 
prepared the message in advance. The controller intended to send the 
message to the crew of the north-east bound B747 once they had 
passed the south-west bound B747 and a separation standard had been 
established. However, he unintentionally sent the message before the 
two aircraft had passed. 
41 
(200200463) 
As the aircraft approached each other 12 NM east of Sydney, an 
infringement of the radar separation standard occurred. After take-off, 
the B737 entered cloud and encountered turbulence. The pilot in 
command was observing the weather situation and did not monitor the 
flight instruments as the aircraft approached the assigned altitude. 
42 
(200301990) 
As the aircraft approached 500 ft above ground level, the rate of 
descent was assessed as too high and the first officer called for a 
missed approach to be conducted. The aircraft‟s altitude was high 
because the barometric settings on the altimeters had not been set to the 
airfield QNH of 1028 hectopascals (hPa) but rather had been left on 
1013 hPa. 
43 
(200003056) 
After departed on a 30-minute scenic flight, the engine suddenly failed. 
Fuel exhaustion may have contributed to the engine's loss of power. 
The pilot made an error to assess fuel quantity check with a new fuel 
dipstick. 
44 
(199804072) 
A vehicle was on the runway. At the time the landing clearance was 
issued, Car 23 was parked on the runway, approximately 200 m from 
the southern end. The aerodrome controller did not adequately scan the 
runway prior to issuing a landing clearance to the crew of WBA. 
45 
(199804069) 
As the B737 approached the crossing point of runway 30 on taxiway 
Foxtrot 2, the crew saw the Pilatus commence to takeoff. The ADC and 
SMC did not conduct an effective scan of runway 30 or the flight 
progress strip display prior to clearing the Pilatus to take off. 
46 
(199902874) 
Shortly after descent had been initiated, both pilots noticed the aircraft 
commence a right turn away from the centreline of the localiser. Both 
pilots incorrectly tuned the Cairns runway 33 localiser on 109.5 MHz 
instead of the runway 15 localiser on 109.9 MHz and subsequently 
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misidentified the morse-code identifier. 
47 
(200000765) 
The low fuel warning light began to flicker. A few moments later the 
engine began to run roughly. The pilot planned the flight using a fuel 
consumption rate that was significantly less than the actual 
consumption. 
48 
(200100596) 
The fuel consumption was 230 kg per hour more than normal. The 
cargo had been re-weighed. The actual cargo weight was more than 
3,400 kg greater than the weight stated on the manifest. The four pallets 
had been carried without changing weight unit from pound to kilogram. 
49 
(200403210) 
At about 1,500 ft above ground level (AGL), the engine abruptly failed. 
The pilot applied an emergency engine restart procedure, but failed. 
The pilot‟s response to the engine failure was not consistent with the 
aircraft manufacturer‟s or the operator‟s emergency and abnormal 
checklist instructions. 
50 
(200106230) 
When the B767 descended through FL326, vertical and horizontal 
separation between the B767 and the C500. There was an infringement 
of separation standards. The controller entered FL330 into The 
Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS). He subsequently, 
and unintentionally, assigned the crew of the B767 descent to FL300. 
51 
(200302037) 
Following a normal take-off the pilot in command (PIC), the handling 
pilot, called for the landing gear to be retracted. A short time later, he 
noticed an amber warning appear on the airspeed scale on his primary 
flight display (PFD) screen. The copilot retracting the flaps/slats 
instead of the landing gear. 
52 
(200402797) 
An aircraft collided with terrain 34 km south-east of Benalla. The flight 
did not follow the usual route to Benalla, but diverted south along the 
coast before tracking to the northernmost initial approach waypoint 
BLAED of the Benalla Runway 26L GPS NPA. While tracking to 
BLAED the aircraft diverged between 3.5 and 4 degrees left, without 
the pilot being aware of the error.   
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APPENDIX D: IMPLICATED SYSTEMS OF THE CASES (SECTION 5.3) 
 
FAILED ARTEFACT 
[CASE NUMBER] 
IMPLICIT DESIGN CONCEPTS 
Takeoff check lists [1] All necessary itineraries could be included in the list that 
would be performed by operators without difficulty or 
error. 
Operating of automatic 
level–up into a pressurizing 
zone [1] 
Operators could recognize and response to a critical by 
continuously checking the current state of a system.  
Alert systems [1] Operators could recognize warning signals provided by a 
system. The operator will look for alerts at any time or 
any circumstance. 
Array of functions/ artefact 
[2] 
Operators would do a right selection (action) of an 
intended position.  
The SWIFT 2 standard 
instrument departure  [2] 
The design of minimum departure separation standard 
could be achieved by controllers. The controllers will 
continuously monitor process of consecutive departure.  
Performance of similar 
type‟ aircrafts [2] 
It is not an essential thing to consider ways in which 
people can more easily recognize difference of 
performance between two aircraft types by e.g. changing 
a model number when designing enhancing performance 
of the same model of an aircraft. The controller 
recognizes the difference of performance ability of 
similar types of aircrafts with a provided specification 
paper. 
Data input into the air 
traffic control computer [3] 
Because the data entry job to a computer system is a 
minor task, that task could not hurt operators‟ decision 
ability. 
The EFIS (electronic flight 
information system) 
failure/disturbances 
checklist [3] 
The crew would check the EFIS failure/disturbances 
checklist step by step from first item to last one. 
Generator failure warning 
system [3] 
Although there is no alert, it can be easily identified by 
the operator that a starter generator fails because a 
generator failure causes a cut of electricity. 
The air traffic controller 
consol [4] 
The controller has enough memory capacity to remember 
all flight progress strips. Display space in a controller 
consol is not an essential but an additional artefact to 
support memory of controllers.  
Charts installed in the It will be useful for operating if a printing function is 
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computer system [5] included in a cockpit computer system. The usability and 
distinguishable of the chart is not consideration of 
design. 
Detecting ice deposit [6] It is not necessary to provide a particular device to detect 
ice deposit because operators can detect degree of ice 
deposit and determine with their experience by the onsite 
inspection. 
Aerodynamic warning 
system [6] 
Operators will be careful to conduct a holding pattern 
while icing condition. Although there is no warning sign, 
the operator would check all situations before 
conducting. 
Alert and instruction 
functions in TCAS (Traffic 
Collision Alert System) [7] 
An audio and visual alert and instruction system in 
TCAS help pilots to identify the situation and follow the 
instruction for remedial measurement. The pilot would 
compare the information provided whether which 
information is true or fault. 
Data cancellation in 
TAAATS (The Australian 
Advanced Air Traffic 
Control System) [8] 
The operator will be careful to delete or cancel data in a 
computer system. An alert message in the display wills 
effective measure to prevent adverse performance of an 
operator. 
Selecting a mode in FMC 
(Flight Management 
Computer) [9] 
Providing various modes in a computer system will help 
operators to perform in different ways. 
An air traffic control strip 
printing system [10] 
Data available in the system would be formatted into the 
specification of the system. 
A flight-planning system 
[10] 
The flight planning system should include all necessary 
times. The different specifications between a system to a 
system could be identified by operators. 
Crosscheck of controllers 
[10] 
Each controller would check data, even the data were 
provided by a system (e.g. computers). 
The surveillance radar 
(SURAD) [11] 
The radar did not have identification labels or height 
information. The limitation of the radar could be 
compensated by coordination of a sector controller and 
approach controller.  
After Take Off check [12] The checklist would be completed within an allowed 
time. There is no delay in the procedure. The GPS setting 
task would not deter the performance of operators. The 
aircraft was allowed to climb above 10,000 ft in an 
unpressurised state. 
The cabin altitude warning 
system [12] 
The warning illumination would alert the operator by 
colour and lighting of the warning system.  
A conditional clearance of 
a taxiing aircraft to cross an 
active runway [13] 
A conditional clearance procedure takes advantage of 
crossing runways and saves the departure and arrival 
times. The controllers would be aware of all aircrafts in 
the crossing runways. The controllers would remember a 
conditional crossing clearance is pending. 
Appendix D: Implicated systems of the cases 
 334 
A V1 cut procedure at night 
[14] 
If a description of a procedure in a manual were not 
clearly permitted, an operator would not use the 
procedure. 
The controller-pilot data 
link communications 
(CPDLC) system [15] 
The computer system helps communication between air 
traffic controllers and flight crew. The operator would 
recognize the limitation of the function on the system.  
frequency (HF) radio 
systems [15] 
High frequency (HF) radio systems compensate the 
CPDLC system. The operator would use backup systems 
while using a main system. 
The fuel system [16] The modification of the design of the fuel selection 
system from previous models would be easily recognized 
by the operator.  
Donning oxygen masks 
[17] 
The crew would wear oxygen masks when the masks 
were deployed. 
Sector console and flight 
progress strips [18] 
When traffic levels are increased, it would be help to 
decrease the level of controller‟s task that if coordinators 
just put into the work.  
A traffic information 
transmission system [19] 
If a system provided more than one frequency, it would 
help controllers and pilots to communicate and not to 
miss transmission.  
Radio congestion is not a serious problem to hamper the 
communication and wrong understandings. 
A search plan [20] The re-tasking details could be passed verbally from staff 
in the control system to pilots in search activity because 
the message search altitude and adjacent search aircraft 
was provided prior to take-off.  
A navigation system [20] The pilot would understand limitations of the navigation 
system. The check and reconfiguration tasks could be 
achieved by conducing procedures designed in normal 
basis.  
Fuel selector system [21] The pilot would check balance of both fuel selections 
during the pre-flight check procedure. The design 
requirement specification on operating procedures of 
pilots to operate the fuel supply cross feed for 60 seconds 
to verify normal operation could be achieved. Also, 
pilots should ensure normal operation of the fuel valves 
by positioning the fuel selectors to the off position to 
observe a decrease in fuel flow.  
A holding pattern 
procedure [22] 
The pilot would check what is a relevant holding pattern 
by asking to air traffic controllers if he(she) did not find 
information in a chart at the cockpit system. 
Terminal chart [22] The pilot would distinguish the depiction of a holding 
pattern from other marks in the chart.  
Flight management A holding pattern is not so much important information 
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computer database [22] to compulsory input into a flight management computer 
database. The information could be checked by pilots. 
The runway 11/29 selector 
[23] 
Controllers will push down the runway selector button 
on the system after scanning the runway. 
The flight progress strip 
display [23] 
Once a clearance issue was conducted the flight strip was 
no longer need. 
The airfield layout [23] Designers try to utilise a system in efficiency. The more 
complicate a runway layout, the more maximise usability 
of the airfield for departure and arrival. Although the 
increased complexity of runway layout, the runway 
selector system can prevent controllers from inadvertent 
selection causing conflict accidents. 
Sydney terminal chart [24] Pilots would read correctly and notice differences of 
letters in the chart. 
Fuel quantity assessment 
systems [25] 
Pilots would assess the fuel quantity by comparing two 
systems; a fuel indicator and a fuel log. 
Fuel quantity assessment 
systems [26] 
The pilot would establish the actual fuel quantity on 
board the aircraft prior to departure by comparing three 
fuel quantity systems. 
The computerised 
automatic terminal 
information system 
(CATIS) [27] 
Constraints of a system could be compensated by 
operators with using other systems. The operator would 
check additional information which was not provided by 
the system.  
The controller pilot 
datalink and the sector 8 
operating console [28] 
 
The task of scanning controller pilot datalink is not a 
main task of controllers. Therefore there is no problem if 
remove the dedicated controller pilot datalink controller. 
Designers believed that a controller could adequately 
manage both the controller pilot datalink and the sector 8 
position. 
The landing gear inhibit 
switch [29] 
When the flight crew prepared the aircraft for flight, they 
can easily fond the position of the main landing gear 
inhibit switch to be in the INHIBIT position or not. 
Manuals of a minimum 
equipment list (MEL) [30] 
MEL 36-11-07 was titled "Engine Bleed High Pressure 
Valve (HPV)" and was composed of two parts. Part (a) 
detailed the actions to be taken if the bleed-air system 
was considered to be inoperative, and indicated that the 
bleed-air system was to be isolated and not used. Part (b) 
detailed the actions to be taken if one HPV was 
inoperative, "locked closed". However, the intention of 
the MEL was that the bleed-air system from that engine 
could still be used except in specified circumstances. 
They expect that operators would understand the 
intention. 
A wire strike protection 
system (WSPS) [31] 
The pilot could be aware of wires while flying low. The 
installation of a wire strike protection system is not a 
compulsory design specification. 
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Reference terms [32] The pilot as well controllers would be familiar with 
instruction terms which have been normally used in 
instruction.  
The emergency power lever 
(EPL) to simulate manual 
 The pilot‟s operating 
handbook (POH) [33] 
As it is not expected that there will be an in-flight 
familiarization of the emergency power lever, the aircraft 
manufacturer only included requirements for an actual 
FCU malfunction. The POH did not address the engine 
control settings for training of this type. The pilot would 
understand that not to mention it is to prohibit 
conducting it. 
The multi-function control 
and display unit (MCDU) 
of the Flight management 
system (FMS) [34] 
The pilot would recognise incorrect data input in the 
flight management system and correct it. The automatic 
movement of screens in the computerised display unit of 
the flight management system would help operators to 
conduct a setting.  
Transponders of a Traffic 
Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) 
[35] 
The transponders could require up to five minutes warm-
up prior to operation. The limitation of design could be 
achieved by operators. Operators would ensure the 
operation of transponders before a departure.  
Utilises the Operational 
Data Information [36] 
The use of Operational Data Information for 
coordination between units was accepted as a standard 
operating procedure. However, the tower controllers and 
the Terminal Control Area controllers would not only 
rely on the Operational Data Information be achieved 
coordination with other communication facilities. They 
understand limitations of the Operational Data 
Information containing only the radar label display. 
The fuel quantity indicating 
system. [37] 
There are three systems available for fuel quantity 
identification: visual inspection on fuel tanks, fuel 
quantity indicators, and a fuel log system. The use of 
separate methods to establish fuel quantity on board is 
substantially more reliable than relying on one system. 
The pilot would use separate methods and compare these 
systems in order to verify the real fuel quantity.  
Controller-Pilot Data Link 
Communications (CPDLC) 
[38] 
Messages were compiled and initiated either by the crew 
of the aircraft or by ATC and were, in this case, pre-
formatted. The use of pre-formatted messages was 
'intended to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation 
and ambiguity‟. 
Weather Radar [39] The radar antenna transmitted microwave energy in the 
form of pulses, which, if reflected off precipitation ahead 
of the aircraft, would be returned to the antenna. There 
were four colour codes that were directly related to 
precipitation intensity, ranging from black (no 
precipitation), green (minimum detectable moisture), 
yellow (medium moisture level), to red (strong to 
extreme moisture level). However, heavy rainfall could 
reduce the ability of the weather radar to provide a 
complete picture of the weather ahead. 
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The limitation of the radar in which would be understood 
by the flight crew.  
Controller-Pilot Data Link 
Communications (CPDLC) 
[40] 
Preparation of the CPDLC message in advance may 
assist controllers with workload management. The pre-
format design can help operators to save time and to 
reduce their tasks.  
Monitoring the aircraft's 
weather radar [41] 
The aircraft's weather can help pilots to assess the 
meteorological conditions. The distraction of pilots is not 
consideration of weather radar design. 
Cockpit displays for 
altimeter [42] 
The pilot can do the required altimeter setting. The task 
could not be forgotten. 
The calibrated dip stick 
[43] 
The wooden dip stick had been calibrated to measure the 
fuel quantity when inserted almost vertically into the 
tank, without passing through the hole in the tank baffle. 
The pilot would be aware that this method for measuring 
the fuel quantity was only valid when using the original 
manufacturer‟s supplied dip stick.  
Checking runways [44] The controllers can conduct effect scanning on runway 
before issuing instructions. The designation system helps 
them to recognise runway situations. 
Blanket  clearance [45] The blanket clearance allows aircraft to occupy or cross 
runway 30 without a specific clearance from the ADC. 
The use of a blanket clearance reduced the need for 
segmented taxi clearances. The ADC and SMC would 
coordinate each other. 
Morse codes in the flight 
management computer [46] 
The flight crew can identify morse-code in the flight 
management computer.  
The fuel consumption 
checking systems [47] 
A fuel gauge and engine instrumentation provided pilots 
with fuel flow information. Apart from this the only fuel 
consumption data provided to pilots was on a 
specification sheet published by the manufacturer of the 
helicopter. The pilot would check the actual fuel 
consumption by comparing two fuel consumption 
checking systems. 
A Weight checking system 
[48] 
The operator would check the weights recorded on the 
manifest with the loadsheet issued by Load Control. 
There is no need a further system to figure out 
conversion of weight. It is an easy task for operators to 
check the figures whether the figures had been converted 
or not.  
Emergency and abnormal 
checklist instructions [49] 
The aircraft manufacturer's emergency and abnormal 
checklist instruction design to the engine failure could be 
formulated in differently from procedures used in other 
types of aircraft systems. The pilots would deal with the 
procedure without confusing with the other procedures 
used in other types of aircrafts.  
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The Australian Advanced 
Air Traffic System 
(TAAATS) [50] 
The TAAATS entry task could not distract the attention 
of a controller even if the controller had to involve other 
tasks (e.g. talking to pilots or other people) while doing 
the task. 
The procedure of a 
flap/slats lever movement 
[51] 
Although the procedures of the movement of flap/slats or 
landing gear levers is similar and associated, pilots could 
not be difficult to manage the two levers correctly 
because they are different shapes and positions. 
The flight management 
system [52] 
The automatic flight management system would help the 
pilot to reduce laborious tasks. The pilot would check 
and confirm information displayed in the computerised 
system. 
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APPENDIX E: FAILURE MODE OF THE CASES (SECTION 5.3) 
 
FAILURE CASE FAILURE MODE IN TERMS OF DIE 
Incomplete takeoff 
check lists [1] 
Many items were included into an after take-off checklist 
procedure without considering the fact that a task, in case of 
failure or difficulty of the parts of jobs, delay or confound with 
other tasks. This led to puzzling of operators when they 
encounter an uncontrolled condition. 
Unrecognized level-
up into a 
pressurizing zone 
[1] 
There were many itineraries to conduct on take-off check lists. 
If a pilot had to do one task in labour intensive cognition. This 
led to distracting operators‟ focus on continuously checking 
current altitude. 
Misidentified 
location of a switch 
[1] 
Location of switches in similar shape but different functions 
plays an important role to the performance of operators. Many 
switches are similar shapes in near location. This led to 
unintended action while the operator was busy with other tasks. 
Unnoticed alert 
system [1] 
An automatic warning system should have alerted operators to 
recognize a hazard. But operators being in a state of distracted 
cognition due to other tasks could not response to a weak 
warning such as lighting or message in a screen display. This led 
to not recognizing.  
Unrecognizing the 
performance ability 
of similar types of 
aircrafts [2] 
The performance of the B737-400 series aircraft was superior to 
that of the B737-300 series aircraft. There was no effective 
process to check the different performance. That led to 
controller‟s considering that the aircraft were like types for the 
purposes of departure standard. 
Monitoring failure 
due to  data entry 
[3] 
The approach/departure controller elected to input data to the air 
traffic computer during the departure sequence. They were 
labour intensive and diverted his attention for the air situation 
display. This led not to monitoring the departure process of two 
aircrafts. 
The overlooked 
item in a failure 
checklist [3] 
There is no alert system for a voltage failure, and the symptom 
of the failure looked like a display error. It might be a right 
decision that the voltage failure is not a cause of the warnings 
because cascade warning illuminations showed there was 
enough electricity in the system. That led the crew to 
overlooking the first item of the EFIS failure/disturbances 
checklist, which required a check of the generator voltage. 
An incorrect 
clearance issue [4] 
The configuration of the Sector 3 console provided insufficient 
space to adequately display all relevant flight progress strips. As 
a result, controllers had developed the habit of removing strips 
at the earliest opportunity, thereby creating the potential for vital 
information to be missed. 
Computer based 
printed charts [5] 
Computer based printed charts in small size is difficult for pilots 
to read correctly. That led to misidentifying a correct taxiway.  
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Misinterpreting ice 
deposit [6] 
Without a clear prohibition standard, it is easy for human to 
ignore unclear evidences and then consider as normal as routine 
practices. This led to misidentify the ice deposit in wings. 
Failure of alerting 
aerodynamic stall in 
icing condition [6] 
Without alerting operators could not identify aerodynamic stall 
in advance. 
Unrecognized alert 
messages [7] 
It is possible that the crew may have misidentified the TCAS 
aural warning. Prompt action was required to resolve the 
apparent ambiguity and the crew may have been guided more by 
the aural warning than by the IVSI display. That may have been, 
at least in part, due to the limitations of the IVSI display, where 
a pilot may initially rely more on the aural alert. Compared with 
a TCAS IVSI display, traffic information that is displayed on an 
EFIS screen increases the crew‟s situational awareness. 
However, pilots are trained to use all the information at their 
disposal and an aural alert would be the trigger to look at the 
IVSI display immediately. Therefore if the green band of the 
IVSI was indicating a required rate of descent of 1200-1500 
ft/min, then the correct procedure would be to disengage the 
autopilot and smoothly adjust the pitch to attain that rate of 
descent. 
Misinterpreted an 
emergency 
instruction [7] 
The reported `descent‟ advisory was actually a `reduce descent‟ 
advisory that was misunderstood by the crew. In a temporal 
decision making condition human cognitions reduce to 
capturing only parts of information. That may lead the 
misinterpretation of the instruction. 
Unintentional 
cancellation of data 
in a computer 
system [8] 
TAAATS displays a warning message requesting confirmation 
of the cancellation action when a controller deletes a flight data 
record for an aircraft. This message does not warn controllers 
that they do not have jurisdiction of the aircraft. Airservices 
Australia have proposed that the warning message for non-
jurisdiction flight data records should be amended to alert 
controllers to the fact that coordination is required prior to 
deleting the record. The coordinator had assumed that an aircraft 
on the ground at Cairns was the aircraft displayed as airborne 
and consequently felt that it was unnecessary to check further 
prior to deleting the record. 
Misidentified mode 
in a computer 
system [9] 
Mode changes in a display are unnoticed without an alerting 
function. A recent incident has indicated that there may be some 
confusion relating to the function of the Leg Distance (LEG 
DIST) prompt of the B737 FMC Hold page. The Leg Distance 
prompt allows entry of the actual length of the inbound Leg of a 
holding pattern in nautical miles. It does not refer to a DME 
limit as depicted on a charted holding pattern. Additionally, 
beware that a Leg Distance entry will override a Leg Time 
value. By entering a leg distance of 14 NM, the crew 
inadvertently commanded the FMC to establish the aircraft in a 
holding pattern that would take the aircraft about 11 NM beyond 
the published holding pattern limit. 
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Misinterpreted chart 
[9] 
The holding pattern limits published for CCK, did not contain 
the referenced DME identifier (Canberra) in the limit notes. The 
holding pattern Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) limit 
distance on the referenced instrument approach chart was 
misinterpreted by the crew. The crew did not detect that the 
DME distance referenced on the chart was based on the 
Canberra DME. The instrument approach chart did not contain 
the specific Canberra DME identifier in the CCK holding 
pattern limits. 
Misinterpreted 
flight progress 
printing system [10] 
There are different criteria or specifications of input data in the 
flight progress printing system of the air controller system and a 
flight-planning system in an airplane. That led to 
misinterpretation of the flight progress printing system. 
Misunderstood 
flight plan [10] 
The flight plan for the A320 contained a manoeuvring time for 
the aircraft prior to setting course. The air traffic control strip 
printing system was unable to allow for a discrete manoeuvring 
time in the strip preparation. The Melbourne Sector 4 controller 
did not conduct a crosscheck calculation on the flight progress 
strip notation for the A320's estimated time of arrival at 
SUBUM. 
Unaccomplished 
crosscheck [10] 
There are many computerised systems and processes that 
reliable in previous process before a crosschecking task. The 
data were based on radar observation and information of the 
computerised flight progress printing system receiving 
information of airplane systems. This led to negligence or 
relying on the previous data. 
Not informed from 
the surveillance 
radar (SURAD) [11] 
The SURAD did not have identification labels or height 
information and that limitation increased the workload on the 
controller. Although the interim radar display system (IRDS) 
that was used by the sector controller had labels and a Mode “C‟ 
height reading capability, the Macchi was not equipped with a 
Mode “C‟ capability. Consequently the sector controller did not 
have a radar indication of the height of the Macchi. The 
coordination of a sector controller and an approach controller 
was hampered by the design of the management of the flight 
progress strip that is very crowded and difficult to read. That led 
the controller  
Unaccomplished an 
after Take Off check 
list and distraction 
[12] 
The checklist may not be completed within a time every time 
due to other tasks. If there is a delay in one task that affect 
remaining tasks and the performance and cognition of operators. 
The GPS setting task may distract the performance of operators. 
The aircraft was allowed to climb above 10,000 ft in an 
unpressurised state. 
Unrecognising the 
cabin altitude 
warning system [12] 
If an operator was captured in a task, the attention of his/her 
may not recognize the warning illumination because of 
distracted cognition of the operator.  
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Forgetting a 
conditional 
clearance of a 
taxiing aircraft to 
cross an active 
runway [13] 
When a system did not provide any physical record, such as 
tactile memory markers) that a conditional clearance was 
pending, there was no cue to alert the controllers to the fact that 
this was the case. That led the aerodrome controller not to being 
aware that a conditional clearance was active when to clear EAL 
for take off. 
Conducting a 
obscure  V1 cut 
procedure at night 
[14] 
When a procedure is not prohibiting firmly, it could be possible 
to conduct the procedure. The V1 cut procedure at daytime is 
permitted and there is not clear prohibition on the procedure at 
night. That led to the misinterpretation of the syllabus on the 
operation manual. 
Unintentional 
actions in the 
controller-pilot data 
link 
communications 
(CPDLC) system 
[15] 
If an operation is needed while conducting tasks, operators think 
the system provide the function, particularly, in computerized 
systems. The mouse buttons are easily to be entered without 
considerable considerations. 
Not trusting in High 
frequency (HF) 
radio systems and 
relying on 
CPDLC[15] 
The operator tends to rely on automated systems. That led 
operators not to using HF system relying on CPDLC. 
Mismanagement of 
the fuel system [16] 
The similarity of selection positions of switches on a system 
make human operators to error managing the system. That led 
the pilot making the mismanagement of fuel selection system. 
Not follow rules of 
donning oxygen 
masks in an 
emergence 
condition [17] 
There was no concrete and forced procedure to wear oxygen 
masks in case of a pressurization problem. Human operators 
tend to focus on a urgent task when they encounter an 
emergency. In this case, the urgent task is to avoid 
depressurization state of the aircraft. The pilots try to overcome 
the problem. That led to not wearing oxygen masks while their 
emergence works. 
Confusion of flight 
progress strips in a 
flight progress strip 
system [18] 
There was no additional space for the additional controllers in 
the console. The design of a flight progress strips positioning 
space and a procedure of positioning and disposition of strips is 
not enough for increased strips. In a busy traffic condition, busy 
space of flight progress strips cause a confusion or the omitting 
of flight progress for controllers. Just putting a person in the 
task would not help the operators  
Confusion with 
capturing 
information in a 
traffic information 
transmission system 
[19] 
When monitoring more than one frequency, the crews had to 
decide upon which frequency to maintain their primary focus in 
the face of competing cognitive demands. The design of the 
procedures used in the Demonstration Class G airspace did not 
fully consider the impact of radio congestion. That led the 
controller and the crew of King Air not correctly recognizing 
their transmissions. 
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Not noticing errors 
in Orion‟s 
navigation system 
[20] 
The design of a procedure of the reconfiguration of a navigation 
system in the aircraft is based on a normal circumstance not 
high workload conditions. Navigation errors of a function of 
equipment limitations are not easily noticed by operators 
without any alert systems or procedure. That led the pilots not to 
notice navigation errors. 
Unaccomplished 
check lists in a 
search plan [20] 
The re-tasking note format does not provide any defence against 
the omission for key information. That led the pilot to forgetting 
checking the configuration of the navigation system. 
Uncompleted a pre-
flight check [21] 
The difference between the pilot‟s operating manual and the 
operator‟s operations manual, and a comment of a manager to 
intend to delete the procedure made the pilot assuming no need 
to a balance check of fuel consumption. 
Misunderstood a 
holding pattern 
procedure [22] 
The Captain of the B767 reported that in the USA, where a 
holding pattern is not displayed, or in the absence of other 
information, a "default" right hand pattern is to be flown. There 
is no such procedure in Australia. As a result, the Captain 
elected to fly a right hand pattern without checking with air 
traffic control for holding pattern information. Without relevant 
information operators would follow previous experiences or 
general rules. That led the pilot make a wrong left turn instead 
of checking further information from the air traffic controller. 
Confusing with 
marks in a terminal 
chart [22] 
The depiction of the holding pattern was difficult to distinguish 
from other markings on the chart and the pattern was not 
displayed on the appropriate Standard Arrival Route (STAR) 
chart. In addition, the holding pattern was not loaded in the 
aircraft's flight management computer database. Difficult to 
distinguish against other information lead operators omitting 
information described in the chart. 
Fail to conduct 
continuous 
monitoring of 
runway conditions 
[23] 
The procedure for release of the runway from the aerodrome 
controller (ADC) to the SMC was for both the ADC and SMC to 
de-select their respective runway 11/29 selection buttons. Both 
buttons would became illuminated when selected on, indicating 
that the runway was active. To check an indication of the 
runway selector system is easier than to scan runways by eyes. 
That led the controller rely on the system not scanning runways. 
Forgetting 
information during 
the air traffic 
instructions [23] 
Eliminated data of flight progress strips easily pass away from 
operators‟ memory with other tasks. 
Confusing with the 
airfield layout [23] 
The threshold of runway 21 is at the midway point of runway 
11/29 and access to the threshold of runway 21 was achieved by 
taxiing via runway 11. The airfield layout increased the potential 
for a runway incident. It is high workload crossing runways with 
many aircrafts landing and departing. That led the controllers 
fail to scan correctly runways. 
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Confusing with 
similar characters in 
a Sydney terminal 
chart [24] 
The chart was ambiguous in that there was another letter “Y” 
displayed to the south of runway 25. That led the crew 
interpreted taxiway G3 to be taxiway Y on the basis of that 
information. The crew subsequently turned the aircraft onto 
taxiway G3, which was closed 
Rely on one of fuel 
quantity assessment 
systems [25] 
Pilots assume they can rely on the one of the two fuel quantity 
systems. That led to masking the unreliable fuel indicator and 
relying only on the fuel log system. 
Rely on one of fuel 
quantity assessment 
system [26] 
A fuel log system is not a direct assessment system causing 
errors. Checking fuel quantity by a dipstick is a difficult task 
and causing executing errors. That led pilots relying on fuel 
quantity gauges. 
Trust in the 
computerised 
automatic terminal 
information system 
(CATIS) [27] 
The controllers in the Adelaide Air Traffic Control tower had 
previously included information that the LLZ and the GP were 
not available on the computerised automatic terminal 
information system (CATIS) that is used to broadcast 
operational information to pilots. When the LLZ was returned 
for operational use, they abbreviated the advice to `localiser 
available‟, due to system constraints on the amount of additional 
information that could be included. The information that the GP 
was not available was not included in the CATIS. The majority 
of the additional information consisted of advice of restrictions 
due to aerodrome works. The CATIS was normally broadcast on 
the non-directional navigation beacon (NDB) and a very high 
frequency (VHF) radio transmitter. However, at the time of the 
occurrence the VHF transmitter was not available and the 
information was only available on the NDB. Despite listening to 
that information, the pilots missed the fact that the localiser was 
available due to the poor quality of the received audio. 
Consequently, when the pilots reported on first contact with the 
approach controller that they had received the CATIS they were 
unaware that only the localiser was available. 
Distraction while 
conducting tasks in 
the controller pilot 
datalink and the 
sector 8 operating 
console [28] 
The positioning of the controller pilot datalink and the sector 8 
operating console restrict the ability of controllers to maintain 
an effective scan of the flight progress strip board. Controllers 
are required to divert their gaze and attention from the board to 
operate the controller pilot datalink keyboard. 
Mismanagement of 
the position of the 
landing gear inhibit 
switch [29] 
The switch was to be in the INHIBIT position, rendering the 
gear unable to extend. There was no indication of the position of 
INHIBIT switch. No caution advisories were illuminated. When 
the flight crew prepared the aircraft for flight, they did not 
confirm the position of the main landing gear inhibit switch.  
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Misinterpretation of 
a manual of a 
minimum 
equipment list 
(MEL) [30] 
Part (b) of the Operations area of the operator's MEL stated: 
"(1) At low engine power (around idle thrust) setting: 
(a) Associated bleed is selected OFF….”  
The crew interpreted the operator‟s MEL to mean that at engine 
“idle thrust” they were to turn the bleed air from that engine to 
off. That prevented any supply of bleed air for the pressurisation 
and airconditioning system coming from that engine.  
Not notice wires 
while conducting a 
flight[31] 
The wires were aligned on 060 degrees magnetic, with a 
maximum height of 31.5 metres for the upper wire and 30.1 
metres for the lower wire. The position of the wires was not 
annotated on the relevant Visual Terminal Charts and they did 
not have high visibility devices attached. A wire strike 
protection system (WSPS) had not been fitted to the helicopter. 
Company employees said that it was usual for the pilot to fly at 
a low height when transiting to and from the work location. 
Misunderstood 
Reference terms 
[32] 
The meaning of the term „southern shores‟ was not available to 
the pilot of the Cessna and therefore the potential existed for the 
misunderstanding between the pilot and the aerodrome 
controller that resulted in this occurrence. 
Mismanagement of 
emergency power 
lever (EPL) [33] 
The POH did not address the engine control settings for training 
of this type, and the engine manufacturer‟s Service Information 
Letter (SIL) noted the use of the EPL for familiarization 
training, while suggesting that this training be completed on the 
ground. The discrepancy between these two documents may 
have led to the flight crew‟s belief that the use of the EPL for 
familiarization training in-flight was acceptable. 
Not recognising 
incorrect data input 
into the multi-
function control and 
display unit 
(MCDU) of the 
Flight management 
system (FMS) [34] 
The sequence of FMS entries advised by the aircraft 
manufacturer provided an explanation of how the 2,500 ft step 
altitude, once removed, could have been incorrectly reinstated 
into the active flight plan. This meant that the FMS contained an 
incorrect step altitude for the inbound turn and that the 
automatic flight system would allow the aircraft to descend 
below the step altitude unless the crew intervened.  
The crew believed that they had operated the FMS system 
appropriately and were unaware that the constraint altitude had 
been changed. It is likely that they expected that the aircraft‟s 
automatic flight system would not infringe the vertical profile 
limits of the approach. However, it was apparent that they 
became distracted during the inbound turn by the track break or 
discontinuity on the map display. 
Misunderstood the 
limitation of 
transponders of a 
Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) 
[35] 
When had selected the transponder code and switched the unit 
to “On” prior to departing, the pilot assume its operation. They 
did not expect that the transponders could require up to five 
minutes warm-up prior to operation. The pilot was sure that the 
indicator light on the transponder was operating. The pilot did 
not believe that the transponder was not operating. 
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Rely on the 
Operational Data 
Information [36] 
Coordination between the tower controllers and the Terminal 
Control Area controllers utilises the Operational Data 
Information contained within the radar label display. The use of 
Operational Data Information for coordination between units 
was accepted as a standard operating procedure. On some 
occasions the overuse and over reliance on Operational Data 
Information coordination may lead to a lack of situational 
awareness. Controllers were aware of what was intended to 
happen after the overshoot but there were no visual cues as to 
what the aircraft was doing. The approach and departures 
controllers coordinated via hotline for Departures to retain the 
Cessna on frequency and place the aircraft on a close right 
downwind. However there was no way for the aerodrome 
controller to know this unless the controller had queried the 
aircraft's current clearance. This may have led the approach 
controller to discount the Cessna from his mental traffic picture. 
Rely on the fuel 
quantity indicating 
system [37] 
A fuel log, if available, and a visual inspection of tank contents, 
if conducted, would have provided additional assurance 
regarding the quantity of fuel on board the aircraft. It is clear 
that the fuel gauges were not accurately indicating the quantity 
of fuel on board the aircraft, probably because of 
microbiological contamination. The pilot‟s method of 
establishing fuel on board was not robust, as it relied exclusively 
on the accuracy of the fuel quantity indicating system. In this 
context, the operations manual procedure was deficient in that it 
did not adequately address the individual fuel system 
characteristics of the different aircraft types in the operator fleet. 
However, the fuel system configuration of most aircraft in the 
operator‟s fleet, including the Nomad, meant that it was not 
possible to conduct a visual inspection of fuel quantity unless 
the fuel tanks were either full or nearly full. The pilot did not 
conduct a visual determination of fuel quantity, even though this 
was required by the operator‟s operations manual. 
Unnoticed error in a 
data entry in 
Controller-Pilot 
Data Link 
Communications 
(CPDLC) [38] 
Selection of a pre-formatted instruction and sending the 
message is a skill-based activity of easy of unintentional 
performance. In reply to the request by OEB for climb to 
FL330, the controller pre-selected the wrong pre-formatted 
CPDLC message and sent the message without checking it. The 
controller had not intended to assign FL330 to the crew of OEB 
and did not realise that they had been assigned FL330. 
Misunderstood data 
in Weather Radar 
[39] 
Due to the limitations of the airborne weather radar and possibly 
the radar antenna setting, the flight crew misinterpreted the 
depicted weather radar returns. The flight crew did not appear to 
understand the limitations of the airborne weather radar. 
Unintentional data 
entry n Controller-
Pilot Data Link 
Communications 
(CPDLC) [40] 
The controller intended to send the message to the crew of the 
north-east bound B747 once they had passed the south-west 
bound B747 and a separation standard had been established. The 
controller had prepared a pre-formatted controller-pilot data link 
communication (CPDLC) message for transmission to the crew 
of the north-east bound B747. However, he unintentionally sent 
the message before the two aircraft had passed. 
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Monitoring the 
aircraft‟s weather 
radar [41] 
When adverse weather condition is imminent, it is necessary the 
pilot in command was monitoring the aircraft‟s weather radar. 
The pilot became distracted while assessing the meteorological 
conditions. The distraction occurred as he monitored the 
weather radar and assessed the meteorological conditions that 
the aircraft was encountering during the climb. 
Rely on cockpit 
displays [42] 
The 737-400 cockpit displays did not have a similar indication 
because the altimeters are not connected to the FMC database 
that includes the aerodrome transition level/altitude information. 
The first officer‟s experience was primarily on the 737-400 and 
the pilot in command had primarily flown the newer 737-800, 
which was equipped with significantly more integrated and up-
to-date cockpit displays compared with the 737-400. If the 
aircraft had been equipped with a similar display then the 
missed changeover from QNE to QNH may not have occurred. 
Mismanagement of 
the calibrated dip 
stick [43] 
The new fuel quantity check method for wooden dip stick 
differed from previous methods. He was not aware that this 
method for measuring the fuel quantity was only valid when 
using the original manufacturer's supplied dip stick. He had used 
the same technique to dip the fuel as he had been instructed to 
use with the original plastic dip stick. This technique could 
result in a significant over estimation of tank contents.  
Failure of 
monitoring runways 
[44] 
It is also likely that the white colour of Car 23 made it difficult 
to see against the background of white runway markings or 
white gable markers. Consequently, without an effective alert to 
the presence of the vehicle on the runway, the controller‟s scan 
was inadequate to see Car 23. The aerodrome controller did not 
change the „runway designator‟ strip to indicate that Car 23 had 
entered the runway. 
Failure of the 
blanket clearance 
[45] 
The blanket clearance needs intensive cognitive loads for 
controllers.  The presentation of the yellow flight progress strip 
did not alert the ADC that a runway 12/30 blanket clearance was 
in place. While conducting other task, it is possible the ADC and 
the SMC did not conduct an effective scan of runway 30 or the 
flight progress strip display prior to clearing the Pilatus to take 
off. They rely on each other. 
Misidentification of 
morse-code in the 
flight management 
computer [46] 
It is easy for human to make errors if a feature of an artefact in 
shape, colour, or number is similar. Both pilots incorrectly 
identified the morse-code ICN signal on frequency 109.5 MHz 
as ICS, the morse-code identifier for the runway 15 ILS on 
frequency 109.9 MHz. The pilot in command then incorrectly 
preset the manual frequency selector of his VHF navigation 
control panel to 109.5 MHz, the frequency for the runway 33 
localiser at Cairns, morse-code identifier ICN. 
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Incomplete fuel 
consumption checks 
[47] 
There was no logging of fuel usage for the helicopter that would 
have alerted the pilot to the greater than planned consumption 
rates.  
This meant significant differences between planned and actual 
fuel consumption rates remained undetected. The lack of any 
recorded fuel consumption checks meant that actual fuel 
consumption rates were not readily available to pilots flying the 
helicopter. The pilot did not check the actual fuel consumption. 
An incomplete 
Weight check 
system [48] 
As same task in everyday make people to conduct same pattern 
of the performance, it make easy to skip or ignore procedures/ 
factors that normally would have not be changed. When the 
agent who handled freight at Honolulu for the B767 operator 
received the pallet weights, she did not check the figures against 
the loadsheet issued by Load Control. Consequently, she did not 
realise that the weights stated on the loadsheet had already been 
converted to kilograms, and applied the conversion a second 
time. Also, as the agent for the US operator was confident that 
she had passed the correct weights to the B767 agent, she did 
not recheck to ensure that the B767 agent had received the 
correct weight information. 
Misunderstanding 
of the emergency 
and abnormal 
checklist 
instructions [49] 
The chief pilot‟s belief that emergency procedures learned 
during early training could be effectively applied to any general 
aviation aircraft did not allow for significant variations between 
aircraft systems and in particular fuel systems. The pilot‟s 
response to the engine failure was not consistent with the 
aircraft manufacturer‟s or the operator‟s emergency and 
abnormal checklist instructions.  
Distraction while 
data entry into The 
Australian 
Advanced Air 
Traffic System 
(TAAATS) [50] 
The controller then entered FL330 into TAAATS as the new 
cleared flight level (CFL). The controller reported that he had 
intended to confirm FL330 as the cleared flight level with the 
B767 crew at that time, but he unintentionally assigned FL300. 
The additional coordination and TAAATS entries associated 
with those aircraft that had been provided with a shorter track 
increased the controller‟s workload and may have distracted him 
as he was trying to assist them in their important task. It is also 
possible that the controller may not have detected the incorrect 
level assignment of FL300 because the level read back by the 
pilot phonologically matched the information stored in the 
controller's short-term memory; he may not have consciously 
processed the assigned flight level information in the read-back 
provided by the crew of the B767. 
Mismanaging of the 
movement of a 
flap/slats and a 
landing gear lever 
[51] 
The PIC immediately called for the flaps to be re-positioned, but 
the copilot selected the landing gear up. The actions of the 
copilot appear to have been an `action slip‟, a type of procedural 
error associated with two actions (landing gear and flaps/slats 
retraction) that are sequentially linked. As was the case here, in 
human behaviour there can sometimes be a `spill-over‟ that 
triggers the associated action at an inappropriate time. There 
may have been other inappropriate/inadvertent flap/slat 
selections in B717 aircraft. 
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Rely on the flight 
management system 
[52] 
The pilot relies on the information provided by the flight 
management system. He did not pursue further checking from 
the air traffic controller. 
 
 
